SHRIVER, JERRY MICHAEL "MAD DOG" Compiled by Task Force Omega Inc

SYNOPSIS MACV-SOG, or Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, was a joint service unconventional warfare task force engaged in highly classified operations throughout Southeast Asia. The 5th Special Forces channeled personnel into MACV-SOG (though it was not a Special Forces group) through Special Operations Augmentation (SOA), which provided their "cover" while under secret orders to MACV-SOG. These teams performed deep penetration missions of strategic reconnaissance and interdiction that were called, depending on the location and time frame, "Shining Brass," "Daniel Boone," "Salem House" or "Prairie Fire" missions.

During 1968 and early 1969, CCS had been inserting 6-man reconnaissance patrols into the Fish Hook border area between South Vietnam and Cambodia. The hard reality was due to the intense enemy presence continuously operating in the region, if a patrol could be inserted and stay on the ground undetected for three days, it was very lucky. Many teams were discovered within 30 minutes of insertion and forced to be extracted under fire shortly thereafter. Another major factor faced by reconnaissance teams, including the Hatchet Force, was locating an unguarded landing zone (LZ). Locating one large enough for a single helicopter insertion was one thing, however, finding an unguarded LZ large enough to accommodate four helicopters was quite another.

To shift the balance of power and disrupt the NVA's influence in the region, a direct attack on the North Vietnamese headquarters for operations in South Vietnam known as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) was developed by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The headquarters bunker complex was located just a mile inside Cambodia in the Fish Hook area; approximately 14 miles southeast of Memot, Cambodia; 20 miles southeast of Quan Loi and 28 miles northeast of Tay Ninh, South Vietnam.

After receiving his mission days before the Hatchet Force was to be inserted, Lt. Col. Earl Trabue, Commander of Command and Control South, informed OP-35, MACV-SOG in his opinion their plan to attack the COSVN complex was not viable. The plan included the Hatchet Force snatching NVA prisoners as well as reporting on the effects of a B-52 Arc Light air strike against the COSVN complex that was also going to be used to cover the team's insertion. Lt. Col. Trabue fully understood the complexities of the mission and believed it to be too dangerous to insert only an augmented platoon and should be cancelled. Further, he believed the B-52 Arc Light air strike would not stun the enemy as projected.

The size of the Hatchet Force was limited as only 9 US Army Huey helicopters assigned to the 195th Assault Helicopter Company were available for the 10 minute, 20-mile flight from Quan Loi Airfield, MACV-SOG's southern launch site, to the target - 4 Huey transport insertion helicopters supported by 4 Huey gunships and 1 Huey command and control aircraft for directing the overall mission. Because of the flight configuration, only one platoon-sized force could be assigned to this mission.

On 24 April 1969, Capt. William H. O'Rourke, Jr., company commander and ground mission commander; Capt. Paul D. Cahill, assistant ground commander; 1st Lt. Gregory M. Harrigan and 1st Lt. Walter L. Marcantel, then SFC Jerry M. "Mad Dog" Shriver, Hatchet Force exploitation platoon leader; Sgt. Earnest C. Jamison, team medic; and their Montagnard soldiers comprised the augmented Hatchet Force that was to be inserted into Cambodia by helicopter 1½ miles north of the Vietnamese/Cambodian border.

All US Army helicopters were under the operational control of the air commander in the command and control helicopter. The only other air asset assigned to this mission was an Air Force Forward Air Controller (FAC) who was to call for and coordinate fixed wing air assets should their participation be necessary.

Shortly before takeoff at dawn, SFC Shriver boarded the first helicopter. As the aircraft lifted off the ground for the flight, the B-52s were to be making final preparations for their bomb run against COSVN. At the same time the helicopters prepared to takeoff, the Huey carrying Capt. O'Rourke and 5 team members developed mechanical problems and was forced to abort the mission. Because of this, Capt. Cahill, the assistant ground commander, took over the responsibilities of ground commander for the remainder of the mission.

The original plan was for the helicopters to insert the team as the air strike's dust settled. Unfortunately, when the helicopters arrived at the designated coordinates, it was the wrong location. The aircraft flew around for 30 to 45 minutes searching for signs of dry bomb craters, which would mark the correct site. When the pilots finally found three dry ones, the helicopters descended in-trail toward them and landed. After the members of the Hatchet Force leaped off, the helicopters' pulled up and away from the landing zone (LZ) for their return flight to Quan Loi.

MAJ Ken Landgren SSG James J. Palmer IV aka "JP4" SSgt Obom Bowen CPT (Join to see) LTC Stephen F. SSG Warren Swan PO2 Ed C. SGM David W. Carr LOM, DMSM MP SGT SSgt (Join to see) CPT L SSP5 Michael Rathbun CW5 (Join to see) CW5 Charlie Poulton SMSgt Minister Gerald A. Thomas SGM Mikel Dawson CSM Charles Hayden SGT Benjamin Lindsey SPC Andrew Griffin d SN Greg Wright TSgt Hunter Logan