Posted on Jun 24, 2016
LTC Stephen F.
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Raider Quantrill captures Federal steamboat USS Little Blue near Sibley, Missouri in 1862; John Mosby escapes an ambush in 1863 near Aldie, VA; Skirmishes between the Army of Northern Virginia and Federal Forces in Pennsylvania during the Gettysburg Campaign of 1863.
An Ode to “hardtack” in 1863: Osborn Oldroyd of the 20th Ohio Infantry, just outside of Vicksburg, writes in his journal about being issued rations, and holds forth on the subject of hardtack---the infamous, hard, unleavened cracker issued by the Army as the bread ration to soldiers: “When hard tack was first issued there was but one way to eat it, and that was dry, just as it reached us. Practice, however, taught us to prepare a variety of dishes from it. The most palatable way to dispose of hard tack, to my taste, is to pulverize, then soak overnight, and fry for breakfast as batter-cakes. Another good way is to soak whole, and then fry; and still another is to soak a little, then lay it by the fire and let grease drop on it from toasted meat, held to the fire on a pointed stick. This latter is the most common way on a march. Sometimes the tack is very hard indeed by the time it reaches us, and it requires some knack to break it. I have frequently seen boys break it over their knees. Just raise your foot up so as to bring the bent knee handy, and then fetch your hard tack down on it with your right hand, with all the force you can spare, and, if not too tough, you may break it in two. But one poor fellow I saw was completely exhausted trying to break a hard tack, and after resorting to all the devices he could think of, finally accomplished it by dropping on it a 12-pound shell. The objection to that plan was, however, that the fellow could hardly find his hard tack afterward.”
Young woman traumatized at sudden and bloody death in their yard in 1863: Greencastle, Pennsylvania. When the Confederate forces had moved a few hundred yards beyond the Fleming house, Federal “Captain Boyd and a number of his men came out of hiding in a small woods then on the right side of the road, and extending on its far side to the Cumberland Valley Railroad tracks. Sgt. Milton S. Cafferty and Cpl. William H. Rihl were evidently in the lead. The group was surprised, however, to find themselves within pistol range of the concealed enemy, and fell back toward their main column when Corporal Rihl was shot from his horse and Sergeant Cafferty was struck in the leg. … The Fleming family must surely have come out of the house to look over the situation, and Miss Mary Fleming, who had come so near death herself a bit earlier, might well have been, as one account has it, “the first person at the side of the young martyr to liberty.” It must have been a horrifying day for her, as Corporal Rihl was shot in the head, “the ball entering his upper lip and passing out through the upper part of the skull,” and in another version, “the blood bespattering the paling fence.”
Rebels charge through woods, fields, and swamps toward prepared Federal soldiers in 1864: Battle of Kolb's Farm, Georgia. Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston sent Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood´s 13,000 troops down Powder Springs Road to stop the Federal army´s threat to his flank. When Confederate skirmishers encountered Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker´s 11,000-man Union Corps at Kolb’s Farm, Hood ordered his troops to attack. Hooker, having learned of Hood´s plans from some captured Confederates, ordered his troops to dig in. At 4:00 p.m. Hood sent two of his three divisions towards the waiting Federals. After several unsuccessful charges through the woods, fields, and swamps across the road, the battered Confederates withdrew.
Pictures: 1864-06-22 Battle of Kolb’s Farm Kennesaw Mountain, GA Map; 1862-06-22 Civil War Hospital; 1863 Gettysburg Campaign Map; William Clark Quantrill

A. 1862: Sibley, Missouri. William Quantrill and a band of Confederate raiders were nearing the town of Sibley. While on the Missouri River, they spotted the steamboat USS Little Blue. They quickly captured the steamboat, threatening the 40 sick and wounded Union soldiers onboard. The Confederates gathered up all of the military supplies that they could carry and soon left
B. 1863: Attempt to ambush CSA Raider Major John S. Mosby fails near Aldie, VA. “I sent 40 mounted men (all I have) and 100 infantry, who succeeded in posting themselves in ambush at the designated spot. Sure enough, Mr. Mosby, together with 30 of his followers, made their appearance about sunrise, but, I regret to say, their exit also, from what I can learn, through the fault both of foot and horse. It appears Mosby saw the cavalry, and immediately charged them. They ran (that is, my horses) toward the infantry, posted behind a fence. The infantry, instead of rising and deliberately delivering their fire, fired lying on the ground; did not hit a rebel, who immediately scattered and dispersed, and thus the prettiest chance in the world to dispose of Mr. Mosby was lost.”
Background: Raiding supply lines and disrupting communication was Major John S. Mosby business. By June 1863 he was already the most prominent Confederate partisan ranger. And the Federals would sleep much better if he were put out of business. Major-General George Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps, attempted just that on this day (June 22) in 1863. From correspondence from Meade to General Oliver O. Howard, commanding the nearby Eleventh Corps: “I came near catching our friend Mosby this morning. I had reliable intelligence of his expected passing a place about 4 miles from here at sunrise.”
The troops Meade used were from the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry and 14th U.S. Infantry. The location was Ewell’s Chapel, as Meade indicated, about four miles south of Aldie. One man killed in the action, Sergeant Martin Aumiller, may still remain at the chapel site, in an umarked grave.
C. 1864: Battle of Kolb's Farm, Georgia. Federal tactical victory that Sherman could not exploit to envelop the confederate positions. Having encountered entrenched Rebels astride Kennesaw Mountain stretching southward, William T. Sherman fixed them in front and extended his right wing to envelop their flank and menace the railroad. CSA Gen Joe Johnston countered by moving CSA Lt Gen John B. Hood’s corps from the left flank to the right on June 22. Arriving in his new position at Mt. Zion Church, Hood decided, on his own, to attack. Warned of Hood’s intentions, Union generals Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield and Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker entrenched. Union artillery and swampy terrain thwarted Hood’s attack and forced him to withdraw with costly casualties. Although the victor, Sherman’s attempts at envelopment had momentarily failed.
During the early afternoon of June 22, Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, commanding one of Hood's divisions, advanced his division from its campsite near Mt. Zion Church towards Kolb's Farm, which lay on the south side of the Powder Springs Road. Stevenson reported heavy skirmish fire from what turned out to be two Federal regiments, the 14th Kentucky Infantry and 123rd New York Infantry. Shortly afterward, Hood ordered his entire corps—the divisions of Stevenson, Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, and Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman—to advance west along the Powder Springs Road, driving the Federals before them. Apparently Hood believed one of two things: 1) he had passed beyond the Federals' far right flank and was in an excellent position to "roll them up" by attacking west and then north or 2) that the Federal troops in the area were deployed in marching columns and were thus vulnerable to attack. Confederate cavalry forces in the area reported the presence of considerable Federal infantry in the area, not just the two outpost regiments encountered by Stevenson, but this information did not reach Hood in time; nor, given Hood's penchant for aggressive action, is it likely that this information would have changed his mind even if he had received it in a more timely fashion.
Hood's corps was deployed with Stevenson's division astride the Powder Springs Road (two brigades north of it and two brigades south of it) and Hindman's north of it; Stewart's division remained behind Stevenson's to provide support if needed. Hood's entire corps, including artillery, numbered around 14,000 men.
D. 1864: Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road, Virginia: CSA Third Corps division commander William “Little Billy” Mahone’s devastating attack routs the Federal II Corps. After the maneuvering of June 21 by the Union II and VI Corps, the actions of June 22 would become decidedly more deadly. Wright’s VI Corps was assigned the task of advancing on the Weldon Railroad near Globe Tavern. The II Corps would act as the connector between the V Corps lines and the VI Corps advance. This proved to be not only troublesome, but resulted in a disaster.
As Wright moved west to the Weldon Railroad, the II Corps was supposed to swing like a gate, keeping contact with the stationary V Corps on its right and the advancing VI Corps on its left. However, the Union commanders had poor maps and were advancing through heavily wooded terrain. To make matters even worse, there were no really good roads other than the one which led west to Globe Tavern. The II Corps would be advancing cross country. As the VI Corps advanced and the distance between the VI and V Corps grew steadily wider, the II Corps couldn’t stay connected to both. Meade directed Francis Barlow, in charge of the leftmost II Corps division, to keep connected to the rest of the II Corps and refuse his left flank. Wright’s VI Corps would be unsupported.
Interestingly, it wasn’t Wright who ran into trouble on June 22. Barlow and the rest of the II Corps would pay the price for the hole which had opened. Confederate Third Corps division commander William “Little Billy” Mahone was about to have the first of many good days at the Siege of Petersburg, in no small part due to the fact that he knew the terrain extremely well. He had been chief civil engineer of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. Mahone put his knowledge of the terrain to good use, utilizing a ravine which ran due south of the Confederate fortifications to get into a position to attack Barlow’s left flank undetected (see both maps connected to this story to visualize Mahone’s initial attacking position).
Mahone’s men hit Barlow’s Division like a sledgehammer that afternoon, getting in behind the Second Corps men in wooded terrain and bagging thousands of prisoners. Before the attack was complete, the Second Corps had been driven all the way back to their entrenchments along Jerusalem Plank Road, and four cannon had been captured. This was a noteworthy event, because it was the first time ANY artillery piece belonging to the Second Corps had been taken forcefully from that organization in combat in the entire Civil War to that point. The Second Corps held at Jerusalem Plank Road and even half-heartedly counterattacked locally, but the damage was done. As the Second Corps strengthened their works that night, Mahone went back the way he had come, with many prisoners in tow.
Wilcox’s Third Corps division supported Mahone’s initial attack, but was not heavily engaged. They were expected to keep an eye on the Sixth Corps and prevent any interference with Mahone’s advance. They were successful in this and also prevented Wright from reaching the Weldon Railroad. The Union forces had tried to reach one of Lee’s vital supply lines, and he had hit back hard.

Colonel John S. Mosby's Confederate Cavalry Rangers - A Civil War History
The 43rd Battalion, Virginia Cavalry, also known as Mosby's Rangers, Mosby's Raiders, or Mosby's Men, was a battalion of partisan cavalry in the Confederate army during the American Civil War. Noted for their lightning strike raids on Union targets and their ability to consistently elude pursuit, the Rangers disrupted Union communications and supply lines. By the summer of 1864, Mosby's battalion had grown to six cavalry companies and one artillery company, comprising about 400 men. The battalion never formally surrendered, but was disbanded on April 21, 1865 - after Lee’s Surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox.
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Poor maps and difficult terrain result in disaster for the Federal II Corps in Petersburg Campaign in 1864. Communication problems for the Federal soldiers making a difficult series of maneuvers combined with the fog of war allowed a Confederate division to roll up and route a Union Corps.
Below are a number of journal entries from 1863 and xx which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly.
Monday, June 22, 1863: Louis Lėon, of the 53rd North Carolina Infantry, marching with Ewell’s Corps, notes the events of the march in his journal, as they pass Greencastle, Pennsylvania: “Left this morning at 8 o’clock, got to Middleburg, Pa., at11, passed through it, and got to Green Castle at half past one. Eleven miles to-day. The people seemed downhearted, and showed their hatred to us by their glum looks and silence, and I am willing to swear that no prayers will be offered in this town for us poor, ragged rebels.”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+22%2C+1863]
Monday, June 22, 1863: Lt. Col. Arthur Fremantle, of Her Majesty’s Coldstream Guards, has attached himself to the Army of Northern Virginia for the purpose of observation. He writes in his diary about his ride this day with Pender’s division of A. P. Hill’s Corps: “We started without food or corn at 6.30 a.m., and soon became entangled with Pender's Division on its line of march, which delayed us a good deal. My poor brute of a horse also took this opportunity of throwing two more shoes, which we found it impossible to replace, all the blacksmiths' shops having been pressed by the troops.
The soldiers of this Division are a remarkably fine body of men, and look quite seasoned and ready for any work. Their clothing is serviceable, so also are their boots; but there is the usual utter absence of uniformity as to colour and shape of their garments and hats: grey of all shades, and brown clothing, with felt hats, predominate. The Confederate troops are now entirely armed with excellent rifles, mostly Enfields. When they first turned out, they were in the habit of wearing numerous revolvers and bowie-knives. General Lee is said to have mildly remarked, "Gentlemen, I think you will find an Enfield rifle, a bayonet, and sixty rounds of ammunition, as much as you can conveniently carry in the way of arms." They laughed, and thought they knew better; but the six-shooters and bowie-knives gradually disappeared; and now none are to be seen among the infantry. . . .
I saw no stragglers during the time I was with Pender's Division; but although the Virginian army certainly does get over a deal of ground, yet they move at a slow dragging pace, and are evidently not good marchers naturally. As Mr Norris observed to me, "Before this war we were a lazy set of devils; our niggers worked for us, and none of us ever dreamt of walking, though we all rode a great deal."

Pictures: 1864-06-22 Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road June 22; 1864-06-22 battle of Kolb’s Farm; 1864-06-21 Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road; CSA Brig. Gen. William Mahone

A. Sunday, June 22, 1862: Sibley, Missouri. William Quantrill and a band of Confederate raiders were nearing the town of Sibley. While on the Missouri River, they spotted the steamboat USS Little Blue. They quickly captured the steamboat, threatening the 40 sick and wounded Union soldiers onboard. The Confederates gathered up all of the military supplies that they could carry and soon left.
B. Monday, June 22, 1863: Attempt to ambush CSA Raider Major John S. Mosby fails near Aldie, VA.
Raiding supply lines and disrupting communication was Major John S. Mosby business. By June 1863 he was already the most prominent Confederate partisan ranger. And the Federals would sleep much better if he were put out of business. Major-General George Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps, attempted just that on this day (June 22) in 1863. From correspondence from Meade to General Oliver O. Howard, commanding the nearby Eleventh Corps: “I came near catching our friend Mosby this morning. I had reliable intelligence of his expected passing a place about 4 miles from here at sunrise. I sent 40 mounted men (all I have) and 100 infantry, who succeeded in posting themselves in ambush at the designated spot. Sure enough, Mr. Mosby, together with 30 of his followers, made their appearance about sunrise, but, I regret to say, their exit also, from what I can learn, through the fault both of foot and horse. It appears Mosby saw the cavalry, and immediately charged them. They ran (that is, my horses) toward the infantry, posted behind a fence. The infantry, instead of rising and deliberately delivering their fire, fired lying on the ground; did not hit a rebel, who immediately scattered and dispersed, and thus the prettiest chance in the world to dispose of Mr. Mosby was lost.”
The troops Meade used were from the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry and 14th U.S. Infantry. The location was Ewell’s Chapel, as Meade indicated, about four miles south of Aldie. One man killed in the action, Sergeant Martin Aumiller, may still remain at the chapel site, in an umarked grave.
This sensitivity to the operations of Mosby underscores another issue facing the Army of the Potomac while operating in Loudoun and surrounding counties. The only rail line remaining in the area, the Orange & Alexandria, ran to the southwest. So the army needed clear, secure roads for supply routes. In the operational area I’m considering for these posts, there were three turnpikes the army could draw upon – The Warrenton Turnpike, The Little River Turnpike (which became the Ashby’s Gap Turnpike past Aldie), and the Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike. I’ve added them in gold for today’s map, along with the general location of Ewell’s Chapell for reference.
The wide area the Army of the Potomac occupied also strained communication. On the letter to Howard, Meade added “- I don’t know what we are going to do. I have had no communications from headquarters for three days.” So Meade, commanded an infantry corps on the front line, at a critical sector. Some of his troops fought in Loudoun Valley. And he had received no communications. (Although I’d point out Meade had received instructions to support the Cavalry a few days earlier, though indirectly.)
However, the army headquarters was communicating instructions to the engineers at Edwards Ferry. Chief of Staff Major-General Daniel Butterfield asked if Captain Charles Turnbull could put a bridge over Goose Creek near its mouth. Butterfield also inquired about blazing a road from the pontoon bridge to the camps of Howard’s Eleventh Corps. The bridge and road were logical additions to allow Howard, at a rather remote location, to draw supplies from across the Potomac. The additions would also allow for rapid movement of that corps should Hooker decide to move across the Potomac, which was a growing possibility on June 22. Butterfield also noted that “General Wadsworth is bridging Goose Creek near the pike,” but was not specific to the location or construction. I’ve placed a small blue line on the map with my guess Wadsworth’s bridge was at the site of the turnpike bridge.
For June 22, the Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac was short: The Cavalry Corps and Barnes’ (First) division, of the Fifth Corps, returned from Upperville to Aldie. Stahel’s cavalry division moved from Buckland Mills, via New Baltimore, to Warrenton. The Army of the Potomac was like a coiled spring. Waiting.
C. Wednesday, June 22, 1864: Battle of Kolb's Farm, Georgia. Federal tactical victory that Sherman could not exploit to envelop the confederate positions. Having encountered entrenched Rebels astride Kennesaw Mountain stretching southward, William T. Sherman fixed them in front and extended his right wing to envelop their flank and menace the railroad. CSA Gen Joe Johnston countered by moving CSA Lt Gen John B. Hood’s corps from the left flank to the right on June 22. Arriving in his new position at Mt. Zion Church, Hood decided, on his own, to attack. Warned of Hood’s intentions, Union generals Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield and Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker entrenched. Union artillery and swampy terrain thwarted Hood’s attack and forced him to withdraw with costly casualties. Although the victor, Sherman’s attempts at envelopment had momentarily failed.
During the early afternoon of June 22, Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, commanding one of Hood's divisions, advanced his division from its campsite near Mt. Zion Church towards Kolb's Farm, which lay on the south side of the Powder Springs Road. Stevenson reported heavy skirmish fire from what turned out to be two Federal regiments, the 14th Kentucky Infantry and 123rd New York Infantry. Shortly afterward, Hood ordered his entire corps—the divisions of Stevenson, Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, and Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman—to advance west along the Powder Springs Road, driving the Federals before them. Apparently Hood believed one of two things: 1) he had passed beyond the Federals' far right flank and was in an excellent position to "roll them up" by attacking west and then north or 2) that the Federal troops in the area were deployed in marching columns and were thus vulnerable to attack. Confederate cavalry forces in the area reported the presence of considerable Federal infantry in the area, not just the two outpost regiments encountered by Stevenson, but this information did not reach Hood in time; nor, given Hood's penchant for aggressive action, is it likely that this information would have changed his mind even if he had received it in a more timely fashion.
Hood's corps was deployed with Stevenson's division astride the Powder Springs Road (two brigades north of it and two brigades south of it) and Hindman's north of it; Stewart's division remained behind Stevenson's to provide support if needed. Hood's entire corps, including artillery, numbered around 14,000 men.
On the Federal side, Hooker had received prior warning of Hood's advance, and had begun to entrench his corps in order to receive it. Like Hood, Hooker's XX Corps consisted of three divisions, under Maj. Gens. John W. Geary, Alpheus S. Williams, and Daniel Butterfield. Williams's division was placed astride of the Powder Springs Road, and thus would receive the brunt of the coming attack. Geary's division was positioned on Williams's left, and Butterfield's division was on Geary's left, in reserve. Hooker's total force numbered around 15,000 men.
Hood launched his attack sometime after 5:00 p.m. The 14th Kentucky Infantry and 123rd New York Infantry, still on picket duty, received the weight of this initial attack and fell back, although in the process they managed to inflict considerable damage on Stevenson's division, particularly its two leftmost brigades under the commands of Brigadier Generals Alfred Cumming and Edmund Pettus. Consequently, these two brigades were forced to pause after driving back the Federal skirmishers, and thus took no part in the coming attack. As the other half of Stevenson's division emerged from the woods north of the road where it had begun its advance into the more open area around Kolb's Farm, Federal artillery cut into it. Stevenson was forced to withdraw; his division had suffered too many casualties and too much disorganization during its advance. Falling back to a position near a ravine, which was unfortunately caught in an enfilade fire from Federal artillery, resulting in even greater losses, Stevenson held on until nightfall then withdrew east.
Meanwhile, Hindman's attack fared even worse; a patch of marshy ground in the area complicated his advance, and he was forced to withdraw after sustaining heavy casualties from Federal artillery. According to Williams' account, Hindman's division was repulsed by artillery alone, Williams's infantry having taken no part in the fighting in that area.
Total Confederate casualties in the battle, which one historian referred to as "more a one-sided slaughter than a battle" were approximately 1,500 men. Of this amount, two-thirds were suffered by Stevenson's division alone. The Federals suffered less than a third of that number, around 350 casualties, with many of them coming in the 123rd New York (48 casualties) and the 14th Kentucky (70 casualties).
D. Wednesday, June 22, 1864: Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road, Virginia: CSA Third Corps division commander William “Little Billy” Mahone’s devastating attack routs the Federal II Corps. After the maneuvering of June 21 by the Union II and VI Corps, the actions of June 22 would become decidedly more deadly. Wright’s VI Corps was assigned the task of advancing on the Weldon Railroad near Globe Tavern. The II Corps would act as the connector between the V Corps lines and the VI Corps advance. This proved to be not only troublesome, but resulted in a disaster.
As Wright moved west to the Weldon Railroad, the II Corps was supposed to swing like a gate, keeping contact with the stationary V Corps on its right and the advancing VI Corps on its left. However, the Union commanders had poor maps and were advancing through heavily wooded terrain. To make matters even worse, there were no really good roads other than the one which led west to Globe Tavern. The II Corps would be advancing cross country. As the VI Corps advanced and the distance between the VI and V Corps grew steadily wider, the II Corps couldn’t stay connected to both. Meade directed Francis Barlow, in charge of the leftmost II Corps division, to keep connected to the rest of the II Corps and refuse his left flank. Wright’s VI Corps would be unsupported.
Interestingly, it wasn’t Wright who ran into trouble on June 22. Barlow and the rest of the II Corps would pay the price for the hole which had opened. Confederate Third Corps division commander William “Little Billy” Mahone was about to have the first of many good days at the Siege of Petersburg, in no small part due to the fact that he knew the terrain extremely well. He had been chief civil engineer of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. Mahone put his knowledge of the terrain to good use, utilizing a ravine which ran due south of the Confederate fortifications to get into a position to attack Barlow’s left flank undetected (see both maps connected to this story to visualize Mahone’s initial attacking position).
Mahone’s men hit Barlow’s Division like a sledgehammer that afternoon, getting in behind the Second Corps men in wooded terrain and bagging thousands of prisoners. Before the attack was complete, the Second Corps had been driven all the way back to their entrenchments along Jerusalem Plank Road, and four cannon had been captured. This was a noteworthy event, because it was the first time ANY artillery piece belonging to the Second Corps had been taken forcefully from that organization in combat in the entire Civil War to that point. The Second Corps held at Jerusalem Plank Road and even half-heartedly counterattacked locally, but the damage was done. As the Second Corps strengthened their works that night, Mahone went back the way he had come, with many prisoners in tow.
Wilcox’s Third Corps division supported Mahone’s initial attack, but was not heavily engaged. They were expected to keep an eye on the Sixth Corps and prevent any interference with Mahone’s advance. They were successful in this and also prevented Wright from reaching the Weldon Railroad. The Union forces had tried to reach one of Lee’s vital supply lines, and he had hit back hard.

1. Sunday, June 22, 1862: Governor Jackson moved out of Booneville, Missouri and travelled further south in the state.
[historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-june-1861/]
2. Monday, June 22, 1863: Skirmish at Greencastle, Pennsylvania. In the meantime, the chief part of the Confederate Army had crossed the river at Shepherdstown and Williamsport. Gen. R. S. Ewell’s corps followed that of Gen. A. P. Hill and was in turn followed by Gen. James Longstreet’s corps. Leaving Hagerstown early on Monday, June 22, Jenkins, who had scouted this country a few days earlier, led the way, cautiously sending out advance detachments to guard against surprise attack. About noon they were within half a mile of Greencastle, and a reconnoitering party was sent from there to Marion, at which place they’ cap­tured a Union soldier, D. K. Appenzeller, who had just returned from service with the 126th Pennsylvania Volunteers. In his book, The Great Invasion of 1863, Jacob Hoke tells us that “After his capture, Mr. Appen­zeller was closely questioned as to the number of troops then at Chambersburg. Having been in the latter place a day or two previously, and having heard a rumor that General D. N. Couch was coming from Harrisburg with a force of 20,000 men, he repeated this story to them. They at once fell back to the main body, and in the hearing of Mr. Appenzeller communi­cated this intelligence to those in command.
About this time a company of the First New York (Lincoln) Cavalry in command of Capt. William H. Boyd, and composed of some 43 men, dashed into view. They were in hot pursuit of a scouting party attached to Jenkin’s Brigade. For a week or more Boyd’s men had ranged as far away as Fulton County, harrassing the advance and flanks of the advancing Confederates, and their sudden and bold appearance caused tremendous excitement. No doubt it was thought that they were the advance guard of General Couch’s 20,000 men, and a line of battle was at once hastily formed.
Artillery was placed on Shook’s Hill and in a field nearby at the north end of town, and fences were torn down on both sides of the Chambersburg road. Gen. R. E. Rodes’s infantry took a strategic position upon the high ground about a quarter of a mile beyond the artillery, and Jenkins, according to Hoke, “threw his cavalry forward and formed a skirmish line upon the land of Mr. William Fleming about a quarter of a mile from the infantry. General Jenkins established his head­quarters in Mr. Fleming’s house. As soon as the Union cavalry came within range of their guns, fire was opened upon them, and for a time the noise and clatter were lively. A sister of Mr. Fleming going to a window to look out, barely escaped a ball which came crashing in the glass right beside her head.”
When the Confederate forces had moved a few hundred yards beyond the Fleming house, Captain Boyd and a number of his men came out of hiding in a small woods then on the right side of the road, and extending on its far side to the Cumberland Valley Railroad tracks. Sgt. Milton S. Cafferty and Cpl. William H. Rihl were evidently in the lead. The group was surprised, however, to find themselves within pistol range of the concealed enemy, and fell back toward their main column when Corporal Rihl was shot from his horse and Sergeant Cafferty was struck in the leg. According to Hoke, the Confederates, fearing that this withdrawal was “a Yankee trick to draw them into an ambuscade, did not pursue.” Appenzeller, interviewed by Hoke after the war, said “that of all the fearless soldiers he ever saw – and he saw manyand had large experience during the war – these New York cavalrymen exceeded any in these qualities. And if they had gone but a short distance further they’ would have come into a crossfire which would have swept them all away. Their foresight and understand­ing, however, were equal to their courage, and they knew when to stop. Their escape must have been across the railroad tracks and through the fields.
There is no mention of the skirmish among the official records of the war, and the accounts of events immediately afterward vary somewhat, but it is certain that the body of the first Union soldier killed on Union soil was buried later that day by a Confederate burial detail in the field where he fell. The Fleming family must surely have come out of the house to look over the situation, and Miss Mary Fleming, who had come so near death herself a bit earlier, might well have been, as one account has it, “the first person at the side of the young martyr to liberty.” It must have been a horrifying day for her, as Corporal Rihl was shot in the head, “the ball entering his upper lip and passing out through the upper part of the skull,” and in another version, “the blood bespattering the paling fence.” A story prevalent at the time, that there were two Con­federate casualties, was certainly false.
A few days later “General” David Detrich and his son, Jere, local undertakers, with the assistance of a number of other citizens, took up the remains and buried them in the Lutheran graveyard. A service was conducted by the Lutheran and German Reformed ministers. Sergeant Cafferty was attended by a local doctor and, until his recovery, lived in the nearby home of George Ilginfritz, a weaver. The fine home-spun coverlets and blankets made by that hospitable family are still treasured in the community.
[threedaysatgettysburg.historicalblogs.com/index.php/rebs-march-through-greencastle/]
3. Monday, June 22, 1863: Skirmish at Monterey, Pennsylvania]
[emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/civil_war/engagements_in_the_emmitsburg_area.htm
4. Monday, June 22, 1863 --- A Democrat newspaper in Seneca County, New York, publishes this editorial that takes it rather ill that the Lincoln government is apparently concealing bad news from the Northern public: “The news from Virginia is startling. The Confederate army under LEE has abandoned Fredericksburg, crossed the Rappahannock, and, appearances indicate that they have determined on an invasion of the North. – In the absence of all intelligence from Washington it is difficult to tell what is going on. It is certain, however, that a part of LEE’s forces appeared in the Shenandoah Valley during the latter part of last week, and that on Friday last they attacked Gen. MILROY at Winchester, defeating and driving him from that place with great loss of life. Gen. MILROY admits a loss of 2,000 killed and wounded. His force was 10,000 strong. All his artillery was captured by the enemy. . . .
During all these disasters to our armies, we have heard nothing from “Fighting Joe Hooker,” though it is stated that his army has fallen back upon Washington. Gen LEE seems to be doing pretty much as he pleases, having out-generaled Hooker at all points. The refusal of the Washington authorities to permit anything to come over the wires has filled the public mind with alarm.”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+22%2C+1863]
5. Monday, June 22, 1863: Greencastle, Pennsylvania - On June 22, a detachment of Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins's cavalry and Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes' infantry moved ahead to a position near Greencastle. Greencastle was located between Chambersburg and Hagerstown. When they arrived, they encountered a group of Union soldiers belonging to the 71st New York Militia. The Confederates overwhelmed the Federals and drove them away.
[mycivilwar.com/battles/1863s.html]
6. Monday, June 22, 1863: Skirmish at Greencastle, Pennsylvania
[emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/civil_war/engagements_in_the_emmitsburg_area.htm]
7. Monday, June 22, 1863 --- Siege of Vicksburg, Day 31
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+22%2C+1863]
8. Monday, June 22, 1863 --- Siege of Port Hudson, Day 26
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+22%2C+1863]
9. Monday, June 22, 1863 --- The Richmond Daily Dispatch reports that Vicksburg repulsed a massive assault by Federal troops on the Confederate fortifications. There seems to be no record of a Federal assault on Vicksburg for that date, other than a massive artillery duel. False alarms and inflated reports of rumors of fights is apparently stock-in-trade for the newspapers of the day.
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+22%2C+1863]
10. Monday, June 22, 1863 --- The Bermuda Royal Gazette reports today that Clement Vallandigham, the recalcitrant former Ohio congressman exiled by the U.S. Government, arrives in Bermuda via the blockade runner Lady Davis. It is reported that the Copperhead celebrity intends on traveling to Canada.
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+22%2C+1863]
11. Monday, June 22, 1863 --- Osborn Oldroyd of the 20th Ohio Infantry, just outside of Vicksburg, writes in his journal about being issued rations, and holds forth on the subject of hardtack---the infamous, hard, unleavened cracker issued by the Army as the bread ration to soldiers: “When hard tack was first issued there was but one way to eat it, and that was dry, just as it reached us. Practice, however, taught us to prepare a variety of dishes from it. The most palatable way to dispose of hard tack, to my taste, is to pulverize, then soak over night, and fry for breakfast as batter-cakes. Another good way is to soak whole, and then fry; and still another is to soak a little, then lay it by the fire and let grease drop on it from toasted meat, held to the fire on a pointed stick. This latter is the most common way on a march. Sometimes the tack is very hard indeed by the time it reaches us, and it requires some knack to break it. I have frequently seen boys break it over their knees. Just raise your foot up so as to bring the bent knee handy, and then fetch your hard tack down on it with your right hand, with all the force you can spare, and, if not too tough, you may break it in two. But one poor fellow I saw was completely exhausted trying to break a hard tack, and after resorting to all the devices he could think of, finally accomplished it by dropping on it a 12-pound shell. The objection to that plan was, however, that the fellow could hardly find his hard tack afterward.”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+22%2C+1863]
12. Monday, June 22, 1863 --- Louis Lėon, of the 53rd North Carolina Infantry, marching with Ewell’s Corps, notes the events of the march in his journal, as they pass Greencastle, Pennsylvania: “Left this morning at 8 o’clock, got to Middleburg, Pa., at11, passed through it, and got to Green Castle at half past one. Eleven miles to-day. The people seemed downhearted, and showed their hatred to us by their glum looks and silence, and I am willing to swear that no prayers will be offered in this town for us poor, ragged rebels.”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+22%2C+1863]
13. Monday, June 22, 1863 --- Lt. Col. Arthur Fremantle, of Her Majesty’s Coldstream Guards, has attached himself to the Army of Northern Virginia for the purpose of observation. He writes in his diary about his ride this day with Pender’s division of A. P. Hill’s Corps: “We started without food or corn at 6.30 a.m., and soon became entangled with Pender's Division on its line of march, which delayed us a good deal. My poor brute of a horse also took this opportunity of throwing two more shoes, which we found it impossible to replace, all the blacksmiths' shops having been pressed by the troops.
The soldiers of this Division are a remarkably fine body of men, and look quite seasoned and ready for any work. Their clothing is serviceable, so also are their boots; but there is the usual utter absence of uniformity as to colour and shape of their garments and hats: grey of all shades, and brown clothing, with felt hats, predominate. The Confederate troops are now entirely armed with excellent rifles, mostly Enfields. When they first turned out, they were in the habit of wearing numerous revolvers and bowie-knives. General Lee is said to have mildly remarked, "Gentlemen, I think you will find an Enfield rifle, a bayonet, and sixty rounds of ammunition, as much as you can conveniently carry in the way of arms." They laughed, and thought they knew better; but the six-shooters and bowie-knives gradually disappeared; and now none are to be seen among the infantry. . . .
I saw no stragglers during the time I was with Pender's Division; but although the Virginian army certainly does get over a deal of ground, yet they move at a slow dragging pace, and are evidently not good marchers naturally. As Mr Norris observed to me, "Before this war we were a lazy set of devils; our niggers worked for us, and none of us ever dreamt of walking, though we all rode a great deal."
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+22%2C+1863]

A Sunday, June 22, 1862: Sibley, Missouri - On June 22, Col. William Quantrill and a band of Confederate raiders were nearing the town of Sibley. While on the Missouri River, they spotted the steamboat USS Little Blue. They quickly captured the steamboat, threatening the 40 sick and wounded Union soldiers onboard. The Confederates gathered up all of the military supplies that they could carry and soon left.
[mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html]
B Monday, June 22, 1863: Raiding supply lines and disrupting communication was Major John S. Mosby business. By June 1863 he was already the most prominent Confederate partisan ranger. And the Federals would sleep much better if he were put out of business. Major-General George Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps, attempted just that on this day (June 22) in 1863. From correspondence from Meade to General Oliver O. Howard, commanding the nearby Eleventh Corps: “I came near catching our friend Mosby this morning. I had reliable intelligence of his expected passing a place about 4 miles from here at sunrise. I sent 40 mounted men (all I have) and 100 infantry, who succeeded in posting themselves in ambush at the designated spot. Sure enough, Mr. Mosby, together with 30 of his followers, made their appearance about sunrise, but, I regret to say, their exit also, from what I can learn, through the fault both of foot and horse. It appears Mosby saw the cavalry, and immediately charged them. They ran (that is, my horses) toward the infantry, posted behind a fence. The infantry, instead of rising and deliberately delivering their fire, fired lying on the ground; did not hit a rebel, who immediately scattered and dispersed, and thus the prettiest chance in the world to dispose of Mr. Mosby was lost.”
The troops Meade used were from the 17th Pennsylvania Cavalry and 14th U.S. Infantry. The location was Ewell’s Chapel, as Meade indicated, about four miles south of Aldie. One man killed in the action, Sergeant Martin Aumiller, may still remain at the chapel site, in an umarked grave.
This sensitivity to the operations of Mosby underscores another issue facing the Army of the Potomac while operating in Loudoun and surrounding counties. The only rail line remaining in the area, the Orange & Alexandria, ran to the southwest. So the army needed clear, secure roads for supply routes. In the operational area I’m considering for these posts, there were three turnpikes the army could draw upon – The Warrenton Turnpike, The Little River Turnpike (which became the Ashby’s Gap Turnpike past Aldie), and the Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike. I’ve added them in gold for today’s map, along with the general location of Ewell’s Chapell for reference.
The wide area the Army of the Potomac occupied also strained communication. On the letter to Howard, Meade added “- I don’t know what we are going to do. I have had no communications from headquarters for three days.” So Meade, commanded an infantry corps on the front line, at a critical sector. Some of his troops fought in Loudoun Valley. And he had received no communications. (Although I’d point out Meade had received instructions to support the Cavalry a few days earlier, though indirectly.)
However, the army headquarters was communicating instructions to the engineers at Edwards Ferry. Chief of Staff Major-General Daniel Butterfield asked if Captain Charles Turnbull could put a bridge over Goose Creek near its mouth. Butterfield also inquired about blazing a road from the pontoon bridge to the camps of Howard’s Eleventh Corps. The bridge and road were logical additions to allow Howard, at a rather remote location, to draw supplies from across the Potomac. The additions would also allow for rapid movement of that corps should Hooker decide to move across the Potomac, which was a growing possibility on June 22. Butterfield also noted that “General Wadsworth is bridging Goose Creek near the pike,” but was not specific to the location or construction. I’ve placed a small blue line on the map with my guess Wadsworth’s bridge was at the site of the turnpike bridge.
For June 22, the Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac was short: The Cavalry Corps and Barnes’ (First) division, of the Fifth Corps, returned from Upperville to Aldie. Stahel’s cavalry division moved from Buckland Mills, via New Baltimore, to Warrenton. The Army of the Potomac was like a coiled spring. Waiting.
[markerhunter.wordpress.com/2013/06/22/]
C Wednesday, June 22, 1864: Battle of Kolb's Farm, Georgia. To prevent Joe Hooker [US] and John Schofield [US] from outflanking the Confederate Army, General John Bell Hood [CS] attacks, without orders.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186406]
C Wednesday, June 22, 1864: Battle of Kolb's Farm, Cobb County, Georgia.
Principal Commanders: Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield and Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker [US]; Lt. Gen. John B. Hood [CS] Forces Engaged: Two corps [US]; Hood s Corps [CS]
Estimated Casualties: 1,350 total (US 350; CS 1,000)
Description: On the night of June 18-19, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, fearing envelopment, moved his army to a new, previously selected position astride Kennesaw Mountain, an entrenched arc-shaped line to the west of Marietta, to protect his supply line, the Western & Atlantic Railroad. Having encountered entrenched Rebels astride Kennesaw Mountain stretching southward, Sherman fixed them in front and extended his right wing to envelop their flank and menace the railroad. Joe Johnston countered by moving John B. Hood’s corps from the left flank to the right on June 22. Arriving in his new position at Mt. Zion Church, Hood decided, on his own, to attack. Warned of Hood’s intentions, Union generals John Schofield and Joseph Hooker entrenched. Union artillery and swampy terrain thwarted Hood’s attack and forced him to withdraw with costly casualties. Although the victor, Sherman’s attempts at envelopment had momentarily failed
[nps.gov/abpp/battles/ga014.htm]
Background: After the Confederate Army of Tennessee, under General Joseph E. Johnston, had settled into the Kennesaw line, consisting principally of the twin elevations of Big Kennesaw Mountain and Little Kennesaw Mountain, on June 19, the pursuing Federal forces under Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman began to probe this new line in search of weak spots. After judging the Kennesaw line to be too strong to take by regular assault—even though he would attempt to do just that five days later—Sherman decided to fix Johnston's line in place with his left wing, the Army of the Tennessee, under Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson, while maneuvering his center and left wing, the Army of the Cumberland, under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, into position to turn Johnston's left flank somewhere south of the Powder Springs Road. In obedience to Sherman's orders, Thomas moved the XX Corps, under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, into the area; Hooker would be supported in this operation by the single-corps Army of the Ohio, under Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, who would guard Hooker's far right.
Johnston correctly anticipated Sherman's movements, and decided to counter them by moving one of his three corps, under Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood, from its reserve position near Marietta south and west along Powder Springs Road to the vicinity of Mt. Zion Church; this would both extend his left and counter Sherman's turning movement. Hood was ordered to pull out of line on June 20 and began the movement on the morning of June 21. His corps passed through Marietta and was in place by June 22.
Battle: During the early afternoon of June 22, Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson, commanding one of Hood's divisions, advanced his division from its campsite near Mt. Zion Church towards Kolb's Farm, which lay on the south side of the Powder Springs Road. Stevenson reported heavy skirmish fire from what turned out to be two Federal regiments, the 14th Kentucky Infantry and 123rd New York Infantry. Shortly afterward, Hood ordered his entire corps—the divisions of Stevenson, Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, and Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman—to advance west along the Powder Springs Road, driving the Federals before them. Apparently Hood believed one of two things: 1) he had passed beyond the Federals' far right flank and was in an excellent position to "roll them up" by attacking west and then north or 2) that the Federal troops in the area were deployed in marching columns and were thus vulnerable to attack. Confederate cavalry forces in the area reported the presence of considerable Federal infantry in the area, not just the two outpost regiments encountered by Stevenson, but this information did not reach Hood in time; nor, given Hood's penchant for aggressive action, is it likely that this information would have changed his mind even if he had received it in a more timely fashion.
Hood's corps was deployed with Stevenson's division astride the Powder Springs Road (two brigades north of it and two brigades south of it) and Hindman's north of it; Stewart's division remained behind Stevenson's to provide support if needed. Hood's entire corps, including artillery, numbered around 14,000 men.
On the Federal side, Hooker had received prior warning of Hood's advance, and had begun to entrench his corps in order to receive it. Like Hood, Hooker's XX Corps consisted of three divisions, under Maj. Gens. John W. Geary, Alpheus S. Williams, and Daniel Butterfield. Williams's division was placed astride of the Powder Springs Road, and thus would receive the brunt of the coming attack. Geary's division was positioned on Williams's left, and Butterfield's division was on Geary's left, in reserve. Hooker's total force numbered around 15,000 men.
Hood launched his attack sometime after 5:00 p.m. The 14th Kentucky Infantry and 123rd New York Infantry, still on picket duty, received the weight of this initial attack and fell back, although in the process they managed to inflict considerable damage on Stevenson's division, particularly its two leftmost brigades under the commands of Brigadier Generals Alfred Cumming and Edmund Pettus. Consequently, these two brigades were forced to pause after driving back the Federal skirmishers, and thus took no part in the coming attack. As the other half of Stevenson's division emerged from the woods north of the road where it had begun its advance into the more open area around Kolb's Farm, Federal artillery cut into it. Stevenson was forced to withdraw; his division had suffered too many casualties and too much disorganization during its advance. Falling back to a position near a ravine, which was unfortunately caught in an enfilade fire from Federal artillery, resulting in even greater losses, Stevenson held on until nightfall then withdrew east.
Meanwhile, Hindman's attack fared even worse; a patch of marshy ground in the area complicated his advance, and he was forced to withdraw after sustaining heavy casualties from Federal artillery. According to Williams' account, Hindman's division was repulsed by artillery alone, Williams's infantry having taken no part in the fighting in that area.
Total Confederate casualties in the battle, which one historian referred to as "more a one-sided slaughter than a battle" were approximately 1,500 men. Of this amount, two-thirds were suffered by Stevenson's division alone. The Federals suffered less than a third of that number, around 350 casualties, with many of them coming in the 123rd New York (48 casualties) and the 14th Kentucky (70 casualties).
[wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kolb%27s_Farm]
D Wednesday, June 22, 1864: Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road, Virginia. The Confederates launched a ferocious attack on Birney’s II Corps at Jerusalem Plank Road. Birney lost 604 killed, 2494 wounded and 1600 captured. The Confederates lost in total 500 men.]
[.historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-june-1864/
D+ Wednesday, June 22, 1864: Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road, Virginia: Mahone’s Devastating Attack Routs the Second Corps
Brief Summary: After the maneuvering of June 21 by the Union Second and Sixth Corps, the actions of June 22 would become decidedly more deadly. Wright’s Sixth Corps was assigned the task of advancing on the Weldon Railroad near Globe Tavern. The Second Corps would act as the connector between the Fifth Corps lines and the Sixth Corps advance. This proved to be not only troublesome, but resulted in a disaster.
As Wright moved west to the Weldon Railroad, the Second Corps was supposed to swing like a gate, keeping contact with the stationary Fifth Corps on its right and the advancing Sixth Corps on its left. However, the Union commanders had poor maps and were advancing through heavily wooded terrain. To make matters even worse, there were no really good roads other than the one which led west to Globe Tavern. The Second Corps would be advancing cross country. As the Sixth Corps advanced and the distance between the Sixth and Fifth Corps grew steadily wider, the Second Corps couldn’t stay connected to both. Meade directed Francis Barlow, in charge of the leftmost Second Corps division, to keep connected to the rest of the Second Corps and refuse his left flank. Wright’s Sixth Corps would be unsupported.
Interestingly, it wasn’t Wright who ran into trouble on June 22. Barlow and the rest of the Second Corps would pay the price for the hole which had opened. Confederate Third Corps division commander William “Little Billy” Mahone was about to have the first of many good days at the Siege of Petersburg, in no small part due to the fact that he knew the terrain extremely well. He had been chief civil engineer of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. Mahone put his knowledge of the terrain to good use, utilizing a ravine which ran due south of the Confederate fortifications to get into a position to attack Barlow’s left flank undetected (see both maps connected to this story to visualize Mahone’s initial attacking position).
Mahone’s men hit Barlow’s Division like a sledgehammer that afternoon, getting in behind the Second Corps men in wooded terrain and bagging thousands of prisoners. Before the attack was complete, the Second Corps had been driven all the way back to their entrenchments along Jerusalem Plank Road, and four cannon had been captured. This was a noteworthy event, because it was the first time ANY artillery piece belonging to the Second Corps had been taken forcefully from that organization in combat in the entire Civil War to that point. The Second Corps held at Jerusalem Plank Road and even half-heartedly counterattacked locally, but the damage was done. As the Second Corps strengthened their works that night, Mahone went back the way he had come, with many prisoners in tow.
Wilcox’s Third Corps division supported Mahone’s initial attack, but was not heavily engaged. They were expected to keep an eye on the Sixth Corps and prevent any interference with Mahone’s advance. They were successful in this and also prevented Wright from reaching the Weldon Railroad. The Union forces had tried to reach one of Lee’s vital supply lines, and he had hit back hard.
The Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road was not finished, however. The next day, Wright would again try to reach the Weldon Railroad…
[beyondthecrater.com/resources/bat-sum/petersburg-siege-sum/second-offensive-summaries/the-battle-of-jerusalem-plank-road-summary/]

D+ Wednesday, June 22, 1864: Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road, Virginia. CSA Brig. Gen. William Mahone had been a railroad engineer before the war and had personally surveyed this area south of Petersburg, so he was familiar with a ravine that could be used to hide the approach of a Confederate attack column. Robert E. Lee approved Mahone's plan and at 3 p.m. on June 22, Mahone's men emerged in the rear of the II Corps division of Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, catching them by surprise. A soldier wrote, "The attack was to the Union troops more than a surprise. It was an astonishment."
With a wild yell which rang out shrill and fierce through the gloomy pines, Mahone's men burst upon the flank—a pealing volley, which roared along the whole front—a stream of wasting fire, under which the adverse left fell as one man—and the bronzed veterans swept forward, shriveling up Barlow's division as lightning shrivels the dead leaves of autumn. Diary of W. Gordon McCabe, artilleryman in Mahone's division.
Barlow's division quickly collapsed under the surprise assault. The division of Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, which had erected earthworks, was also surprised by an attack from the rear and many of the regiments ran for safety. Mahone sent an urgent message to his colleague Wilcox, asking him to join in the attack, but Wilcox was concerned about the VI Corps men to his front and the two regiments he sent in support arrived too late to make a difference. The II Corps troops rallied around earthworks that they had constructed on the night of June 21 and stabilized their lines. Darkness ended the fighting
[wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jerusalem_Plank_Road]
Tour Stop 26: An Impetuous Move at Kolb's Farm in Cobb County, GA
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xA-tXkqmjTQ
FYI SPC Michael Duricko, Ph.D PV2 Larry Sellnow MSG Greg Kelly MSgt Gloria Vance LCpl (Join to see) LTC Greg Henning LTC John Shaw CSM Chuck Stafford CMSgt (Join to see) SPC Mike Bennett LTC Trent Klug SFC William Farrell SGT Jim Arnold SPC Woody Bullard SSG Jeffrey Leake PO3 Edward Riddle 1stSgt Eugene Harless
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SSgt David M.
SSgt David M.
>1 y
What amazes me most is the tactics used by the Confederate Army for most of the Civil War was the REBEL YELL! This tactic was used by the North Korean Army by similarly just making all manner of NOISE to bewilder a larger opponent in battle. The Confederates used NOISE as a way to shake up Union troops and cause wide spread panic in the lines and cause many to run and throw away all their weapons. Fear of the unknown has always been a great weapon if you take full advantage of it at the time. Traveling across any area without good map resources is very poor planning for any Military. Knowing where you are and where you are going are a must but knowing how to get from Point A to Point B is Mandatory for success! ;-) I SALUTE All My Fellow Veterans!!!
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LTC Stephen F.
LTC Stephen F.
>1 y
Thank you my friend SSgt David M. By the way in WWI confederate veterans taught US Army soldiers the rebel yell. Some soldiers in the American Expeditionary Force in WWI wereable to use the rebel yell to create fear in the Germans.
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SSgt David M.
SSgt David M.
>1 y
LTC Stephen F. - I was not aware of it but I am not surprised that it was used. It is a tactic that should be taught in all the Military Academies. This is one tactic that works on any opposing force because it is unexpected and gives the conception of a much larger force. Just my two cents. ;-) I SALUTE All My Fellow Veterans!!!
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SSG Leo Bell
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Thanks for sharing
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LTC Stephen F.
LTC Stephen F.
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You are very welcome my friend SSG Leo Bell
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TSgt Joe C.
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Great reading LTC Stephen F.!
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LTC Stephen F.
LTC Stephen F.
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You are very welcome my fellow civil war appreciating friend and brother-in-Christ TSgt Joe C.
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