What was the most significant event on September 22 during the U.S. Civil War?

In 1862, near Yellow Medicine, Minnesota, Col. Sibley of the U.S. Army and his command were attacked by over 300 Dakota warriors. After a two-hour battle, the Federal troops drove off the attackers, suffering only 4 men dead and about 30 wounded. By best count, the Dakota suffered nearly 10 times that many casualties.
In 1864, the decisive Union victory at the Battle of Fisher’s Hill opened the Shenandoah Valley to the destruction of its agricultural base.
Thursday, September 22, 1864: Battle of Fisher's Hill. FROM AMERICA'S CIVIL WAR MAGAZINE (HISTORYNET.COM) BY JONATHAN A. NOYALES
Background: Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan (Library of Congress) As the shadows began to grow long on September 20, 1864, Union Major General Philip H. Sheridan and his commanders stared at the seemingly impregnable heights of Fisher’s Hill, grandly known as the ‘Gibraltar of the Shenandoah Valley,’ which seemed to be crawling with Lieutenant General Jubal Early’s men.
Fisher’s Hill, just south of Strasburg, was recognized as a defensive key to the lower Valley during the Civil War. Massanutten Mountain stood to the east, while Little North Mountain rose to the west. Those two ridges narrowed the Valley, and the steep slopes of Fisher’s Hill stood roughly in the middle. The hill had a sharp northward-facing slope and a small creek, Tumbling Run, traversing the ground to the north. Officers in both armies knew the site and understood that if defended properly it could be impenetrable. ‘Fisher’s hill is a natural fortification of lofty heights thrown across the Shenandoah Valley at a point where the Massanutten Mountain reduces [it] to a width of barely four miles,’ remarked a staff officer in the Union XIX Corps. Nonetheless, Sheridan knew he had to attack the precipitous slopes — how to do so remained the question.
When Sheridan received command of the Middle Military Division in early August 1864, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant ordered him to ‘give the enemy no rest.’ Grant was disgusted that Early had become such a distraction that summer by marching down the Shenandoah Valley into Maryland and threatening Washington. That campaign had disrupted Grant’s efforts to hammer General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia into submission near Petersburg, and the Yankee commander wanted the troublesome ‘Old Jube’ quieted for good.
But throughout his first month of command of the Army of the Shenandoah, which consisted of the VI Corps, two divisions of the XIX Corps, the VIII Corps and two cavalry divisions, Early’s Army of the Valley — approximately 15,000 men — had kept Sheridan at bay, even though ‘Little Phil’ had some 60,000 men at his disposal. By mid-September, Sheridan had received intelligence from area Unionists and his own scouts that bolstered his confidence and prompted an attack on Early’s Confederates in Winchester on September 19. The Third Battle of Winchester turned out to be an outstanding victory for Sheridan’s army and left Early’s command in chaos. However, Early’s army was not totally demoralized as it retreated south to the fastness of Fisher’s Hill before Sheridan’s pursuit.
Jubal Early (Library of Congress) Early knew the Valley well and understood that Fisher’s Hill afforded the best immediate opportunity to defend against Sheridan. The previous month he had sought refuge at Fisher’s Hill after feeling threatened by Federal forces and was never attacked. Furthermore, Early could not retreat any farther up the Shenandoah Valley without leaving the door wide open for Sheridan to move into the upper valley and carry out his plan to lay waste to the fertile region known as the Confederacy’s ‘breadbasket.’
The battered Confederate force arrived at Fisher’s Hill during the early morning hours of September 20 and by noon had taken up defensive positions facing north to Strasburg. Although the chief engineer of Maj. Gen. William Emory’s XIX Corps had initially deemed the heights ‘inattackable,’ during the afternoon of September 20 the position was in fact extremely vulnerable.
In order to adequately defend Fisher’s Hill, Early needed to have enough troops to stretch out over a four-mile front from Little North Mountain to Massanutten or his flanks would be exposed and susceptible to assault. And there was the rub. A captain in the 13th Virginia succinctly described the Confederate dilemma, saying, ‘The position was a very strong one, but our army was too small to man it.’
In August Early had the ability to defend the position, but by late September he did not. Four thousand of his men had become casualties at Third Winchester, most of whom had been taken prisoner. Orders from the Confederate War Department to move Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge’s troops to the Department of Southwest Virginia further diminished Early’s strength. Early also had to pare off troopers to contend with a Union cavalry threat in the Luray Valley, as the portion of the Shenandoah Valley from Massanutten east to the Blue Ridge was known.
Early attempted to compensate for his lack of troops by strengthening the defenses and using dismounted cavalry, but with Sheridan’s Federals moving in to his front, Early realized the foolishness of his position and thought it best to withdraw. ‘Having discovered that the position could be flanked,’ Early confessed, ‘I had determined to fall back on the night of the 22nd.’ Unfortunately for Early, he would not be given the option to retreat without battle, for the Federals had realized the extent of Early’s problems by late on the night of the 20th.
Little Phil realized a frontal attack was unlikely to succeed and would result in heavy casualties no matter the outcome. He recalled that the ‘enemy’s position at Fisher’s Hill was so strong that a direct assault would entail unnecessary destruction of life, and besides, be of doubtful result.’ The initial meeting of Sheridan and his three corps commanders on September 20 provided no immediate decision. One of the initial plans discussed was an attack against the Confederate right flank, and although VI Corps commander Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright and Emory liked the idea, Brig. Gen. George Crook, Sheridan’s West Point roommate and close friend and the head of the VIII Corps, was not keen on the idea.
Captain Russell Hastings, the adjutant of the 23rd Ohio of Crook’s command, had been wounded on the 19th and was in a hospital in Winchester, but after the fight at Fisher’s Hill, he undoubtedly discussed the battle with those who were there and had access to correspondence related to the engagement. Hastings claimed that Crook suggested a turning movement before the evening meeting. A flank attack on the right would be difficult to conceal from a Confederate signal station atop Massanutten, but an assault against the left end of Early’s line held promise, argued Crook. Sheridan adjourned the meeting and then summoned the commanders later that evening to discuss a turning movement of Early’s left.
Major General George Crook (Library of Congress) Crook sometimes lacked confidence in presenting his opinions verbally, especially to superiors. To bolster his argument and hopefully convince Sheridan at the evening meeting, Crook brought his two division commanders, Colonels Rutherford Hayes and Joseph Thoburn, to Sheridan’s headquarters. Hayes, a Harvard-trained lawyer, was brought along to plead Crook’s case. At the ’somewhat stormy council of war,’ as Hastings later described it, Hayes made a most eloquent appeal to Sheridan to allow Crook to conduct the turning movement against Early’s left flank — just as Crook had done one day earlier at Winchester. General Wright, however, would not hear of it.
Wright, senior to Crook, believed that conducting the flank attack should be his privilege, as it was the post of honor. Some Union officers in Sheridan’s army already had a negative opinion of Wright and saw him as a glory hound who disliked working in conjunction with other commands. When Wright demanded he be given the post of honor, Hayes apparently lambasted him. ‘It is not a question of post of honor,’ Hayes lectured Wright. ‘The question is, how can the battle be fought, and won, at the least loss of life. The success of the Union Arms must not at this time be jeopardized by personal interests.’ Crook suggested that while his men got into position to flank the enemy, the VI and XIX corps could distract the Confederates by moving against Early’s front. Wright was still doing everything he could to block the flank attack plan, and Sheridan was not yet convinced.
Hayes then reminded Sheridan about the fighting experiences of many of the men in Crook’s command and the nature of the ground over which this flank march of nearly a dozen miles would take place — rocky, rugged and mountainous terrain. A large portion of Crook’s corps had fought much of the Civil War in the mountains of western Virginia and the men were simply more accustomed to this sort of terrain; neither the troops of the VI Corps nor the XIX Corps had such experience. An aged fifer in the 13th West Virginia constantly boasted that he ‘was born on the mountain side [and] have always stood sidewise, with one foot higher than the other ever since I can remember.’
Despite Wright’s strong feelings against the attack, Sheridan believed it was the only way to break the Valley’s Gibraltar. After the war ended Sheridan failed to give Crook any credit for devising the plan to crush Early at Fisher’s Hill. ‘I resolved on the night of the 20th,’ Sheridan penned in his memoirs, ‘to use again a turning-column, against his left, as had been done’ at Third Winchester. ‘To this end I resolved to move Crook, unperceived if possible, over to the eastern face of Little North Mountain, whence he could strike the left and rear of the Confederate line.’ Sheridan’s reluctance to credit Crook for his role in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864 marred a four-decades-old friendship.
Other officers, however, did give Crook credit. Chief among them was Hayes. Four days after the battle Hayes wrote his uncle: ‘At Fisher’s Hill the turning of the Rebel left was planned and executed by General Crook against the opinions of other generals….General Sheridan is a whole-souled brave man and believes in Crook, his old class and roommate at West Point. Intellectually he is not General Crook’s equal, so that, as I said, General Crook is the brains of this army.’ Others viewed things with a bit more objectivity. Artillery Captain Henry A. DuPont recognized that the flank attack was Crook’s idea, but keenly observed that ‘Hayes’ admiration for his corps commander may have led him to underestimate the intellectual ability of his commanding general.’
Regardless of who should receive the lion’s share of the credit for conceiving the plan, both Sheridan and Crook knew that if the plan was going to succeed, the flank attack needed to be kept secret — therefore many of Crook’s movements would have to take place under cover of darkness or amid the fall foliage. That night Crook organized his men in heavy woods on the north bank of Cedar Creek. Paramount in Crook’s mind was keeping his corps out of sight of the Confederate signal station on Massanutten.
Throughout the day on the 21st, Crook’s men stayed concealed in the woods north of Cedar Creek while the VI and XIX corps marched from the area around Strasburg south to Fisher’s Hill. Troops of the VI Corps occupied a small hill in front of Fisher’s Hill that was a good platform for artillery. Meanwhile, Crook’s men waited for the cover of darkness. Then, as the sun began to set, they marched southwest and occupied a position in an area of dense woods slightly north of Hupp’s Hill. Crook wore a private’s blouse, just in case prying eyes from Massanutten happened to land on him, and he ordered his color bearers to trail their flags, fearing that the bright colors of the Stars and Stripes or flagpole finials would attract attention.
Crook’s regiments filed into their positions near Hupp’s Hill during the evening of the 21st and rested for several hours.
September 22 Battle: Beginning the next morning, they marched to the eastern face of Little North Mountain, from which they would launch their assault.
By 2 p.m., Crook’s two divisions had reached the Back Road, situated at the base of the mountain. Along the road, near St. Stephens Church, Crook’s men made their final preparations for the ascent up Little North Mountain and the subsequent attack. Knapsacks were piled, and the men, remembered one soldier from the 116th Ohio, ‘arranged canteens and bayonet scabbards so that no noise would be made by them.’ Crook’s men had managed to maintain secrecy throughout the march, but that effort would be wasted if the Yankees revealed themselves as they climbed up the slopes of the mountain.
To distract Early’s men from the events on their left flank, Sheridan directed Emory and Wright to increase their activity along the Rebel front. While the large majority of Early’s men were preoccupied with Emory and Wright, the VIII Corps moved into position along the eastern face of Little North Mountain. The march was a difficult one, and all organization in Hayes and Thoburn’s columns was lost as they moved along the rocky precipice.
At approximately 4 p.m., Crook — with battle lines formed squarely on the enemy’s left flank — launched his assault. While most Confederates did not know Crook’s whereabouts, evidence suggests that Early had some knowledge of the attack but failed to give it credence. Brigadier General Bryan Grimes noticed some activity on the Confederate left flank around 3 p.m., at least one hour before the flank attack commenced. Concerned about the vulnerability of his position, Grimes summoned Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur and implored him to reinforce the left end of the line. The units on the extreme Confederate left, dismounted cavalry under Maj. Gen. Lunsford Lomax, a force that many other Rebel commanders rated as sub-par, were the only obstacles that stood in the way of the massive flank attack.
Ramseur initially shrugged off Grimes’ suggestion, stating that the Union troops Grimes observed was nothing more than a fence row. But when Ramseur peered through his binoculars, he saw Crook’s 16 infantry regiments bearing down on the left. Despite that, Ramseur declined to bolster the left until he first discussed the matter with Early — a tremendous error in judgment on his part. To many, the sight of Crook’s four brigades was plain as day. A Confederate private observed in his diary that he and his comrades could see Crook’s men ‘moving heavy columns of infantry to their right all day. We can see them plainly climbing up the side of North Mountain.’
Between 4 and 4:30 p.m., as the sun began to set behind Little North Mountain, Crook’s two divisions, about 5,500 strong, struck Early’s left, encountering Confederate pickets who put up no resistance and took to their heels, reporting to their comrades in Ramseur’s Division that they had been flanked. Confederate artillery soon opened up, but did ‘little execution,’ Crook later remembered.
As Hayes’ and Thoburn’s divisions rolled down the mountain into a ravine, their orderly lines became jumbled. By ‘the time we arrived at the foot of the mountain and emerged from the woods our lines were completely broken,’ recalled Crook. Speed was everything, and that meant there would be no time to reform. ‘Thence we went, sweeping down their works like a western cyclone, every man for himself, firing whenever he saw a rebel and always yelling and cheering to the extent of his ability,’ recalled the 116th Ohio’s Colonel Thomas F. Wildes.
The Union attackers first ran into Lomax’s dismounted horsemen. Early generally held his cavalry in low regard, and those troopers did little to change his opinion that they had ‘been the cause of all my disasters’ when they could not thwart the Union onslaught.
After the war, some Confederate veterans contended that the panic-stricken cavalrymen did more than Crook’s division to create alarm among the Confederate defenders and break up the left. ‘While standing in position a cavalryman from our left came down our line,’ remembered the 13th Virginia’s Captain S.D. Buck, ‘reporting to each command that we are flanked! This did much for Sheridan and the worthless soldier should have been shot then and there.’ Buck continued his tirade against this nameless horseman, ‘That one cowardly cavalryman is responsible for this disaster.’ While unfair to blame one cavalryman for the disintegration of Early’s line, it is reasonable to surmise that the sound of firing on the left and frantic men from Lomax’s command fleeing their position must have been demoralizing to an army that three days earlier had suffered defeat.
By the time Crook’s men caromed into the Confederate left, Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts’ division of the VI Corps had linked with Crook’s left. Sheridan’s entire army then pressed Early from the front and left, just as it had done three days earlier at Winchester. Crook had thrown Early’s army into disarray, and Old Jube’s attempts to redeploy troops to bolster his left were counterproductive, as that only weakened the areas that were under pressure by the Union VI and XIX corps.
Ramseur desperately tried to hold to his tenuous position, and immediately ordered Brig. Gen. Cullen A. Battle’s Brigade of Alabamians to the left to form a line parallel to the attackers. Battle’s Brigade, which had performed admirably at Winchester, found itself supporting Major Thomas J. Kirkpatrick’s Amherst Battery (part of Major William Nelson’s artillery battalion) and the only obstacle between Crook’s Federals and the Confederate left. As the attackers rushed onward, the gunners of the Amherst Battery fired canister into their foe, and Battle — wielding a cedar fence stake — urged his men to stand firm and shouted, ‘Close up! On your life!’
Even though they were facing a hopeless situation, Battle’s Brigade put up enough resistance to gain Crook’s attention. ‘On a prominent ridge about one mile from the base of the mountain,’ Crook penned in his after-action report, ‘where one of their main batteries was posted, the enemy made his most stubborn stand.’ Regardless of that tenacity, however, Crook claimed his men soon drove the Confederates ‘pell-mell from their position.’
As the men of Hayes’ and Thoburn’s divisions pounded the Confederate left, Ramseur sent Brig. Gen. William R. Cox’s Brigade to help Battle. In the confusion of the fight, however, Cox got off track and left the Alabamians to fend for themselves. When the pressure of Crook’s attack became too much to endure, the Alabamians and the guns they supported withdrew from the field.
After Battle’s men pulled out, Grimes’ Brigade of North Carolina Tar Heels was next to bear the weight of the attack. Without orders, Grimes, who was already taking fire to his front, took two of his regiments and faced them to the west to meet Crook’s attack. Grimes’ men fought ably according to most accounts, but fire from the front, left and rear compelled him to fall back. The rout was on. Small pockets of Confederates desperately tried to defend their positions but to no avail.
The regimental historian of the 116th Ohio recorded that they had been ’stopped at several points by small bodies of the enemy, but such stops were only momentary, for as soon as a little sharp firing was heard at any point, the men would of their own accord, concentrate there, and in a few moments would be rushing on again.’ Colonel George Wells, commanding Thoburn’s 1st Brigade in the fight, echoed, ‘As long as a rebel was in sight they chased him, and whenever they heard heavy firing and saw that our advance was checked they gathered like bees.’
As darkness began to cloak the field, Early’s men withdrew from their positions, and he later admitted he was quite displeased that the fight was a ‘very brief contest’ and that his men ‘retired in considerable confusion.’ The Southern commander believed that the troops could have provided better resistance to Crook’s flank attack, but as he explained to General Robert E. Lee: ‘In the affair at Fisher’s Hill the cavalry gave way, but it was flanked. This could have been remedied if the troops had remained steady, but a panic seized them at the idea of being flanked, and without being defeated they broke, many of them fleeing shamefully.’ A Virginian agreed with Early, expressing shame that, as he put it, ‘we had disgraced ourselves.’
Battlefield deaths were minimal at Fisher’s Hill; only 30 of Early’s men and 51 of Sheridan’s were killed. Early, however, did have his ranks greatly depleted, with nearly 1,000 of his men captured and more than 200 wounded. Sheridan had slightly more than 400 wounded, but he had more men than Early and could afford the loss. Crook lost 162 men in the fight, about 30 percent of the Federal casualties.
Sheridan’s army pursued the Confederates south past Woodstock after the battle, but were unable to put the finishing touches on Early. ‘Our success was very great,’ lamented Sheridan, ‘yet I had anticipated results still more pregnant.’ Early had slipped away once again. Following his second defeat in three days Early retreated south and by month’s end was near Waynesboro.
Aftermath: Fisher's Hill Battlefield Today (CWPT) Despite the fact Early had escaped, Crook’s flank attack reaped significant results. Fisher’s Hill had disorganized Early’s men and pushed them farther up the Valley. The lack of a strong Rebel presence in the upper Shenandoah gave Sheridan the freedom to begin what became known as the ‘Burning’ during the autumn of 1864, as he fired large amounts of property, carrying out another element of Grant’s plan to destroy the region as a source of provender for the Confederate armies.
While Sheridan laid waste to the upper Shenandoah Valley, Early reorganized and reinforced his battered command. The two would lock horns on October 19, 1864, at the Battle of Cedar Creek. That morning, Early turned the tables by striking Crook’s VIII Corps on Sheridan’s left flank. In a matter of 15 minutes Crook’s men, many of them asleep in the early morning hours, were captured or driven from their position.Though Sheridan’s men rallied to carry the day, that fight tainted the reputation of the VIII Corps. Although it is true that Sheridan’s army won at Cedar Creek largely due to the fighting of the XIX and VI corps, the VIII Corps was responsible for much of Sheridan’s success in the Valley up to that point and played an important role in the creation of his wartime legacy. The flank attack at Winchester and the massive maneuver at Fisher’s Hill gave Sheridan two crucial victories and elevated him to the pantheon of legendary Union commanders.
As the years went by, arguing over the fight at Fisher’s Hill resulted in animosity between Sheridan and Crook, two men who had been nearly as close as brothers for four decades. Historians have expended a fair amount of ink debating who was responsible for developing the idea to strike Early’s left flank. Evidence exists to support both claims.
Regardless of who conceived the plan, Crook should be credited for guiding his men to the eastern slopes of Little North Mountain, and his soldiers deserve a large portion of the recognition for taking matters into their own hands after the terrain had disrupted their formations. Had the soldiers lacked initiative and fighting prowess, the attack would have failed and the plan declared a blunder. ‘I feel the success is due, more than in any battle I know,’ Colonel Wells wrote in his battle report, ‘to the splendid individual heroism of the men in the ranks.’
http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/fishers-hill/fishers-hill-history-articles/battle-of-fishers-hill.html
Below are several journal entries from 1861, 1862, 1863 and 1864 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. … I am including journal entries from Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee for each year. I have been spending some time researching Civil War journals and diaries and editing them to fit into this series of Civil War discussions.
Sunday, September 22, 1861: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee. “I remained in Tipton all day, going to preaching this morning and to Sunday school in the afternoon.”
Monday, September 22, 1862: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee. “No news of importance. Rain last night. Foraging parties are bringing in all the fresh pork that we can use, besides plenty of sweet potatoes. Our crackers, having been kept in storage so long, are musty and full of the weevil web, and there are no trains from Corinth to bring a fresh supply. We often clean them the best we can and bake them again in ashes or in skillets.”
Monday, September 22, 1862: General Lee issues an order that reveals the shocking degree that lawless behavior and morale have declined considerably during the break-neck pace of operations by the Army of Northern Virginia during the summer, as well as the scarcity of rations and other supplies, which has led to Confederate soldiers engaged in foraging and looting: “The depredations committed by this army, its daily diminution by straggling, and the loss of arms thrown aside as too burdensome by stragglers, make it necessary for preservation itself, aside from considerations of disgrace and injury to our cause arising form such outrages committed upon our citizens, that greater efforts be made by our officers to correct this growing evil.”
Monday, September 22, 1862: Union army surgeon Alfred L. Castleman records with fine sarcasm his scorn for McClellan’s timidity in pursuing the retreating Rebels: “Monday, 22nd.—A beautiful morning and all quiet, except that the officers are pitching tents and fixing up tables, as if for a stay. But that is no indication of what is in store for us; even before night we may be ordered to pull up and move again. But this would be very cruel. Our poor, worn out enemy, having fought and been driven for seven days, and now being entirely without provisions, must be exhausted and need rest. How cruel it would be to pursue him, under these circumstances. The kind heart of our Commander can entertain no such idea.”
Monday, September 22, 1862: Sec. of the Navy Gideon Welles writes in his journal of his thoughts and reaction to Lincoln presenting to the Cabinet the Emancipation Proclamation: “While, however, these dark clouds are above and around us, I cannot see how the subject can be avoided. Perhaps it is not desirable it should be. It is, however, an arbitrary and despotic measure in the cause of freedom.”
Tuesday, September 22, 1863: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee. “Everything is very quiet. We learned that Alexander Ragan of Company E died at Benton Barracks, St. Louis, on the 9th of this month. His is the first death in our company since August 3, 1862, when Ebenezer McCullough died at Corinth, Mississippi, on that date.”
Tuesday, September 22, 1863: Gen. William S. Rosecrans, in command of the beaten Army of the Cumberland, sends this dispatch by telegraph to Gen. Halleck in Washington, which shows Rosecrans wildly overestimating the forces opposing him: “CHATTANOOGA, TENN., September 22, 1863-9.30 a.m. (Received 2.30 p.m.), Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief: “We have fought a most sanguinary battle against vastly superior numbers. Longstreet is here, and probably Ewell, and a force is coming from Charleston. We have suffered terribly, but have inflicted equal injury upon the enemy. The mass of this army is intact and in good spirits. Disaster not as great as I anticipated. We held our position in the main up to Sunday night. Retired on Rossville, which we held yesterday; then retired on Chattanooga. Our position is a strong one. Think we can hold out right. Our transportation is mostly across the river. Have one bridge. Another will be done to-day. Our cavalry will be concentrated on the west side of the river, to guard it on our left. Telegraph communication will probably be cut off for several days, as we will be compelled to abandon south side of the Tennessee River below this point. W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.”
Tuesday, September 22, 1863: News of the Battle of Chickamauga finally reaches Richmond. War Department clerk John Beauchamp Jones records in his journal the jubilation over the news of the victory, and rather optimistically embellishes what he hopes will accrue from it: “September 22d.—Another dispatch from Bragg, received at a late hour last night, says the victory is complete. This announcement has lifted a heavy load from the spirits of our people; and as successive dispatches come from Gov. Harris and others on the battle-field to-day, there is a great change in the recent elongated faces of many we meet in the streets. So far we learn that the enemy has been beaten back and pursued some eleven miles; that we have from 5000 to 6000 prisoners, some 40 guns, besides small arms and stores in vast quantities. But Gen. Hood, whom I saw at the department but a fortnight ago, is said to be dead! and some half dozen of our brigadier-generals have been killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy, however, has been still greater than ours. . . . Yet, this is from the West.
The effects of this great victory will be electrical. The whole South will be filled again with patriotic fervor, and in the North there will be a corresponding depression. Rosecrans’s position is now one of great peril; for his army, being away from the protection of gun-boats, may be utterly destroyed, and then Tennessee and Southern Kentucky may fall into our hands again. To-morrow the papers will be filled with accounts from the field of battle, and we shall have a more distinct knowledge of the magnitude of it. There must have been at least 150,000 men engaged; and no doubt the killed and wounded on both sides amounted to tens of thousands!
Surely the Government of the United States must now see the impossibility of subjugating the Southern people, spread over such a vast extent of territory; and the European governments ought now to interpose to put an end to this cruel waste of blood and treasure. . . .”
Tuesday, September 22, 1863: Charles Wright Wills, a captain in the 103rd Illinois Infantry, stationed in southern Mississippi, writes in his journal : “Camp at Messenger’s Ferry, Big Black River, Miss., September 22, 1863. I wrote you a few lines from Vicksburg on the 18th inst. to notify you that I had escaped the perils of navigation (sandbar and guerillas) and of my safe arrival. I had a delightful trip down the river. A splendid boat, gentlemanly officers, not too many passengers, and beautiful weather. Major General Tuttle and wife and Mrs. General Grant were of our number. I think Mrs. Grant a model lady. She has seen not over thirty years, medium size, healthy blonde complexion, brown hair, blue eyes (cross-eyed) and has a pretty hand. She dresses very plainly, and busied herself knitting during nearly the whole trip. Believe her worthy of the general. Vicksburg is a miserable hole and was never anything better. A number of houses have been burned by our artillery firing, but altogether the town has suffered less than any secesh village I have seen at the hands of our forces. . . . They call it level here when the surface presents no greater angles than 45 degrees. . . . We have lost a large number by disease since I left the regiment. Anyone who saw us in Peoria would open wide his eyes at the length of our line now, and think we’d surely passed a dozen battles. The greater part of the material this regiment is made of should never have been sent into the field. The consolation is that these folks would all have to die sometime, and they ought to be glad to get rid of their sickly lives, and get credit as patriots for the sacrifice. We are now in the 2d Brigade 4th Division 15th Army Corps, having been transferred from the 16th Army Corps. We are camped on the bluffs of Black river, which we picket. Our camp is the finest one I ever was in. There are two large magnolias, three white beeches, and a half dozen holly trees around my tent. I think the magnolia the finest looking tree I ever saw. Many of the trees are ornamented with Spanish moss, which, hanging from the branches in long and graceful rolls, adds very much to the beauty of the forest. Another little item I cannot help mentioning is the “chigger,” a little red insect much smaller than a pin-head, that buries itself in the skin and stings worse than a mosquito bite. Squirrels skip around in the trees in camp, and coons, owls, etc., make music for us nights. Capt. Gus Smith when on picket several nights, saw a bear (so he swears) and shot at it several times. . . .”
Thursday, September 22, 1864: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee. “It is still raining, which makes the third day's rain. My ward was broken up today and the sick boys were transferred to Ward D in hospital number 4. We worked all afternoon making the ward ready for the wounded from the field hospital. I tried to get permission to return to my regiment today, but the doctor would not let me go. But all who are able, if not needed here, are to be sent to the front tomorrow.”

Pictures: 1864-09-22 Battle of Fishers Hill Map by Hotchkiss-925; 1864-09-22 Battle of Fisher's Hill bivouuc; 1863 Chattanooga Map; 1864-09-22 Battle of Fisher's Hill

A. Sunday, September 22, 1861: Fort Fauntleroy Horserace.
Background: “Fort Fauntleroy, now Ft. Wingate, was taking its ease one warm October afternoon in the fall of 1861. A group of men were idly chatting in Dr. Cavanaugh's store. Among the group were Jose B. Sena, Captain of Co. A, Aniceto Abeyta, Adjutant of the Regiment, Manuel Pino and. Rafael Ortiz all well known in New Mexico and particularly in Santa Fe.
Tall, calm grey‑eyed Dr. Cavanaugh was well-known in those days. He was Fort Sutter at the time and his store was sort of city hall and clubroom combined. It was there that all the great questions of the day were discussed, where many disputes arose and all were settled. A never failing topic of interest and discussion was the doctor's thoroughbred Kentucky horse. On this day as the group was talking aimlessly, a commotion was heard outside. The door of the store was thrown open and Manuelito the great Navajo chief and five or six followers walked in. The Navajos were on very friendly terms with the soldiers and were warmly received.
Manuelito said that he wished to speak to Col. Chaves who was the commander of the Regiment, but was told that the Col. was ill. He said nothing for a few minutes and then singled out Captain Sena and asked if he could speak to him in private. Capt. Sena went outside with Manuelito and after a few minutes returned with the news that the Indians wished to challenge the soldiers to a horserace between Dr. Cavanaugh's horse and a prize horse of the Indians. The terms of the race were quickly agreed upon and the Indians went off.
The race was to take place in two weeks. In the interim, the Kentucky horse was the object of more attention than ever. It was agreed that Rafael Ortiz was the best horseman in the fort and should therefore ride the horse. From that time on, the main topic for discussion in Dr. Cavanaugh's store was the great race and the bets which would be won.
While great preparations were going on at the fort, the Indians were by no means idle. They assembled great quantities of horses and mules, blankets and buckskins to bet against the soldiers. Every night the “Pujacantes” or medicine men held ceremonies to see how the race was going to turn out. At these ceremonies, two crude little wooden horses were the objects of interest, Prayers and incantations being said over them. At the end of all the ceremonies some sign was given the Pujacantes that the race would be won by the Indian pony.
Race: The day of the big race arrived. By six o'clock in the morning the Indians began to appear driving before them horses and mules which they were going to bet. By noon there were two thousand Indians on the spot. The fort was a busy place indeed and wagers were made on all sides. Manuel Pino, Officer of the Day, was busy trying to keep some semblance of order. At one end of the fort was a large corral which was to hold the stakes. Pino stood by the gate ready to receive the wagers. When one horse was bet against another, the two were tied together and put into the corral. If money was bet against a piece of buckskin, the money was tied in a corner of the buckskin with a paper bearing the names of the betters, and thrown on a pile in the center of the fort. The camp was a veritable chaos of stamping horses and noisy men.
Rafael Pino and the Kentucky horse were the center of an admiring group. As yet no one had seen the horse that the Indians had matched with a professional race horse.
At last the very hour for the race arrived, and the Indian horse was brought forth. It turned out to be a nervous little sorrel pony with a wiry little Indian for a rider. Everything was ready for the start. Indians and soldiers crowded together on the sides of the parade ground where the race was to take place. In those days there were no starters. The contestants decided when the race should begin.
The Kentucky thoroughbred and the Indian pony made ready for the start. Three times they started and three times the Indian turned back saying that they had not started together. The fourth time the two horses were given their heads and started neck and neck at an easy trot. Soon the Kentucky horse was in the lead. The Indian struck his pony with a piece or rope and rushed right across the path of the big horse.
Ortiz tried to stop but it was no use. The Indian and his pony were thrown and rolled over and over in the dust. In a second, the whole camp was in an uproar. The Indians made a break for the corral yelling that they had won the race. They gathered blankets and buckskins as they ran and turned all the horses and mules loose. Someone started to shoot and in a second, a regular battle was in process. Nearly two hundred Indians were killed and as were many soldiers.
The Indians finally fled dropping blankets and buckskins as they ran.
The next morning Col. Chaves was up and around and superintended the burial of the Indians and the soldiers, side by side.
Thus ended the last race between the soldiers of Fort Fauntleroy and the Navajo Indians.”
B. Monday, September 22, 1862: The Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln had waited a long time for any kind of victory to make new announcements about the war effort and slavery. On June 19, 1862, Lincoln had signed into law, a measure prohibiting slavery in US territories, and made it known that he planned to outlaw slavery in all states in America. Today, President Lincoln issued to his Cabinet the preliminary version of issues the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing slaves in states or portions of states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863. This measure did not technically free any slaves, but it expanded the Union’s war aim from just reunification to include the abolition of slavery. The proclamation was a shrewd maneuver by Lincoln to brand the Confederate States as a slave nation and the US not, thus would render foreign aid almost impossible now to the South. The measure was met by a good deal of opposition, because many Northerners were unwilling to fight for the freedom of blacks. Lincoln just wanted the war to end, regardless of the cost.
The Emancipation Proclamation - On this day, Pres. Abraham Lincoln does the single most renowned deed of his time in office: He issues the Emancipation Proclamation. As he shares it with his Cabinet, he tells them that he is keeping a promise he made to “myself and to my Maker” that he would reveal this document if the Rebels were driven back across the Potomac. It is a strange document, in many ways: It freed only the slaves behind Confederate lines but not in any of the occupied South (such as southern Louisiana, the coastal islands of South Carolina, western Tennessee, coastal North Carolina, and so forth), nor in any of the slave states that were loyal to the Union: Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware. Also, this proclamation would not become law until January 1, 1863—giving the Rebel states time to consider their options. The Proclamation states.: That on the 1st day of January, A.D. 1863, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.”
Lincoln argues that this is a military measure, and therefore under his authority as commander-in-chief. The Proclamation will be released to the public on the morrow.
C. Tuesday, September 22, 1863: Union defense of Chattanooga, Tennessee Since the fall of Vicksburg, Grant’s army had been parceled out here and there. Some had gone south to Nathaniel Banks, while others went into Arkansas with Frederick Steel. Most had been spread out across Mississippi. But when Grant received the message, which was sent by Henry Halleck, and came through Memphis, he rounded up his best. “Urge Sherman to act with all possible promptness,” wrote Halleck. And Grant took it to heart.
“Please order at once one division of your army corps to proceed to re-enforce Rosecrans,” wrote Grant to William Tecumseh Sherman, “moving form here [Vicksburg] by brigades as fast as transportation can be had.” General James McPhearson was also ordered to contribute a division. In the end, Sherman would end up commanding the reinforcements.In Washington, other means of reinforcing Rosecrans were being discussed. General George Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, had been called to Washington to discuss the coming campaign. Since Longstreet was clearly in Tennessee, General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was weakened. Might not something be done to strike a blow towards Richmond?
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton did not believe so. Before Meade arrived, Stanton had called a meeting with the President, Halleck, Secretary of State William Seward, and Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase. Stanton revealed that he wanted to send 20,000 troops from Meade’s army to Chattanooga. If Lee could send such a force via the rickety Southern railroads, there’s no reason why Washington couldn’t do the same upon the northern tracks.
This was a compelling challenge, but Lincoln and Halleck both thought that Chattanooga would fall before the reinforcements could arrive. Additionally, if Lee found out that Meade had been weakened, he might try another offensive.
But Stanton was prepared for such arguments, and brought in Col. D.C. McCallum as an expert witness. McCallum was the director of the Department of Military Railroads, and had been prepped for the meeting. When asked by Lincoln how long it would take to rush 20,000 troops from Virginia to Chattanooga, McCallum assured him that he could do it in a week, even pledging his life that his calculations were accurate.
This must have touched Lincoln, for he immediately approved of the plan. Meade would be ordered to release the XI Corps, commanded by Oliver Otis Howard, and the XII Corps under John Slocum. It would take some time to organize, and Stanton would sequester himself away for two full days to pound out the details.
With Burnside coming from the north, Sherman coming from the west, and Meade’s troops moving east, one way or another, Lincoln was determined to fortify Rosecrans and save Chattanooga.”
D. Thursday, September 22, 1864: Battle of Fisher's Hill, Virginia. The Battle of Fisher’s Hill was an excellent example of a surprise flanking movement against a defending force in a strong position. Crook's Flank Attack (22 September): During the morning Gen. George Crook moved his two divisions (about 5,000 men) to the base of Little North Mountain beyond St. Stephens Church, unseen by the Confederate signal station on Massanutten Mountain. About 1400 hours, Sheridan directed him to commence a flanking movement along the shoulder of the mountain. Crook formed his corps in two parallel columns and marched south until more than half of the command was beyond the Confederate left flank, which was held by Lomax's cavalry division. Crook encountered only scattered fire from a few surprised pickets.
About 1600 hours, Crook ordered his columns to face left and to charge. The soldiers charged down the side of the mountain, shouting at the tops of their lungs. The CS cavalry took to their horses and scattered. In their rush down the hill, Crook's divisions lost all order; a mass of men funneled through the ravine of the Middle Fork of Tumbling Run past the Barbe House and closed on the Confederate infantry on ``Ramseur's Hill.'' A second mass funneled to the right along an old road that penetrated to the rear of the Confederate positions. Grimes's brigade of North Carolinians held out against Crook's onslaught until Ricketts ordered his division forward. Hearing, more than seeing, that they were flanked, CS defenders along the remainder of the line began abandoning their entrenchments. Battle's CS brigade was sent to the left to confront Crook but was misdirected into a ravine and missed the fighting altogether. Sheridan advanced his other divisions, the men attacking generally up the ravines. Early's army was soon in full flight, abandoning equipment and 14 artillery pieces that could not be extricated from the works.
Phase Six. Rear Guard Action at Prospect Hill (22 September): The CS army was a shambles but attempted to collect itself at the base of Round Hill on the Valley Pike. Generals Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram and staff officers established a rear guard of artillery and infantry at Prospect Hill and held off the disorganized Union pursuit. During this action, Col. Alexander ``Sandie'' Pendleton, Stonewall Jackson's favorite staff officer, was wounded; he died the following day in Woodstock. The CS army retreated to Narrow Passage, and the wagon train went on to Mt. Jackson. Darkness and confusion among the Union victors prevented effective pursuit.
During the fighting at Fisher's Hill, a CS cavalry division turned back the Union cavalry at Milford (present day Overall) in the Luray Valley, preventing an attempt to gain Early's rear by crossing the gap to New Market. Sheridan remarked that if his cavalry had been successful, he could have captured Early's army.
The battle opened the Shenandoah Valley to the destruction of its agricultural base.

1. Sunday, September 22, 1861: James H. Lane's Kansas Jayhawkers (pictured) (Jayhawkers were a militant bands affiliated with the free-state cause) raid, loot, and burn the town of Osceola, Missouri, a senseless act of terror providing no military advantage to the Union. (Note: These events inspired the novel Gone to Texas by Forrest Carter, which was the basis for the 1976 Clint Eastwood movie The Outlaw Josey Wales.)
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-four
2. Sunday, September 22, 1861: Both Union and Confederates pour more troops into Kentucky. “Since the opening guns at Fort Sumter, war had erupted in eastern and western Virginia, all across Missouri, along the Atlantic coast and as far southwest as New Mexico. For a time, Kentuckians believed they could keep the war out of their state. Though their boys had gone both North and South, a claimed neutrality, it was hoped, would keep scenes like those at Manassas, far from her borders. That was, at best, wishful thinking.
Confederates presently occupied a thin line from Cumberland Gap west to the Missouri River, while Union General Robert Anderson chose Louisville as his headquarters, raising more and more troops inside Kentucky.
The previous day, General Albert Sidney Johnston, Confederate commander of the Trans-Mississippi, called upon Tennessee to give 30,000 volunteers to the Confederate cause. On this date, he expanded the request to both Mississippi and Arkansas.
The wording of both requests was nearly identical as that to Tennessee, including Johnston’s desire for long-term enlistments and an added request for the troops to bring their own guns.
There were, however, a few differences. While Tennessee was asked for 30,000, both Mississippi and Arkansas were asked to supply only 10,000. Tennessee’s volunteers, according to Johnston, would be used throughout his Trans-Mississippi Department, while Mississippi’s troops would be moved to “the frontier,” and Arkansas’ would march “to the Missouri frontier of your state.”
As in Kentucky, both Mississippi and Arkansas had designated recruitment cities and soon, hoped Johnston, they would be filled with Confederate volunteers. [1]
Also understanding that Kentucky would be the new point of contention, Union General Anderson was scrambling to acquire more troops for his Department of Kentucky. A few days prior, Anderson took notice of Confederates under General Simon Bolivar Buckner at Bowling Green, about 100 miles south. Louisville was defended by only 3,000 Union troops, and it was rumored that Buckner had nearly 10,000.
While that was nearly double the actual figures, Anderson asked Indiana’s governor, O.P. Morton, for as many troops as he could spare. Morton supplied four regiments (probably around 3,000 men) and then wrote to General Fremont, Union commander in Missouri (who had himself requested troops from Indiana) and asked to borrow 5,000 muskets.
Meanwhile, General Anderson was doing what he could to keep his Kentucky garrisons supplied with troops. On this day, he sent four regiments to Camp Dick Robinson, near Danville. He could not, however, obtain any artillery.
Fifty miles from Louisville, it was reported that newly–recruited Rebels were gathering in Anderson County and had already captured the armory in Lawrenceburg. [2]
Along the Mississippi River, Union forces under General Ulysses S. Grant had been probing south from Cairo, Illinois and Paducah, Kentucky, attempting to discover the most northern town occupied by the Confederates. The march, which was supported by two gunboats, revealed the Rebels to be no farther north than Columbus.
That afternoon, however, along Mayfield Creek, between Columbus and Paducah, a Union infantry outpost was attacked by 100 Confederate cavalry. The Rebels were repulsed and a few were probably wounded.” [3]
[1] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 4, p421-423.
[2] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 4, p266, 267-268.
[3] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 4, p199-200.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/both-union-and-confederates-pour-more-troops-into-kentucky/
3. Sunday, September 22, 1861: Lincoln Claims that Freeing the Slaves Not a Military Necessity. “United States Senator Orville Browning had voted in favor of the Confiscation Act, which declared that the slaves of secessionists were no longer slaves. While it didn’t explicitly free them, it was understood that they would be, when coming into Union lines, under the control of the US Government. General John C. Fremont’s Proclamation, which actually freed the slaves of secessionists in Missouri, overstepped the bounds of the Confiscation Act.
Lincoln ordered Fremont to abide strictly by the Act, which angered many abolitionists, including Senator Browning, who put pen to paper, addressing Lincoln.
On this day, Lincoln replied. He was “astonished” that Browning, a long time colleague and friend, had objected to him “adhering to a law, which you had assisted in making.”
The main point in Lincoln’s unusually long letter was that General Fremont’s “proclamation, as to confiscation of property, and the liberation of slaves, is purely political, and not within the range of military law, or necessity.” Lincoln, at this point in time, believed that freeing the slaves was not a military necessity.
The President further explained that if a General needs slaves, “he can seize them, and use them; but when the need is past, it is not for him to fix their permanent future condition. That must be settled according to laws made by law-makers, and not by military proclamations.”
In his letter, Browning spoke of freeing the slaves as the only means of saving the Government. Lincoln countered that it was “itself the surrender of the government,” asking if it could be “pretended that it is any longer the government of the U.S. … wherein a General, or a President, may make permanent rules of property by proclamation?”
Lincoln conceded that he would support Congress passing a law such as Fremont proclaimed, but could not allow a General, or even a President, “to seize and exercise the permanent legislative functions of the government.”[4]
[4] Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Sen. Orville Browning, September 22, 1861.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/both-union-and-confederates-pour-more-troops-into-kentucky/
4. Sunday, September 22, 1861: General Robert E. Lee views Henry Wise’s position, still unsure. “General Robert E. Lee arrived in the Kanawha Valley to try to convince feuding Generals John Floyd and Henry Wise to work together. He established his headquarters at Meadow Bluff, a position that General Floyd chose to defend. Twelve miles closer to the Yankees, General Wise selected a ridge on Big Sewell Mountain and refused to fall back to Meadow Bluff.
Lee decided to examine Wise’s position before making a decision on whether Wise should fall back or Floyd should advance. There, he discovered that everything Wise claimed about his position was true. It afforded a view of the enemy advance from over a mile away. This advance, should it come, would have to funnel itself through a deep gorge, down the James River & Kanawha Valley Turnpike, upon which Wise was firmly entrenched.
The Union forces could attack by either frontal assault up the gorge and turnpike or a flanking maneuver, bypassing Big Sewell Mountain and Wise’s defenses entirely, hitting Floyd at Meadow Bluff. So far, no attempt to flank the Confederates had been detected.
Still unsure, Lee rode back to Meadow Bluff without issuing orders for Wise to fall back.” [5]
[5] Rebels at the Gate by Lesser.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/both-union-and-confederates-pour-more-troops-into-kentucky/
5. Monday, September 22, 1862: Following the preemptive strike at Antietam President Lincoln issues the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing slaves in states or portions of states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186209
6. Monday, September 22, 1862: Near Yellow Medicine, Minnesota, Col. Sibley of the U.S. Army and his command were attacked by over 300 Dakota warriors. After a two-hour battle, the Federal troops drove off the attackers, suffering only 4 men dead and about 30 wounded. By best count, the Dakota suffered nearly 10 times that many casualties.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+22%2C+1862
7. Monday, September 22, 1862: General Lee issues an order that reveals the shocking degree that lawless behavior and morale have declined considerably during the break-neck pace of operations by the Army of Northern Virginia during the summer, as well as the scarcity of rations and other supplies, which has led to Confederate soldiers engaged in foraging and looting: “The depredations committed by this army, its daily diminution by straggling, and the loss of arms thrown aside as too burdensome by stragglers, make it necessary for preservation itself, aside from considerations of disgrace and injury to our cause arising form such outrages committed upon our citizens, that greater efforts be made by our officers to correct this growing evil.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+22%2C+1862
8. Monday, September 22, 1862: Union army surgeon Alfred L. Castleman records with fine sarcasm his scorn for McClellan’s timidity in pursuing the retreating Rebels: “Monday, 22nd.—A beautiful morning and all quiet, except that the officers are pitching tents and fixing up tables, as if for a stay. But that is no indication of what is in store for us; even before night we may be ordered to pull up and move again. But this would be very cruel. Our poor, worn out enemy, having fought and been driven for seven days, and now being entirely without provisions, must be exhausted and need rest. How cruel it would be to pursue him, under these circumstances. The kind heart of our Commander can entertain no such idea.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+22%2C+1862
9. Monday, September 22, 1862: Sec. of the Navy Gideon Welles writes in his journal of his thoughts and reaction to Lincoln presenting to the Cabinet the Emancipation Proclamation: “While, however, these dark clouds are above and around us, I cannot see how the subject can be avoided. Perhaps it is not desirable it should be. It is, however, an arbitrary and despotic measure in the cause of freedom.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+22%2C+1862
10. Tuesday, September 22, 1863: Gen. William S. Rosecrans, in command of the beaten Army of the Cumberland, sends this dispatch by telegraph to Gen. Halleck in Washington, which shows Rosecrans wildly overestimating the forces opposing him: “CHATTANOOGA, TENN., September 22, 1863-9.30 a.m. (Received 2.30 p.m.), Major General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief: “We have fought a most sanguinary battle against vastly superior numbers. Longstreet is here, and probably Ewell, and a force is coming from Charleston. We have suffered terribly, but have inflicted equal injury upon the enemy. The mass of this army is intact and in good spirits. Disaster not as great as I anticipated. We held our position in the main up to Sunday night. Retired on Rossville, which we held yesterday; then retired on Chattanooga. Our position is a strong one. Think we can hold out right. Our transportation is mostly across the river. Have one bridge. Another will be done to-day. Our cavalry will be concentrated on the west side of the river, to guard it on our left. Telegraph communication will probably be cut off for several days, as we will be compelled to abandon south side of the Tennessee River below this point. W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+22%2C+1863
11. Tuesday, September 22, 1863: News of the Battle of Chickamauga finally reaches Richmond. War Department clerk John Beauchamp Jones records in his journal the jubilation over the news of the victory, and rather optimistically embellishes what he hopes will accrue from it: “September 22d.—Another dispatch from Bragg, received at a late hour last night, says the victory is complete. This announcement has lifted a heavy load from the spirits of our people; and as successive dispatches come from Gov. Harris and others on the battle-field to-day, there is a great change in the recent elongated faces of many we meet in the streets. So far we learn that the enemy has been beaten back and pursued some eleven miles; that we have from 5000 to 6000 prisoners, some 40 guns, besides small arms and stores in vast quantities. But Gen. Hood, whom I saw at the department but a fortnight ago, is said to be dead! and some half dozen of our brigadier-generals have been killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy, however, has been still greater than ours. . . . Yet, this is from the West.
The effects of this great victory will be electrical. The whole South will be filled again with patriotic fervor, and in the North there will be a corresponding depression. Rosecrans’s position is now one of great peril; for his army, being away from the protection of gun-boats, may be utterly destroyed, and then Tennessee and Southern Kentucky may fall into our hands again. To-morrow the papers will be filled with accounts from the field of battle, and we shall have a more distinct knowledge of the magnitude of it. There must have been at least 150,000 men engaged; and no doubt the killed and wounded on both sides amounted to tens of thousands!
Surely the Government of the United States must now see the impossibility of subjugating the Southern people, spread over such a vast extent of territory; and the European governments ought now to interpose to put an end to this cruel waste of blood and treasure. . . .”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+22%2C+1863
12. Tuesday, September 22, 1863: Charles Wright Wills, a captain in the 103rd Illinois Infantry, stationed in southern Mississippi, writes in his journal : “Camp at Messenger’s Ferry, Big Black River, Miss., September 22, 1863. I wrote you a few lines from Vicksburg on the 18th inst. to notify you that I had escaped the perils of navigation (sandbar and guerillas) and of my safe arrival. I had a delightful trip down the river. A splendid boat, gentlemanly officers, not too many passengers, and beautiful weather. Major General Tuttle and wife and Mrs. General Grant were of our number. I think Mrs. Grant a model lady. She has seen not over thirty years, medium size, healthy blonde complexion, brown hair, blue eyes (cross-eyed) and has a pretty hand. She dresses very plainly, and busied herself knitting during nearly the whole trip. Believe her worthy of the general. Vicksburg is a miserable hole and was never anything better. A number of houses have been burned by our artillery firing, but altogether the town has suffered less than any secesh village I have seen at the hands of our forces. . . . They call it level here when the surface presents no greater angles than 45 degrees. . . . We have lost a large number by disease since I left the regiment. Anyone who saw us in Peoria would open wide his eyes at the length of our line now, and think we’d surely passed a dozen battles. The greater part of the material this regiment is made of should never have been sent into the field. The consolation is that these folks would all have to die sometime, and they ought to be glad to get rid of their sickly lives, and get credit as patriots for the sacrifice. We are now in the 2d Brigade 4th Division 15th Army Corps, having been transferred from the 16th Army Corps. We are camped on the bluffs of Black river, which we picket. Our camp is the finest one I ever was in. There are two large magnolias, three white beeches, and a half dozen holly trees around my tent. I think the magnolia the finest looking tree I ever saw. Many of the trees are ornamented with Spanish moss, which, hanging from the branches in long and graceful rolls, adds very much to the beauty of the forest. Another little item I cannot help mentioning is the “chigger,” a little red insect much smaller than a pin-head, that buries itself in the skin and stings worse than a mosquito bite. Squirrels skip around in the trees in camp, and coons, owls, etc., make music for us nights. Capt. Gus Smith when on picket several nights, saw a bear (so he swears) and shot at it several times. . . .”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+22%2C+1863
13. Tuesday, September 22, 1863: General Joseph O. "Jo" Shelby begins his raids into Missouri and Arkansas which will conclude by October 26, 1863.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186309
14. Tuesday, September 22, 1863: As of this date, two days after the battle, Bragg has made no serious move toward Chattanooga. Rosecrans uses this reprieve to strengthen his positions and the earthworks surrounding the city.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186309
15. Tuesday, September 22, 1863: Skirmishes at Missionary Ridge and Shallow Ford Gap, near Chattanooga, TN, bring the Chickamauga Campaign to a close as General Braxton Bragg (CSA) occupies the high ground of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain surrounding Chattanooga and the Union Army of the Cumberland (US).
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-128
16. Thursday, September 22, 1864: Guerrilla fighters in Carthage, Missouri capture the city, then burn it to the ground with more fighting at Patterson, Sikeston and Longwood.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-180

A Sunday, September 22, 1861: In the West during the Civil War, with many soldiers were heading east to fight in one army or another, an incident occurred, surrounding a horse race between Navajo and army mounts at Fort Fauntleroy (Fort Lyon since the war) near Gallup, New Mexico. Navajos claimed that a soldier had cut their horse’s bridle rein, but the soldier-judges refused to run the race again; the Indians rioted and were fired upon with howitzers. Twelve Navajos died in the melee.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-four
A+ Sunday, September 22, 1861: Fort Fauntleroy Horserace. “Fort Fauntleroy, now Ft. Wingate, was taking its ease one warm October afternoon in the fall of 1861. A group of men were idly chatting in Dr. Cavanaugh's store. Among the group were Jose B. Sena, Captain of Co. A, Aniceto Abeyta, Adjutant of the Regiment, Manuel Pino and. Rafael Ortiz all well known in New Mexico and particularly in Santa Fe.
Tall, calm grey‑eyed Dr. Cavanaugh was well-known in those days. He was Fort Sutter at the time and his store was sort of city hall and clubroom combined. It was there that all the great questions of the day were discussed, where many disputes arose and all were settled. A never failing topic of interest and discussion was the doctor's thoroughbred Kentucky horse. On this day as the group was talking aimlessly, a commotion was heard outside. The door of the store was thrown open and Manuelito the great Navajo chief and five or six followers walked in. The Navajos were on very friendly terms with the soldiers and were warmly received.
Manuelito said that he wished to speak to Col. Chaves who was the commander of the Regiment, but was told that the Col. was ill. He said nothing for a few minutes and then singled out Captain Sena and asked if he could speak to him in private. Capt. Sena went outside with Manuelito and after a few minutes returned with the news that the Indians wished to challenge the soldiers to a horserace between Dr. Cavanaugh's horse and a prize horse of the Indians. The terms of the race were quickly agreed upon and the Indians went off.
The race was to take place in two weeks. In the interim, the Kentucky horse was the object of more attention than ever. It was agreed that Rafael Ortiz was the best horseman in the fort and should therefore ride the horse. From that time on, the main topic for discussion in Dr. Cavanaugh's store was the great race and the bets which would be won.
While great preparations were going on at the fort, the Indians were by no means idle. They assembled great quantities of horses and mules, blankets and buckskins to bet against the soldiers. Every night the “Pujacantes” or medicine men held ceremonies to see how the race was going to turn out. At these ceremonies, two crude little wooden horses were the objects of interest, Prayers and incantations being said over them. At the end of all the ceremonies some sign was given the Pujacantes that the race would be won by the Indian pony.
The day of the big race arrived. By six o'clock in the morning the Indians began to appear driving before them horses and mules which they were going to bet. By noon there were two thousand Indians on the spot. The fort was a busy place indeed and wagers were made on all sides. Manuel Pino, Officer of the Day, was busy trying to keep some semblance of order. At one end of the fort was a large corral which was to hold the stakes. Pino stood by the gate ready to receive the wagers. When one horse was bet against another, the two were tied together and put into the corral. If money was bet against a piece of buckskin, the money was tied in a corner of the buckskin with a paper bearing the names of the betters, and thrown on a pile in the center of the fort. The camp was a veritable chaos of stamping horses and noisy men.
Rafael Pino and the Kentucky horse were the center of an admiring group. As yet no one had seen the horse that the Indians had matched with a professional race horse.
At last the very hour for the race arrived, and the Indian horse was brought forth. It turned out to be a nervous little sorrel pony with a wiry little Indian for a rider. Everything was ready for the start. Indians and soldiers crowded together on the sides of the parade ground where the race was to take place. In those days there were no starters. The contestants decided when the race should begin.
The Kentucky thoroughbred and the Indian pony made ready for the start. Three times they started and three times the Indian turned back saying that they had not started together. The fourth time the two horses were given their heads and started neck and neck at an easy trot. Soon the Kentucky horse was in the lead. The Indian struck his pony with a piece or rope and rushed right across the path of the big horse.
Ortiz tried to stop but it was no use. The Indian and his pony were thrown and rolled over and over in the dust. In a second, the whole camp was in an uproar. The Indians made a break for the corral yelling that they had won the race. They gathered blankets and buckskins as they ran and turned all the horses and mules loose. Someone started to shoot and in a second, a regular battle was in process. Nearly two hundred Indians were killed and as were many soldiers.
The Indians finally fled dropping blankets and buckskins as they ran.
The next morning Col. Chaves was up and around and superintended the burial of the Indians and the soldiers, side by side.
Thus ended the last race between the soldiers of Fort Fauntleroy and the Navajo Indians.”
http://newmexicohistory.org/people/fort-fauntleroy-horserace
B Monday, September 22, 1862: Lincoln had waited a long time for any kind of victory to make new announcements about the war effort and slavery. On June 19, 1862, Lincoln had signed into law, a measure prohibiting slavery in US territories, and made it known that he planned to outlaw slavery in all states in America. Today, President Lincoln issued to his Cabinet the preliminary version of issues the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing slaves in states or portions of states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863. This measure did not technically free any slaves, but it expanded the Union’s war aim from just reunification to include the abolition of slavery. The proclamation was a shrewd maneuver by Lincoln to brand the Confederate States as a slave nation and the US not, thus would render foreign aid almost impossible now to the South. The measure was met by a good deal of opposition, because many Northerners were unwilling to fight for the freedom of blacks. Lincoln just wanted the war to end, regardless of the cost.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-six
B+ Monday, September 22, 1862: The Emancipation Proclamation - On this day, Pres. Abraham Lincoln does the single most renowned deed of his time in office: He issues the Emancipation Proclamation. As he shares it with his Cabinet, he tells them that he is keeping a promise he made to “myself and to my Maker” that he would reveal this document if the Rebels were driven back across the Potomac. It is a strange document, in many ways: It freed only the slaves behind Confederate lines but not in any of the occupied South (such as southern Louisiana, the coastal islands of South Carolina, western Tennessee, coastal North Carolina, and so forth), nor in any of the slave states that were loyal to the Union: Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware. Also, this proclamation would not become law until January 1, 1863—giving the Rebel states time to consider their options. The Proclamation states.: That on the 1st day of January, A.D. 1863, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.”
Lincoln argues that this is a military measure, and therefore under his authority as commander-in-chief. The Proclamation will be released to the public on the morrow.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+22%2C+1862
C Tuesday, September 22, 1863: ‘Disaster Not As Great As I Anticipated’ – Lincoln Tries To Reinforce Roscrans From Everywhere. “Following the defeat at Chickamauga, Federal commander William Rosecrans was, to put it mildly, distraught. President Lincoln had tried to lift his spirits some, and by the second day after the battle, Rosecrans was feeling better – though far from steady. While once he believed himself to be chasing a foe in full retreat, he now believed he was being stalked by Rebels far outnumbering him.
“We have fought a most sanguinary battle against vastly superior numbers,” he wrote in the morning of this date. “Longstreet is here, and probably Ewell, and a force is coming from Charleston.” Rosecrans was jumping at every rumor. It was certain that James Longstreet, who had quickly arrived from Virginia, was commanding at least a corps under Braxton Bragg, but there was no evidence that Richard Ewell, another of General Lee’s corps commanders, was present, just as there were no Confederate troops en route from Charleston.
Rosecrans admitted that his army was suffering, but held to the notion that his troops “have inflicted equal injury upon the enemy.” Here is where his mood turned lighter. “The mass of this army is intact and in good spirits,” he reported. “Disaster not as great as I anticipated. […] Our position is a strong one. Think we can hold out several days, and if re-enforcemetns come up soon everything will come out right.”
But that was the rub. Trying to get reinforcements to Chattanooga was proving rather difficult. The closest force was the Army of the Ohio, under Ambrose Burnside. But Burnside seemed more interested in tracking down bands of guerrillas than aiding Rosecrans. Even before the battle, all of Washington was calling for the two armies to unite at Chattanooga. Even by this day, it was a far off notion.
“I must again urge you to move immediately to Rosecrans’ relief,” wrote General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. “I fear your delay has already permitted Bragg to prevent your junction. […] If the enemy should cross the Tennessee above Chattanooga, you will be hopelessly separated from Rosecrans, who may not be able to hold out on the south side.” Burnside would promise Lincoln himself that he would comply the following day.
Probably not trusting that Burnside could be counted upon, Washington had designed that Rosecrans also be reinforced by some of General Ulysses Grant’s troops from the Army of the Tennessee. The order was written on September 15th, but wasn’t received by Grant until this date.
Since the fall of Vicksburg, Grant’s army had been parceled out here and there. Some had gone south to Nathaniel Banks, while others went into Arkansas with Frederick Steel. Most had been spread out across Mississippi. But when Grant received the message, which was sent by Henry Halleck, and came through Memphis, he rounded up his best. “Urge Sherman to act with all possible promptness,” wrote Halleck. And Grant took it to heart.
“Please order at once one division of your army corps to proceed to re-enforce Rosecrans,” wrote Grant to William Tecumseh Sherman, “moving form here [Vicksburg] by brigades as fast as transportation can be had.” General James McPhearson was also ordered to contribute a division. In the end, Sherman would end up commanding the reinforcements.In Washington, other means of reinforcing Rosecrans were being discussed. General George Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, had been called to Washington to discuss the coming campaign. Since Longstreet was clearly in Tennessee, General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was weakened. Might not something be done to strike a blow towards Richmond?
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton did not believe so. Before Meade arrived, Stanton had called a meeting with the President, Halleck, Secretary of State William Seward, and Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase. Stanton revealed that he wanted to send 20,000 troops from Meade’s army to Chattanooga. If Lee could send such a force via the rickety Southern railroads, there’s no reason why Washington couldn’t do the same upon the northern tracks.
This was a compelling challenge, but Lincoln and Halleck both thought that Chattanooga would fall before the reinforcements could arrive. Additionally, if Lee found out that Meade had been weakened, he might try another offensive.
But Stanton was prepared for such arguments, and brought in Col. D.C. McCallum as an expert witness. McCallum was the director of the Department of Military Railroads, and had been prepped for the meeting. When asked by Lincoln how long it would take to rush 20,000 troops from Virginia to Chattanooga, McCallum assured him that he could do it in a week, even pledging his life that his calculations were accurate.
This must have touched Lincoln, for he immediately approved of the plan. Meade would be ordered to release the XI Corps, commanded by Oliver Otis Howard, and the XII Corps under John Slocum. It would take some time to organize, and Stanton would sequester himself away for two full days to pound out the details.
With Burnside coming from the north, Sherman coming from the west, and Meade’s troops moving east, one way or another, Lincoln was determined to fortify Rosecrans and save Chattanooga.” [1]
[1] Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 30, Part 1, p160, 164-168; Part 3, p785, 809-810; Mountains Touched With Fire by Wiley Sword; The Bristoe Campaign by Adrian Tighe.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/disaster-not-as-great-as-i-anticipated-lincoln-tries-to-reinforce-roscrans-from-everywhere/
D. Thursday, September 22, 1864: Battle of Fisher's Hill, Virginia. George Crook's [US] 8th Corps overpowers Jubal Early [CS] marking the start of Phil Sheridan's [US] destructive Shenandoah Valley campaign.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186409
D+ Thursday, September 22, 1864: Battle of Fisher's Hill, Virginia. The Battle of Fisher’s Hill was an excellent example of a surprise flanking movement against a defending force in a strong position. Crook's Flank Attack (22 September): During the morning Gen. George Crook moved his two divisions (about 5,000 men) to the base of Little North Mountain beyond St. Stephens Church, unseen by the Confederate signal station on Massanutten Mountain. About 1400 hours, Sheridan directed him to commence a flanking movement along the shoulder of the mountain. Crook formed his corps in two parallel columns and marched south until more than half of the command was beyond the Confederate left flank, which was held by Lomax's cavalry division. Crook encountered only scattered fire from a few surprised pickets.
About 1600 hours, Crook ordered his columns to face left and to charge. The soldiers charged down the side of the mountain, shouting at the tops of their lungs. The CS cavalry took to their horses and scattered. In their rush down the hill, Crook's divisions lost all order; a mass of men funneled through the ravine of the Middle Fork of Tumbling Run past the Barbe House and closed on the Confederate infantry on ``Ramseur's Hill.'' A second mass funneled to the right along an old road that penetrated to the rear of the Confederate positions. Grimes's brigade of North Carolinians held out against Crook's onslaught until Ricketts ordered his division forward. Hearing, more than seeing, that they were flanked, CS defenders along the remainder of the line began abandoning their entrenchments. Battle's CS brigade was sent to the left to confront Crook but was misdirected into a ravine and missed the fighting altogether. Sheridan advanced his other divisions, the men attacking generally up the ravines. Early's army was soon in full flight, abandoning equipment and 14 artillery pieces that could not be extricated from the works.
Phase Six. Rear Guard Action at Prospect Hill (22 September): The CS army was a shambles but attempted to collect itself at the base of Round Hill on the Valley Pike. Generals Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram and staff officers established a rear guard of artillery and infantry at Prospect Hill and held off the disorganized Union pursuit. During this action, Col. Alexander ``Sandie'' Pendleton, Stonewall Jackson's favorite staff officer, was wounded; he died the following day in Woodstock. The CS army retreated to Narrow Passage, and the wagon train went on to Mt. Jackson. Darkness and confusion among the Union victors prevented effective pursuit.
During the fighting at Fisher's Hill, a CS cavalry division turned back the Union cavalry at Milford (present day Overall) in the Luray Valley, preventing an attempt to gain Early's rear by crossing the gap to New Market. Sheridan remarked that if his cavalry had been successful, he could have captured Early's army.
The battle opened the Shenandoah Valley to the destruction of its agricultural base.
https://www.nps.gov/abpp/shenandoah/svs3-13.html
Thursday, September 22, 1864: Union troops outflank General Early’s (CSA) positions and attacked about 4 pm. The Confederate cavalry offered little resistance, and the infantry are unable to face the attacking force. The Confederate defense collapses. Early retreats to Rockfish Gap near Waynesboro. General Early loses another 1,200 men in the attack and now he only has half the men he had a week ago. This opens the Valley to the Union.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-180
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter LTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard WalkoSSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SFC David Reid, M.S, PHR, SHRM-CP, DTMSgt Christopher Collins SPC (Join to see) SPC Gary C. PO3 Lynn Spalding

LTC Stephen F. thanks for this excellent read and share! I chose:
1862: The Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln had waited a long time for any kind of victory to make new announcements about the war effort and slavery. Pres. Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. He told his Cabinet that he is keeping a

All great history, thank you for the sharing.