1st Cav Search and Destroy Mission

Thanks SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL for sharing a background on the 1st Cav search and destroy mission in in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, Vietnam.
04 January 1966, Operation MATADOR began in response to the intelligence reports. The 1st and 2nd Brigades were airlifted west of Pleiku and Kontum Provinces to begin a search and destroy mission. Conducted on the Vietnamese side of the Ton Le San River, this was the first time US troops actually went right to the Cambodian border. Previously they were under orders not to enter the three mile buffer zone along the border. During this operation, the 1st Cavalry saw the enemy flee across the border into Cambodia, confirming that the enemy had well-developed sanctuaries and base camps inside Cambodia. Operation MATADOR was closed out on 17 January.

Here is another S&D mission video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6KhyBY8GED8

Here is a summary of 1st Cav missions
"On 14 November, the first day of battle at LZ X-Ray in Ia Drang Valley, that Edward W. Freeman, while serving in the grade of Captain and flight leader and second-in-command of a helicopter lift unit at LZ X-Ray, Alpha Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) performed conspicuous acts of gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life and beyond the call of duty. As a flight leader and second in command of a 16-helicopter lift unit, he supported a heavily engaged American infantry battalion at Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley, Republic of Vietnam. The unit was almost out of ammunition after taking some of the heaviest casualties of the war, fighting off a relentless attack from a highly motivated, heavily armed enemy force. When the infantry commander closed the helicopter landing zone due to intense direct enemy fire, Captain Freeman risked his own life by flying his unarmed helicopter through a gauntlet of enemy fire time after time, delivering critically needed ammunition, water and medical supplies to the besieged battalion. His flights had a direct impact on the battle's outcome by providing the engaged units with timely supplies of ammunition critical to their survival, without which they would almost surely have experienced a much greater loss of life. After medical evacuation helicopters refused to fly into the area due to intense enemy fire, Captain Freeman flew fourteen separate rescue missions, providing lifesaving evacuation-of an estimated thirty seriously wounded soldiers, some of whom would not have survived had he not acted. All flights were made into a small emergency landing zone within one hundred to two hundred meters of the defensive perimeter where heavily committed units were perilously holding off the attacking elements. Captain Freeman's selfless acts of great valor, extraordinary perseverance and intrepidity were far above and beyond the call of duty or mission and set a superb example of leadership and courage for all of his peers. Captain Freeman's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself; his unit and the United States Army. For his valiant action, Captain Edward W. Freeman received the Medal of Honor.

On the same day and battle, Major Bruce P. Crandall, while serving with "A" Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), was lifting troops for a search and destroy mission from Plei Me, Vietnam, to Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley. On the fourth troop lift, the airlift began to take enemy fire, and by the time the aircraft had refueled and returned for the next troop lift, the enemy had Landing Zone X-Ray targeted. As Major Crandall and the first eight helicopters landed to discharge troops on his fifth troop lift, his unarmed helicopter came under such intense enemy fire that the ground commander ordered the second flight of eight aircraft to abort their mission. As Major Crandall flew back to Plei Me, his base of operations, he determined that the ground commander of the besieged infantry battalion desperately needed more ammunition. Major Crandall then decided to adjust his base of operations to Artillery Firebase Falcon in order to shorten the flight distance to deliver ammunition and evacuate wounded soldiers. While medical evacuation was not his mission, he immediately sought volunteers and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, led the two aircraft to Landing Zone X-Ray. Despite the fact that the landing zone was still under relentless enemy fire, Major Crandall landed and proceeded to supervise the loading of seriously wounded soldiers aboard his aircraft. Major Crandall's voluntary decision to land under the most extreme fire instilled in the other pilots the will and spirit to continue to land their own aircraft, and in the ground forces the realization that they would be resupplied and that friendly wounded would be promptly evacuated. This greatly enhanced morale and the will to fight at a critical time. After his first medical evacuation, Major Crandall continued to fly into and out of the landing zone throughout the day and into the evening. That day he completed a total of 22 flights, most under intense enemy fire, retiring from the battlefield only after all possible service had been rendered to the Infantry Battalion. His actions provided critical resupply of ammunition and evacuation of the wounded. Major Crandall's daring acts of bravery and courage in the face of an overwhelming and determined enemy are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army. For his valiant action, Major Bruce P. Crandall received the Medal of Honor.

It was during the battle at LZ X-Ray that "A" Company, 7th Cavalry was moving through the valley to relieve a friendly unit surrounded by an enemy force of estimated regimental size. First Lieutenant Walter J. Marm led his platoon through withering fire until they were finally forced to take cover. Realizing that his platoon could not hold very long, and seeing four enemy soldiers moving into his position, he moved under heavy fire and annihilated all four. Then, seeing that his platoon was receiving intense fire from a concealed machine gun, he deliberately exposed himself to draw its fire. Locating its position, he attempted to destroy it with an antitank weapon. Although he inflicted casualties, the weapon did not silence the enemy fire. Disregarding the intense fire directed on him and his platoon, he charged thirty meters across open ground and hurled grenades into the enemy position, killing some of the eight insurgents manning it. Although severely wounded, when his grenades were expended, and armed with only a rifle, he continued the momentum of his assault on the position and killed the remainder of the enemy. For his valiant action, First Lieutenant Walter J. Marm was awarded the Medal of Honor.

In the early morning hours of the next day of the fight, 15 November, reinforcements immediately began to cover the battle at LZ X-Ray. A mortar and a reconnaissance platoon of "D" Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, located at LZ Victor - about 2 miles away, air assaulted into LZ X-Ray, arriving around 0900 hours. The LZ was under heavy fire as the units jumped from their hovering helicopters. They were directed to get in a position behind the perimeter of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry to reinforce their firepower. The balance of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment force marched from LZ_Victor, arriving at LZ X-Ray before noon.

Joining in with the main body of "C" Company, 7th Cavalry, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry continued on unopposed to rescue their cut-off platoon. They brought the platoon back with all wounded and dead. Of the twenty-nine man platoon, nine were killed and thirteen were wounded. Survivors of "C" Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry was replaced on line by the fresh "B" Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. The battalions formed a strong perimeter and prepared for more action in the night.

On 16th November, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, having seventy-nine men killed and one hundred-twenty one wounded was ordered back to the rear for reorganization. The battle continued for two more days. With the help of reinforcements and overwhelming firepower, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry and 1st and 2nd Battalions, 7th Cavalry forced the North Vietnamese to abandon their attack and withdraw back into Cambodia.

By 1500 hours, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry turned over LZ X-Ray to the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry and 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. After helping clear the area, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, less "A" Company were airlifted to the Camp Holloway airfield at Pleiku City.

On the morning of 17 November, with the close out of action at LZ X-Ray, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, with "A" Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry attached, walked out of LZ X-Ray and headed for a location, identified as LZ Albany, to set up blocking positions to reinforce the exhausted skytroopers and prepare for extraction from the battle area and get out of the area targeted for an impending B-52 strike.

As the troopers moved safely out of the area, the new weapon, Operation ARC LIGHT, introduced to support the US Ground Forces, struck terror into the hearts of even the most hardened enemy soldier. Shortly after noon, a large area suddenly erupted with hundreds of thunderous explosions. The B-52 bombers had struck the area of the NVA withdrawal. The big bombers systematically worked over large areas of the Chu Pong Massif.
Early in the afternoon of 17 November, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Command Group and "A" Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry reached LZ Albany. The column was 550 yards long. "C" Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry and "A" Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry put out flank security. Not known at the time, NAV soldiers of the fresh 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment (which had not seen action) deployed down the northeast side of the column. Survivors of the 33rd NAV Regiment deployed at the head of the 2nd Battalion column. As they drew near LZ Albany, the exhausted troopers was ambushed by the NVA units.

At 1320 hours mortar rounds exploded in the clearing and down the length of the column followed by a violent assault which fragmented the column into small groups. When the firing began, the troopers drop into the tall elephant grass where it is impossible for the soldiers of either side to identify friend or foe except at extremely close range. Within minutes, the situation becomes a wild melee, a shoot-out, with the gunfighters killing not only the enemy but sometimes their friends just a few feet away.

For the next two hours, the battle roared. Douglas A-1E Skyraiders were brought in to drop napalm and 250 pound bombs which slowed down enemy actions. Artillery was brought in. By dark, "B" Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry had landed to reinforce LZ Albany. There was a small perimeter at LZ Albany and one at the tail of the column. In between troopers were being hounded and killed throughout the night. Also, in the night, a few isolated troopers escaped trying to make it to the artillery position at LZ Columbus.

On 18 November daylight broke over a quiet and tense battlefield. Survivors began the grim task of recovering the dead from the intermingled bodies of both sides. By the 19th of November, evacuation of the wounded and dead was complete. On 20 November, after 3 days and nights on that bloody, hellish, haunted battleground, the survivors of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry were airlifted out. The casualties for the NVA was reported as 403 dead and 150 wounded. Total First Team casualties at LZ Albany were reported as 151 killed, 121 wounded and 4 missing in action. Nearly half of the 300 men killed in the Pleiku Campaign died at LZ Albany.

When the Pleiku Campaign of SILVER BAYONET ended on 25 November, troopers of the First Team had paid a heavy price for its success, having lost some three hundred troopers killed in action. However, they had killed 3,561 North Vietnamese soldiers and captured 157 more. The troopers destroyed two of three regiments of a North Vietnamese Division, earning the first Presidential Unit Citation awarded to a division in Vietnam. The enemy had been given their first major defeat and their carefully laid plans for conquest had been torn apart.

On 17 December, after a short rest, the 3rd Brigade went into action to conduct a four-day operation known as CLEAN HOUSE in the vicinity of Binh Khe, in Binh Dinh Province's Soui Ca River Valley. From a position northeast of the valley, troopers moved down from high ground to sweep through suspected VC areas. By the Christmas Holidays, the 1st Cavalry Division returned to its original base of operations at An Khe on Highway 19.

Soon, the intelligence sections recommended a return to the Western Highlands early in 1966 in hopes of encountering the enemy reassembling in the unpopulated jungles. However a new threat emerged in Binh Dinh Province, a region of abrupt mountains and populated coastal plains. The Army of the Republic Vietnam (ARVN) 22nd Division, responsible for that area, was spread thin trying to keep Highway 19 open and secure. The intelligence staff of the 1st Cavalry Division had confirmed that the 2nd Regiment, Vietcong Main Force and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 18th and 19th Regiments were operating in the area. These three regiments comprised the NVA Division known as the "Sao Vang" or "Yellow Star" Division.

On 04 January 1966, Operation MATADOR began in response to the intelligence reports. The 1st and 2nd Brigades were airlifted west of Pleiku and Kontum Provinces to begin a search and destroy mission. Conducted on the Vietnamese side of the Ton Le San River, this was the first time US troops actually went right to the Cambodian border. Previously they were under orders not to enter the three mile buffer zone along the border. During this operation, the 1st Cavalry saw the enemy flee across the border into Cambodia, confirming that the enemy had well-developed sanctuaries and base camps inside Cambodia. Operation MATADOR was closed out on 17 January.

The Chinese Lunar New Year begins on the phases of the moon and each of the years in the a 12 year cycle is named after an animal. The Chinese year of 1966, the year of the "Horse", began on 21 January 1966. Just before midnight more than 400 helicopters of the 1st Cavalry Division flew over the darkness of the Central Highlands. One of the helicopters broadcast a message to the unseen people of the surrounding area. "Attention members of the National Liberation Front. It is the Year of the Horse. It is also the year of the Horse Division. The 1st Cavalry Division will continue to strike from the sky as a constellation of death to all those who support Godless Communism. It will thunder across the heavens and strike everywhere, no matter where you hide. At midnight listen for the New Year and the thunder the heralds your destruction." At midnight a 66 round mass barrage of high explosives was fired to bring in the New Year - followed by white phosphorus rounds for their pyrotechnic qualities. The year of the Flying Horsemen had began in Central Highlands.

On 25 January 1966, following the truce for the Tet holiday and Lunar New Year, MASHER/WHITE WING, which were the code names for the operations of the 3rd Brigade in Binh Dinh Province, began. The 3rd Brigade gathered its gear and weapons and began to move by highway and air to staging areas in Eastern Binh Dinh Province. The opening phase of the mission included the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 12th Cavalry as well as the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry -- a reconnaissance unit of scout, gun and infantry heliborne elements. The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry reconnoitered ahead of the convey and along both sides of the road, searching for potential ambushes.

On 28 January, Operation MASHER, the first phase, began, The 3rd Brigade assaulted North of Bong Son and LZ Dog and soon encountered heavy resistance by the NVA. Contact by the enemy diminished in the first two days of February as the North Vietnamese continued their withdrawal to the north and west. In the first week of combat, the division had lost seventy-seven troopers and the enemy losses amounted to an estimated 1,350 killed in action. Two battalions of the NVA 22nd Regiment had been rendered ineffective.

On 07 February, Operation WHITE WING began the second phase of the "search and destroy" mission. On 16 February, following heavy enemy engagement, the battle weary 3rd Brigade, returned to the Division's home base of An Khe and was replaced in the field by the 1st Brigade. While the 1st Brigade patrolled in the valleys around LZ Bird, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 5th Cavalry and 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry, of the 2nd Brigade encircled the "Iron Triangle", the regimental headquarters of the NVA. Aided by artillery and air support, the three battalions continued fighting for four days against a tenacious enemy defense.

On 17 February, "B" Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry air assaulted into a LZ located in the "Crow's Foot" area of the Kim Son Valley and by 0915 hours came into contact with a VC company armed with heavy weapons and a large number of automatic weapons. Two additional companies of the battalion were quickly committed to exploit the contact. A third company assaulted to the southeast and immediately engaged another heavily armed unit. Intensive tube and aerial artillery fire were delivered on the area throughout the day. By 1800 hours, a sweep through the vacated defensive positions of the enemy revealed 127 KIA. A large number of mortars and recoilless rifles were left behind. It was concluded that the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry had fought and decimated the anti-aircraft battalion of the Yellow Star Division as well as the signal company of the 2nd VC Main Force Regiment.

Interrogating VC Prisoner
On 19 - 21 February, one of the main actions occurred in an area known as the "Iron Triangle", an elaborate, well fortified defensive position twelve miles south of Bong Son. During interrogation, a prisoner revealed the location of the NVA 22nd Regimental headquarters. Elements of the 2nd Brigade advanced into the area and were met by fierce resistance. Units of the NVA 22nd Regiment attempted to reinforce its headquarters, but were cut down in the crossfire of two companies of the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry. The next three days the area was saturated with artillery fire and B-52 strikes. All resistance collapsed after a final B-52 strike.

On 01 March the final phase of WHITE WING commenced, moving into the jungle covered Cay Giep Mountains. B-52s blasted openings in the thick jungle canopy, permitting engineer teams to descend from helicopters to clear out landing zones for the 2nd Brigade. Sweeping down the slopes of the Cay Giep Mountains, the 2nd Brigade encountered little resistance as the main body of the NVA 6th and 18th Battalions had fled, departing two days earlier, following the first air assault.

On 06 March 1966, Operation MASHER/WHITE WING ended and was, by all tactical measures, pronounced a military success with the enemy losing its grip on the Binh Dinh Province; however, its name would be heard again and again during the next six years. The 1st Cavalry Division had once again made an effective use of mobility and firepower. Helicopters airlifted entire infantry battalions a total of seventy-eight times and moved artillery batteries fifty-five times. During MASHER/WHITE WING the 1st Cavalry Division had maintained constant contact with the enemy for the forty-one day operation, an unprecedented feat in the Vietnam War. In the actions, the Division clashed with all three regiments of the Sao Vang Division and rendered five of its nine battalions ineffective for combat.

On 06 May, in the midst of two more Operations, LEWIS and CLARK and DAVY CROCKETT, the Division experienced its first change of command when Major General Harry W. O. Kinnard turned over his post to his replacement, Major General John Norton. General Norton, a veteran paratrooper, was no stranger to the First Team or airmobility. He had commanded a battle group in Korea in 1959-60 and later, on the Howze Board had help pioneer airmobility.

On 16 May, the next major Operation, CRAZY HORSE, commenced during the hot summer, with the temperature soaring to 110 degrees. The search and destroy mission extended into the heavy jungle covered hills between Soui Ca and the Vinh Thanh Valleys. The 1st Brigade went into action against the 2nd Viet Cong Regiment. Intelligence indicated that the Viet Cong were massing in a natural corridor known as the "Oregon Trail", planning to attack the Special Forces Camp on 19 May; the birthday of Ho Chi Minh. Initial contact was made by Company "B", 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry at LZ Hereford. Company "A", 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry was airlifted to a nearby point to join the battle. The two companies held off superior enemy forces throughout the night. The next morning more elements of the 12th Cavalry and the entire 1st Brigade became involved in CRAZY HORSE. The fighting now consisted of short but bitter engagements in tall elephant grass and heavily canopied jungle. The battleground covered approximately 20 kilometers with the Viet Cong holed up on three hills. Once they were surrounded, all available firepower was concentrated in their area. The Viet Cong regiment was hit with artillery, aerial rockets, tactical air strikes by F-4s and bombs from high flying B-52s. Many of the enemy soldiers, if not killed outright by the devastation, were cut down by heavy crossfire. Many important military documents, detailing the Viet Cong infrastructure in Binh Dinh Province, were discovered.

On 18 May, in the course of the fighting, a squad leader with "B" Company, 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Staff Sergeant Jimmy G. Stewart, demonstrated the leadership and courage necessary to engage and destroy the enemy. Early in the morning, a reinforced North Vietnamese company attacked "B" Company, which was manning a defensive perimeter. The surprise onslaught wounded five members of a six man squad caught in the direct path of the enemy's thrust. Sergeant Stewart became a lone defender of vital terrain -- virtually one man against a hostile platoon. Refusing to take advantage of a lull in the firing which would have permitted him to withdraw, Sergeant Stewart elected to hold his ground to protect his fallen comrades and prevent an enemy penetration of the company perimeter. As the full force of the platoon-sized man attack struck his lone position, he fought like a man possessed; emptying magazine after magazine at the determined, on-charging enemy. The enemy drove almost to his position and hurled grenades, but Sergeant Stewart decimated them by retrieving and throwing the grenades back. Exhausting his ammunition, he crawled under intense fire to his wounded team members and collected ammunition that they were unable to use. Far past the normal point of exhaustion, he held his position for four harrowing hours and through three assaults, annihilating the enemy as they approached and before they could get a foothold. As a result of his defense, the company position held until the arrival of a reinforcing platoon which counterattacked the enemy, now occupying foxholes to the left of Sergeant Stewart's position. After the counterattack, his body was found in a shallow enemy hole where he had advanced in order to add his fire to that of the counterattacking platoon. Eight enemy dead were found around his immediate position, with evidence that fifteen others had been dragged away. The wounded, whom he gave his life to protect, were recovered and evacuated. For his valiant actions, Staff Sergeant Jimmy G. Stewart received the Medal of Honor.

On 21 May, in a second major engagement of Operation CRAZY HORSE, the platoon of Sergeant David C. Dolby, a member of "B" Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, suddenly came under intense fire from the enemy located on a ridge immediately to the front. Six members of the platoon were killed instantly and a number were wounded, including the platoon leader. Sergeant Dolby's every move brought fire from the enemy. However, aware that the platoon leader was critically wounded, and that the platoon was in a precarious situation, Sergeant Dolby moved the wounded men to safety and deployed the remainder of the platoon to engage the enemy. Subsequently, his dying platoon leader ordered Sergeant Dolby to withdraw the forward elements to rejoin the platoon. Despite the continuing intense enemy fire and with utter disregard for his own safety, Sergeant Dolby positioned able-bodied men to cover the withdrawal of the forward elements, assisted the wounded to the new position, and he, alone, attacked enemy positions until his ammunition was expended. Replenishing his ammunition, he returned to the area of most intense action, single-handedly killed three enemy machine gunners and neutralized the enemy fire, thus enabling friendly elements on the flank to advance on the enemy redoubt. He defied the enemy fire to personally carry a seriously wounded soldier to safety where he could be treated and, returning to the forward area, he crawled through withering fire to within fifty meters of the enemy bunkers and threw smoke grenades to mark them for air strikes. Although repeatedly under fire at close range from enemy snipers and automatic weapons, Sergeant Dolby directed artillery fire on the enemy and succeeded in silencing several enemy weapons. He remained in his exposed location until his comrades had displaced to more secure positions. His actions of unsurpassed valor during four hours of intense combat were a source of inspiration to his entire company, contributed significantly to the success of the overall assault on the enemy position, and were directly responsible for saving the lives of a number of his fellow soldiers. For his valiant actions, Sergeant David C. Dolby received the Medal of Honor. On 05 June 1966, Operation CRAZY HORSE was concluded.


Redhat Stands Ready To Hookup
In July 1966 the 1st Cavalry Division Support Command added a fourth FFSE due to the large commitment of the numerous battalions of the division in the central highlands, By November 1966, due to the increased combat activity, a fifth FFSE element was added. In January 1968, a new dimension in support was added to the responsibilities of the Support Command. In November 1968, all units began air, land and sealift operations to the Hue-Phu Bai area in northern I Corps in preparation for immediate support of the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force military operations.

On 02 August 1966, Operation PAUL REVERE II was launched to deny areas of the rich rice fields to the famished Viet Cong. Significant contact with the enemy did not occur until 08 August, at LZ Juliett. Company "A", 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry came under heavy fire from a reinforced enemy battalion. In several hours of intense fighting, Alpha Company turned back repeated mass attacks. Timely artillery and air strikes eliminated the opportunity for the enemy to surround the Skytroopers. The roar of helicopters from two companies from the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry arriving at LZ Juliett frightened the enemy, causing them to flee.

On 02 August, the main body of the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry departed Ft. Carson, flew to the port of embarkment at Oakland, California and boarded the USS Gaffey. Following this movement, the advance party of the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry departed Peterson Field, Colorado on 08 August and arrived at Qui Nhon on 11 August. The main body made a brief stop at Okinawa on 15 August for a brief shore leave and after 20 days afloat, arrived at Qui Nhon on 20 August. They disembarked into LSTs and moved ashore. "HHC" and "D" Company joined in a wheeled vehicle convey to Camp Radcliff at An Khe and the remainder of the Battalion were flown in by C-130s. The 5th Battalion, rounding out the 3rd maneuvering element of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, began its initial training exercises at An Khe. On 05 September, following their first exposure to the jungle environment, the Battalion deployed for an additional training/operation mission of road security along Highway 19 from An Khe to Pleiku, with the Battalion Command Post (CP) located atop Mang Yang Pass. The first major deployment of the 5th Battalion was to LZ Hammond in preparation for Operation IRVING.

On 15 August Operation PAUL REVERE II ended with the battle of Hill 534, on the southern portion of Chu Pong Massif near the Cambodian Border. The operation had begun on 02 August, after Company "A" 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry suddenly ran into a North Vietnamese battalion and Company "B", 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry began slugging it out with enemy troops in bunkers. A total of two battalions of Skytroopers were committed to the fight. When it ended the next morning, 138 NVA bodies were counted.

At the end of PAUL REVERE II, which had killed a total of 861 of the enemy, a task force of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry was organized for Operation BYRD. The task force was dispatched to Binh Thaun Province, in the southern area of II Corps, to support the Revolutionary Development Program and bring the long months of Operation BYRD to a productive finish.

At that time the heavily populated province of Binh Thaun was almost totally under the power of two Viet Cong Battalions. The South Vietnamese government controlled little more than the provincial capital, Phan Thiet, a coastal town known for its fishermen and its fish sauce manufacturing industry. In sixteen months the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry had fanned out from Phan Thiet and cleared the enemy from the populous "triangle" area that stretched north and west of Phan Thiet. They also cleared provincial roads that had been closed by the Viet Cong. Most significantly, the troopers reopened Highway 1, an action that restored commerce to life between Phan Thiet and Saigon.

On 13 September, Operation THAYER I began. It was one of the largest air assaults launched by the 1st Cavalry Division. Its mission was to rid Binh Dinh Province of NVA and VC soldiers and the political infrastructure of the Viet Cong. On 16 September, troopers of the 1st Brigade discovered an enemy regimental hospital, a factory for making grenades, antipersonnel mines and a variety of weapons. On 19 September, elements of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry traded fire with two NVA combat support companies.

On 21 September, near Bon Son in Binh Dinh Province, part of the squad of Private First Class Billy L. Lauffer, "C" Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, was suddenly struck at close range by an intense machine gun crossfire from two concealed bunkers astride the squad's route. Private First Class Lauffer, the second man in the column, saw the lead man fall and noted that the remainder of the squad was unable to move. Two comrades, previously wounded and being carried on litters, were lying helpless in the beaten zone of the enemy fire. Reacting instinctively, Private First Class Lauffer quickly engaged both bunkers with fire from his rifle, but when the other squad members attempted to maneuver under his covering fire, the enemy fusillade increased in volume and thwarted every attempt to move. Seeing this and his wounded comrades helpless in the open, Private First Class Lauffer rose to his feet and charged the enemy machine gun positions, firing his weapon and drawing the enemy's attention. Keeping the enemy confused and off balance, his one man assault provided the crucial moments for the wounded point man to crawl to a covered position, the squad to move the exposed litter patients to safety, and his comrades to gain more advantageous positions. Private First Class Lauffer was fatally wounded during his selfless act of courage and devotion to his fellow soldiers. His gallantry. at the cost of his life, served as an inspiration to his comrades and saved the lives of an untold number of his companions. For his valiant action, Private First Class Billy L. Lauffer received the Medal of Honor.

In the closing phases of Operation THAYER I and the prelude to Operation IRVING, enemy elements of the 7th and 8th Battalions, NVA 18th Regiment had been reported in the village of Hoa Hoi. On 02 October, at about 8:00 hours, a "Blue Team" platoon of "A" Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, flying a routine reconnaissance mission, was diverted and ordered to land and access the degree of enemy build up. Entering the village, they engaged a heavy concentration of the enemy forces and as the battle wore on, they called for backup at about 1000 hours. Quickly, the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, deployed to encircle the village. At 1200 hours, "B" Company, 12th Cavalry, the first of the backup units to arrive, air assaulted into a landing area 300 meters east of the village in the face of heavy resistance. Immediately, the units came under intense small arms and mortar fire. "A" Company, 12th Cavalry landed to the southwest and began a movement northeast to the village. In the meantime, "C" Company, 12th Cavalry landed north of the village and began moving south.

The arrival of the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry took pressure off the "Blue Team" platoon of "A" Troop and, still heavily engaged with the entrenched enemy and taking heavy fire, were able to withdraw and make it back to the LZ, taking their dead with them. By late in the afternoon, "A" and "B" Companies, 1st Battalion had linked up and established blocking positions which prevented the enemy from slipping out of the village. During the course of the evening, "A" and "C" Companies, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry were airlifted into an area east of the village to assist in the containment of the enemy. Additional support of artillery forward observers from "A" Battery, 2nd Battalion, 19th Artillery helped as enemy locations were identified and called in during the night.

In the morning of 03 October, "C" Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry and "C" Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry attacked south to drive the remaining enemy forces into "A" and "B" Companies, 12th Cavalry which were braced in strong blocking positions to take the attack. This last action broke the strong resistance of the enemy and mission was completed.

Lasting from 02 - 28 October, Operation IRVING was one of a trio of operations launched by Americans, South Vietnamese and South Korean Forces. The mission was established to entrap Viet Cong soldiers who were fleeing Operation THAYER I. The mission was to trap the enemy in a pocket between a group of hills and the coastline of Binh Dinh Province. The operations were complicated by a heavy concentration of civilians living in the operational area, but great care was taken to minimize civilian casualties.

Trapped in a tight cordon, the enemy lost 2,063 killed. The free World Allies captured 2,071 NVA and Viet Cong troops - an unusually large number in Vietnam fighting. The 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for valor and aggressive pursuit of the enemy on 02 October, after reinforcing a "Blue Team" platoon from "A" Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry that was heavily engaged and outnumbered.

On October 25, Operation THAYER II continued the drive of pacification of the Binh Dinh Province. On 01 November troopers of "A" Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry and elements of the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry became engaged in a sharp fight with the 93rd Battalion and the 2nd Viet Cong Regiment. The action took place in the vicinity of National Route 1 and Dam Tra-O Lake south of the Cay Giep mountains. In Thayer II the enemy suffered a punishing loss of 1,757 killed.

On 31 October, Operation PAUL REVERE IV was launched by the 2nd Brigade. Its units included; 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry; 2nd Battalion, 12 Cavalry; "B" Troop. 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry and the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery. The operation called for extensive search and destroy in the areas of Chu Pong and the Ia Drang Valley as well as along the Cambodian Border. With only one exception only light contact with the enemy was achieved.

It was during this action that the platoon of Private First Class Lewis Albanese, "B" Company, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry was advancing through the densely covered terrain to establish a blocking position. The platoon received intense automatic weapons fire from close range. As other members of the platoon maneuvered to assault the enemy position, Private First Class Albanese was ordered to provide security for the left flank of the platoon. Suddenly, the left flank received fire from enemy soldiers located in a well-concealed ditch. Realizing the imminent danger to his comrades from this fire, Private First Class Albanese fixed his bayonet and moved aggressively into the ditch. His action silenced the sniper fire, enabling the platoon to resume movement toward the main enemy position. As the platoon continued to advance, the sound of heavy firing emanated from the left flank from a pitched battle that ensued in the ditch which Private First Class Albanese had entered. The ditch was actually a well-organized complex of enemy defenses designed to bring devastating flanking fire on the forces attacking the main position. Private First Class Albanese, disregarding the danger to himself, advanced one hundred meters along the trench and killed six of the snipers, who were armed with automatic weapons. Having exhausted his ammunition, Private First Class Albanese was mortally wounded when he engaged and killed two more enemy soldiers in fierce hand-to-hand combat. His unparalleled actions saved the lives of many members of his platoon who otherwise would have fallen to the sniper fire from the ditch, and enabled his platoon to successfully advance against an enemy force of overwhelming numerical superiority. For his valiant action, Private First Class Lewis Albanese received the Medal of Honor.

On 17 November, as part of Operation PAUL REVERE IV, rifle companies "A", "B" and "C" of the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment air assaulted into three widely dispersed LZs in the southwestern corner of Pleiku Province, LZ Lime, LZ Hawk and LZ Fatima, each contiguous to the Cambodian border. Previous missions into this area, a long used infiltration route from Cambodia, had failed to turn up any enemy ammunition caches, assembly areas or well traveled trails. At 1300 hours the first sighting and contact with the enemy was made by the 2nd platoon of "A" Company which resulted in a limited firefight.

Following four days of searching the area with minimal enemy contact, the 1st Battalion was still widely separated. "A" Company was located at LZ Lime, the main body of "B" Company was 13 kilometers south of Duc Co at LZ Fatima and "C" Company was nearly 2 kilometers south of LZ Hawk. By 21 November, "C" Company had three platoons in the field with the following strength; 1st platoon, 30; 2nd platoon and Command Post Group, 45; 3rd platoon, 35. The 4th platoon of 22 had remained at LZ Hawk. Before moving to a new location to the east, 13 men of the 3rd platoon evacuated a sick man and a cache of enemy weapons captured in an engagement of the previous night.

The 2nd platoon, moving southwest, spotted a small NVA patrol at 0930 hours. Following recon fire they called for supporting artillery fire in the direction of the enemy along the border. As the enemy fled into Cambodia, the 2nd platoon observed another group of NVA moving around a knoll and into an open area at 1005 hours. The 2nd platoon moved through the tall jungle grass, positioned themselves and began small arms fire on the enemy. In response to the intensity of the return fire which continued to build, artillery fire was directed at the knoll and surrounding open areas. Simultaneously the 3rd platoon moved forward to block any movement of the enemy toward the 2nd platoon, As soon as they were in position, they found themselves in an ambush and began to receive arms fire from the enemy on its three sides.

Following a delay in getting artillery to cover them, the 3rd platoon requested that the artillery fire continue. This was the last communication heard from them. In addition to the artillery fire, several Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) helicopters responded and made their first pass at 1105 hours. Additional aerial support was provided by A1E Skyfighters, scrambled from Pleiku, who dropped napalm on the enemy at 1205 hours followed by F-100 Super Sabers giving ground cover with Cluster Bomb Units (CBU) and twenty millimeter cannon fire at 1235 hours. Except for a few stray rounds from the departing NVA, the battle was over.

In the hour that it had taken to get the close air support, the 2nd platoon had remained heavily engaged with the enemy until the area was cleared by the aerial actions. "A" Company located the ambush site of the 3rd platoon and a search revealed that the 3rd platoon had suffered nineteen killed in action and three wounded. One later died of his wounds, leaving only 2 survivors. The 2nd platoon experienced fifteen killed in action and ten wounded. The foliage was too thick to cut an LZ and the wounded were lifted out one by one by Hueys equipped with winches. The killed in action were placed in a cargo net and were lifted out by a CH-47 Chinook helicopter.

The next morning, a search of the battle area revealed 27 enemy bodies in the vicinity of the position of the 2nd platoon and an additional 118 enemy bodies in the vicinity of the artillery barrage and airstrikes. Documents taken from the enemy identified them as from three companies of the 5th Battalion, 101C NVA Regiment which was on its way to attack the artillery positions located in Duc Co. The reconnaissance of force by the three platoons of "C" Company had detected, interrupted and aborted the attack plan of the NVA as it had lost the element of surprise.

On 09 December the Division launched Operation ROVER to evacuate all civilians from the Kim Son Valley. By 14 December, the valley was clear and all civilians had been evacuated from the area, bringing Operation ROVER to a close with the valley being declared a "free-fire" zone. Now the heavy work of the troopers had just began as they moved in to drive the elusive enemy from the area.

On 17 December, heavy contact was made in the Highway 506 Valley just east of the Kim Son Valley. "C" Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry observed an enemy squad moving into the valley and went after them. Air support was called in to help and drew ground fire from several positions. The Infantry Platoon of "A" Troop 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry made an air assault into the valley and encountered heavy resistance. The 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry was also brought in, along with four infantry companies and two platoons of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry.

They attempted to encircle the enemy force of a "dug in" battalion. Night fell and an Air Force ship kept the area illuminated, but the encirclement was not complete and many of the enemy managed to escape. At least ninety-five did not as their bodies were found in a final sweep of the battle area on 19 December. On 27 December, Operation PAUL REVERE IV was closed out and 2nd Brigade troopers added their strength to Operation THAYER II."
From first-team.us/tableaux/chapt_08/


Below is a summary of search and destroy from 1965 when it was more effective in the hearts and minds strategy than it was by 1968.
"1965 - Search and Destroy
Critics like Andrew Krepinevich have argued that the United States and South Vietnam could have succeeded in Vietnam had they only dispersed their troops into the villages to control the population, instead of using large numbers of troops in search-and-destroy operations. But such a shift would have caused the enemy to shift gears, too, by massing forcesand defeating the dispersed forces in detail - the Communists actually did so on a number occasions, and their strategic deliberations show that they viewed South Vietnamese regulars, notmilitia units, as the principal obstacle to victory.

The three most basic operations or missions were search and destroy, clearing, and security. These terms and the concepts they described were new, and like most new names and ideas, they were understood by some and misunderstood by others. Best known and most misunderstood was search and destroy. Search and destroy operations began in 1964, before U.S. ground forces were committed. These operations were conducted to locate the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong main force units in and around their base areas and to attack them by fire and maneuver. Since enemy infiltration of the populated areas depended heavily on the availability of base areas near the population centers, destruction of close-in base areas received priority attention.

The second of the three basic missions was clearing. Clearing operations were conducted to drive enemy forces away from populated areas and to allow small units to carry on securing activities among the people. These operations upset the pattern of mutual support that was essential to the enemy's integrated main force-local force effort. Operation IRVING demonstrated the clearing of the central coastal area of Binh Dinh Province and the effects of the operation on the inhabitants.

Securing operations, the last of the three missions, were directed at the enemy in the hamlets-at the infrastructure and the farmers by day and at the Viet Cong guerrillas by night-who operated individually as well as in squads and platoons. These enemy elements required tactics that were different from those used against the main forces. Saturation patrols and squad-size ambushes, which were highly risky in the jungle against the main forces, proved to be effective against the local guerrillas. During securing operations, U.S. and allied forces maintained a respect for private property and for the people whose hearts and minds were the objectives of the enemy forces.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, who was appointed Ambassador to Saigon in mid-1964, believed that a carefully calibrated air campaign would be the most effective means of exerting pressure against the North and, at the same time, the method least likely to provoke intervention by China. Taylor thought conventional Army ground forces ill suited to engage in day-to-day counterinsurgency operations against the Viet Cong in hamlets and villages. Ground forces might, however, be used to protect vital air bases in the South and to repel any North Vietnamese attack across the demilitarized zone, which separated North from South Vietnam. Together, a more vigorous counterinsurgency effort in the South and military pressure against the North might buy time for Saigon to put its political house in order, boost flagging military and civilian morale, and strengthen its military position in the event of a negotiated peace.

Throughout the spring of 1965 the Viet Cong sought to disrupt pacification and oust the government from many rural areas. The insurgents made deep inroads in the central coastal provinces and withstood government efforts to reduce their influence in the Delta and in the critical provinces around Saigon. Committed to static defense of key towns and bases, government forces were unable or unwilling to respond to attacks against rural communities.

By the summer of 1965, the Viet Cong, strengthened by several recently infiltrated NVA regiments, had gained the upper hand over government forces in some areas of South Vietnam. With U.S. close air support and the aid of Army helicopter gunships, Saigon's forces repelled many enemy attacks, but suffered heavy casualties. Elsewhere highland camps and border outposts had to be abandoned. ARVN's cumulative losses from battle deaths and desertions amounted to nearly a battalion a week. Saigon was hard pressed to find men to replenish these heavy losses and completely unable to match the growth of Communist forces from local recruitment and infiltration.

In early March 1965, General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army, was in South Vietnam to assess the situation. Upon returning to Washington, he recommended a substantial increase in American military assistance, including several combat divisions. He wanted U.S. forces either to interdict the Laotian panhandle to stop infiltration or to counter a growing enemy threat in the central and northern provinces.

The commitment of U.S. forces in 1965 prevented the enemy from attaining his objectives and averted collapse in the south. In this environment of impending disaster U.S. units were first ordered to search for and destroy or neutralize North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces, base areas, and supply points. The question of how best to use large numbers of American ground forces was still unresolved on the eve of their deployment. Focusing on population security and pacification, some planners saw U.S. combat forces concentrating their efforts in coastal enclaves and around key urban centers and bases. Under this plan, such forces would provide a security shield behind which the Vietnamese could expand the pacification zone; when required, American combat units would venture beyond their enclaves as mobile reaction forces. This concept, largely defensive in nature, reflected the pattern established by the first Army combat units to enter South Vietnam.

But the mobility and offensive firepower of U.S. ground units suggested their use in remote, sparsely populated regions to seek out and engage main force enemy units as they infiltrated into South Vietnam or emerged from their secret bases. The pattern of deployment that actually developed in South Vietnam was a compromise between the first two concepts. On 28 July 1965, President Johnson announced plans to deploy additional combat units and to increase American military strength in South Vietnam to 175,000 by year's end.

During 1966 and 1967, the Americans engaged in a constant search for tactical concepts and techniques to maximize their advantages of firepower and mobility and to compensate for the constraints of time, distance, difficult terrain, and an inviolable border. Here the war was fought primarily to prevent the incursion of NVA units into South Vietnam and to erode their combat strength. In the highlands, each side pursued a strategy of military confrontation, seeking to weaken the fighting forces and will of its opponent through attrition. Each sought military victories to convince opposing leaders of the futility of continuing the contest. For the North Vietnamese, however, confrontation in the highlands had the additional purpose of relieving allied pressure in other areas, where pacification jeopardized their hold on the rural population.

Four phases of the Vietnam strategy have been described by General Westmoreland. All four phases emphasized strengthening the Republic of Vietnam armed forces. In addition, during the first phase, from mid-1965 to mid-1966, the enemy offensive was blunted.. The second phase, from mid-1966 to the end of 1967, saw the mounting of major offensives that forced the enemy into defensive positions and drove him away from the population centers. In phase three, beginning in early 1968, the Vietnamese armed forces were addition?ally strengthened, and more of the war effort was turned over to them. The final phase called for further weakening of the enemy and strengthening of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam as the U.S. role became, in the words of General Westmoreland, "progressively superfluous."

The communist army simply refused to fight unless it had a distinct advantage. The JCS reported in 1972 that of all the American patrols conducted in 1967 and 1968-years of peak combat activity in the war-less than 1 percent resulted in contact with the enemy. When South Vietnamese patrols are considered as well, the number drops to one-tenth of 1 percent! (Edward Doyle, Samuel Lipsman et al., America Takes Over, The Vietnam Experience [Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1982], 60).

The third phase of the war began in early 1968. Although the ob?jectives of the second phase included wearing down the enemy and driving him away from the population centers, they did not take into consideration that the enemy was a victim of his own propaganda, that he was irrational, or that he was prepared to pay an awesome price to enter the cities of South Vietnam.

Early in the third phase the U.S. command recognized that the term "search and destroy" had unfortunately become associated with "aimless searches in the jungle and the destruction of property." In April 1968 General Westmoreland therefore directed that the use of the term be discontinued. Operations thereafter were defined and discussed in basic military terms which described the type of operation, for example, reconnaissance in force. Besides avoiding the mis-understanding of search and destroy operations, the change expressed the difference between U.S. operations in the early stages of the war and those conducted during the third phase. In the early stages, the terms "clearing," "securing," and "search and destroy" had served as doctrinal teaching points to show the relationship between military operations and the pacification effort. They had been adopted in 1964 for use by military and civilian agencies involved in pacification. By 1968, when the terms were dropped, the pacification program had developed to the point where civilian-military co-ordination was routine."
From globalsecurity.org/military/ops/vietnam2-search-and-destroy.htm
COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. LTC Ivan Raiklin, Esq. Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown CW5 (Join to see) MSG Andrew White SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx SSgt (Join to see) TSgt Joe C. SGT John " Mac " McConnell SP5 Mark Kuzinski SPC (Join to see) SrA Christopher Wright Cpl Joshua Caldwell LTC Wayne Brandon LTC Bill Koski

Great share.

Thats my guys if you ain’t Cav you ain’t Shit Hooah