Posted on Jun 27, 2016
What was the most significant event on June 25 during the U.S. Civil War?
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1862-39 Battle of Oak Grove June 25 1862
Battle of Oak GroveHenrico County, VAJune 25th 18621862 (Published 1/28/2018)Website: http://youshouldknowthings.wordpress....Youtube: http://www.youtube.com...
Federal forces tunneling under Confederate fortifications at Vicksburg, Mississippi in 1863 and at Petersburg, Virginia in 1864. Tunneling requires stability in the walls and roof – enter the lowly sandbag for the sides with timbers across the tops for stopping the “roof” from collapsing.
Building field fortifications requires a lot of “consumable” materials. One material that comes in high demand is the lowly sandbag. In 1863, engineers on Morris Island recorded using over 46,000 sandbags in just one portion of the siege lines. Reporting on that operation, Major Thomas Brooks described the standard sandbag of the time: “The dimensions of the filled sand-bags, when laid, varied from 6 by 10 by 24 inches to 5 ½ by 11 by 23 inches, and contained .85 of a cubic foot of damp sand, weighing about 85 pounds; hence 32 to the cubic yard. So 32 sandbags made up one cubic yard of earthwork. And 32 sandbags filled with 85 pounds of earth weigh 2,720 pounds – one and a third short tons.”
“Corduroying of military roads during the Civil War seems to have been exclusively a Yankee technique. Writing from Virginia in the winter of 1861-62, an anonymous rebel comments on “. . .the incredible quantity and tenacity of the mud. Locomotion in rainy or damp weather baffles all description; and to say that I have seen whole wagon trains fast in the road, with mud up to the axles, would afford but a faint idea of the reality. If timber had been plentiful, the roads might have been ‘corduroyed’ according to the Yankee plan, viz., of piling logs across the road, filling the interstices with small limbs, and covering with mud; but timber was not to be procured for such a purpose; what little there might be was economically served out for fuel.”
Preparation for what would become the Seven Day’s battles began a day before the battles. Maj Gen McLellan tried to interrupt Robert E. Lee’s plans by launching an offensive at Oak Grove, Virginia in 1862 “Lee detailed his plan in General Order No. 75, sent to his commanders on June 24. Though it has been called complex, in truth Lee's plan was the essence of simplicity. He required three separate columns to be prepared to march on the same morning. Each column would move on its own road, and each would march - or attack - only if the commander saw an advantage. The advantage, to be sure, depended upon the success of the other columns, but if one column did not succeed, another was not required to attack. Lee based his plan to dislodge the largest army in the history of the New World on what would prove to be an accurate understanding of the Federal position and its weaknesses. He believed that the immense size of the Federal army could actually be used against it. Major General George B. McClellan's army required more than 600 tons of food and supplies each day. The long tendrils of the Union supply line began in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Annapolis and wound southward over the waves of the Atlantic and the Chesapeake Bay and up the broad York and Pamunkey Rivers to White House, Virginia, from whence the food and supplies traveled over the Richmond & York River Railroad. The railroad provided McClellan with a lifeline, and to protect it he had to divide his army by placing part of it south of the Chickahominy River (the Richmond side) and part of it north of the Chickahominy (the White House side). From Lee's perspective, the Federals' dependence on the railroad made it an obvious target, and their deployment astride the river suggested that he might be able to attack and defeat one wing before the other wing could intervene.
But there were great risks involved. To move upon the railroad and still maintain a defensive force before Richmond, Lee would have to divide his own army. If McClellan saw through the plan and decided to throw the bulk of his troops upon the token force of 25,000 men that Lee had left in the defenses of the city, the capital might fall and Lee's plan would forever be seen as folly. Thus Lee's first offensive revealed what would become over the next two years his hallmarks: opportunism and a willingness to take risks. Lee studied the enemy, exploited his weaknesses as early as possible, and sought every opportunity to attack before he could be prepared.”
Roads: “During the Civil War, almost all roads were of dirt that became quagmires of mud after heavy rains. Only a few hard-surface all-weather roads existed. These were called “macadamized” roads after their inventor, Scottish civil engineer John Loudon McAdam, who in turn was indebted to the road builders of the ancient Roman empire. The pavement (from Latin pavinientum) was made of compressed layers of gravel set on a cement bed with limestone shoulders. Ditches at the sides of the road provided necessary drainage.
Such a paved road was the Shenandoah Valley turnpike, put to good use by Stonewall Jackson in the 1862 campaign. The road was opened in 1840 and ran for 80 miles from Winchester to Staunton. But during the war such roads were rarities, and armies had to move their men and equipment over the ubiquitous dirt roads, as they had since war began. Also dating from ancient times was the technique of surfacing muddy roads with branches and small tree trunks laid crosswise to allow passage of wagon trains and artillery over mud. From its appearance, this was called “corduroy road.” Larger logs were used for military bridges and other semi-permanent structures.
Because the felling and cutting of saplings and branches large enough to sustain heavy loads required considerable labor, fence rails were used if these were available. Union army chief engineer Brig. Gen. Orlando Poe, reporting on the engineering achievements during the Carolinas campaign, noted that corduroying was a very simple affair when there were plenty of fence rails, but involved the severest labor in their absence. Engineering officers found that two good fences would furnish enough rails to corduroy a strip of road as long as one of the fences so as to make it passable.
A plank road, corduroy surfaced with heavy planking, was a permanent and more sophisticated road used over swamps and boggy areas. The Winston-Salem and Fayetteville plank road in North Carolina was the longest in the United States, being 120 miles long.“
Pictures: 1862-06-25 Battle of Oak Grove Map -red and blue; Corduroy road construction as drawn by Jano Casari; 1863-06-25 Battle at Hoovers Gap Map; 1863-06-25 1530 on June 25, 1863, Union sappers detonated a mine beneath the 3rd Louisiana Redan
A. 1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Inconclusive, the first of the Seven Days’ battles. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan advanced his lines along the Williamsburg Road with the objective of bringing Richmond within range of his siege guns. Union forces attacked over swampy ground with inconclusive results, and darkness halted the fighting. McClellan’s attack was not strong enough to derail the Confederate offensive that already had been set in motion. Estimated Casualties: 1,057 total (US 516; CS 541)
Lee planned to begin his offensive on June 26, but on June 25 he suffered an anxious day. McClellan, correctly guessing that Lee was up to something, launched a preemptive attack against the defenses of Richmond just west of Seven Pines in a battle that became known as Oak Grove. After insignificant gains, the Federal commander withdrew his troops in the evening, confident that he controlled both the battlefield and the campaign. In truth, by not pressing his attack, McClellan had given Lee a great gift - more time - and Lee wasted none of it. The next day, Gen. Robert E. Lee seized the initiative by attacking at Beaver Dam Creek north of the Chickahominy.
B. 1863: Battle of Hoover’s Gap, Tennessee. Decisive union victory. The 1st Kentucky Cavalry was on duty when Colonel John T. Wilder’s sudden and unexpected advance took them completely by surprise. Confederate forces retreated after a valiant fight through the seven-mile length of the gap and Wilder pushed on through, seizing the hills at the south end of Hoover’s Gap, which he was determined to hold until reinforcements arrived. This was the very position that Confederate forces had planned to use for their own defense. Brigadier General William B. Bate rushed his Confederates to the front and for over an hour they gallantly attacked Wilder’s entrenched, but badly outnumbered, brigade.
Company E, of the 72nd Indiana overran its position and while returning to the battle line, and being fired upon by Confederates, came across three small children, two girls and a boy, trying to find their way out of the woods amid the shower of bullets. The firing suddenly stopped. Sgt. Wilhite of the 72nd dismounted, helped the children over a fence and headed them toward a house out of range of the battle. The fighting then resumed and Company E went about its business of fighting its way back to the brigade.
The battle continued throughout the day, with charge after charge of brave Southern men being repulsed by a storm of Yankee bullets from their new “seven-shooters.” Bate’s Tennesseans staggered but filled their ranks and came on time and time again only to fall back in a hail of bullets. General Bate reorganized his men, brought up his reserves, and together with Bushrod Johnson’s newly arrived brigade, began preparations for a new attack on Wilder’s position. In the meantime, Wilder was ordered to withdraw immediately, but refused and steadfastly maintained that he could hold his position and would take responsibility for the consequences, even under the threat of arrest. He was accurate in this assessment and the last attack of the day was easily repulsed. By 7:00 p.m., Union reinforcements had arrived and on June 26th Confederate forces withdrew toward Tullahoma.
C. 1863: Vicksburg, Mississippi. Fierce fighting in the breach. Confederates repulsed the attack. One Federal group of sappers tunneled underneath the Third Louisiana Redan, named for its defenders, and on June 25 detonated barrels of black powder that blasted a hole in the works. Union soldiers surged into the breach only to be met by a counterattack. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting ensued for hours before the attackers were driven out. Union soldiers try to exploit an explosion under the Confederate entrenchments at Vicksburg. The Rebel line easily repulses the attack.
D. 1864: Sandbag day at Petersburg, Virginia. Federal force engineers begin digging a tunnel from Union lines to underneath one of the main Confederate redoubts in Petersburg. On June 25, 1864, at 2:45 p.m., Major-General Ambrose Burnside had a pressing need for sandbags: “We have commenced a mine that will reach the batteries of the enemy in our front by a reach of 115 yards. I have given orders for all the necessary changes of the line to make the work ordinarily secure. We want about 7,000 sand-bags or more. I think we can break the line of the enemy in due time if we can have the necessary facilities. We want heavy guns very much. Can we have the sand-bags?”
That mine, in particular, would require a lot of sandbags. Major-General George Meade responded promptly, granting that request for sandbags: “I have directed Duane to send you an engineer officer and a company of sappers, and Hunt to send you sand-bags and siege guns. I am delighted to hear you can do anything against the enemy’s line, and will furnish you everything you want, and earnest wishes for your success besides. I would have been over to see you to-day, but certain movements of the enemy on the left have kept me here.”
“Delighted!” The slow turning siege could grind forward, but needed just a few thousand sandbags. Now time for staff officers to do what they get paid for. Brigadier-General Henry Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, became the “stuckee” on the sandbag tasking request, as he was also directing the siege operations and generally kept sandbags around to support the artillery positions.
Hunt first inquired, at around 6 p.m. that day, to Brigadier-General John Barnard, running engineering operations out of City Point, specifically requesting that Brigadier-General Henry Benham provide the required sandbags. Barnard, no slouch for military protocol, pointed out that Benham came under Meade’s orders, but “There ought to be 100,000 sand-bags somewhere.” He also suggested inquiries with Brigadier-General Godfrey Weitzel, of the Army of the James. But, hold that for a moment.
Upon receipt of Barnard’s reply, Hunt sent the request for sandbags directly to Benham. And Benham, as he did so often with such matters, replied at 8:10 p.m. that the materials were not exactly at arm’s reach: “All my siege materials, as I have kept General Meade fully advised, have been retained at Fort Monroe. On receipt of your dispatch to General Barnard, through Colonel Porter, I at once sent an aide down in a steamer to bring it up, and I expect it to-morrow afternoon or evening, and will send them out to you at once, if you then wish them, of which please advise me.”
Battle of Oak Grove, Henrico County, VA, June 25th 1862
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=maBGc84Hqr4
FYI Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D.LTC Trent KlugSSgt David M. PV2 Larry Sellnow MSgt Gloria Vance LCpl (Join to see) SFC Dr. Jesus Garcia-Arce, Psy.D ~1907216:SPC Maurice Evans] SFC Ralph E KelleyMAJ (Join to see) SMSgt David A Asbury SFC Dr. Jesus Garcia-Arce, Psy.D SSG Bill McCoy CSM Charles Hayden COL Randall C. SGT Jim Arnold SPC Jon O. SPC Woody Bullard
Building field fortifications requires a lot of “consumable” materials. One material that comes in high demand is the lowly sandbag. In 1863, engineers on Morris Island recorded using over 46,000 sandbags in just one portion of the siege lines. Reporting on that operation, Major Thomas Brooks described the standard sandbag of the time: “The dimensions of the filled sand-bags, when laid, varied from 6 by 10 by 24 inches to 5 ½ by 11 by 23 inches, and contained .85 of a cubic foot of damp sand, weighing about 85 pounds; hence 32 to the cubic yard. So 32 sandbags made up one cubic yard of earthwork. And 32 sandbags filled with 85 pounds of earth weigh 2,720 pounds – one and a third short tons.”
“Corduroying of military roads during the Civil War seems to have been exclusively a Yankee technique. Writing from Virginia in the winter of 1861-62, an anonymous rebel comments on “. . .the incredible quantity and tenacity of the mud. Locomotion in rainy or damp weather baffles all description; and to say that I have seen whole wagon trains fast in the road, with mud up to the axles, would afford but a faint idea of the reality. If timber had been plentiful, the roads might have been ‘corduroyed’ according to the Yankee plan, viz., of piling logs across the road, filling the interstices with small limbs, and covering with mud; but timber was not to be procured for such a purpose; what little there might be was economically served out for fuel.”
Preparation for what would become the Seven Day’s battles began a day before the battles. Maj Gen McLellan tried to interrupt Robert E. Lee’s plans by launching an offensive at Oak Grove, Virginia in 1862 “Lee detailed his plan in General Order No. 75, sent to his commanders on June 24. Though it has been called complex, in truth Lee's plan was the essence of simplicity. He required three separate columns to be prepared to march on the same morning. Each column would move on its own road, and each would march - or attack - only if the commander saw an advantage. The advantage, to be sure, depended upon the success of the other columns, but if one column did not succeed, another was not required to attack. Lee based his plan to dislodge the largest army in the history of the New World on what would prove to be an accurate understanding of the Federal position and its weaknesses. He believed that the immense size of the Federal army could actually be used against it. Major General George B. McClellan's army required more than 600 tons of food and supplies each day. The long tendrils of the Union supply line began in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Annapolis and wound southward over the waves of the Atlantic and the Chesapeake Bay and up the broad York and Pamunkey Rivers to White House, Virginia, from whence the food and supplies traveled over the Richmond & York River Railroad. The railroad provided McClellan with a lifeline, and to protect it he had to divide his army by placing part of it south of the Chickahominy River (the Richmond side) and part of it north of the Chickahominy (the White House side). From Lee's perspective, the Federals' dependence on the railroad made it an obvious target, and their deployment astride the river suggested that he might be able to attack and defeat one wing before the other wing could intervene.
But there were great risks involved. To move upon the railroad and still maintain a defensive force before Richmond, Lee would have to divide his own army. If McClellan saw through the plan and decided to throw the bulk of his troops upon the token force of 25,000 men that Lee had left in the defenses of the city, the capital might fall and Lee's plan would forever be seen as folly. Thus Lee's first offensive revealed what would become over the next two years his hallmarks: opportunism and a willingness to take risks. Lee studied the enemy, exploited his weaknesses as early as possible, and sought every opportunity to attack before he could be prepared.”
Roads: “During the Civil War, almost all roads were of dirt that became quagmires of mud after heavy rains. Only a few hard-surface all-weather roads existed. These were called “macadamized” roads after their inventor, Scottish civil engineer John Loudon McAdam, who in turn was indebted to the road builders of the ancient Roman empire. The pavement (from Latin pavinientum) was made of compressed layers of gravel set on a cement bed with limestone shoulders. Ditches at the sides of the road provided necessary drainage.
Such a paved road was the Shenandoah Valley turnpike, put to good use by Stonewall Jackson in the 1862 campaign. The road was opened in 1840 and ran for 80 miles from Winchester to Staunton. But during the war such roads were rarities, and armies had to move their men and equipment over the ubiquitous dirt roads, as they had since war began. Also dating from ancient times was the technique of surfacing muddy roads with branches and small tree trunks laid crosswise to allow passage of wagon trains and artillery over mud. From its appearance, this was called “corduroy road.” Larger logs were used for military bridges and other semi-permanent structures.
Because the felling and cutting of saplings and branches large enough to sustain heavy loads required considerable labor, fence rails were used if these were available. Union army chief engineer Brig. Gen. Orlando Poe, reporting on the engineering achievements during the Carolinas campaign, noted that corduroying was a very simple affair when there were plenty of fence rails, but involved the severest labor in their absence. Engineering officers found that two good fences would furnish enough rails to corduroy a strip of road as long as one of the fences so as to make it passable.
A plank road, corduroy surfaced with heavy planking, was a permanent and more sophisticated road used over swamps and boggy areas. The Winston-Salem and Fayetteville plank road in North Carolina was the longest in the United States, being 120 miles long.“
Pictures: 1862-06-25 Battle of Oak Grove Map -red and blue; Corduroy road construction as drawn by Jano Casari; 1863-06-25 Battle at Hoovers Gap Map; 1863-06-25 1530 on June 25, 1863, Union sappers detonated a mine beneath the 3rd Louisiana Redan
A. 1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Inconclusive, the first of the Seven Days’ battles. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan advanced his lines along the Williamsburg Road with the objective of bringing Richmond within range of his siege guns. Union forces attacked over swampy ground with inconclusive results, and darkness halted the fighting. McClellan’s attack was not strong enough to derail the Confederate offensive that already had been set in motion. Estimated Casualties: 1,057 total (US 516; CS 541)
Lee planned to begin his offensive on June 26, but on June 25 he suffered an anxious day. McClellan, correctly guessing that Lee was up to something, launched a preemptive attack against the defenses of Richmond just west of Seven Pines in a battle that became known as Oak Grove. After insignificant gains, the Federal commander withdrew his troops in the evening, confident that he controlled both the battlefield and the campaign. In truth, by not pressing his attack, McClellan had given Lee a great gift - more time - and Lee wasted none of it. The next day, Gen. Robert E. Lee seized the initiative by attacking at Beaver Dam Creek north of the Chickahominy.
B. 1863: Battle of Hoover’s Gap, Tennessee. Decisive union victory. The 1st Kentucky Cavalry was on duty when Colonel John T. Wilder’s sudden and unexpected advance took them completely by surprise. Confederate forces retreated after a valiant fight through the seven-mile length of the gap and Wilder pushed on through, seizing the hills at the south end of Hoover’s Gap, which he was determined to hold until reinforcements arrived. This was the very position that Confederate forces had planned to use for their own defense. Brigadier General William B. Bate rushed his Confederates to the front and for over an hour they gallantly attacked Wilder’s entrenched, but badly outnumbered, brigade.
Company E, of the 72nd Indiana overran its position and while returning to the battle line, and being fired upon by Confederates, came across three small children, two girls and a boy, trying to find their way out of the woods amid the shower of bullets. The firing suddenly stopped. Sgt. Wilhite of the 72nd dismounted, helped the children over a fence and headed them toward a house out of range of the battle. The fighting then resumed and Company E went about its business of fighting its way back to the brigade.
The battle continued throughout the day, with charge after charge of brave Southern men being repulsed by a storm of Yankee bullets from their new “seven-shooters.” Bate’s Tennesseans staggered but filled their ranks and came on time and time again only to fall back in a hail of bullets. General Bate reorganized his men, brought up his reserves, and together with Bushrod Johnson’s newly arrived brigade, began preparations for a new attack on Wilder’s position. In the meantime, Wilder was ordered to withdraw immediately, but refused and steadfastly maintained that he could hold his position and would take responsibility for the consequences, even under the threat of arrest. He was accurate in this assessment and the last attack of the day was easily repulsed. By 7:00 p.m., Union reinforcements had arrived and on June 26th Confederate forces withdrew toward Tullahoma.
C. 1863: Vicksburg, Mississippi. Fierce fighting in the breach. Confederates repulsed the attack. One Federal group of sappers tunneled underneath the Third Louisiana Redan, named for its defenders, and on June 25 detonated barrels of black powder that blasted a hole in the works. Union soldiers surged into the breach only to be met by a counterattack. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting ensued for hours before the attackers were driven out. Union soldiers try to exploit an explosion under the Confederate entrenchments at Vicksburg. The Rebel line easily repulses the attack.
D. 1864: Sandbag day at Petersburg, Virginia. Federal force engineers begin digging a tunnel from Union lines to underneath one of the main Confederate redoubts in Petersburg. On June 25, 1864, at 2:45 p.m., Major-General Ambrose Burnside had a pressing need for sandbags: “We have commenced a mine that will reach the batteries of the enemy in our front by a reach of 115 yards. I have given orders for all the necessary changes of the line to make the work ordinarily secure. We want about 7,000 sand-bags or more. I think we can break the line of the enemy in due time if we can have the necessary facilities. We want heavy guns very much. Can we have the sand-bags?”
That mine, in particular, would require a lot of sandbags. Major-General George Meade responded promptly, granting that request for sandbags: “I have directed Duane to send you an engineer officer and a company of sappers, and Hunt to send you sand-bags and siege guns. I am delighted to hear you can do anything against the enemy’s line, and will furnish you everything you want, and earnest wishes for your success besides. I would have been over to see you to-day, but certain movements of the enemy on the left have kept me here.”
“Delighted!” The slow turning siege could grind forward, but needed just a few thousand sandbags. Now time for staff officers to do what they get paid for. Brigadier-General Henry Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, became the “stuckee” on the sandbag tasking request, as he was also directing the siege operations and generally kept sandbags around to support the artillery positions.
Hunt first inquired, at around 6 p.m. that day, to Brigadier-General John Barnard, running engineering operations out of City Point, specifically requesting that Brigadier-General Henry Benham provide the required sandbags. Barnard, no slouch for military protocol, pointed out that Benham came under Meade’s orders, but “There ought to be 100,000 sand-bags somewhere.” He also suggested inquiries with Brigadier-General Godfrey Weitzel, of the Army of the James. But, hold that for a moment.
Upon receipt of Barnard’s reply, Hunt sent the request for sandbags directly to Benham. And Benham, as he did so often with such matters, replied at 8:10 p.m. that the materials were not exactly at arm’s reach: “All my siege materials, as I have kept General Meade fully advised, have been retained at Fort Monroe. On receipt of your dispatch to General Barnard, through Colonel Porter, I at once sent an aide down in a steamer to bring it up, and I expect it to-morrow afternoon or evening, and will send them out to you at once, if you then wish them, of which please advise me.”
Battle of Oak Grove, Henrico County, VA, June 25th 1862
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=maBGc84Hqr4
FYI Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D.LTC Trent KlugSSgt David M. PV2 Larry Sellnow MSgt Gloria Vance LCpl (Join to see) SFC Dr. Jesus Garcia-Arce, Psy.D ~1907216:SPC Maurice Evans] SFC Ralph E KelleyMAJ (Join to see) SMSgt David A Asbury SFC Dr. Jesus Garcia-Arce, Psy.D SSG Bill McCoy CSM Charles Hayden COL Randall C. SGT Jim Arnold SPC Jon O. SPC Woody Bullard
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Grant: Massive Siege of Vicksburg Leads to Union Victory | History
Watch all new episodes of Grant over three consecutive nights starting May 25th at 9/8c, and stay up to date on all of your favorite History Channel shows at...
Spencer repeating rifles were capable of firing 14 rounds per minute in 1863: “The Battle at Hoover’s Gap was the beginning of what was to be known as the ill-fated Tullahoma campaign. It was the first battle to see the use of repeater rifles. The loss of Hoover’s Gap resulted in the loss of Middle Tennessee, a blow from which the South would never recover, and ultimately set the stage for the Atlanta Campaign and Sherman’s March to the Sea one year later. It was also the beginning of the end of two military careers—Bragg and Rosecrans. Although over-shadowed by the battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, the importance and impact of those eleven rainy days in Tennessee cannot be denied.”
“The 1,500 Spencer repeating rifles were capable of firing 14 rounds per minute and proved to be the difference between Union forces and the numerically superior Confederates. General Thomas declared following the day’s battle that he had not expected to capture the gap for three days and that henceforth Wilder’s men would be known as the “Lightning Brigade.” Over two hundred, or nearly one forth of the Confederate forces, were killed or wounded at Hoover’s Gap while Wilder’s Brigade suffered only fifty-one casualties. General Bate later commented that judging from the fire power of the Union force, he thought he was outnumbered five to one. It may very well be that this first encounter with repeating rifles at Hoover’s Gap was the beginning of the expression which traveled around the Confederate army for the remainder of the war, that the “Yankees could load on Sunday and shoot all the rest of the week.”
Below are a number of journal entries from 1863 and xx which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly.
Thursday, June 25, 1863: Louis Lėon, an infantryman from North Carolina in Ewell’s corps, finds himself at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the farthest north that Lee’s men will penetrate. He writes in his journal about the march and the reception by the town: “Marched on, passed through Leesburg, Canada, Hockinsville, and Centerville, all small villages. We got to Carlisle, Pa., at sundown. Marched 21 miles to-day. This city is certainly a beautiful place. It has 8,000 inhabitants, and we were treated very good by the ladies. They thought we would do as their soldiers do, burn every place we passed through, but when we told them the strict orders of General Lee they were rejoiced. Our regiment was provost guard in the city, but were relieved by the 21st Georgia Regiment, and we went to camp at the U. S. barracks. So far we have lived very good in the enemy’s country. We stayed here until the 30th, when we took the Baltimore pike road, crossed South Mountain at Holly Gap, passed through Papertown and Petersburg. We then left the Pike and took the Gettysburg road – 17 miles to-day. This has been a hard day for us, as we were the rear guard of the division, and it was very hot, close and very dusty, and a terrible job to keep the stragglers up.”
Thursday, June 25, 1863: A Unionist woman living in Vicksburg, records in her journal the bloody effects of the Yankee bombardment, and how it finally unnerved her: “A horrible day. The most horrible yet to me, because I’ve lost my nerve. we were all in the cellar, when a shell came tearing through the roof, burst up-stairs, tore up that room, and the pieces coming through both floors down into the cellar, one of them tore open the leg of H.’s pantaloons. This was tangible proof the cellar was no place of protection from them. On the heels of this came Mr. J. to tell us that young Mrs. P. had had her thigh-bone crushed. When Martha went for the milk she came back horror-stricken to tell us the black girl there had her arm taken off by a shell. For the first time I quailed. I do not think people who are physically brave deserve much credit for it; it is a matter of nerves. In this way I am constitutionally brave, and seldom think of danger until it is over; and death has not the terrors for me it has for some others. Every night I had lain down expecting death, and every morning rose to the same prospect, without being unnerved. It was for H. I trembled. But now I first seemed to realize that something worse than death might come: I might be crippled, and not killed. Life, without all one’s powers and limbs, was a thought that broke down my courage. I said to H., “You must get me out of this horrible place; I cannot stay; I know I shall be crippled.” Now the regret comes that I lost control, because H. is worried, and has lost his composure, because my coolness has broken down.”
Pictures: 1863-06-25 Skirmishes near Liberty Gap Tenn Map; 1863-06-23 Union mining operations under Fort Hill, Vicksburg, Mississippi; 1862-06-25 oak hill map; xx
A. Wednesday, June 25, 1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Inconclusive (Union forces withdrew to their lines.) Other Names: French’s Field, King’s School House
Location: Henrico County; Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862); Forces Engaged: Corps; Estimated Casualties: 1,057 total (US 516; CS 541)
Description: Oak Grove was the first of the Seven Days’ battles. On June 25, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan advanced his lines along the Williamsburg Road with the objective of bringing Richmond within range of his siege guns. Union forces attacked over swampy ground with inconclusive results, and darkness halted the fighting. McClellan’s attack was not strong enough to derail the Confederate offensive that already had been set in motion.
Lee planned to begin his offensive on June 26, but on June 25 he suffered an anxious day. McClellan, correctly guessing that Lee was up to something, launched a preemptive attack against the defenses of Richmond just west of Seven Pines in a battle that became known as Oak Grove. After insignificant gains, the Federal commander withdrew his troops in the evening, confident that he controlled both the battlefield and the campaign. In truth, by not pressing his attack, McClellan had given Lee a great gift - more time - and Lee wasted none of it. The next day, Gen. Robert E. Lee seized the initiative by attacking at Beaver Dam Creek north of the Chickahominy.
B. Thursday, June 25, 1863: Battle of Hoover’s Gap, Tennessee. Decisive union victory. The 1st Kentucky Cavalry was on duty when Colonel John T. Wilder’s sudden and unexpected advance took them completely by surprise. Confederate forces retreated after a valiant fight through the seven-mile length of the gap and Wilder pushed on through, seizing the hills at the south end of Hoover’s Gap, which he was determined to hold until reinforcements arrived. This was the very position that Confederate forces had planned to use for their own defense. Brigadier General William B. Bate rushed his Confederates to the front and for over an hour they gallantly attacked Wilder’s entrenched, but badly outnumbered, brigade.
Company E, of the 72nd Indiana overran its position and while returning to the battle line, and being fired upon by Confederates, came across three small children, two girls and a boy, trying to find their way out of the woods amid the shower of bullets. The firing suddenly stopped. Sgt. Wilhite of the 72nd dismounted, helped the children over a fence and headed them toward a house out of range of the battle. The fighting then resumed and Company E went about its business of fighting its way back to the brigade.
The battle continued throughout the day, with charge after charge of brave Southern men being repulsed by a storm of Yankee bullets from their new “seven-shooters.” Bate’s Tennesseans staggered but filled their ranks and came on time and time again only to fall back in a hail of bullets. General Bate reorganized his men, brought up his reserves, and together with Bushrod Johnson’s newly arrived brigade, began preparations for a new attack on Wilder’s position. In the meantime, Wilder was ordered to withdraw immediately, but refused and steadfastly maintained that he could hold his position and would take responsibility for the consequences, even under the threat of arrest. He was accurate in this assessment and the last attack of the day was easily repulsed. By 7:00 p.m., Union reinforcements had arrived and on June 26th Confederate forces withdrew toward Tullahoma.
Background: In early May, Rosecrans knew that Bragg’s army had been weakened by detachments having been sent to aid the Vicksburg Campaign—11,300 men in all (9,300 infantry and 2,000 cavalry). And, then on June 13, General John Hunt Morgan and his 2,500 cavalrymen rode out on what was to be the “Great Ohio Raid.” The time was now right for Union forces to move so on June 24, Rosecrans’ army of 50,000 men began its advance on Tullahoma. Rosecrans very cleverly attempted to deceive Bragg from seeing the drive on Manchester as the main Union objective and sent troops to Shelbyville as a devisive maneuver. The goal was the capture of Hoover’s Gap, then Manchester Pike and Bradyville, ultimately moving onto Manchester, thus forcing Bragg to recall his forces to Tullahoma. If Union forces could capture Manchester and force Bragg to abandon the Shelbyville-Wartrace line, they could also make his Tullahoma base untenable with another flanking move, thereby cutting Bragg off from his main supply base at Chattanooga. Hoover’s Gap was critical for the success of this plan.
The task of capturing Manchester was assigned to Corps commanders George H. Thomas and Alexander M. McCook, both seasoned veterans of war. Before dawn on the 24th, Colonel John T. Wilder’s Brigade moved out in advance of Thomas’ corps. A slow drizzling rain turned the roads into quagmires. This rain continued for the next eleven days, and was described by Rosecrans as “one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee.” Despite the discomfort, however, Wilder’s men marched on eagerly, anxious to try their new Spencer repeating rifles, in what they knew would be a major encounter with the enemy. Wilder himself had arranged for the financing of these new weapons with his hometown bank in Greensburg, Indiana when the Army brass in Washington had refused to purchase them. At 10:00 a.m. Colonel Wilder and his Brigade, almost nine miles ahead of the rest of their division, reached the entrance to Hoover’s Gap.
C. Thursday, June 25, 1863: Vicksburg, Mississippi. Fierce fighting in the breach. Confederates repulsed the attack. One Federal group of sappers tunneled underneath the Third Louisiana Redan, named for its defenders, and on June 25 detonated barrels of black powder that blasted a hole in the works. Union soldiers surged into the breach only to be met by a counterattack. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting ensued for hours before the attackers were driven out. Union soldiers try to exploit an explosion under the Confederate entrenchments at Vicksburg. The Rebel line easily repulses the attack.
Background: On May 19, Grant, hoping for a quick victory over a defeated foe, ordered Sherman’s corps to attack along the Graveyard Road northeast of town. Pemberton, the engineer, had developed a series of strong works around Vicksburg, and the Federals were repulsed by the defenders of Stockade Redan, suffering 1,000 casualties.
Three days later, coordinated assaults were made: Sherman along the Graveyard Road, Maj. Gen. James McPherson hitting the center from the Jackson Road, and Maj. Gen. John McClernand attacking from the south along the lines of the Baldwin Ferry Road and the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. Although McClernand’s men briefly penetrated what was called the Railroad Redoubt, all three columns were repulsed, with a total loss of over 3,000 men.
The Siege of Vicksburg
These losses and the strong Confederate defensive works convinced Grant to take the town by siege, cutting it off from all supply. He initiated a plan that is still studied today as a classic example of how to conduct siege warfare.
Reinforced to over 70,000 strong, for weeks his men dug trenches that zigged and zagged but steadily brought them closer to Pemberton’s positions.
D. Saturday, June 25, 1864: Sandbag day at Petersburg, Virginia. Federal force engineers begin digging a tunnel from Union lines to underneath one of the main Confederate redoubts in Petersburg. On June 25, 1864, at 2:45 p.m., Major-General Ambrose Burnside had a pressing need for sandbags: “We have commenced a mine that will reach the batteries of the enemy in our front by a reach of 115 yards. I have given orders for all the necessary changes of the line to make the work ordinarily secure. We want about 7,000 sand-bags or more. I think we can break the line of the enemy in due time if we can have the necessary facilities. We want heavy guns very much. Can we have the sand-bags?”
That mine, in particular, would require a lot of sandbags. Major-General George Meade responded promptly, granting that request for sandbags: “I have directed Duane to send you an engineer officer and a company of sappers, and Hunt to send you sand-bags and siege guns. I am delighted to hear you can do anything against the enemy’s line, and will furnish you everything you want, and earnest wishes for your success besides. I would have been over to see you to-day, but certain movements of the enemy on the left have kept me here.”
“Delighted!” The slow turning siege could grind forward, but needed just a few thousand sandbags. Now time for staff officers to do what they get paid for. Brigadier-General Henry Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, became the “stuckee” on the sandbag tasking request, as he was also directing the siege operations and generally kept sandbags around to support the artillery positions.
Hunt first inquired, at around 6 p.m. that day, to Brigadier-General John Barnard, running engineering operations out of City Point, specifically requesting that Brigadier-General Henry Benham provide the required sandbags. Barnard, no slouch for military protocol, pointed out that Benham came under Meade’s orders, but “There ought to be 100,000 sand-bags somewhere.” He also suggested inquiries with Brigadier-General Godfrey Weitzel, of the Army of the James. But, hold that for a moment.
Upon receipt of Barnard’s reply, Hunt sent the request for sandbags directly to Benham. And Benham, as he did so often with such matters, replied at 8:10 p.m. that the materials were not exactly at arm’s reach: “All my siege materials, as I have kept General Meade fully advised, have been retained at Fort Monroe. On receipt of your dispatch to General Barnard, through Colonel Porter, I at once sent an aide down in a steamer to bring it up, and I expect it to-morrow afternoon or evening, and will send them out to you at once, if you then wish them, of which please advise me.”
1. Tuesday, June 25, 1861: Minor clashes occurred between the forces of Johnson and General Patterson, a Union commander in the Shenandoah Valley.
[historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-june-1861/]
2. Wednesday, June 25, 1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186206]
3. Wednesday, June 25, 1862 --- Gen. McClellan, that night, sends Sec. of War Stanton this message: that he expects that Jackson has indeed reinforced Lee, and that he expects a Confederate attack---and adds that he desperately needs more troops. Otherwise, McClellan indicates that he is perfectly prepared to resist the enemy or—if defeated—to blame the government for not getting enough troops: PORTER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 25, 1862--10.40 p.m. (Received June 26--3 a.m.) Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War: “The information I received on this side tends to confirm impression that Jackson will soon attack our right and rear. Every possible precaution is being taken. If I had another good division I could laugh at Jackson. The task is difficult, but this army will do its best, and will never disgrace the country. Nothing but overwhelming forces can defeat us. Indications are of attack on our front tomorrow. Have made all possible arrangements. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General.
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1862]
4. Wednesday, June 25, 1862: Battle of The Orchards, Virginia. Joseph Hooker [US] tries to push forward to gain ground for better positioning of McClellan's siege guns.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186206]
5. Wednesday, June 25, 1862: A series of closely linked battles known as The Seven Days Battle or The Seven Day Retreat start near Mechanicsville as the Army of the Potomac begins its advance to Richmond.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186206]
6. Wednesday, June 25, 1862: McClellan ordered his men to advance on the left flank of Richmond. He also sent a letter to Washington DC that stated that he was facing an army of 200,000 men and that if he lost to them it would not be his fault and that he would die fighting with his men. McClellan made it clear that if he did lose the battle, there was nothing to stop the Confederates attacking the capital. To the end McClellan remained cautious. But it was a simple fact. If he did lose, what would stop Lee and then Davis entering Washington DC?
[historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-june-1862/]
7. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- Siege of Vicksburg, Day 34
civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
8. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- Siege of Port Hudson, Day 29
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
9. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- Louis Lėon, an infantryman from North Carolina in Ewell’s corps, finds himself at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the farthest north that Lee’s men will penetrate. He writes in his journal about the march and the reception by the town: “Marched on, passed through Leesburg, Canada, Hockinsville, and Centerville, all small villages. We got to Carlisle, Pa., at sundown. Marched 21 miles to-day. This city is certainly a beautiful place. It has 8,000 inhabitants, and we were treated very good by the ladies. They thought we would do as their soldiers do, burn every place we passed through, but when we told them the strict orders of General Lee they were rejoiced. Our regiment was provost guard in the city, but were relieved by the 21st Georgia Regiment, and we went to camp at the U. S. barracks. So far we have lived very good in the enemy’s country. We stayed here until the 30th, when we took the Baltimore pike road, crossed South Mountain at Holly Gap, passed through Papertown and Petersburg. We then left the Pike and took the Gettysburg road – 17 miles to-day. This has been a hard day for us, as we were the rear guard of the division, and it was very hot, close and very dusty, and a terrible job to keep the stragglers up.”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
10. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- A Unionist woman living in Vicksburg, records in her journal the bloody effects of the Yankee bombardment, and how it finally unnerved her: “A horrible day. The most horrible yet to me, because I’ve lost my nerve. we were all in the cellar, when a shell came tearing through the roof, burst up-stairs, tore up that room, and the pieces coming through both floors down into the cellar, one of them tore open the leg of H.’s pantaloons. This was tangible proof the cellar was no place of protection from them. On the heels of this came Mr. J. to tell us that young Mrs. P. had had her thigh-bone crushed. When Martha went for the milk she came back horror-stricken to tell us the black girl there had her arm taken off by a shell. For the first time I quailed. I do not think people who are physically brave deserve much credit for it; it is a matter of nerves. In this way I am constitutionally brave, and seldom think of danger until it is over; and death has not the terrors for me it has for some others. Every night I had lain down expecting death, and every morning rose to the same prospect, without being unnerved. It was for H. I trembled. But now I first seemed to realize that something worse than death might come: I might be crippled, and not killed. Life, without all one’s powers and limbs, was a thought that broke down my courage. I said to H., “You must get me out of this horrible place; I cannot stay; I know I shall be crippled.” Now the regret comes that I lost control, because H. is worried, and has lost his composure, because my coolness has broken down.”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
11. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- This morning, Jeb Stuart and his three brigades of Rebel troopers set out on their big ride around Hooker’s army. His troopers skirmish with Union infantry guarding a large wagon train.
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
12. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- Battle of Hoover’s Gap, Tennessee: Beginning yesterday, Gen. Rosecrans has directed Gen. George Thomas to march his corps to this and a few other gaps in the Highland Rim range of hills in central Tennessee, in order to force Bragg’s right flank. Thomas’s troops approach this location, but leading out in front are the mounted infantry of Col. John T. Wilder of Indiana, whose men are equipped with the repeating Spencer rifle. Wilder arrives first, and drives off the Rebel cavalry posted there. In the meantime, infantry from the brigade of Gen. Bate from A.P. Stewart’s division arrives, and attacks Wilder, who is now entrenched on higher ground. Bate is driven back with heavy losses, but is later joined by another brigade under Bushrod Johnson, and the two brigades launch another assault, also repulsed with heavy losses. Thomas sends a note asking Wilder to withdraw, but Wilder insists on staying. He is reinforced by troops under Rousseau and Brannan.
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
A Wednesday, June 25, 1862 --- Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Eastern Theater, Peninsula Campaign - SEVEN DAYS’ BATTLES, Day 1: McClellan, at last moving forward, advances troops from two divisions of the III Corps to push the Confederates back in order to get his lines close enough to mount his siege guns within range of Richmond. He orders Gen. Joseph Hooker to advance three brigades from his division to advance across a large expanse of swampy ground and push the Confederate pickets back. As Grover’s brigade advances, Wright’s Rebels push them back with heavy losses. Sickles pushes his brigade forward, and likewise a Southern counterattack causes his troops to retreat. Both sides throw in increasingly larger numbers of reinforcements until a stalemate lulls the field into relative quiet. McClellan finally visits the battlefield from his headquarters, and orders more assaults in the evening. In the end, the Union gains 600 yards and puts the swampy ground behind them; the Rebels do not have to retreat one inch. Although often counted as the first of the Seven Days’ Battles, Oak Grove is in no way connected with or a precursor to the movements by Lee that causes these battles to ensue. Stalemate.
Losses: Killed Wounded Missing Total
Union 68 503 55 626
Confederate 13 362 66 441
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1862]
A+ Wednesday, June 25, 1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Other Names: French’s Field, King’s School House
Location: Henrico County; Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862); Forces Engaged: Corps
Estimated Casualties: 1,057 total (US 516; CS 541)
Description: Oak Grove was the first of the Seven Days’ battles. On June 25, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan advanced his lines along the Williamsburg Road with the objective of bringing Richmond within range of his siege guns. Union forces attacked over swampy ground with inconclusive results, and darkness halted the fighting. McClellan’s attack was not strong enough to derail the Confederate offensive that already had been set in motion. The next day, Gen. Robert E. Lee seized the initiative by attacking at Beaver Dam Creek north of the Chickahominy. Result(s): Inconclusive (Union forces withdrew to their lines.)
[nps.gov/abpp/battles/va015.htm]
A++ Wednesday, June 25, 1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Lee detailed his plan in General Order No. 75, sent to his commanders on June 24. Though it has been called complex, in truth Lee's plan was the essence of simplicity. He required three separate columns to be prepared to march on the same morning. Each column would move on its own road, and each would march - or attack - only if the commander saw an advantage. The advantage, to be sure, depended upon the success of the other columns, but if one column did not succeed, another was not required to attack. Lee based his plan to dislodge the largest army in the history of the New World on what would prove to be an accurate understanding of the Federal position and its weaknesses. He believed that the immense size of the Federal army could actually be used against it. Major General George B. McClellan's army required more than 600 tons of food and supplies each day. The long tendrils of the Union supply line began in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Annapolis and wound southward over the waves of the Atlantic and the Chesapeake Bay and up the broad York and Pamunkey Rivers to White House, Virginia, from whence the food and supplies traveled over the Richmond & York River Railroad. The railroad provided McClellan with a lifeline, and to protect it he had to divide his army by placing part of it south of the Chickahominy River (the Richmond side) and part of it north of the Chickahominy (the White House side). From Lee's perspective, the Federals' dependence on the railroad made it an obvious target, and their deployment astride the river suggested that he might be able to attack and defeat one wing before the other wing could intervene.
But there were great risks involved. To move upon the railroad and still maintain a defensive force before Richmond, Lee would have to divide his own army. If McClellan saw through the plan and decided to throw the bulk of his troops upon the token force of 25,000 men that Lee had left in the defenses of the city, the capital might fall and Lee's plan would forever be seen as folly. Thus Lee's first offensive revealed what would become over the next two years his hallmarks: opportunism and a willingness to take risks. Lee studied the enemy, exploited his weaknesses as early as possible, and sought every opportunity to attack before he could be prepared.
Lee planned to begin his offensive on June 26, but on June 25 he suffered an anxious day. McClellan, correctly guessing that Lee was up to something, launched a preemptive attack against the defenses of Richmond just west of Seven Pines in a battle that became known as Oak Grove. After insignificant gains, the Federal commander withdrew his troops in the evening, confident that he controlled both the battlefield and the campaign. In truth, by not pressing his attack, McClellan had given Lee a great gift - more time - and Lee wasted none of it.
[civilwar.org/battlefields/glendale/glendale-history-articles/sevendaysmiller.html]
Wednesday, June 25, 1862: near Germantown, Tennessee - On June 25, a group of Confederate cavalry arrived at La Fayette Station. The station was located about a mile from Germantown. The cavalry set up an ambush and attacked the incoming train. The train was derailed and burned by the cavalry before they left.
[mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html]
Thursday, June 25, 1863: Skirmish at McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania.
[emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/civil_war/engagements_in_the_emmitsburg_area.htm]
B Thursday, June 25, 1863: Battle of Hoover’s Gap, Tennessee: In early May, Rosecrans knew that Bragg’s army had been weakened by detachments having been sent to aid the Vicksburg Campaign—11,300 men in all (9,300 infantry and 2,000 cavalry). And, then on June 13, General John Hunt Morgan and his 2,500 cavalrymen rode out on what was to be the “Great Ohio Raid.” The time was now right for Union forces to move so on June 24, Rosecrans’ army of 50,000 men began its advance on Tullahoma. Rosecrans very cleverly attempted to deceive Bragg from seeing the drive on Manchester as the main Union objective and sent troops to Shelbyville as a devisive maneuver. The goal was the capture of Hoover’s Gap, then Manchester Pike and Bradyville, ultimately moving onto Manchester, thus forcing Bragg to recall his forces to Tullahoma. If Union forces could capture Manchester and force Bragg to abandon the Shelbyville-Wartrace line, they could also make his Tullahoma base untenable with another flanking move, thereby cutting Bragg off from his main supply base at Chattanooga. Hoover’s Gap was critical for the success of this plan.
The task of capturing Manchester was assigned to Corps commanders George H. Thomas and Alexander M. McCook, both seasoned veterans of war. Before dawn on the 24th, Colonel John T. Wilder’s Brigade moved out in advance of Thomas’ corps. A slow drizzling rain turned the roads into quagmires. This rain continued for the next eleven days, and was described by Rosecrans as “one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee.” Despite the discomfort, however, Wilder’s men marched on eagerly, anxious to try their new Spencer repeating rifles, in what they knew would be a major encounter with the enemy. Wilder himself had arranged for the financing of these new weapons with his hometown bank in Greensburg, Indiana when the Army brass in Washington had refused to purchase them. At 10:00 a.m. Colonel Wilder and his Brigade, almost nine miles ahead of the rest of their division, reached the entrance to Hoover’s Gap.
The 1st Kentucky Cavalry was on duty when Wilder’s sudden and unexpected advance took them completely by surprise. Confederate forces retreated after a valiant fight through the seven-mile length of the gap and Wilder pushed on through, seizing the hills at the south end of Hoover’s Gap, which he was determined to hold until reinforcements arrived. This was the very position that Confederate forces had planned to use for their own defense. Brigadier General William B. Bate rushed his Confederates to the front and for over an hour they gallantly attacked Wilder’s entrenched, but badly outnumbered, brigade.
Company E, of the 72nd Indiana overran its position and while returning to the battle line, and being fired upon by Confederates, came across three small children, two girls and a boy, trying to find their way out of the woods amid the shower of bullets. The firing suddenly stopped. Sgt. Wilhite of the 72nd dismounted, helped the children over a fence and headed them toward a house out of range of the battle. The fighting then resumed and Company E went about its business of fighting its way back to the brigade.
The battle continued throughout the day, with charge after charge of brave Southern men being repulsed by a storm of Yankee bullets from their new “seven-shooters.” Bate’s Tennesseans staggered but filled their ranks and came on time and time again only to fall back in a hail of bullets. General Bate reorganized his men, brought up his reserves, and together with Bushrod Johnson’s newly arrived brigade, began preparations for a new attack on Wilder’s position. In the meantime, Wilder was ordered to withdraw immediately, but refused and steadfastly maintained that he could hold his position and would take responsibility for the consequences, even under the threat of arrest. He was accurate in this assessment and the last attack of the day was easily repulsed. By 7:00 p.m., Union reinforcements had arrived and on June 26th Confederate forces withdrew toward Tullahoma.
The 1,500 Spencer repeating rifles were capable of firing 14 rounds per minute and proved to be the difference between Union forces and the numerically superior Confederates. General Thomas declared following the day’s battle that he had not expected to capture the gap for three days and that henceforth Wilder’s men would be known as the “Lightning Brigade.” Over two hundred, or nearly one forth of the Confederate forces, were killed or wounded at Hoover’s Gap while Wilder’s Brigade suffered only fifty-one casualties. General Bate later commented that judging from the fire power of the Union force, he thought he was outnumbered five to one. It may very well be that this first encounter with repeating rifles at Hoover’s Gap was the beginning of the expression which traveled around the Confederate army for the remainder of the war, that the “Yankees could load on Sunday and shoot all the rest of the week.”
The Battle at Hoover’s Gap was the beginning of what was to be known as the ill-fated Tullahoma campaign. It was the first battle to see the use of repeater rifles. The loss of Hoover’s Gap resulted in the loss of Middle Tennessee, a blow from which the South would never recover, and ultimately set the stage for the Atlanta Campaign and Sherman’s March to the Sea one year later. It was also the beginning of the end of two military careers—Bragg and Rosecrans. Although over-shadowed by the battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, the importance and impact of those eleven rainy days in Tennessee cannot be denied.
[southernreader.com/SouthRead13.9.html]
Thursday, June 25, 1863: Liberty Gap, Tennessee - On June 25, Maj. Gen. Alexander M. McCook and his Union corps were on their way to Tullahoma. When they were approaching Liberty gap, his lead elements encountered the Confederate defenders. The Federals were able to drive away the Confederates.
[mycivilwar.com/battles/1863s.html]
Thursday, June 25, 1863: Liberty Gap, Tennessee. CSA Brig. Gen. William B. Bate and CSA Brig. Gen. Bushrod Johnson renewed their attempts to drive the Union men out of Hoover's Gap, while CSA Brig. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne did the same at Liberty Gap. Both were unsuccessful, although Cleburne pushed back Brig. Gen. August Willich for a time, causing 20% casualties in the 77th Pennsylvania, until reinforcements arrived. Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans brought the forward movement of the Army of the Cumberland to a halt as the roads had become quagmires. But during this lull, General Braxton Bragg took no effective action to counter Rosecrans because his cavalry commanders were not relaying intelligence to him reliably — CSA Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest was not informing of the weak nature of the Union right flank attack and Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler cavalry corps failed to report the movement of Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden's XXI corps through Bradyville and toward Bragg's rear.
[wikipedia.org/wiki/Tullahoma_Campaign]
C Thursday, June 25, 1863: Vicksburg, Mississippi. Union soldiers try to exploit an explosion under the Confederate entrenchments at Vicksburg. The Rebel line easily repulses the attack.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186306
C+ Thursday, June 25, 1863: Vicksburg, Mississippi. On May 19, Grant, hoping for a quick victory over a defeated foe, ordered Sherman’s corps to attack along the Graveyard Road northeast of town. Pemberton, the engineer, had developed a series of strong works around Vicksburg, and the Federals were repulsed by the defenders of Stockade Redan, suffering 1,000 casualties.
Three days later, coordinated assaults were made: Sherman along the Graveyard Road, Maj. Gen. James McPherson hitting the center from the Jackson Road, and Maj. Gen. John McClernand attacking from the south along the lines of the Baldwin Ferry Road and the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. Although McClernand’s men briefly penetrated what was called the Railroad Redoubt, all three columns were repulsed, with a total loss of over 3,000 men.
The Siege of Vicksburg
These losses and the strong Confederate defensive works convinced Grant to take the town by siege, cutting it off from all supply. He initiated a plan that is still studied today as a classic example of how to conduct siege warfare.
Reinforced to over 70,000 strong, for weeks his men dug trenches that zigged and zagged but steadily brought them closer to Pemberton’s positions. One group tunneled underneath the Third Louisiana Redan, named for its defenders, and on June 25 detonated barrels of black powder that blasted a hole in the works. Union soldiers surged into the breach only to be met by a counterattack. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting ensued for hours before the attackers were driven out.
[historynet.com/battle-of-vicksburg]
Saturday, June 25, 1864: Petersburg, Virginia. Engineers begin digging a tunnel from Union lines under Confederate entrenchments.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186406]
Saturday, June 25, 1864: Petersburg, Virginia. Union forces started to build a tunnel underneath one of the main Confederate redoubts in Petersburg.
[historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-june-1864/]
June 25, 1864: Sandbag day at Petersburg. Building field fortifications requires a lot of “consumable” materials. Even in modern times, when the soldiers fortify a position, they tend to displace a lot of earth and use stockpiles of building materials. One material that comes in high demand is the lowly sandbag. In 1863, engineers on Morris Island recorded using over 46,000 sandbags in just one portion of the siege lines. Reporting on that operation, Major Thomas Brooks described the standard sandbag of the time:
The dimensions of the filled sand-bags, when laid, varied from 6 by 10 by 24 inches to 5 ½ by 11 by 23 inches, and contained .85 of a cubic foot of damp sand, weighing about 85 pounds; hence 32 to the cubic yard.
So 32 sandbags made up one cubic yard of earthwork. (Check my math as I check Brooks here – 0.85 cubic feet is 0.0314 cubic yards… and 0.0314 goes into 1 cubic yard 32.2 times. Seems right?) And 32 sandbags filled with 85 pounds of earth weigh 2,720 pounds – one and a third short tons.
For those commencing the siege of Petersburg, just under a year later, the sandbag was likewise an important commodity. On June 25, 1864, at 2:45 p.m., Major-General Ambrose Burnside had a pressing need for sandbags: “We have commenced a mine that will reach the batteries of the enemy in our front by a reach of 115 yards. I have given orders for all the necessary changes of the line to make the work ordinarily secure. We want about 7,000 sand-bags or more. I think we can break the line of the enemy in due time if we can have the necessary facilities. We want heavy guns very much. Can we have the sand-bags?”
That mine, in particular, would require a lot of sandbags. Major-General George Meade responded promptly, granting that request for sandbags: “I have directed Duane to send you an engineer officer and a company of sappers, and Hunt to send you sand-bags and siege guns. I am delighted to hear you can do anything against the enemy’s line, and will furnish you everything you want, and earnest wishes for your success besides. I would have been over to see you to-day, but certain movements of the enemy on the left have kept me here.”
“Delighted!” The slow turning siege could grind forward, but needed just a few thousand sandbags. Now time for staff officers to do what they get paid for. Brigadier-General Henry Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, became the “stuckee” on the sandbag tasking request, as he was also directing the siege operations and generally kept sandbags around to support the artillery positions.
Hunt first inquired, at around 6 p.m. that day, to Brigadier-General John Barnard, running engineering operations out of City Point, specifically requesting that Brigadier-General Henry Benham provide the required sandbags. Barnard, no slouch for military protocol, pointed out that Benham came under Meade’s orders, but “There ought to be 100,000 sand-bags somewhere.” He also suggested inquiries with Brigadier-General Godfrey Weitzel, of the Army of the James. But, hold that for a moment.
Upon receipt of Barnard’s reply, Hunt sent the request for sandbags directly to Benham. And Benham, as he did so often with such matters, replied at 8:10 p.m. that the materials were not exactly at arm’s reach: “All my siege materials, as I have kept General Meade fully advised, have been retained at Fort Monroe. On receipt of your dispatch to General Barnard, through Colonel Porter, I at once sent an aide down in a steamer to bring it up, and I expect it to-morrow afternoon or evening, and will send them out to you at once, if you then wish them, of which please advise me.”
So Benham had sandbags, but he just didn’t have them around at that moment. Maybe tomorrow or the next day….
We hear all sorts of references to the Federal war effort featuring an over-abundance of resources. But such abundance means nothing if the resources are not at the right place for use. Barnard estimated 100,000 sandbags were “around.” So now a capable staff officer needed to secure a small draft of that sandbag stockpile for use on the line.
Enter Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock, aide-de-camp on the staff of Lieutenant-General U.S. Grant. While Hunt conversed with Benham, he also communicated with Comstock, who was also working this “tasking.” At 6:10 p.m., Hunt related to Burnside: “Have heard from Comstock. He says General Benham has sand-bags. I have telegraphed to General Barnard to have 7,000 or 8,000 sent you to-night either by Benham or Abbot.”
Ah, Colonel Henry Abbot also might have sandbags. Comstock inquired with Abbot. And promptly Abbot responded with an affirmative, but with limitations: “I made requisition for 25,000 sand-bags–5,000 for each gun, excluding the 100-pounders. How many were actually obtained I cannot say without seeing my ordnance officer, who is now at Broadway Landing. I have no transportation for them. I would suggest that you direct General Ingalls to send transportation to the Broadway Landing (one mile below the pontoon bridge), and let the wagon-master carry an order for Capt. S. P. Hatfield, ordnance officer of siege train, to issue the required number of bags to General Burnside. I think this plan would save much time. These bags, I hope, will be replaced, as I find I shall be obliged to supply them for my embrasures.”
Abbot also suggested, within separate correspondence to Barnard, to inquire with Weitzel, on the Bermuda Hundred line. So that’s how Barnard knew to reference Weitzel, perhaps? At any rate, that’s where the draft of sandbags would come from. That evening, Weitzel sent word to Burnside: I have just ordered 8,000 sandbags to be sent to you from my depot at Bermuda Hundred with all possible haste. I imagine they will reach you about 1 o’clock.”
So Burnside got his sandbags the following morning. Soon the troops would be employed filling those sandbags. Mind you those 8,000 would only provide 250 cubic yards of sandbags – be that reinforcing or revetments. Oh, but that was 340 short tons of earth to be moved. Sieges are indeed labor intensive operations.
The main reason I bring all this up is not to impress the reader with the number or weight of sandbags used, but to demonstrate how a good staff functions to support the commander. While commanders can designate the point of attack or defense, it is often up to staff officer to ensure the resources are arranged to support that command. Hunt, Comstock, Abbot, and Weitzel demonstrated just that function on June 25. A small episode of the war, not something to command a paragraph in any history of the battle. But the complex nature of any battle, particularly a siege, required hundreds of such small episodes – thankless staff work – in order to reach a successful conclusion.
There would be many more “sandbag days” at Petersburg. 100,000 sandbags would not be enough.
markerhunter.wordpress.com/2014/06/25/sandbag-day-at-petersburg/
Grant: Massive Siege of Vicksburg Leads to Union Victory | History
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“The 1,500 Spencer repeating rifles were capable of firing 14 rounds per minute and proved to be the difference between Union forces and the numerically superior Confederates. General Thomas declared following the day’s battle that he had not expected to capture the gap for three days and that henceforth Wilder’s men would be known as the “Lightning Brigade.” Over two hundred, or nearly one forth of the Confederate forces, were killed or wounded at Hoover’s Gap while Wilder’s Brigade suffered only fifty-one casualties. General Bate later commented that judging from the fire power of the Union force, he thought he was outnumbered five to one. It may very well be that this first encounter with repeating rifles at Hoover’s Gap was the beginning of the expression which traveled around the Confederate army for the remainder of the war, that the “Yankees could load on Sunday and shoot all the rest of the week.”
Below are a number of journal entries from 1863 and xx which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly.
Thursday, June 25, 1863: Louis Lėon, an infantryman from North Carolina in Ewell’s corps, finds himself at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the farthest north that Lee’s men will penetrate. He writes in his journal about the march and the reception by the town: “Marched on, passed through Leesburg, Canada, Hockinsville, and Centerville, all small villages. We got to Carlisle, Pa., at sundown. Marched 21 miles to-day. This city is certainly a beautiful place. It has 8,000 inhabitants, and we were treated very good by the ladies. They thought we would do as their soldiers do, burn every place we passed through, but when we told them the strict orders of General Lee they were rejoiced. Our regiment was provost guard in the city, but were relieved by the 21st Georgia Regiment, and we went to camp at the U. S. barracks. So far we have lived very good in the enemy’s country. We stayed here until the 30th, when we took the Baltimore pike road, crossed South Mountain at Holly Gap, passed through Papertown and Petersburg. We then left the Pike and took the Gettysburg road – 17 miles to-day. This has been a hard day for us, as we were the rear guard of the division, and it was very hot, close and very dusty, and a terrible job to keep the stragglers up.”
Thursday, June 25, 1863: A Unionist woman living in Vicksburg, records in her journal the bloody effects of the Yankee bombardment, and how it finally unnerved her: “A horrible day. The most horrible yet to me, because I’ve lost my nerve. we were all in the cellar, when a shell came tearing through the roof, burst up-stairs, tore up that room, and the pieces coming through both floors down into the cellar, one of them tore open the leg of H.’s pantaloons. This was tangible proof the cellar was no place of protection from them. On the heels of this came Mr. J. to tell us that young Mrs. P. had had her thigh-bone crushed. When Martha went for the milk she came back horror-stricken to tell us the black girl there had her arm taken off by a shell. For the first time I quailed. I do not think people who are physically brave deserve much credit for it; it is a matter of nerves. In this way I am constitutionally brave, and seldom think of danger until it is over; and death has not the terrors for me it has for some others. Every night I had lain down expecting death, and every morning rose to the same prospect, without being unnerved. It was for H. I trembled. But now I first seemed to realize that something worse than death might come: I might be crippled, and not killed. Life, without all one’s powers and limbs, was a thought that broke down my courage. I said to H., “You must get me out of this horrible place; I cannot stay; I know I shall be crippled.” Now the regret comes that I lost control, because H. is worried, and has lost his composure, because my coolness has broken down.”
Pictures: 1863-06-25 Skirmishes near Liberty Gap Tenn Map; 1863-06-23 Union mining operations under Fort Hill, Vicksburg, Mississippi; 1862-06-25 oak hill map; xx
A. Wednesday, June 25, 1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Inconclusive (Union forces withdrew to their lines.) Other Names: French’s Field, King’s School House
Location: Henrico County; Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862); Forces Engaged: Corps; Estimated Casualties: 1,057 total (US 516; CS 541)
Description: Oak Grove was the first of the Seven Days’ battles. On June 25, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan advanced his lines along the Williamsburg Road with the objective of bringing Richmond within range of his siege guns. Union forces attacked over swampy ground with inconclusive results, and darkness halted the fighting. McClellan’s attack was not strong enough to derail the Confederate offensive that already had been set in motion.
Lee planned to begin his offensive on June 26, but on June 25 he suffered an anxious day. McClellan, correctly guessing that Lee was up to something, launched a preemptive attack against the defenses of Richmond just west of Seven Pines in a battle that became known as Oak Grove. After insignificant gains, the Federal commander withdrew his troops in the evening, confident that he controlled both the battlefield and the campaign. In truth, by not pressing his attack, McClellan had given Lee a great gift - more time - and Lee wasted none of it. The next day, Gen. Robert E. Lee seized the initiative by attacking at Beaver Dam Creek north of the Chickahominy.
B. Thursday, June 25, 1863: Battle of Hoover’s Gap, Tennessee. Decisive union victory. The 1st Kentucky Cavalry was on duty when Colonel John T. Wilder’s sudden and unexpected advance took them completely by surprise. Confederate forces retreated after a valiant fight through the seven-mile length of the gap and Wilder pushed on through, seizing the hills at the south end of Hoover’s Gap, which he was determined to hold until reinforcements arrived. This was the very position that Confederate forces had planned to use for their own defense. Brigadier General William B. Bate rushed his Confederates to the front and for over an hour they gallantly attacked Wilder’s entrenched, but badly outnumbered, brigade.
Company E, of the 72nd Indiana overran its position and while returning to the battle line, and being fired upon by Confederates, came across three small children, two girls and a boy, trying to find their way out of the woods amid the shower of bullets. The firing suddenly stopped. Sgt. Wilhite of the 72nd dismounted, helped the children over a fence and headed them toward a house out of range of the battle. The fighting then resumed and Company E went about its business of fighting its way back to the brigade.
The battle continued throughout the day, with charge after charge of brave Southern men being repulsed by a storm of Yankee bullets from their new “seven-shooters.” Bate’s Tennesseans staggered but filled their ranks and came on time and time again only to fall back in a hail of bullets. General Bate reorganized his men, brought up his reserves, and together with Bushrod Johnson’s newly arrived brigade, began preparations for a new attack on Wilder’s position. In the meantime, Wilder was ordered to withdraw immediately, but refused and steadfastly maintained that he could hold his position and would take responsibility for the consequences, even under the threat of arrest. He was accurate in this assessment and the last attack of the day was easily repulsed. By 7:00 p.m., Union reinforcements had arrived and on June 26th Confederate forces withdrew toward Tullahoma.
Background: In early May, Rosecrans knew that Bragg’s army had been weakened by detachments having been sent to aid the Vicksburg Campaign—11,300 men in all (9,300 infantry and 2,000 cavalry). And, then on June 13, General John Hunt Morgan and his 2,500 cavalrymen rode out on what was to be the “Great Ohio Raid.” The time was now right for Union forces to move so on June 24, Rosecrans’ army of 50,000 men began its advance on Tullahoma. Rosecrans very cleverly attempted to deceive Bragg from seeing the drive on Manchester as the main Union objective and sent troops to Shelbyville as a devisive maneuver. The goal was the capture of Hoover’s Gap, then Manchester Pike and Bradyville, ultimately moving onto Manchester, thus forcing Bragg to recall his forces to Tullahoma. If Union forces could capture Manchester and force Bragg to abandon the Shelbyville-Wartrace line, they could also make his Tullahoma base untenable with another flanking move, thereby cutting Bragg off from his main supply base at Chattanooga. Hoover’s Gap was critical for the success of this plan.
The task of capturing Manchester was assigned to Corps commanders George H. Thomas and Alexander M. McCook, both seasoned veterans of war. Before dawn on the 24th, Colonel John T. Wilder’s Brigade moved out in advance of Thomas’ corps. A slow drizzling rain turned the roads into quagmires. This rain continued for the next eleven days, and was described by Rosecrans as “one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee.” Despite the discomfort, however, Wilder’s men marched on eagerly, anxious to try their new Spencer repeating rifles, in what they knew would be a major encounter with the enemy. Wilder himself had arranged for the financing of these new weapons with his hometown bank in Greensburg, Indiana when the Army brass in Washington had refused to purchase them. At 10:00 a.m. Colonel Wilder and his Brigade, almost nine miles ahead of the rest of their division, reached the entrance to Hoover’s Gap.
C. Thursday, June 25, 1863: Vicksburg, Mississippi. Fierce fighting in the breach. Confederates repulsed the attack. One Federal group of sappers tunneled underneath the Third Louisiana Redan, named for its defenders, and on June 25 detonated barrels of black powder that blasted a hole in the works. Union soldiers surged into the breach only to be met by a counterattack. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting ensued for hours before the attackers were driven out. Union soldiers try to exploit an explosion under the Confederate entrenchments at Vicksburg. The Rebel line easily repulses the attack.
Background: On May 19, Grant, hoping for a quick victory over a defeated foe, ordered Sherman’s corps to attack along the Graveyard Road northeast of town. Pemberton, the engineer, had developed a series of strong works around Vicksburg, and the Federals were repulsed by the defenders of Stockade Redan, suffering 1,000 casualties.
Three days later, coordinated assaults were made: Sherman along the Graveyard Road, Maj. Gen. James McPherson hitting the center from the Jackson Road, and Maj. Gen. John McClernand attacking from the south along the lines of the Baldwin Ferry Road and the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. Although McClernand’s men briefly penetrated what was called the Railroad Redoubt, all three columns were repulsed, with a total loss of over 3,000 men.
The Siege of Vicksburg
These losses and the strong Confederate defensive works convinced Grant to take the town by siege, cutting it off from all supply. He initiated a plan that is still studied today as a classic example of how to conduct siege warfare.
Reinforced to over 70,000 strong, for weeks his men dug trenches that zigged and zagged but steadily brought them closer to Pemberton’s positions.
D. Saturday, June 25, 1864: Sandbag day at Petersburg, Virginia. Federal force engineers begin digging a tunnel from Union lines to underneath one of the main Confederate redoubts in Petersburg. On June 25, 1864, at 2:45 p.m., Major-General Ambrose Burnside had a pressing need for sandbags: “We have commenced a mine that will reach the batteries of the enemy in our front by a reach of 115 yards. I have given orders for all the necessary changes of the line to make the work ordinarily secure. We want about 7,000 sand-bags or more. I think we can break the line of the enemy in due time if we can have the necessary facilities. We want heavy guns very much. Can we have the sand-bags?”
That mine, in particular, would require a lot of sandbags. Major-General George Meade responded promptly, granting that request for sandbags: “I have directed Duane to send you an engineer officer and a company of sappers, and Hunt to send you sand-bags and siege guns. I am delighted to hear you can do anything against the enemy’s line, and will furnish you everything you want, and earnest wishes for your success besides. I would have been over to see you to-day, but certain movements of the enemy on the left have kept me here.”
“Delighted!” The slow turning siege could grind forward, but needed just a few thousand sandbags. Now time for staff officers to do what they get paid for. Brigadier-General Henry Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, became the “stuckee” on the sandbag tasking request, as he was also directing the siege operations and generally kept sandbags around to support the artillery positions.
Hunt first inquired, at around 6 p.m. that day, to Brigadier-General John Barnard, running engineering operations out of City Point, specifically requesting that Brigadier-General Henry Benham provide the required sandbags. Barnard, no slouch for military protocol, pointed out that Benham came under Meade’s orders, but “There ought to be 100,000 sand-bags somewhere.” He also suggested inquiries with Brigadier-General Godfrey Weitzel, of the Army of the James. But, hold that for a moment.
Upon receipt of Barnard’s reply, Hunt sent the request for sandbags directly to Benham. And Benham, as he did so often with such matters, replied at 8:10 p.m. that the materials were not exactly at arm’s reach: “All my siege materials, as I have kept General Meade fully advised, have been retained at Fort Monroe. On receipt of your dispatch to General Barnard, through Colonel Porter, I at once sent an aide down in a steamer to bring it up, and I expect it to-morrow afternoon or evening, and will send them out to you at once, if you then wish them, of which please advise me.”
1. Tuesday, June 25, 1861: Minor clashes occurred between the forces of Johnson and General Patterson, a Union commander in the Shenandoah Valley.
[historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-june-1861/]
2. Wednesday, June 25, 1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186206]
3. Wednesday, June 25, 1862 --- Gen. McClellan, that night, sends Sec. of War Stanton this message: that he expects that Jackson has indeed reinforced Lee, and that he expects a Confederate attack---and adds that he desperately needs more troops. Otherwise, McClellan indicates that he is perfectly prepared to resist the enemy or—if defeated—to blame the government for not getting enough troops: PORTER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 25, 1862--10.40 p.m. (Received June 26--3 a.m.) Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War: “The information I received on this side tends to confirm impression that Jackson will soon attack our right and rear. Every possible precaution is being taken. If I had another good division I could laugh at Jackson. The task is difficult, but this army will do its best, and will never disgrace the country. Nothing but overwhelming forces can defeat us. Indications are of attack on our front tomorrow. Have made all possible arrangements. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General.
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1862]
4. Wednesday, June 25, 1862: Battle of The Orchards, Virginia. Joseph Hooker [US] tries to push forward to gain ground for better positioning of McClellan's siege guns.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186206]
5. Wednesday, June 25, 1862: A series of closely linked battles known as The Seven Days Battle or The Seven Day Retreat start near Mechanicsville as the Army of the Potomac begins its advance to Richmond.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186206]
6. Wednesday, June 25, 1862: McClellan ordered his men to advance on the left flank of Richmond. He also sent a letter to Washington DC that stated that he was facing an army of 200,000 men and that if he lost to them it would not be his fault and that he would die fighting with his men. McClellan made it clear that if he did lose the battle, there was nothing to stop the Confederates attacking the capital. To the end McClellan remained cautious. But it was a simple fact. If he did lose, what would stop Lee and then Davis entering Washington DC?
[historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-june-1862/]
7. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- Siege of Vicksburg, Day 34
civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
8. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- Siege of Port Hudson, Day 29
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
9. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- Louis Lėon, an infantryman from North Carolina in Ewell’s corps, finds himself at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the farthest north that Lee’s men will penetrate. He writes in his journal about the march and the reception by the town: “Marched on, passed through Leesburg, Canada, Hockinsville, and Centerville, all small villages. We got to Carlisle, Pa., at sundown. Marched 21 miles to-day. This city is certainly a beautiful place. It has 8,000 inhabitants, and we were treated very good by the ladies. They thought we would do as their soldiers do, burn every place we passed through, but when we told them the strict orders of General Lee they were rejoiced. Our regiment was provost guard in the city, but were relieved by the 21st Georgia Regiment, and we went to camp at the U. S. barracks. So far we have lived very good in the enemy’s country. We stayed here until the 30th, when we took the Baltimore pike road, crossed South Mountain at Holly Gap, passed through Papertown and Petersburg. We then left the Pike and took the Gettysburg road – 17 miles to-day. This has been a hard day for us, as we were the rear guard of the division, and it was very hot, close and very dusty, and a terrible job to keep the stragglers up.”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
10. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- A Unionist woman living in Vicksburg, records in her journal the bloody effects of the Yankee bombardment, and how it finally unnerved her: “A horrible day. The most horrible yet to me, because I’ve lost my nerve. we were all in the cellar, when a shell came tearing through the roof, burst up-stairs, tore up that room, and the pieces coming through both floors down into the cellar, one of them tore open the leg of H.’s pantaloons. This was tangible proof the cellar was no place of protection from them. On the heels of this came Mr. J. to tell us that young Mrs. P. had had her thigh-bone crushed. When Martha went for the milk she came back horror-stricken to tell us the black girl there had her arm taken off by a shell. For the first time I quailed. I do not think people who are physically brave deserve much credit for it; it is a matter of nerves. In this way I am constitutionally brave, and seldom think of danger until it is over; and death has not the terrors for me it has for some others. Every night I had lain down expecting death, and every morning rose to the same prospect, without being unnerved. It was for H. I trembled. But now I first seemed to realize that something worse than death might come: I might be crippled, and not killed. Life, without all one’s powers and limbs, was a thought that broke down my courage. I said to H., “You must get me out of this horrible place; I cannot stay; I know I shall be crippled.” Now the regret comes that I lost control, because H. is worried, and has lost his composure, because my coolness has broken down.”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
11. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- This morning, Jeb Stuart and his three brigades of Rebel troopers set out on their big ride around Hooker’s army. His troopers skirmish with Union infantry guarding a large wagon train.
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
12. Thursday, June 25, 1863 --- Battle of Hoover’s Gap, Tennessee: Beginning yesterday, Gen. Rosecrans has directed Gen. George Thomas to march his corps to this and a few other gaps in the Highland Rim range of hills in central Tennessee, in order to force Bragg’s right flank. Thomas’s troops approach this location, but leading out in front are the mounted infantry of Col. John T. Wilder of Indiana, whose men are equipped with the repeating Spencer rifle. Wilder arrives first, and drives off the Rebel cavalry posted there. In the meantime, infantry from the brigade of Gen. Bate from A.P. Stewart’s division arrives, and attacks Wilder, who is now entrenched on higher ground. Bate is driven back with heavy losses, but is later joined by another brigade under Bushrod Johnson, and the two brigades launch another assault, also repulsed with heavy losses. Thomas sends a note asking Wilder to withdraw, but Wilder insists on staying. He is reinforced by troops under Rousseau and Brannan.
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1863]
A Wednesday, June 25, 1862 --- Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Eastern Theater, Peninsula Campaign - SEVEN DAYS’ BATTLES, Day 1: McClellan, at last moving forward, advances troops from two divisions of the III Corps to push the Confederates back in order to get his lines close enough to mount his siege guns within range of Richmond. He orders Gen. Joseph Hooker to advance three brigades from his division to advance across a large expanse of swampy ground and push the Confederate pickets back. As Grover’s brigade advances, Wright’s Rebels push them back with heavy losses. Sickles pushes his brigade forward, and likewise a Southern counterattack causes his troops to retreat. Both sides throw in increasingly larger numbers of reinforcements until a stalemate lulls the field into relative quiet. McClellan finally visits the battlefield from his headquarters, and orders more assaults in the evening. In the end, the Union gains 600 yards and puts the swampy ground behind them; the Rebels do not have to retreat one inch. Although often counted as the first of the Seven Days’ Battles, Oak Grove is in no way connected with or a precursor to the movements by Lee that causes these battles to ensue. Stalemate.
Losses: Killed Wounded Missing Total
Union 68 503 55 626
Confederate 13 362 66 441
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=June+25%2C+1862]
A+ Wednesday, June 25, 1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Other Names: French’s Field, King’s School House
Location: Henrico County; Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862); Forces Engaged: Corps
Estimated Casualties: 1,057 total (US 516; CS 541)
Description: Oak Grove was the first of the Seven Days’ battles. On June 25, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan advanced his lines along the Williamsburg Road with the objective of bringing Richmond within range of his siege guns. Union forces attacked over swampy ground with inconclusive results, and darkness halted the fighting. McClellan’s attack was not strong enough to derail the Confederate offensive that already had been set in motion. The next day, Gen. Robert E. Lee seized the initiative by attacking at Beaver Dam Creek north of the Chickahominy. Result(s): Inconclusive (Union forces withdrew to their lines.)
[nps.gov/abpp/battles/va015.htm]
A++ Wednesday, June 25, 1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Lee detailed his plan in General Order No. 75, sent to his commanders on June 24. Though it has been called complex, in truth Lee's plan was the essence of simplicity. He required three separate columns to be prepared to march on the same morning. Each column would move on its own road, and each would march - or attack - only if the commander saw an advantage. The advantage, to be sure, depended upon the success of the other columns, but if one column did not succeed, another was not required to attack. Lee based his plan to dislodge the largest army in the history of the New World on what would prove to be an accurate understanding of the Federal position and its weaknesses. He believed that the immense size of the Federal army could actually be used against it. Major General George B. McClellan's army required more than 600 tons of food and supplies each day. The long tendrils of the Union supply line began in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Annapolis and wound southward over the waves of the Atlantic and the Chesapeake Bay and up the broad York and Pamunkey Rivers to White House, Virginia, from whence the food and supplies traveled over the Richmond & York River Railroad. The railroad provided McClellan with a lifeline, and to protect it he had to divide his army by placing part of it south of the Chickahominy River (the Richmond side) and part of it north of the Chickahominy (the White House side). From Lee's perspective, the Federals' dependence on the railroad made it an obvious target, and their deployment astride the river suggested that he might be able to attack and defeat one wing before the other wing could intervene.
But there were great risks involved. To move upon the railroad and still maintain a defensive force before Richmond, Lee would have to divide his own army. If McClellan saw through the plan and decided to throw the bulk of his troops upon the token force of 25,000 men that Lee had left in the defenses of the city, the capital might fall and Lee's plan would forever be seen as folly. Thus Lee's first offensive revealed what would become over the next two years his hallmarks: opportunism and a willingness to take risks. Lee studied the enemy, exploited his weaknesses as early as possible, and sought every opportunity to attack before he could be prepared.
Lee planned to begin his offensive on June 26, but on June 25 he suffered an anxious day. McClellan, correctly guessing that Lee was up to something, launched a preemptive attack against the defenses of Richmond just west of Seven Pines in a battle that became known as Oak Grove. After insignificant gains, the Federal commander withdrew his troops in the evening, confident that he controlled both the battlefield and the campaign. In truth, by not pressing his attack, McClellan had given Lee a great gift - more time - and Lee wasted none of it.
[civilwar.org/battlefields/glendale/glendale-history-articles/sevendaysmiller.html]
Wednesday, June 25, 1862: near Germantown, Tennessee - On June 25, a group of Confederate cavalry arrived at La Fayette Station. The station was located about a mile from Germantown. The cavalry set up an ambush and attacked the incoming train. The train was derailed and burned by the cavalry before they left.
[mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html]
Thursday, June 25, 1863: Skirmish at McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania.
[emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/civil_war/engagements_in_the_emmitsburg_area.htm]
B Thursday, June 25, 1863: Battle of Hoover’s Gap, Tennessee: In early May, Rosecrans knew that Bragg’s army had been weakened by detachments having been sent to aid the Vicksburg Campaign—11,300 men in all (9,300 infantry and 2,000 cavalry). And, then on June 13, General John Hunt Morgan and his 2,500 cavalrymen rode out on what was to be the “Great Ohio Raid.” The time was now right for Union forces to move so on June 24, Rosecrans’ army of 50,000 men began its advance on Tullahoma. Rosecrans very cleverly attempted to deceive Bragg from seeing the drive on Manchester as the main Union objective and sent troops to Shelbyville as a devisive maneuver. The goal was the capture of Hoover’s Gap, then Manchester Pike and Bradyville, ultimately moving onto Manchester, thus forcing Bragg to recall his forces to Tullahoma. If Union forces could capture Manchester and force Bragg to abandon the Shelbyville-Wartrace line, they could also make his Tullahoma base untenable with another flanking move, thereby cutting Bragg off from his main supply base at Chattanooga. Hoover’s Gap was critical for the success of this plan.
The task of capturing Manchester was assigned to Corps commanders George H. Thomas and Alexander M. McCook, both seasoned veterans of war. Before dawn on the 24th, Colonel John T. Wilder’s Brigade moved out in advance of Thomas’ corps. A slow drizzling rain turned the roads into quagmires. This rain continued for the next eleven days, and was described by Rosecrans as “one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee.” Despite the discomfort, however, Wilder’s men marched on eagerly, anxious to try their new Spencer repeating rifles, in what they knew would be a major encounter with the enemy. Wilder himself had arranged for the financing of these new weapons with his hometown bank in Greensburg, Indiana when the Army brass in Washington had refused to purchase them. At 10:00 a.m. Colonel Wilder and his Brigade, almost nine miles ahead of the rest of their division, reached the entrance to Hoover’s Gap.
The 1st Kentucky Cavalry was on duty when Wilder’s sudden and unexpected advance took them completely by surprise. Confederate forces retreated after a valiant fight through the seven-mile length of the gap and Wilder pushed on through, seizing the hills at the south end of Hoover’s Gap, which he was determined to hold until reinforcements arrived. This was the very position that Confederate forces had planned to use for their own defense. Brigadier General William B. Bate rushed his Confederates to the front and for over an hour they gallantly attacked Wilder’s entrenched, but badly outnumbered, brigade.
Company E, of the 72nd Indiana overran its position and while returning to the battle line, and being fired upon by Confederates, came across three small children, two girls and a boy, trying to find their way out of the woods amid the shower of bullets. The firing suddenly stopped. Sgt. Wilhite of the 72nd dismounted, helped the children over a fence and headed them toward a house out of range of the battle. The fighting then resumed and Company E went about its business of fighting its way back to the brigade.
The battle continued throughout the day, with charge after charge of brave Southern men being repulsed by a storm of Yankee bullets from their new “seven-shooters.” Bate’s Tennesseans staggered but filled their ranks and came on time and time again only to fall back in a hail of bullets. General Bate reorganized his men, brought up his reserves, and together with Bushrod Johnson’s newly arrived brigade, began preparations for a new attack on Wilder’s position. In the meantime, Wilder was ordered to withdraw immediately, but refused and steadfastly maintained that he could hold his position and would take responsibility for the consequences, even under the threat of arrest. He was accurate in this assessment and the last attack of the day was easily repulsed. By 7:00 p.m., Union reinforcements had arrived and on June 26th Confederate forces withdrew toward Tullahoma.
The 1,500 Spencer repeating rifles were capable of firing 14 rounds per minute and proved to be the difference between Union forces and the numerically superior Confederates. General Thomas declared following the day’s battle that he had not expected to capture the gap for three days and that henceforth Wilder’s men would be known as the “Lightning Brigade.” Over two hundred, or nearly one forth of the Confederate forces, were killed or wounded at Hoover’s Gap while Wilder’s Brigade suffered only fifty-one casualties. General Bate later commented that judging from the fire power of the Union force, he thought he was outnumbered five to one. It may very well be that this first encounter with repeating rifles at Hoover’s Gap was the beginning of the expression which traveled around the Confederate army for the remainder of the war, that the “Yankees could load on Sunday and shoot all the rest of the week.”
The Battle at Hoover’s Gap was the beginning of what was to be known as the ill-fated Tullahoma campaign. It was the first battle to see the use of repeater rifles. The loss of Hoover’s Gap resulted in the loss of Middle Tennessee, a blow from which the South would never recover, and ultimately set the stage for the Atlanta Campaign and Sherman’s March to the Sea one year later. It was also the beginning of the end of two military careers—Bragg and Rosecrans. Although over-shadowed by the battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, the importance and impact of those eleven rainy days in Tennessee cannot be denied.
[southernreader.com/SouthRead13.9.html]
Thursday, June 25, 1863: Liberty Gap, Tennessee - On June 25, Maj. Gen. Alexander M. McCook and his Union corps were on their way to Tullahoma. When they were approaching Liberty gap, his lead elements encountered the Confederate defenders. The Federals were able to drive away the Confederates.
[mycivilwar.com/battles/1863s.html]
Thursday, June 25, 1863: Liberty Gap, Tennessee. CSA Brig. Gen. William B. Bate and CSA Brig. Gen. Bushrod Johnson renewed their attempts to drive the Union men out of Hoover's Gap, while CSA Brig. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne did the same at Liberty Gap. Both were unsuccessful, although Cleburne pushed back Brig. Gen. August Willich for a time, causing 20% casualties in the 77th Pennsylvania, until reinforcements arrived. Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans brought the forward movement of the Army of the Cumberland to a halt as the roads had become quagmires. But during this lull, General Braxton Bragg took no effective action to counter Rosecrans because his cavalry commanders were not relaying intelligence to him reliably — CSA Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest was not informing of the weak nature of the Union right flank attack and Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler cavalry corps failed to report the movement of Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden's XXI corps through Bradyville and toward Bragg's rear.
[wikipedia.org/wiki/Tullahoma_Campaign]
C Thursday, June 25, 1863: Vicksburg, Mississippi. Union soldiers try to exploit an explosion under the Confederate entrenchments at Vicksburg. The Rebel line easily repulses the attack.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186306
C+ Thursday, June 25, 1863: Vicksburg, Mississippi. On May 19, Grant, hoping for a quick victory over a defeated foe, ordered Sherman’s corps to attack along the Graveyard Road northeast of town. Pemberton, the engineer, had developed a series of strong works around Vicksburg, and the Federals were repulsed by the defenders of Stockade Redan, suffering 1,000 casualties.
Three days later, coordinated assaults were made: Sherman along the Graveyard Road, Maj. Gen. James McPherson hitting the center from the Jackson Road, and Maj. Gen. John McClernand attacking from the south along the lines of the Baldwin Ferry Road and the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. Although McClernand’s men briefly penetrated what was called the Railroad Redoubt, all three columns were repulsed, with a total loss of over 3,000 men.
The Siege of Vicksburg
These losses and the strong Confederate defensive works convinced Grant to take the town by siege, cutting it off from all supply. He initiated a plan that is still studied today as a classic example of how to conduct siege warfare.
Reinforced to over 70,000 strong, for weeks his men dug trenches that zigged and zagged but steadily brought them closer to Pemberton’s positions. One group tunneled underneath the Third Louisiana Redan, named for its defenders, and on June 25 detonated barrels of black powder that blasted a hole in the works. Union soldiers surged into the breach only to be met by a counterattack. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting ensued for hours before the attackers were driven out.
[historynet.com/battle-of-vicksburg]
Saturday, June 25, 1864: Petersburg, Virginia. Engineers begin digging a tunnel from Union lines under Confederate entrenchments.
[blueandgraytrail.com/year/186406]
Saturday, June 25, 1864: Petersburg, Virginia. Union forces started to build a tunnel underneath one of the main Confederate redoubts in Petersburg.
[historylearningsite.co.uk/the-american-civil-war/american-civil-war-june-1864/]
June 25, 1864: Sandbag day at Petersburg. Building field fortifications requires a lot of “consumable” materials. Even in modern times, when the soldiers fortify a position, they tend to displace a lot of earth and use stockpiles of building materials. One material that comes in high demand is the lowly sandbag. In 1863, engineers on Morris Island recorded using over 46,000 sandbags in just one portion of the siege lines. Reporting on that operation, Major Thomas Brooks described the standard sandbag of the time:
The dimensions of the filled sand-bags, when laid, varied from 6 by 10 by 24 inches to 5 ½ by 11 by 23 inches, and contained .85 of a cubic foot of damp sand, weighing about 85 pounds; hence 32 to the cubic yard.
So 32 sandbags made up one cubic yard of earthwork. (Check my math as I check Brooks here – 0.85 cubic feet is 0.0314 cubic yards… and 0.0314 goes into 1 cubic yard 32.2 times. Seems right?) And 32 sandbags filled with 85 pounds of earth weigh 2,720 pounds – one and a third short tons.
For those commencing the siege of Petersburg, just under a year later, the sandbag was likewise an important commodity. On June 25, 1864, at 2:45 p.m., Major-General Ambrose Burnside had a pressing need for sandbags: “We have commenced a mine that will reach the batteries of the enemy in our front by a reach of 115 yards. I have given orders for all the necessary changes of the line to make the work ordinarily secure. We want about 7,000 sand-bags or more. I think we can break the line of the enemy in due time if we can have the necessary facilities. We want heavy guns very much. Can we have the sand-bags?”
That mine, in particular, would require a lot of sandbags. Major-General George Meade responded promptly, granting that request for sandbags: “I have directed Duane to send you an engineer officer and a company of sappers, and Hunt to send you sand-bags and siege guns. I am delighted to hear you can do anything against the enemy’s line, and will furnish you everything you want, and earnest wishes for your success besides. I would have been over to see you to-day, but certain movements of the enemy on the left have kept me here.”
“Delighted!” The slow turning siege could grind forward, but needed just a few thousand sandbags. Now time for staff officers to do what they get paid for. Brigadier-General Henry Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, became the “stuckee” on the sandbag tasking request, as he was also directing the siege operations and generally kept sandbags around to support the artillery positions.
Hunt first inquired, at around 6 p.m. that day, to Brigadier-General John Barnard, running engineering operations out of City Point, specifically requesting that Brigadier-General Henry Benham provide the required sandbags. Barnard, no slouch for military protocol, pointed out that Benham came under Meade’s orders, but “There ought to be 100,000 sand-bags somewhere.” He also suggested inquiries with Brigadier-General Godfrey Weitzel, of the Army of the James. But, hold that for a moment.
Upon receipt of Barnard’s reply, Hunt sent the request for sandbags directly to Benham. And Benham, as he did so often with such matters, replied at 8:10 p.m. that the materials were not exactly at arm’s reach: “All my siege materials, as I have kept General Meade fully advised, have been retained at Fort Monroe. On receipt of your dispatch to General Barnard, through Colonel Porter, I at once sent an aide down in a steamer to bring it up, and I expect it to-morrow afternoon or evening, and will send them out to you at once, if you then wish them, of which please advise me.”
So Benham had sandbags, but he just didn’t have them around at that moment. Maybe tomorrow or the next day….
We hear all sorts of references to the Federal war effort featuring an over-abundance of resources. But such abundance means nothing if the resources are not at the right place for use. Barnard estimated 100,000 sandbags were “around.” So now a capable staff officer needed to secure a small draft of that sandbag stockpile for use on the line.
Enter Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock, aide-de-camp on the staff of Lieutenant-General U.S. Grant. While Hunt conversed with Benham, he also communicated with Comstock, who was also working this “tasking.” At 6:10 p.m., Hunt related to Burnside: “Have heard from Comstock. He says General Benham has sand-bags. I have telegraphed to General Barnard to have 7,000 or 8,000 sent you to-night either by Benham or Abbot.”
Ah, Colonel Henry Abbot also might have sandbags. Comstock inquired with Abbot. And promptly Abbot responded with an affirmative, but with limitations: “I made requisition for 25,000 sand-bags–5,000 for each gun, excluding the 100-pounders. How many were actually obtained I cannot say without seeing my ordnance officer, who is now at Broadway Landing. I have no transportation for them. I would suggest that you direct General Ingalls to send transportation to the Broadway Landing (one mile below the pontoon bridge), and let the wagon-master carry an order for Capt. S. P. Hatfield, ordnance officer of siege train, to issue the required number of bags to General Burnside. I think this plan would save much time. These bags, I hope, will be replaced, as I find I shall be obliged to supply them for my embrasures.”
Abbot also suggested, within separate correspondence to Barnard, to inquire with Weitzel, on the Bermuda Hundred line. So that’s how Barnard knew to reference Weitzel, perhaps? At any rate, that’s where the draft of sandbags would come from. That evening, Weitzel sent word to Burnside: I have just ordered 8,000 sandbags to be sent to you from my depot at Bermuda Hundred with all possible haste. I imagine they will reach you about 1 o’clock.”
So Burnside got his sandbags the following morning. Soon the troops would be employed filling those sandbags. Mind you those 8,000 would only provide 250 cubic yards of sandbags – be that reinforcing or revetments. Oh, but that was 340 short tons of earth to be moved. Sieges are indeed labor intensive operations.
The main reason I bring all this up is not to impress the reader with the number or weight of sandbags used, but to demonstrate how a good staff functions to support the commander. While commanders can designate the point of attack or defense, it is often up to staff officer to ensure the resources are arranged to support that command. Hunt, Comstock, Abbot, and Weitzel demonstrated just that function on June 25. A small episode of the war, not something to command a paragraph in any history of the battle. But the complex nature of any battle, particularly a siege, required hundreds of such small episodes – thankless staff work – in order to reach a successful conclusion.
There would be many more “sandbag days” at Petersburg. 100,000 sandbags would not be enough.
markerhunter.wordpress.com/2014/06/25/sandbag-day-at-petersburg/
Grant: Massive Siege of Vicksburg Leads to Union Victory | History
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qnq-df4MQzI
FYI PO2 Tom Belcher PO1 John Johnson PO2 Marco Monsalve SN Greg Wright PO3 Steven Sherrill LTC Trent Klug LTC (Join to see)SPC (Join to see) SSG (Join to see) Sgt Axel Hasting Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. SPC Jon O. SGT (Join to see) SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth MSgt (Join to see) CPT Kevin McComas SPC Maurice Evans SFC Ralph E Kelley PO3 Edward Riddle
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SGT Robert George
There were a few important happenings such as road building , tunneling , use of sandbags , securing hoover gap , Vicksburg but Oak Grove was probably most significant in the need to get siege guns closer to Richmond ....
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LTC Stephen F.
Thank you my friend SGT Robert George for letting us know that you consider the June 25, 1862 Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Inconclusive, the first of the Seven Days’ battles, to be the most significant event on June 25 during the civil war.
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LTC Stephen F. Greetings, I am going with:1862: Battle of Oak Grove, Virginia. Inconclusive, the first of the Seven Days’ battles. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan advanced his lines along the Williamsburg Road with the objective of bringing Richmond within range of his siege guns. Union forces atta --strategic importance throughout the region.
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LTC Stephen F.
You are very welcome my fellow civil war history appreciating friend SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL and thanks for letting me know that you voted for the 1862 Battle of Oak Grove
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