Posted on Oct 4, 2017
Johnson orders the commencement of Oplan 34A raids - Oct 04, 1964 - HISTORY.com
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President Johnson issues the order to reactivate North Vietnamese coastal raids by South Vietnamese boats as part of Oplan 34A.
These raids had been suspended after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in early August. On August 2, North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the destroyer USS Maddox, which was conducting an intelligence gathering mission in the same general area that had just come under attack by several Oplan 34A raids. Two days after the first attack, there was another incident, the details of which remain unclear. The Maddox, joined by destroyer USS C. Turner Joy, engaged what were, at the time, believed to be more attacking North Vietnamese patrol boats.
Although it was questionable whether the second attack actually happened, the incident provided the rationale for retaliatory air attacks against the North Vietnamese and the subsequent Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which became the basis for the initial escalation of the war in Vietnam and ultimately, the insertion of U.S. combat troops into the area. After two months, approval was given to continue the Oplan 34A raids against North Vietnamese coastal installations.
@ SMSgt Minister Gerald A. Thomas Capt Christopher MuellerCOL Mikel J. Burroughs Cynthia Croft SSgt (Join to see)Capt Seid WaddellSrA Christopher Wright LTC Stephen F. PO2 Richard C. MSG Tom EarleyPVT James Strait Alan K. PO1 William "Chip" NagelSGT John " Mac " McConnell SFC William Farrell LTC (Join to see) SSgt Robert Marx PO1 Tony Holland Maj Marty Hogan SCPO Morris Ramsey
These raids had been suspended after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in early August. On August 2, North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the destroyer USS Maddox, which was conducting an intelligence gathering mission in the same general area that had just come under attack by several Oplan 34A raids. Two days after the first attack, there was another incident, the details of which remain unclear. The Maddox, joined by destroyer USS C. Turner Joy, engaged what were, at the time, believed to be more attacking North Vietnamese patrol boats.
Although it was questionable whether the second attack actually happened, the incident provided the rationale for retaliatory air attacks against the North Vietnamese and the subsequent Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which became the basis for the initial escalation of the war in Vietnam and ultimately, the insertion of U.S. combat troops into the area. After two months, approval was given to continue the Oplan 34A raids against North Vietnamese coastal installations.
@ SMSgt Minister Gerald A. Thomas Capt Christopher MuellerCOL Mikel J. Burroughs Cynthia Croft SSgt (Join to see)Capt Seid WaddellSrA Christopher Wright LTC Stephen F. PO2 Richard C. MSG Tom EarleyPVT James Strait Alan K. PO1 William "Chip" NagelSGT John " Mac " McConnell SFC William Farrell LTC (Join to see) SSgt Robert Marx PO1 Tony Holland Maj Marty Hogan SCPO Morris Ramsey
Johnson orders the commencement of Oplan 34A raids - Oct 04, 1964 - HISTORY.com
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American History
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Office of the President (POTUS)
Vietnam War American History Military History Office of the President (POTUS)
Posted 7 y ago
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Thanks for reminding us SP5 Mark Kuzinski that on October 4, 1964 President Lyndon Baines Johnson issued the order to reactivate North Vietnamese coastal raids by South Vietnamese boats as part of Oplan 34A.
Background on OPLAN 34A
"As 1963 came to an end, there were nearly 16,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam. Just three days before President Kennedy’s death the secretaries of Defense and State, along with a host of other high-level civil and military officials, met in Honolulu to review the situation in post-Diem Vietnam. Out of this conference came National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 273, in which the LBJ White House reiterated the domino theory and called for planning "different levels of possible increased activity,” to include “estimates of the resulting damage to North Vietnam” and the plausible deniability of such activity.
The heads of the Defense and State departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CIA began discussions immediately. Defense Secretary McNamara reported that the Viet Cong were making steady gains, thanks in part to increased infiltration of supplies over what would become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The conferees made four general recommendations: (1) increase pressure on North Vietnam; (2) begin covert cross-border operations in Laos; (3) initiate aerial reconnaissance of both Cambodia and Laos; and (4) send American aid and economic advisers to South Vietnam.
The Joint Chiefs directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINPAC), in coordination with the CIA, to undertake the actual planning. CINCPAC in turn delegated the military responsibilities to the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). The resulting MACV/CIA plan cataloged more than 2,000 options, ranging from covert pin-pricks to battalion size raids and bombing of North Vietnamese targets. LBJ’s staff ordered that this rather unrealistic list be whittled down to those actions that would yield the greatest return for the least amount of risk. The upshot was a mulit-phase program, the first of which called for increased photo reconnaissance and SIGINT flights, psychological warfare operations, and sabotage of selected North Vietnamese targets by South Vietnamese commandos. Building on existing contingency planning, the program was designated Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A-64.
SOUR GRAPES
Although apparently not directly related to OPLAN 34A, in early 1964 a pair of USAF Gooney Birds appeared in Vietnam, tasked with SIGINT missions. First on the scene was a modified C-47 flown in from Korea to Vietnam under a project known as SOUR GRAPES.
According to the technicians who performed much of the work, Headquarters USAFSS ordered the conversion in an attempt to provide a low-cost alternative to Japan-based C-130 COMINT platforms which would be overextended if forced to cover Southeast Asia in addition to their Chinese and Soviet targets.
SOUR GRAPES deployed to Vietnam essentially as a “hearability” test, targeting enemy VHF voice communications. Chinese and Vietnamese linguists recorded any “take” in flight then processed their tapes after landing at either Tan Son Nhut or Da Nang. The equipment functioned as advertised on the 32 missions flown, but results were “underwhelming”. In April, the SIGINT gear was removed and the Gooney Bird was flown back to Korea."
http://www.ec47.com/widening-the-war-in-64
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SPC Margaret Higgins MSgt Jason McClish AN Christopher Crayne LTC Bill Koski SPC Tom DeSmet SGT Charles H. Hawes LTC Wayne Brandon SGT (Join to see) SGT Michael Thorin
Background on OPLAN 34A
"As 1963 came to an end, there were nearly 16,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam. Just three days before President Kennedy’s death the secretaries of Defense and State, along with a host of other high-level civil and military officials, met in Honolulu to review the situation in post-Diem Vietnam. Out of this conference came National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 273, in which the LBJ White House reiterated the domino theory and called for planning "different levels of possible increased activity,” to include “estimates of the resulting damage to North Vietnam” and the plausible deniability of such activity.
The heads of the Defense and State departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CIA began discussions immediately. Defense Secretary McNamara reported that the Viet Cong were making steady gains, thanks in part to increased infiltration of supplies over what would become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The conferees made four general recommendations: (1) increase pressure on North Vietnam; (2) begin covert cross-border operations in Laos; (3) initiate aerial reconnaissance of both Cambodia and Laos; and (4) send American aid and economic advisers to South Vietnam.
The Joint Chiefs directed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINPAC), in coordination with the CIA, to undertake the actual planning. CINCPAC in turn delegated the military responsibilities to the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). The resulting MACV/CIA plan cataloged more than 2,000 options, ranging from covert pin-pricks to battalion size raids and bombing of North Vietnamese targets. LBJ’s staff ordered that this rather unrealistic list be whittled down to those actions that would yield the greatest return for the least amount of risk. The upshot was a mulit-phase program, the first of which called for increased photo reconnaissance and SIGINT flights, psychological warfare operations, and sabotage of selected North Vietnamese targets by South Vietnamese commandos. Building on existing contingency planning, the program was designated Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A-64.
SOUR GRAPES
Although apparently not directly related to OPLAN 34A, in early 1964 a pair of USAF Gooney Birds appeared in Vietnam, tasked with SIGINT missions. First on the scene was a modified C-47 flown in from Korea to Vietnam under a project known as SOUR GRAPES.
According to the technicians who performed much of the work, Headquarters USAFSS ordered the conversion in an attempt to provide a low-cost alternative to Japan-based C-130 COMINT platforms which would be overextended if forced to cover Southeast Asia in addition to their Chinese and Soviet targets.
SOUR GRAPES deployed to Vietnam essentially as a “hearability” test, targeting enemy VHF voice communications. Chinese and Vietnamese linguists recorded any “take” in flight then processed their tapes after landing at either Tan Son Nhut or Da Nang. The equipment functioned as advertised on the 32 missions flown, but results were “underwhelming”. In April, the SIGINT gear was removed and the Gooney Bird was flown back to Korea."
http://www.ec47.com/widening-the-war-in-64
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SPC Margaret Higgins MSgt Jason McClish AN Christopher Crayne LTC Bill Koski SPC Tom DeSmet SGT Charles H. Hawes LTC Wayne Brandon SGT (Join to see) SGT Michael Thorin
OPLAN 34A As 1963 came to an end, there were nearly 16,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam. Just three days before President Kennedy s death the secretaries of Defense and State, along with a host of other high-level civil and military officials, met in Honolulu to review the situation in post-Diem Vietnam. Out of this conference came National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 273, in which the LBJ White House reiterated the domino theory and called...
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LTC Bill Koski
Thanks SP5 Mark Kuzinski,LTC Stephen F. for passing along this history lesson today, coincidentally timed with PBS "Vietnam ", which I am also listening to on books on tape. The lessons never get old.
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The onset of VN War all based on attacks that may have never happened.
"In the 2003 documentary The Fog of War, the former United States Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara admitted that the August 2 USS Maddox attack happened with no Defense Department response, but the August 4 Gulf of Tonkin attack never happened."
"In the 2003 documentary The Fog of War, the former United States Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara admitted that the August 2 USS Maddox attack happened with no Defense Department response, but the August 4 Gulf of Tonkin attack never happened."
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