Posted on Mar 29, 2017
What was the most significant event on October 13 during the U.S. Civil War?
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Autumn in warfare in previous centuries was a time when Armies sought advantage before the snows and/or colder weather of winter descended over the land. Winter tended to affect the areas north of Atlanta, Georgia to Birmingham, Alabama to Tupelo, Mississippi much more than those south of that line.
Armies traveled at the rate of the infantry soldier. While Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson had his foot cavalry in the Shenandoah Valley prior to his death, most Armies traveled more slowly. Timid commanders [e.g., George B. McClellan] advanced more slowly and deliberately than aggressive leaders [e.g., Phil Sheridan, Stonewall Jackson, U.S. Grant, William T. Sherman and Robert E Lee].
Armies tended to use their cavalry to screen the movements of infantry and artillery as well as performing the reconnaissance role of gaining intelligence on enemy dispositions. While the Armies moved their forces towards positions which gave them an advantage, on many occasions a skirmish or movement to contact forced leaders to adjust their plans. In those cases, battles were fought at places like Antietam, Maryland and Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and up and down the Shenandoah Valley.
Monday, October 13, 1862: “Lincoln gives McClellan one last chance “Getting through to George Brinton McClellan was no simple task. The man was self-assured, self-congratulatory, and self-centered. Since the battle of Antietam, nearly a month ago, President Lincoln had tried numerous times to convince his General that moving against Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, positioned near Winchester, was incredibly important.
With every request, suggestion, and order came excuses from the pen of McClellan. When Lincoln visited the Army of the Potomac, he and McClellan had numerous talks as the President reiterated the necessity for him to move.
Since that time, Confederate cavalry under Jeb Stuart had raided to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania and circled the Union Army, centered near Harpers Ferry. This was the second time it had happened. It was humiliating. Though this latest embarrassment would not be specifically addressed by the President until he had all the details, Lincoln thought it once again time for a letter to General McClellan.
During the meeting at Antietam, Lincoln had termed McClellan as “over-cautious.” Perhaps it was the nicest way he could think of to put it. In the letter dated “October 13,” Lincoln continued this line of thought.
“Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing?” asked the President. “Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?”
Both Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry Halleck wanted McClellan to move the army to Winchester, forcing what they believed to be the smaller enemy force out into the open. McClellan’s reasoning was that getting supplies to Winchester from Harpers Ferry without a working railroad line would be impossible.
To counter the excuse, Lincoln suggested that “the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named.” Lincoln wrote that he would love for McClellan to have a working railroad built all the way from Harpers Ferry to Winchester, “but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you; and, in fact ignores the question of time, which can not, and must not be ignored.”
The Rebel army sat in a strange position. From Winchester, they could either move south to Richmond or north into Pennsylvania – a threat that Lincoln was taking all the more seriously with Stuart’s latest raid. Lincoln had a plan for both.
If the Rebels moved north, they would necessarily cut communication with Richmond. This could work to McClellan’s advantage. If General Lee invaded Pennsylvania, wrote Lincoln, “you have nothing to do but to follow, and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon, and beat what is left behind all the easier.”
Should Lee move towards Richmond, McClellan’s army was closer to the Rebel capital than the Confederate army, “I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and, at least, try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track.” To further drive this point home, Lincoln mused, “Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march.”
The point of this whole thing was that the Confederate army needed to be defeated. “We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere,” reminded Lincoln. If McClellan could not beat Lee in the field, there really wasn’t a chance that he could beat him once behind the defenses of Richmond.
From the letter, it was clear that Lincoln wanted McClellan to make a move towards Richmond. He detailed the roads and the mountain passes across the Blue Ridge which the Rebels might take. “I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy,” advised the President, “disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together, for dread of you.”
To sweeten the pot, Lincoln knew that he would have to promise McClellan troops – all the troops he could ever imagine that he would need. “For a great part of the way, you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here.”
If the Federal army moved against Richmond and the Rebels made a play for Washington, all McClellan had to do was fall upon the rear of the enemy. “But,” reminded Lincoln, “I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached.”
In closing, Lincoln boldly asserted that this was all easy “if our troops march as well as the enemy; and it is unmanly to say they can not do it.”
The letter was biting, but, it was “in no sense an order.” It was merely a suggestion that McClellan should probably follow – and quickly.
Before sending the letter to the army, Lincoln shared it with is Vice-President, Hannibal Hamlin. At the Soldiers Home just north of the city, he and Lincoln stayed up all night discussing the McClellan issue. There were many, including his Cabinet, who wanted to see McClellan removed from command. Lincoln, however, wanted to exhaust all possibilities before coming to that conclusion.
Hamlin gave McClellan the credit he deserved for organizing the Army of the Potomac. But that is where the praise ended. McClellan, in Hamlin’s eyes, was by nature not a fighter. There were numerous times, especially on the Peninsula, where McClellan could have done more, but instead chose not to fight.
Interestingly, Hamlin contrasted this behavior with another general in the field: Ulysses S. Grant. While McClellan had been given all the resources that Washington had to offer, he still had to be coaxed into fighting. Grant, on the other hand, was out West, where the resources were limited, at best. And yet, Grant was always ready for a fight. While McClellan meddled in politics during his long stretches of military inactivity, Grant did no such thing.
To sum upon his opinion of General McClellan, Hamlin told Lincoln that the General was “the first man to build a bridge, but the last man to cross it.”
Lincoln agreed completely, but decided that McClellan deserved one more chance. This letter, it appears, was that final chance. It was the last opportunity McClellan would have to prove himself to Lincoln.
It wouldn’t arrive in Harpers Ferry until the 16th. When it did, McClellan’s only response was that he was too busy to give “the full and respectful consideration which it merits at my hands.” He promised to give the President’s views “the fullest and most unprejudiced consideration.” It was apparently his intention to “advance the moment my men are shod and my cavalry are sufficiently remounted to be serviceable.”
And that was all. It wasn’t that McClellan was too busy to consider the letter. He seemed to know that this was his last chance. “Lincoln is down on me,” he told one of his generals. “I expect to be relieved from the Army of the Potomac, and to have a command in the West.” Maybe part of him wished this to be. A western command would put him farther away from the coaxing and prodding Washington. But none of him seemed to believe there was even the most remote chance he would simply be fired. [1]
[1] Sources: Diary of Gideon Welles; The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 6; McClellan’s Own Story by George McClellan; The Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin by Charles Eugene Hamlin; George B. McClellan by Stephen W. Sear.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lincoln-gives-mcclellan-one-last-chance/
Thursday, October 13, 1864: John Bell Hood’s men murder black prisoners of war in cold blood. “Col. Lewis Johnson had dispatched a few parties of scouts to discover from where the Confederates would be approaching his garrison at Dalton, Georgia. The day previous, the town of Resaca had been half-heartedly attacked by Steven D. Lee’s Corps from John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee, and now it seemed like they had turned north to fall upon his command.
Near dawn, there was already skirmishing to the south, near the town of Tilton, with the Confederates pushing back the Federals as they came. Johnson had called for reinforcements, but only fifty men from the 57th Illinois had shown up. This only slightly augmented his own regiment, the 44th United States Colored Troops.
General Sherman, whom Hood was trying to pry from Atlanta by attacking the railroad to the north, was enthusiastically against black soldiers being part of his command. “I prefer some negroes as pioneers, teamsters, cooks, and servants,” he said in July, though dabbled with the idea of someday using them “to experiment in the art of the soldier, beginning with the duties of local garrison….”
And that is how the 44th USCT came to be at Dalton. This was Sherman’s experiment. While it had been well over a year since black soldiers had more than proven their worth on the battlefield, Sherman was clinging tightly to his outdated ways.
When the skirmishers from the 7th Kentucky Cavalry retreated back into town, they could not say for sure who was behind them – infantry or dismounted cavalry. But as the Rebels drew closer, it became clear to Johnson that it was indeed infantry. Following some skirmishing much closer to Dalton, a flag of truce borne by a messenger was filed across the lines. Along with the flag, he carried an order to surrender written by General Hood. Officer Commanding U.S. Forces, Dalton, Georgia: I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the post and garrison under your command, and should this be acceded to, all white officers and soldiers will be paroled in a few days. If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant, J.B. Hood, General.”
Though Johnson could not know this, Hood’s demand was the same as was presented to Col. Wever in Resaca the day previous. But like Col. Wever, Johnson refused: “I cannot surrender the troops under my command, whatever the consequences may be.”
And those consequences seemed dire indeed for the 600 or more black soldiers who made up the 44th. It was clear that only the whites among them – the Illinois and Kentucky troops – would be paroled. The rest would be, at best, forced back into slavery, a horror with which nearly every man in the regiment was intimately familiar. Since this would happen whether they could hold Dalton or not, Col. Johnson decided to fight.
The fighting continued, though it was not long before another plea came across for the Federals to surrender. Once more Johnson refused. The Rebels, it seemed, had given him his chance. Soon, a thick line of Southern infantry, stretching two miles in length, uncoiled around the town. It ran from Tunnel Hill to the north, around the town to the south and cut off the road to Spring Place to the east. Rebel artillery began to hammer outpost all around him. “In short,” wrote Johnson in his report, “we were surrounded.”
A captain from the 7th Kentucky took it upon himself to ride the length of the enemy line, and upon his return, begging Johnson to surrender – “they had men enough to eat us up.”
Johnson now began to reconsider. He sent a few messengers across, asking if they might be allowed to inspect the Confederate lines. If they found more than 10,000 men, they would agree to abandon the post and be allowed to march unmolested to the nearest Federal garrison. Hood, of course, denied this permission, and his aide-de-camp assured the Federals that many times more than 10,000 were before them. There were two fully corps in line and a third, S.D. Lee’s, within easy support. They also reminded them that once they made their attack, no quarter would be given. No prisoners would be taken.
Stepping into these talks came General Hood himself, asking to parlay with Col. Johnson. “I saw General Hood,” wrote Johnson a few days later, “and he repeated what his staff officers had told my lieutenant-colonel and the other officers, and showed me at least 25,000 men and thirty pieces of artillery, which were then in position bearing upon my work.”
Hood warned him that he must decide at once, telling him that he had already taken too long. Johnson made a protest against the brutal idea of giving no quarter, but according to Johnson, Hood replied that “he could not restrain his men, and would not if he could; that I could choose between surrender and death.”
There was not much to consider. His 800 or so men could hold out maybe fifteen minutes, and he believed full well that all would be slaughtered. “To fight any more than had been done was madness, in the face of such barbarous threats, which I was fully satisfied would be carried out, as the division of Cleburne, which was in the immediate rear of the rebel general and his staff, was over anxious to move upon the ‘niggers,’ and constantly violated the flag of truce by skirmishing near it, and to fight was also hopeless, as we were surrounded and could not be supported from anywhere.”
A Confederate private from Arkansas, named William E. Bevens, recalled that “while the artillery made ready the Texans passed the word down the line as though it came from General Cheatham, “Kill every damn one of them,” which would have been carrying out their own threat of ‘no quarter.’ However they saved their necks by five minutes, for when the white officers saw they were overwhelmingly surrounded they gave up.”
“I surrendered the command as prisoners of war between 3 and 4pm,” wrote Johnson in his report, “under conditions that the men were to be treated humanely, officers and white soldiers to be paroled, officers to retain their swords and such private property as they could carry.”
Knowing that his regiment of Colored Troops would be sent south into slavery, he made clear his desires that he, along with the other white officers, be sent south with them, “but this was refused us, and I was told by general Hood that he would return all slaves belonging to persons in the Confederacy to their masters; and when I protested against this and told him that the United States Government would retaliate, and that I surrendered the men as soldiers, he said I might surrender them as whatever I pleased; that he would have them attended to, &c.”
Just what “would have them attended to” actually meant, Johnson was fairly certain. Being with his men in their immediate capture, Johnson related their ordeal: “Although assured by General Hood in person that the terms of the agreement should be strictly observed, my men, especially the colored soldiers, were immediately robbed and abused in a terrible manner. The treatment of the officers of my regiment exceeded anything in brutality I have ever witnessed, and a General Bate distinguished himself especially by meanness and beastly conduct.
“This General Bate was ordered to take charge of us, and immediately commenced heaping insults upon me and my officers. He had my colored soldiers robbed of their shoes (this was done systematically and by his order), and sent them down to the railroad and made them tear up the track for a distance of nearly two miles. One of my soldiers, who refused to injure the track, was shot on the spot, as were also five others shortly after the surrender, who having been sick, were unable to keep up with the rest of the march.”
Johnson went into more detail in a subsequent report, written on the same date (October 17th): “Not withstanding all this the officers and men were immediately after the surrender deprived of almost every article of clothing they had about them, and when all, about dark, were marching off toward Tunnel Hill, several men who were taken from the hospital and were unable to travel were shot down in cold blood and left on the road.”
Of the first murder, Private Beven alludes: “The prisoners were put to work at tearing up the railroad track. One of the negoes protested against the work as he was a sergeant. When he had paid the penalty for disobeying orders the rest tore up the road readily and rapidly.” Of the five other murders, he made no reference, but chose not to dispute Col. Johnson’s claims, which by the time he wrote his memoirs, were part of the public record.
The prisoners were taken to Villanow, ten miles west, where, as Johnson relates, “a number of my soldiers were returned to their former masters. This I know was done, because I saw it done in a number of instances myself.”
That night, according to Private Beven’s accounting, the Texans moved in to guard the prisoners. “We heard them yelling and singing but did not know what had happened. They were guarding the negro prisoners, and were calling to us, ‘Here are your “no quarter” negroes, come and kill them!’ The poor negroes, with eyes popped out nearly two inches, begged, prayed, and made all sorts of promises for the future. They soon moved on out of sight and the general turned them over to the engineer corps, where they did splendid service. This was better than killing them.”
Col. Johnson, in his report, corroborates this: “several times on the march soldiers made a rush upon the guards to massacre the colored soldiers and their officers. Mississippians did this principally (belonging to Stewart’s Corps), and were often encouraged in these outrages by officers of high rank. I saw an lieutenant-colonel who endeavored to infuriate a mob, and we were only saved from massacre by our guards’ greatest efforts.”
Through the next day (the 14th), Johnson helped several of his men escape, though witnessed several others murdered for not being able to keep up with their new masters. The next day, when Col. Johnson was about to be paroled, he “tried to get the free servants and soldiers in the regiment belonging to the free States (Ohio and Indiana) released, but to no avail.”
After Johnson was paroled, he had no way of knowing what happened to his men. A month later, on November 12th, Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard questioned Hood about “whether the negroes at work on the railroad and fortifications in and about Corinth are the same captured by your command in Georgia, and if so what arrangements have been made for medical attendance upon them.” Hood’s reply was either lost or never sent.
Few of the prisoners, it seems now, lived through the ordeal, though their true numbers are impossible to tell. It can be hoped that many more escaped to the North or back into Union lines, though the stories to support this are simply nonexistent. [1]
[1] Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 39, Part 1, p717-724; Part 3, p914; Reminiscences of a Private by William E. Bevens; The Chessboard of War by Anne J. Bailey.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/hoods-men-murder-black-prisoners-of-war-in-cold-blood/
Pictures: 1864-10-13 Battle of Darbytown Roadmap; Union corporal. The Union was always better equipped than the Confederates; 1864-10-13 Map of the positions around Dalton; 1864-10-13 Mosby's Greenback Raid
A. 1861: Sunday, October 13, 1861: Union Victory at Wet Glaze near Henrytown, Mo. Maj Gen Fremont’s Army of the West had been gathering to advance upon the Missouri State Guard army of General Sterling Price, falling back towards the southwest border of the state. Col. John B. Wyman 13th Illinois Infantry regiment, along with two battalions of Missouri cavalry, had passed through Rolla on their way to join Hunter’s Division. Though the Union cavalry was greatly outnumbered, they decided to attack. Infantry support was still miles away, so they were on their own.
From their secure position, the Rebels fired a volley into the Fremont Battalion, who returned fire, drew sabers and charged. The Rebels, not expecting such a small force of cavalry to charge, scattered before they could reload their weapons. The 600 Rebels tried to put up a running fight for a mile and half as the two cavalry battalions gave chase. Before long, however, it was a rout. As the 13th Illinois Infantry made camp, the cavalry pursued the Rebels nearly twelve miles towards Lebanon, capturing over forty.
By nightfall, all Union troops, but one killed in the action, were in camp on the road to Linn Creek. The Missouri State Guards never submitted a report of the battle, so their casualty figures are unknown. Per the Union figures submitted by Col. Grenville Dodge, who took care of the wounded in Rolla, sixteen Rebels were killed and about thirty were wounded.
B. 1862: Following an intercession, the second session of the First Congress met from August 18 to October 13, 1862. Except for a single six-year term for the President and references to the everlasting legality of the institution of slavery “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America” was written much like the US Constitution. It also included the right of habeas corpus, the rule that persons could only be arrested on specific charges, and had the right to have these heard before a judge. The Congress today renewed a law authorizing the suspension of these rights. Then they adjourned the second session of the First Congress.
C. 1863: J.E.B Stuart’s cavalry almost trapped at Auburn, Virginia - After the retreat from Gettysburg, the Confederate army concentrated behind Rapidan River in Orange County. On October 13, J.E.B. Stuart, with Fitzhugh Lee’s and Lunsford L. Lomax's brigades, skirmished with the rearguard of the Union III Corps near Auburn which brushed them aside. Finding himself cut off by retreating Union columns, Stuart secreted his troopers in a wooded ravine until the unsuspecting Federals moved on.
Background: General Lee was determined to find out how quickly Meade was reacting to his flanking maneuverer, and sent Jeb Stuart to Catlett’s Station, one stop north of Warrenton Junction, to sort it out. By this time, Lee had reached Warrenton, and dispatched Stuart from there. Stuart grabbed the nearest brigade he could find, which turned out to belong to Lunsford L. Lomax, from Fitz Lee’s Division. They were sent via Auburn, which they reached around 2pm, just as French’s III Corps stepped off four miles south. Shortly after, the rest of Fitz Lee’s Division followed.
Stuart had left General Lomax’s brigade at the crossing of Cedar Run just south of Auburn, and there was where French found them. Lomax had noticed the Federals first, and deployed artillery and skirmishers as a greeting. This caught French off guard, but he quickly recovered. One small brigade of cavalry, even with artillery, could do little against an entire corps. In fact, French deployed only a division, and brushed Lomax aside.
“In this predicament,” wrote Stuart, “I was not long in deciding to conceal my whereabouts, if possible, from the enemy.” Though Stuart was in a tight spot, it also placed him between the two Federal columns. This allowed him to intercept several dispatches that detailed the position and intent of the enemy.
The more he thought about it, the less this seemed like a trap, and the more it seemed like an opportunity. It was clear that the Yankees had no idea that he was hiding between their columns. In the dark, he had placed his artillery in a fine position and “was prepared to co-operate with any attack made by our main body upon the flank [of the enemy]. Start dispatched six “bold men” to pass through the marching lines of Yankees to communicate with General Lee. If all went well, the next morning would be a hot surprise for the Federals.
D. 1864: Darbytown Road in Henrico County, Virginia. Union forces advanced to find and feel the new Confederate defensive line in front of Richmond. While mostly a battle of skirmishers, a Union brigade assaulted fortifications north of Darbytown Road and was repulsed with heavy casualties. The Federals retired to their entrenched lines along New Market Road. This was part of Petersburg Campaign
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Armies traveled at the rate of the infantry soldier. While Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson had his foot cavalry in the Shenandoah Valley prior to his death, most Armies traveled more slowly. Timid commanders [e.g., George B. McClellan] advanced more slowly and deliberately than aggressive leaders [e.g., Phil Sheridan, Stonewall Jackson, U.S. Grant, William T. Sherman and Robert E Lee].
Armies tended to use their cavalry to screen the movements of infantry and artillery as well as performing the reconnaissance role of gaining intelligence on enemy dispositions. While the Armies moved their forces towards positions which gave them an advantage, on many occasions a skirmish or movement to contact forced leaders to adjust their plans. In those cases, battles were fought at places like Antietam, Maryland and Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and up and down the Shenandoah Valley.
Monday, October 13, 1862: “Lincoln gives McClellan one last chance “Getting through to George Brinton McClellan was no simple task. The man was self-assured, self-congratulatory, and self-centered. Since the battle of Antietam, nearly a month ago, President Lincoln had tried numerous times to convince his General that moving against Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, positioned near Winchester, was incredibly important.
With every request, suggestion, and order came excuses from the pen of McClellan. When Lincoln visited the Army of the Potomac, he and McClellan had numerous talks as the President reiterated the necessity for him to move.
Since that time, Confederate cavalry under Jeb Stuart had raided to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania and circled the Union Army, centered near Harpers Ferry. This was the second time it had happened. It was humiliating. Though this latest embarrassment would not be specifically addressed by the President until he had all the details, Lincoln thought it once again time for a letter to General McClellan.
During the meeting at Antietam, Lincoln had termed McClellan as “over-cautious.” Perhaps it was the nicest way he could think of to put it. In the letter dated “October 13,” Lincoln continued this line of thought.
“Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing?” asked the President. “Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?”
Both Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry Halleck wanted McClellan to move the army to Winchester, forcing what they believed to be the smaller enemy force out into the open. McClellan’s reasoning was that getting supplies to Winchester from Harpers Ferry without a working railroad line would be impossible.
To counter the excuse, Lincoln suggested that “the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named.” Lincoln wrote that he would love for McClellan to have a working railroad built all the way from Harpers Ferry to Winchester, “but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you; and, in fact ignores the question of time, which can not, and must not be ignored.”
The Rebel army sat in a strange position. From Winchester, they could either move south to Richmond or north into Pennsylvania – a threat that Lincoln was taking all the more seriously with Stuart’s latest raid. Lincoln had a plan for both.
If the Rebels moved north, they would necessarily cut communication with Richmond. This could work to McClellan’s advantage. If General Lee invaded Pennsylvania, wrote Lincoln, “you have nothing to do but to follow, and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon, and beat what is left behind all the easier.”
Should Lee move towards Richmond, McClellan’s army was closer to the Rebel capital than the Confederate army, “I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and, at least, try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track.” To further drive this point home, Lincoln mused, “Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march.”
The point of this whole thing was that the Confederate army needed to be defeated. “We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere,” reminded Lincoln. If McClellan could not beat Lee in the field, there really wasn’t a chance that he could beat him once behind the defenses of Richmond.
From the letter, it was clear that Lincoln wanted McClellan to make a move towards Richmond. He detailed the roads and the mountain passes across the Blue Ridge which the Rebels might take. “I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy,” advised the President, “disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together, for dread of you.”
To sweeten the pot, Lincoln knew that he would have to promise McClellan troops – all the troops he could ever imagine that he would need. “For a great part of the way, you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here.”
If the Federal army moved against Richmond and the Rebels made a play for Washington, all McClellan had to do was fall upon the rear of the enemy. “But,” reminded Lincoln, “I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached.”
In closing, Lincoln boldly asserted that this was all easy “if our troops march as well as the enemy; and it is unmanly to say they can not do it.”
The letter was biting, but, it was “in no sense an order.” It was merely a suggestion that McClellan should probably follow – and quickly.
Before sending the letter to the army, Lincoln shared it with is Vice-President, Hannibal Hamlin. At the Soldiers Home just north of the city, he and Lincoln stayed up all night discussing the McClellan issue. There were many, including his Cabinet, who wanted to see McClellan removed from command. Lincoln, however, wanted to exhaust all possibilities before coming to that conclusion.
Hamlin gave McClellan the credit he deserved for organizing the Army of the Potomac. But that is where the praise ended. McClellan, in Hamlin’s eyes, was by nature not a fighter. There were numerous times, especially on the Peninsula, where McClellan could have done more, but instead chose not to fight.
Interestingly, Hamlin contrasted this behavior with another general in the field: Ulysses S. Grant. While McClellan had been given all the resources that Washington had to offer, he still had to be coaxed into fighting. Grant, on the other hand, was out West, where the resources were limited, at best. And yet, Grant was always ready for a fight. While McClellan meddled in politics during his long stretches of military inactivity, Grant did no such thing.
To sum upon his opinion of General McClellan, Hamlin told Lincoln that the General was “the first man to build a bridge, but the last man to cross it.”
Lincoln agreed completely, but decided that McClellan deserved one more chance. This letter, it appears, was that final chance. It was the last opportunity McClellan would have to prove himself to Lincoln.
It wouldn’t arrive in Harpers Ferry until the 16th. When it did, McClellan’s only response was that he was too busy to give “the full and respectful consideration which it merits at my hands.” He promised to give the President’s views “the fullest and most unprejudiced consideration.” It was apparently his intention to “advance the moment my men are shod and my cavalry are sufficiently remounted to be serviceable.”
And that was all. It wasn’t that McClellan was too busy to consider the letter. He seemed to know that this was his last chance. “Lincoln is down on me,” he told one of his generals. “I expect to be relieved from the Army of the Potomac, and to have a command in the West.” Maybe part of him wished this to be. A western command would put him farther away from the coaxing and prodding Washington. But none of him seemed to believe there was even the most remote chance he would simply be fired. [1]
[1] Sources: Diary of Gideon Welles; The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 6; McClellan’s Own Story by George McClellan; The Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin by Charles Eugene Hamlin; George B. McClellan by Stephen W. Sear.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lincoln-gives-mcclellan-one-last-chance/
Thursday, October 13, 1864: John Bell Hood’s men murder black prisoners of war in cold blood. “Col. Lewis Johnson had dispatched a few parties of scouts to discover from where the Confederates would be approaching his garrison at Dalton, Georgia. The day previous, the town of Resaca had been half-heartedly attacked by Steven D. Lee’s Corps from John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee, and now it seemed like they had turned north to fall upon his command.
Near dawn, there was already skirmishing to the south, near the town of Tilton, with the Confederates pushing back the Federals as they came. Johnson had called for reinforcements, but only fifty men from the 57th Illinois had shown up. This only slightly augmented his own regiment, the 44th United States Colored Troops.
General Sherman, whom Hood was trying to pry from Atlanta by attacking the railroad to the north, was enthusiastically against black soldiers being part of his command. “I prefer some negroes as pioneers, teamsters, cooks, and servants,” he said in July, though dabbled with the idea of someday using them “to experiment in the art of the soldier, beginning with the duties of local garrison….”
And that is how the 44th USCT came to be at Dalton. This was Sherman’s experiment. While it had been well over a year since black soldiers had more than proven their worth on the battlefield, Sherman was clinging tightly to his outdated ways.
When the skirmishers from the 7th Kentucky Cavalry retreated back into town, they could not say for sure who was behind them – infantry or dismounted cavalry. But as the Rebels drew closer, it became clear to Johnson that it was indeed infantry. Following some skirmishing much closer to Dalton, a flag of truce borne by a messenger was filed across the lines. Along with the flag, he carried an order to surrender written by General Hood. Officer Commanding U.S. Forces, Dalton, Georgia: I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the post and garrison under your command, and should this be acceded to, all white officers and soldiers will be paroled in a few days. If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant, J.B. Hood, General.”
Though Johnson could not know this, Hood’s demand was the same as was presented to Col. Wever in Resaca the day previous. But like Col. Wever, Johnson refused: “I cannot surrender the troops under my command, whatever the consequences may be.”
And those consequences seemed dire indeed for the 600 or more black soldiers who made up the 44th. It was clear that only the whites among them – the Illinois and Kentucky troops – would be paroled. The rest would be, at best, forced back into slavery, a horror with which nearly every man in the regiment was intimately familiar. Since this would happen whether they could hold Dalton or not, Col. Johnson decided to fight.
The fighting continued, though it was not long before another plea came across for the Federals to surrender. Once more Johnson refused. The Rebels, it seemed, had given him his chance. Soon, a thick line of Southern infantry, stretching two miles in length, uncoiled around the town. It ran from Tunnel Hill to the north, around the town to the south and cut off the road to Spring Place to the east. Rebel artillery began to hammer outpost all around him. “In short,” wrote Johnson in his report, “we were surrounded.”
A captain from the 7th Kentucky took it upon himself to ride the length of the enemy line, and upon his return, begging Johnson to surrender – “they had men enough to eat us up.”
Johnson now began to reconsider. He sent a few messengers across, asking if they might be allowed to inspect the Confederate lines. If they found more than 10,000 men, they would agree to abandon the post and be allowed to march unmolested to the nearest Federal garrison. Hood, of course, denied this permission, and his aide-de-camp assured the Federals that many times more than 10,000 were before them. There were two fully corps in line and a third, S.D. Lee’s, within easy support. They also reminded them that once they made their attack, no quarter would be given. No prisoners would be taken.
Stepping into these talks came General Hood himself, asking to parlay with Col. Johnson. “I saw General Hood,” wrote Johnson a few days later, “and he repeated what his staff officers had told my lieutenant-colonel and the other officers, and showed me at least 25,000 men and thirty pieces of artillery, which were then in position bearing upon my work.”
Hood warned him that he must decide at once, telling him that he had already taken too long. Johnson made a protest against the brutal idea of giving no quarter, but according to Johnson, Hood replied that “he could not restrain his men, and would not if he could; that I could choose between surrender and death.”
There was not much to consider. His 800 or so men could hold out maybe fifteen minutes, and he believed full well that all would be slaughtered. “To fight any more than had been done was madness, in the face of such barbarous threats, which I was fully satisfied would be carried out, as the division of Cleburne, which was in the immediate rear of the rebel general and his staff, was over anxious to move upon the ‘niggers,’ and constantly violated the flag of truce by skirmishing near it, and to fight was also hopeless, as we were surrounded and could not be supported from anywhere.”
A Confederate private from Arkansas, named William E. Bevens, recalled that “while the artillery made ready the Texans passed the word down the line as though it came from General Cheatham, “Kill every damn one of them,” which would have been carrying out their own threat of ‘no quarter.’ However they saved their necks by five minutes, for when the white officers saw they were overwhelmingly surrounded they gave up.”
“I surrendered the command as prisoners of war between 3 and 4pm,” wrote Johnson in his report, “under conditions that the men were to be treated humanely, officers and white soldiers to be paroled, officers to retain their swords and such private property as they could carry.”
Knowing that his regiment of Colored Troops would be sent south into slavery, he made clear his desires that he, along with the other white officers, be sent south with them, “but this was refused us, and I was told by general Hood that he would return all slaves belonging to persons in the Confederacy to their masters; and when I protested against this and told him that the United States Government would retaliate, and that I surrendered the men as soldiers, he said I might surrender them as whatever I pleased; that he would have them attended to, &c.”
Just what “would have them attended to” actually meant, Johnson was fairly certain. Being with his men in their immediate capture, Johnson related their ordeal: “Although assured by General Hood in person that the terms of the agreement should be strictly observed, my men, especially the colored soldiers, were immediately robbed and abused in a terrible manner. The treatment of the officers of my regiment exceeded anything in brutality I have ever witnessed, and a General Bate distinguished himself especially by meanness and beastly conduct.
“This General Bate was ordered to take charge of us, and immediately commenced heaping insults upon me and my officers. He had my colored soldiers robbed of their shoes (this was done systematically and by his order), and sent them down to the railroad and made them tear up the track for a distance of nearly two miles. One of my soldiers, who refused to injure the track, was shot on the spot, as were also five others shortly after the surrender, who having been sick, were unable to keep up with the rest of the march.”
Johnson went into more detail in a subsequent report, written on the same date (October 17th): “Not withstanding all this the officers and men were immediately after the surrender deprived of almost every article of clothing they had about them, and when all, about dark, were marching off toward Tunnel Hill, several men who were taken from the hospital and were unable to travel were shot down in cold blood and left on the road.”
Of the first murder, Private Beven alludes: “The prisoners were put to work at tearing up the railroad track. One of the negoes protested against the work as he was a sergeant. When he had paid the penalty for disobeying orders the rest tore up the road readily and rapidly.” Of the five other murders, he made no reference, but chose not to dispute Col. Johnson’s claims, which by the time he wrote his memoirs, were part of the public record.
The prisoners were taken to Villanow, ten miles west, where, as Johnson relates, “a number of my soldiers were returned to their former masters. This I know was done, because I saw it done in a number of instances myself.”
That night, according to Private Beven’s accounting, the Texans moved in to guard the prisoners. “We heard them yelling and singing but did not know what had happened. They were guarding the negro prisoners, and were calling to us, ‘Here are your “no quarter” negroes, come and kill them!’ The poor negroes, with eyes popped out nearly two inches, begged, prayed, and made all sorts of promises for the future. They soon moved on out of sight and the general turned them over to the engineer corps, where they did splendid service. This was better than killing them.”
Col. Johnson, in his report, corroborates this: “several times on the march soldiers made a rush upon the guards to massacre the colored soldiers and their officers. Mississippians did this principally (belonging to Stewart’s Corps), and were often encouraged in these outrages by officers of high rank. I saw an lieutenant-colonel who endeavored to infuriate a mob, and we were only saved from massacre by our guards’ greatest efforts.”
Through the next day (the 14th), Johnson helped several of his men escape, though witnessed several others murdered for not being able to keep up with their new masters. The next day, when Col. Johnson was about to be paroled, he “tried to get the free servants and soldiers in the regiment belonging to the free States (Ohio and Indiana) released, but to no avail.”
After Johnson was paroled, he had no way of knowing what happened to his men. A month later, on November 12th, Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard questioned Hood about “whether the negroes at work on the railroad and fortifications in and about Corinth are the same captured by your command in Georgia, and if so what arrangements have been made for medical attendance upon them.” Hood’s reply was either lost or never sent.
Few of the prisoners, it seems now, lived through the ordeal, though their true numbers are impossible to tell. It can be hoped that many more escaped to the North or back into Union lines, though the stories to support this are simply nonexistent. [1]
[1] Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 39, Part 1, p717-724; Part 3, p914; Reminiscences of a Private by William E. Bevens; The Chessboard of War by Anne J. Bailey.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/hoods-men-murder-black-prisoners-of-war-in-cold-blood/
Pictures: 1864-10-13 Battle of Darbytown Roadmap; Union corporal. The Union was always better equipped than the Confederates; 1864-10-13 Map of the positions around Dalton; 1864-10-13 Mosby's Greenback Raid
A. 1861: Sunday, October 13, 1861: Union Victory at Wet Glaze near Henrytown, Mo. Maj Gen Fremont’s Army of the West had been gathering to advance upon the Missouri State Guard army of General Sterling Price, falling back towards the southwest border of the state. Col. John B. Wyman 13th Illinois Infantry regiment, along with two battalions of Missouri cavalry, had passed through Rolla on their way to join Hunter’s Division. Though the Union cavalry was greatly outnumbered, they decided to attack. Infantry support was still miles away, so they were on their own.
From their secure position, the Rebels fired a volley into the Fremont Battalion, who returned fire, drew sabers and charged. The Rebels, not expecting such a small force of cavalry to charge, scattered before they could reload their weapons. The 600 Rebels tried to put up a running fight for a mile and half as the two cavalry battalions gave chase. Before long, however, it was a rout. As the 13th Illinois Infantry made camp, the cavalry pursued the Rebels nearly twelve miles towards Lebanon, capturing over forty.
By nightfall, all Union troops, but one killed in the action, were in camp on the road to Linn Creek. The Missouri State Guards never submitted a report of the battle, so their casualty figures are unknown. Per the Union figures submitted by Col. Grenville Dodge, who took care of the wounded in Rolla, sixteen Rebels were killed and about thirty were wounded.
B. 1862: Following an intercession, the second session of the First Congress met from August 18 to October 13, 1862. Except for a single six-year term for the President and references to the everlasting legality of the institution of slavery “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America” was written much like the US Constitution. It also included the right of habeas corpus, the rule that persons could only be arrested on specific charges, and had the right to have these heard before a judge. The Congress today renewed a law authorizing the suspension of these rights. Then they adjourned the second session of the First Congress.
C. 1863: J.E.B Stuart’s cavalry almost trapped at Auburn, Virginia - After the retreat from Gettysburg, the Confederate army concentrated behind Rapidan River in Orange County. On October 13, J.E.B. Stuart, with Fitzhugh Lee’s and Lunsford L. Lomax's brigades, skirmished with the rearguard of the Union III Corps near Auburn which brushed them aside. Finding himself cut off by retreating Union columns, Stuart secreted his troopers in a wooded ravine until the unsuspecting Federals moved on.
Background: General Lee was determined to find out how quickly Meade was reacting to his flanking maneuverer, and sent Jeb Stuart to Catlett’s Station, one stop north of Warrenton Junction, to sort it out. By this time, Lee had reached Warrenton, and dispatched Stuart from there. Stuart grabbed the nearest brigade he could find, which turned out to belong to Lunsford L. Lomax, from Fitz Lee’s Division. They were sent via Auburn, which they reached around 2pm, just as French’s III Corps stepped off four miles south. Shortly after, the rest of Fitz Lee’s Division followed.
Stuart had left General Lomax’s brigade at the crossing of Cedar Run just south of Auburn, and there was where French found them. Lomax had noticed the Federals first, and deployed artillery and skirmishers as a greeting. This caught French off guard, but he quickly recovered. One small brigade of cavalry, even with artillery, could do little against an entire corps. In fact, French deployed only a division, and brushed Lomax aside.
“In this predicament,” wrote Stuart, “I was not long in deciding to conceal my whereabouts, if possible, from the enemy.” Though Stuart was in a tight spot, it also placed him between the two Federal columns. This allowed him to intercept several dispatches that detailed the position and intent of the enemy.
The more he thought about it, the less this seemed like a trap, and the more it seemed like an opportunity. It was clear that the Yankees had no idea that he was hiding between their columns. In the dark, he had placed his artillery in a fine position and “was prepared to co-operate with any attack made by our main body upon the flank [of the enemy]. Start dispatched six “bold men” to pass through the marching lines of Yankees to communicate with General Lee. If all went well, the next morning would be a hot surprise for the Federals.
D. 1864: Darbytown Road in Henrico County, Virginia. Union forces advanced to find and feel the new Confederate defensive line in front of Richmond. While mostly a battle of skirmishers, a Union brigade assaulted fortifications north of Darbytown Road and was repulsed with heavy casualties. The Federals retired to their entrenched lines along New Market Road. This was part of Petersburg Campaign
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LTC Stephen F. thank for the read/share 1861: Sunday, October 13, 1861: Union Victory at Wet Glaze near Henrytown, Mo. Maj Gen Fremont’s Army of the West had been gathering to advance upon the Missouri State Guard army of General Sterling Price, falling back towards the southwest border of the
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LTC Stephen F.
You are very welcome my friend and brother-in-Christ SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL and thank for letting us know that you consider "Sunday, October 13, 1861: Union Victory at Wet Glaze near Henrytown, Mo. Maj Gen Fremont’s Army of the West had been gathering to advance upon the Missouri State Guard army of General Sterling Price, falling back towards the southwest border of the state. Col. John B. Wyman 13th Illinois Infantry regiment, along with two battalions of Missouri cavalry, had passed through Rolla on their way to join Hunter’s Division. Though the Union cavalry was greatly outnumbered, they decided to attack. Infantry support was still miles away, so they were on their own.
From their secure position, the Rebels fired a volley into the Fremont Battalion, who returned fire, drew sabers and charged. The Rebels, not expecting such a small force of cavalry to charge, scattered before they could reload their weapons. The 600 Rebels tried to put up a running fight for a mile and half as the two cavalry battalions gave chase. Before long, however, it was a rout. As the 13th Illinois Infantry made camp, the cavalry pursued the Rebels nearly twelve miles towards Lebanon, capturing over forty.
By nightfall, all Union troops, but one killed in the action, were in camp on the road to Linn Creek. The Missouri State Guards never submitted a report of the battle, so their casualty figures are unknown. Per the Union figures submitted by Col. Grenville Dodge, who took care of the wounded in Rolla, sixteen Rebels were killed and about thirty were wounded." to be the most significant for October 13 during the US Civil War.
From their secure position, the Rebels fired a volley into the Fremont Battalion, who returned fire, drew sabers and charged. The Rebels, not expecting such a small force of cavalry to charge, scattered before they could reload their weapons. The 600 Rebels tried to put up a running fight for a mile and half as the two cavalry battalions gave chase. Before long, however, it was a rout. As the 13th Illinois Infantry made camp, the cavalry pursued the Rebels nearly twelve miles towards Lebanon, capturing over forty.
By nightfall, all Union troops, but one killed in the action, were in camp on the road to Linn Creek. The Missouri State Guards never submitted a report of the battle, so their casualty figures are unknown. Per the Union figures submitted by Col. Grenville Dodge, who took care of the wounded in Rolla, sixteen Rebels were killed and about thirty were wounded." to be the most significant for October 13 during the US Civil War.
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Democracy in wartime. During the Civil War soldiers voted in state and federal elections as best they could.
In 1863, John Brough was elected Governor over Peace Democrat Clement Vallandigham. Soldiers voting in the field for the first time gave Brough nearly 40% of his vote margin; 44,000 Ohio soldier ballots received. 56th Ohio General Assembly elected (Senate: 29 Repub, 5 Dem; House: 74 Repub, 23 Dem).
Crime and punishment in the Civil War. Deserters tended to be hung after a court martial trial. The body would be left hanging for an appropriate amount of time for all to see.
Pictures:
1864 'Hanging a Deserter';
1861-10-13 The kitchen of Fremont Dragoons, fairgrounds, Tipton, MO;
1864 Franklin–Nashville Campaign map;
1863-10 civil-discourse Bristoe Campaign from Harper's Weekly
Arrow Rock, MO was a popular spot for a fight in the Civil war:
1. July 29, 1862 – Skirmish at Arrow Rock involving Missouri’s 6th State Militia Cavalry (Companies B, D, & E).
2. October 13, 1862 – Action at Arrow Rock involving Missouri’s 1st, 4th (Companies A, B, E, & F), and 7th State Militia Cavalry alongside Missouri’s 5th (Companies D & E) and 9th Enrolled Militia.
3. July 20, 1864 – Attack at Arrow Rock involving Missouri’s 1st State Militia Cavalry alongside Citizen Guard.
4. August 7, 1864 – Skirmish at Arrow Rock involving a detachment of Missouri’s 1st State Militia Cavalry.
5. September 23, 1864 – Skirmish on the Arrow Rock Road involving Missouri’s 7th State Militia Cavalry.
It is a sad commentary that the way some Confederate Commanders and many soldiers treated Federal soldiers who were captures the same way the Nazi’s treated Jews and Slavs in WWII: summary execution and sentenced to slave labor. In 1864, after the surrender of Union forces at Dalton, Georgia, John Bell Hood’s men slaughtered some members of the 44th United States Colored Troops and delivered the rest of slave masters
Thursday, October 13, 1864: Battle of Darbytown Road. On October 11, under orders from General Robert E. Lee, Maj. Generals Charles Field and Robert Hoke began building a new intermediate line between the old Richmond exterior defense line and the interior line. The purpose of the line was to connect Fort Gilmer to the exterior defense line on Charles City Road. The work proceeded quickly and by the end of the day, the outlines of an earthwork extended from Fort Gilmer and to Darbytown Road. On the morning of October 12, pickets from Gen. August V. Kautz’s cavalry noticed the work and at 9:30 a.m. Kautz reported the fact to Butler who told Grant.
Later in the morning, Grant ordered Butler to make a reconnaissance to Darbytown Road: “I think it advisable to send out a strong reconnaissance of infantry and cavalry to drive the enemy from the work they are doing on the Central road. Such a reconnaissance should not go far enough to endanger their being cut off, however. Weitzel should at the same time hold as much force as he can, ready to move to the support of the reconnoitering party if attacked by a superior force.”
That afternoon, Butler ordered Maj. Gen. Alfred Terry, the X Corps commander, to take two divisions of his corps to drive the enemy away from his new works. He suggested Terry take his 1st and 3rd divisions. Butler informed Terry that Weitzel would support his line if necessary. Butler informed Terry that he would encounter 6,000 Confederates from Hoke’s and Field’s divisions in his front. He also told Terry to inform Kautz that his cavalry division would cooperate with him.
In making his plans for the movement that afternoon, Terry arranged for Kautz to cover his right, between Darbytown and Charles City Road. He planned to place Ames’ 1st Division south of Darbytown Road and Birney’s 3rd Division north of the road to turn the Confederate left. Since after detaching pickets and leaving three regiments behind, by his estimate Terry’s two divisions numbered only 3100 and 1600 respectively, Terry asked Butler for one of Weitzel’s brigades. Butler refused his request.
Anticipating that work on the intermediate line by Darbytown Road would provoke a Union attack, Field asked Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, commander of the field troops north of James River, to order Hoke to extend his line to the left so that he could throw a brigade across the road to protect his left. Anderson failed to issue the order, so just after dark on Oct. 12, Field withdrew Col. Winkler’s Texas brigade from his right and placed it on his extreme left north of the road. The brigade worked in the midst of a rain storm until late in the night building a small work with a ditch in front. On the right of the Texas brigade were the infantry brigades of Bratton and DuBose, along with the Hampton Legion and 24th Virginia Cavalry, both under command of Col. Logan.The Confederate works were located on a crest near the Cunningham house and consisted of a redoubt situated on Darbytown Road, with another near the Darby House.
Although Terry was ready to move by 3:25 p.m., the movement was delayed by a flag of truce on the picket line and postponed until the next day.
Late in the day Butler finally gave Terry specific orders. He was to move near the brick house on Darbytown road and capture the Confederate line. Kautz would move with him, turning the Confederate left. He was to strike the enemy at sunrise.
Terry issued instructions to his corps as well. Ames’ division would form north of the road and turn the Confederate left. Birney’s division would form south of the road and advance at the same time as Ames. Kautz would cover Ames’ right with one brigade and drive back the enemy between Darbytown and Charles City Road. Another brigade would travel up Charles City Road and try to take the Confederate in reverse at Darbytown Road.
Modern Day Map of the Darbytown Road Battlefield with Unit Positions Drawn Over Top. Used with Permission of Bryce Suderow. This map may not be reproduced without his written permission.
Terry set out from his intrenchments at 4 a.m. The weaknesses of the plan were not lost on Terry’s men. If Terry was to make an attack, why was he not accompanied by Weitzel’s XVIII Corps? And why had no one reconnoitered the position prior to the attack?
Gen. Kautz has written, “The hopelessness of the movement was apparent to all as we felt that the enemy’s line must be held by a force equal if not superior in numbers to our own, and that we could do nothing more than make a demonstration in support of some other movement at another point.” Kautz says it was the “feeling on the part of nearly every officer and soldier in the command that we were simply marching out to lose several hundred men and be repulsed.”
The 1st and 3rd divisions marched 1 1/2 to two miles on the road from Cox’s house to Johnson’s field, while the artillery and cavalry took the road from Four Mile Church to Darbytown Road. It halted at the fork of the Mill and Darbytown roads.12 Here Terry placed Brig. Gen. William Birney’s 3rd Division south of Darbytown Road and Adelbert Ames’ 1st Division to the north.
Although the attack was scheduled for dawn, Kautz didn’t arrive on time, so the two infantry divisions remained in position until 6:35 a.m. Of course by now the element of surprise was lost.
Upon reaching Darbytown Road, General Birney formed a line south of Darbytown Road, Col. Ulysses Doubleday’s 2nd Brigade on his left and Col. Alvin C. Vorhis’ 1st Brigade on his right. Vorhis placed his two regiments, the 7th and 9th USCT in line of battle. In Doubleday’s line of battle, the 29th Connecticut held the left and the 45th USCT the right and its flank rested on the road. Doubleday’s 8th USCT was deployed as skirmishers for the division.
Birney’s division then entered a dense piece of woods and soon the 8th USCT drove Confederate skirmishers from a rail fence and two lines of rifle pits and into their line of works 100 yards from the edge of the woods. In examining the Confederates lines, Doubleday spotted a battery sited behind a house in his front and located two battle flags in front. Birney ordered a reconnaissance on his left and Maj. Bates of the 45th USCT and Lt. Marshall of Doubleday’s staff scouted the Union left, looking for an opening. They found the Confederate works extended at least half a mile beyond the left.
Ames’ 1st Division formed line of battle, with Hawley’s 2nd Brigade on the left, their left resting on Darbytown Road. Col. Harris M. Plaisted’s brigade formed the center and Col. Pond’s 1st brigade on Ames’ right.
In Hawley’s line of battle, the first line consisted of the 6th Connecticut on the right and the 16th New York on the left. The 3rd New Hampshire and 7th New Hampshire were held in reserve on the right and left. Hawley put the 7th Connecticut on the skirmish line.
The 1100 men of Hawley’s brigade moved forward slowly over the field in front and over its earthworks into a “thick and troublesome young wood.” Upon nearing Pleasants’ plantation about 500 yards into the brush, Hawley encountered Confederate pickets and drove them in. At about 8 a.m. the brigade encountered a sharp fire from an unseen enemy in the wood. Ordered by Ames to find out what was in front, Hawley ordered Capt. S.S. Atwell to advance his 7th Connecticut. The regiment advanced, but could see little because of ten foot high undergrowth and had to fall back when Plaisted’s troops on the right fired into its rear. Capt. Thompson climbed a tree and discovered a slashing from 100 to 200 yards wide in front of a strong breastwork well lined with the enemy and at least two cannon.
On Hawley’s right, Col. Harris M. Plaisted formed his 3rd Brigade, the 24th Massachusetts and 11th Maine in line and four companies of the 10th Connecticut on the skirmish line. The remainder of the 10th Connecticut remained in reserve. After advancing across an open field at Gerhardt’s house, Plaisted entered a thick growth of scrub oaks. Several hundred yards into the brush, he encountered and drove back Confederate pickets in a line of detached rifle pits. In front of his left and center, Plaisted could see the Confederate line strongly manned with a border of slashing — “It was altogether an ugly looking chance for a charge.” In this position, Plaisted was vulnerable to fire from three sides including case shot and rifle fire.
On Plaisted’s right, Col. Francis B. Pond placed his 1st brigade – 882 muskets – in battle line. The 67th Ohio and 85th Pennsylvania formed the battle line and the 62nd Ohio and two companies of the 39th Illinois formed the skirmish line. The remainder of the 39th Illinois was placed in reserve. Pond moved forward, crossed the Confederate works by the Jordan House and advanced 700 yards.
Once the Federals were in position, Ames’ line extended from Darbytown Road to the north half a mile. He learned from his brigade commanders that the Confederate works in his front were protected by slashing 100-200 yards in width and by rifle pits and a battery. William Birney reported a strong work on Darbytown Road with artillery. Kautz was moving forward on Ames’ right with Col. Robert M. West’s brigade and Col. Samuel Spear’s brigade was advancing on Charles City Road.
At 10:30 a.m. Terry told Butler what he had found and stated: “As at present advised, I think we cannot pierce their works except by massing on some point and attacking in column. I hesitate to do this without further instructions from you after our conversation of last night. Please direct me in regard to it.”
General Charles W. Field commanded most of the Confederate defenses attacked at Darbytown Road.
While Terry was conducting his reconnaissance, General Lee arrived and learned from Field that the Federals were about to flank him. Lee directed him to strengthen his left. Field immediately sent Anderson’s, Perry’s and DuBose’s brigades to the north side of the road. Upon arriving, the men immediately began intrenching the position. Upon the arrival of Bratton’s brigade south of Darbytown Road, Col. Logan left the position with the Hampton Legion and the 24th Virginia Cavalry for Charles City Road. Hoke’s division thinned out its line to fill the trenches vacated by Field’s brigades.
At noon Butler referred the matter to Grant, asking, “Shall I order an attack on the works?” At 12:10 Butler told Terry to stay put: “Dispatch received; contents referred to General Grant. Will send orders.”
Shortly afterwards Grant replied to Butler and stated what should have been clear all along:
“I would not attack the enemy in his intrenchments. The reconnaissance now serves to locate them for any future operation. To attack now we would lose more than the enemy and only gain ground which we are not prepared to hold, nor are we prepared to follow up any advantage we might gain.”
At 1:30 Butler sent Terry a note informing him of Grant’s decision: “I would not attack the enemy in their intrenchments. Having carefully reconnoitered the enemy, found their position, and looked out all the roads, retire at leisure.”
It was too late. Kautz reported to Terry that there was an opening in his front where there appeared to be no slashing. He notified Terry that the Confederates was still intrenching there. Terry ordered Ames to extend his right toward Charles City Road and to try to break through.
Shortly before 2 p.m. Ames ordered Col. Francis Pond to attack with his 1st brigade. Ames reinforced Pond with 70 of the 10th Connecticut under Maj. Henry Camp and the 3rd New Hampshire, which Ames told Pond to keep in reserve.
The point of attack was about half a mile south of Charles City Road. Here the Confederate line was bent back so that attacking troops would present their left flank to the fire of the Confederates. Ames was probably the only officer who thought an assault might work. Lt. Col. Homer A. Plimpton of the 39th Illinois Infantry later wrote in his diary:
“The circumstances surrounding us at this time were discouraging indeed. We were compelled to charge their works at a point where they had a heavy flank fire upon us, and through thick underbrush and small timber, and then over heavy slashing where their artillery could rake us. The men all knew before going in the difficulties ahead; all of the officers of the brigade were opposed to the charge, and reported so to the General commanding the corps; but it made no difference. Charge we must, and charge we did, and Death reaped a rich harvest as the result.”
Pond formed the 10th Connecticut, part of the 62nd Ohio, 39th Illinois and 67th Ohio in double columns at half distance and sent them forward. The position in front was held by Perry’s Alabama Brigade.
A Photo of William A. McClendon in 1895. McClendon and his fellow Alabamians in Perry's Brigade defended the Confederate works in the Union assault.
Pond’s columns advanced about 300 yards into the brush and when the Federals reached the point where the bushes had been cut down, the Alabamians opened fire. Pond’s men were caught in a cross-fire. Some of the men penetrated the abatis and died on the Confederate breastwork. Brave Major Camp of the 10th Connecticut was shot by W.A. McClendon of Co. G, 15th Alabama. Pond lost 228 of his 550 officers and men.
During this time, Gen. Gary and the 7th S.C. Cavalry kept Spear’s brigade at bay on Charles City Road. Having been relived by Bratton’s South Carolina brigade, Col. Logan joined Gary with the 24th Virginia Cavalry and the Hampton Legion. The brigade then attacked Spear who fell back.
After the assault failed, Terry ordered his two divisions to move their wounded to the rear and to be prepared to get ready to retreat.32 At 3 p.m. Terry informed Butler that Ames’ attack had failed and that he would now return to his camp.33 At 3:30 Ames ordered his commanders to fall back into the open field, leaving their skirmishers behind, and form line of battle. The Confederates in front of Ames advanced, but Terry’s artillery, located at the outer line of intrenchments, drove them back with a heavy fire. After retreating, Ames’ division rested at the Johnson House for half an hour. The troops then marched back to their entrenchments, arriving at 6 p.m.
Terry lost 36 killed, 358 wounded, 43 missing, a total of 437. Field lost 50 casualties.
In criticizing the Union plans and performance, it is difficult to know where to begin since both were so lackluster.
First, as usual Grant was in such a hurry to mount the attack that he had not bothered to determine how complete the Confederate earthworks were or how many Confederates held it. Butler had some idea of the Confederate numbers, but knew nothing of the earthwork’s strength.
Second, Grant was not clear in his own mind whether he was ordering a reconnaissance or making an attack. If he was making an attack, why not employ the entire Army of the James? Terry’s force was adequate for a reconnaissance but Terry did not have enough men follow up a breakthrough or to hold the ground that it seized.
Clearly, Butler wasn’t sure whether he was making a reconnaissance or attack, either. According to Butler, the two divisions he recommended for the expedition numbered 7,458 officers and men, not many more than he supposed the Confederates had.37 Why then, since he knew Terry would encounter such a large number of Confederates, didn’t Butler give Terry more men?
Third, once Butler refused to give him more men for his mission, why did not Terry protest? How could his two divisions attack two Confederate divisions in their works and drive them off?
So much for the planning. The tactics were equally weak. Although he had two infantry divisions and a cavalry division, Terry failed to concentrate his troops for an assault on one spot. Instead, he spread his force out over a wide front and attacked with a single brigade which lacked a reserve to exploit a breakthrough.
Hancock had employed these ruinous tactics during the Riddell’s Shop and Fussell’s Mill Campaigns. Grant and Butler later replicated them again on October 27 at Burgess Mill and Second Fair Oaks. Indeed, these sorts of tactics were becoming standard procedure in the Armies of the Potomac and James.
It is difficult to disagree with Kautz’s conclusion that from its inception, everyone, from Butler down to the lowliest private, knew that the expedition would accomplish nothing except sacrifice several hundred men. Yet they all carried out Grant’s half-baked scheme as though it was brilliant strategy.
http://www.beyondthecrater.com/news-and-notes/research/battles/an-ugly-looking-chance-for-a-charge-the-battle-of-darbytown-road-october-13-1864-by-bryce-suderow/
Tuesday, October 13, 1863: Robert E. Lee blunders and J.E.B. Stuart is trapped! “I am still moving with the view of throwing him further back toward Washington,” wrote General Lee to President Davis the previous night. His army had successfully slipped around the right flank of George Meade’s Army of the Potomac, and appeared, as the dawn brightened the morning, that it would stream north toward Warrenton. If Meade would only give them another day, if he were slow to move as so many Federal generals had been in the past, Lee could possibly get between the Union army and Washington.
Though Meade had been in a fog the past couple of days, his clarity was sharpened with the dawn. He had formed a line of battle near Fayetteville, facing northwest, but quickly discovered that Lee had no plans to attack him. In fear of being bypassed once more, Meade issued quick orders for a full day of marching. This would shift his entire line (with some exceptions) north by about ten miles.
For most, these orders came while they were still on the march. So even before a corps reached its originally intended destination, they received new orders directing them to their new intended lines. The only corps to have any contact with the enemy during this shift was William French’s III Corps, which skirmished much of the day near Auburn with elements of Jeb Stuart’s Cavalry.
But it was odd how that came to be. General French had been directed to Greenwich, via Auburn, which was itself on the north side of Cedar Run between Warrenton and Warrenton Junction. They stepped off early and were making good time, reaching the branch line to Warrenton around noon. Auburn was only four miles farther, separated only by a thick woods through which ran the road French would be taking. An alarm went up that threw the corps into a line of battle, and they were slow in getting started, unable to leave the railroad before 2pm.
General Lee was determined to find out how quickly Meade was reacting to his flanking maneuverer, and sent Jeb Stuart to Catlett’s Station, one stop north of Warrenton Junction, to sort it out. By this time, Lee had reached Warrenton, and dispatched Stuart from there. Stuart grabbed the nearest brigade he could find, which turned out to belong to Lunsford L. Lomax, from Fitz Lee’s Division. They were sent via Auburn, which they reached around 2pm, just as French’s III Corps stepped off four miles south. Shortly after, the rest of Fitz Lee’s Division followed.
Just as Stuart continued his march to Catlett’s, bringing along with him two small brigades, he sent scouts toward Warrenton Junction. They spied a feast. Thousands (Stuart gave the number of 2,500) of Federal supply wagons were arrayed in a clearing and ripe for the picking if only Stuart had more men. The supply wagons didn’t seem to be going anywhere, so a message was sent to General Lee: “I believe you can reach the rear if Hill is up.”
What Stuart meant was the entire rear of Meade’s retreating army. Lee’s forces were only nine miles away. The two Confederate corps had met at Warrenton in the afternoon, but instead of carrying onward, Lee rested them. With hours of daylight before them, the troops encamped and were cooking rations.
This was a problem of a bigger sort, and soon would matter little to Stuart, who was about to have some very immediate issues. The supply wagons he was scouting were from Meade’s right column moving north. Stuart, of course, did not know this. He also did not know that the head of the left column, led by French’s III Corps, was about to cut him off from the rest of Lee’s Army.
Stuart had left General Lomax’s brigade at the crossing of Cedar Run just south of Auburn, and there was where French found them. Lomax had noticed the Federals first, and deployed artillery and skirmishers as a greeting. This caught French off guard, but he quickly recovered. One small brigade of cavalry, even with artillery, could do little against an entire corps. In fact, French deployed only a division, and brushed Lomax aside.
Fitz Lee joined Lomax at Auburn, and sent word to General Lee. He requested a division to stop the Federals from crossing Cedar Run, adding that “unless we can stop march of enemy along railroad, he will probably be out of the way by daybreak tomorrow.” But “out of the way” was not a good thing. It actually meant, out of reach. Sometime after that, they got word to Stuart that Auburn had been given up and Fitz Lee’s Division was headed toward Warrenton.
This left Stuart with two brigades trapped between French’s III Corps at Auburn and the rest of the Yankee army at Warrenton Junction. Little was left for Stuart to do, but try to punch a hole through the enemy lines. He decided to try near Auburn, because, as Stuart later reported, “that was the only road of egress toward Warrenton.” It was dark by the time he reached Auburn, and the way was blocked and he was trapped for sure.
“In this predicament,” wrote Stuart, “I was not long in deciding to conceal my whereabouts, if possible, from the enemy.” Though Stuart was in a tight spot, it also placed him between the two Federal columns. This allowed him to intercept several dispatches that detailed the position and intent of the enemy.
The more he thought about it, the less this seemed like a trap, and the more it seemed like an opportunity. It was clear that the Yankees had no idea that he was hiding between their columns. In the dark, he had placed his artillery in a fine position and “was prepared to co-operate with any attack made by our main body upon the flank [of the enemy]. Start dispatched six “bold men” to pass through the marching lines of Yankees to communicate with General Lee. If all went well, the next morning would be a hot surprise for the Federals.
Lee received Stuart’s message at 1am. The courier gave Lee the precise location of Stuart’s two brigades, as well as the enemy’s position. Stuart hard requested that artillery be massed upon the Union troops at Auburn. Then, without saying much at all, Lee went into his tent for the night.
Taken aback, the courier continued talking about it with Lee’s aide. After some time, Lee, who was trying to sleep, became annoyed and chastised the two men for talking. After a bit of explaining, Lee decided that he should probably do something about it and ordered Ewell’s entire corps to head to Auburn the next morning.
In the meantime, French’s III Corps had passed Auburn, and Gouverneur K. Warren’s II Corps was to follow, stepping off at the early hour of 2am. [1]
[1] Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 29, Part 1, p403, 447-448; Part 2, p303, 304; Vol. 51, Part 2, p776, 777; The Bristoe Campaign by Adrian Tighe.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lee-blunders-and-stuart-is-trapped/
Below are several journal entries from 1861, 1862, 1863 and 1864 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. … I am including journal entries from Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee for each year. I have been spending some time researching Civil War journals and diaries and editing them to fit into this series of Civil War discussions.
In 1862, President Abraham Lincoln wrote that he would love for McClellan to have a working railroad built all the way from Harpers Ferry to Winchester.
In 1864, CSA General John Bell Hood issues an ultimatum to the Federal defenders at Dalton, Georgia which included the 44th United States Colored Troops “all white officers and soldiers will be paroled in a few days. If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken.”
In 1864 Col. Lewis Johnson reported “I surrendered the command as prisoners of war between 3 and 4pm, under conditions that the men were to be treated humanely, officers and white soldiers to be paroled, officers to retain their swords and such private property as they could carry.”
Knowing that his regiment of Colored Troops would be sent south into slavery, he made clear his desires that he, along with the other white officers, be sent south with them, “but this was refused us, and I was told by general Hood that he would return all slaves belonging to persons in the Confederacy to their masters; and when I protested against this and told him that the United States Government would retaliate, and that I surrendered the men as soldiers, he said I might surrender them as whatever I pleased; that he would have them attended to, &c.”
Sunday, October 13, 1861: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, “Crocker's Brigade,” “We had preaching in camp this morning by the chaplain, and he gave us a good sermon. A great many people came out from town to attend the meeting, and still more came this afternoon to see us on dress parade at 5 o'clock.”
Monday, October 13, 1862: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, “Crocker's Brigade,” “Quite a large mail awaited us here. We cleaned up our camp grounds and pitched our tents in order. All are glad to be in camp again, as sleeping on the damp ground in bivouac, without any protection whatever, as we did the last week, is hard on the health.”
Monday, October 13, 1862: President Abraham Lincoln wrote that he would love for McClellan to have a working railroad built all the way from Harpers Ferry to Winchester, “but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you; and, in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot, and must not be ignored.”
The Rebel army sat in a strange position. From Winchester, they could either move south to Richmond or north into Pennsylvania – a threat that Lincoln was taking all the more seriously with Stuart’s latest raid. Lincoln had a plan for both.
If the Rebels moved north, they would necessarily cut communication with Richmond. This could work to McClellan’s advantage. If General Lee invaded Pennsylvania, wrote Lincoln, “you have nothing to do but to follow, and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon, and beat what is left behind all the easier.”
Should Lee move towards Richmond, McClellan’s army was closer to the Rebel capital than the Confederate army, “I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and, at least, try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track.” To further drive this point home, Lincoln mused, “Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march.”
The point of this whole thing was that the Confederate army needed to be defeated. “We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere,” reminded Lincoln. If McClellan could not beat Lee in the field, there really wasn’t a chance that he could beat him once behind the defenses of Richmond.
From the letter, it was clear that Lincoln wanted McClellan to make a move towards Richmond. He detailed the roads and the mountain passes across the Blue Ridge which the Rebels might take. “I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy,” advised the President, “disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together, for dread of you.”
To sweeten the pot, Lincoln knew that he would have to promise McClellan troops – all the troops he could ever imagine that he would need. “For a great part of the way, you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here.”
If the Federal army moved against Richmond and the Rebels made a play for Washington, all McClellan had to do was fall upon the rear of the enemy. “But,” reminded Lincoln, “I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached.”
In closing, Lincoln boldly asserted that this was all easy “if our troops march as well as the enemy; and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lincoln-gives-mcclellan-one-last-chance/
Tuesday, October 13, 1863: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade “Crocker's Brigade,” “This is election day for the soldiers of Iowa, they having been given the right to vote while in the army. No one is permitted to electioneer for his favorite candidate and those who persisted in doing so were arrested and put in the guard-house. General Tuttle, the commander of a division, is from Iowa and is the candidate for governor of the State on the Democratic ticket, against Colonel Stone, formerly of the Twenty-second Iowa Regiment, who is the Republican candidate for governor. [1]
[1] Col Stone was elected, even without the soldier vote by a large margin”
Thursday, October 13, 1864: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, “Crocker's Brigade,” “We left our teams behind at Kingston and they did not catch up with us till this morning. We lay here in camp all day. About sundown we received marching orders and our division started for Adairsville, some fifteen miles distant from Rome. We left our teams and all artillery behind and marching through on a by-road, reached Adairsville by midnight.”
Thursday, October 13, 1864: Following some skirmishing much closer to Dalton, a flag of truce borne by a messenger was filed across the lines. Along with the flag, he carried an order to surrender written by General Hood. Officer Commanding U.S. Forces, Dalton, Georgia: I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the post and garrison under your command, and should this be acceded to, all white officers and soldiers will be paroled in a few days. If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant, J.B. Hood, General.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/hoods-men-murder-black-prisoners-of-war-in-cold-blood/
Thursday, October 13, 1864: Col. Lewis Johnson reported “I surrendered the command as prisoners of war between 3 and 4pm, under conditions that the men were to be treated humanely, officers and white soldiers to be paroled, officers to retain their swords and such private property as they could carry.”
Knowing that his regiment of Colored Troops would be sent south into slavery, he made clear his desires that he, along with the other white officers, be sent south with them, “but this was refused us, and I was told by general Hood that he would return all slaves belonging to persons in the Confederacy to their masters; and when I protested against this and told him that the United States Government would retaliate, and that I surrendered the men as soldiers, he said I might surrender them as whatever I pleased; that he would have them attended to, &c.”
Just what “would have them attended to” actually meant, Johnson was fairly certain. Being with his men in their immediate capture, Johnson related their ordeal: “Although assured by General Hood in person that the terms of the agreement should be strictly observed, my men, especially the colored soldiers, were immediately robbed and abused in a terrible manner. The treatment of the officers of my regiment exceeded anything in brutality I have ever witnessed, and a General Bate distinguished himself especially by meanness and beastly conduct.
“This General Bate was ordered to take charge of us, and immediately commenced heaping insults upon me and my officers. He had my colored soldiers robbed of their shoes (this was done systematically and by his order), and sent them down to the railroad and made them tear up the track for a distance of nearly two miles. One of my soldiers, who refused to injure the track, was shot on the spot, as were also five others shortly after the surrender, who having been sick, were unable to keep up with the rest of the march.”
Johnson went into more detail in a subsequent report, written on the same date (October 17th): “Not withstanding all this the officers and men were immediately after the surrender deprived of almost every article of clothing they had about them, and when all, about dark, were marching off toward Tunnel Hill, several men who were taken from the hospital and were unable to travel were shot down in cold blood and left on the road.”
Of the first murder, Private Beven alludes: “The prisoners were put to work at tearing up the railroad track. One of the negoes protested against the work as he was a sergeant. When he had paid the penalty for disobeying orders the rest tore up the road readily and rapidly.” Of the five other murders, he made no reference, but chose not to dispute Col. Johnson’s claims, which by the time he wrote his memoirs, were part of the public record.
The prisoners were taken to Villanow, ten miles west, where, as Johnson relates, “a number of my soldiers were returned to their former masters. This I know was done, because I saw it done in a number of instances myself.”
That night, according to Private Beven’s accounting, the Texans moved in to guard the prisoners. “We heard them yelling and singing but did not know what had happened. They were guarding the negro prisoners, and were calling to us, ‘Here are your “no quarter” negroes, come and kill them!’ The poor negroes, with eyes popped out nearly two inches, begged, prayed, and made all sorts of promises for the future. They soon moved on out of sight and the general turned them over to the engineer corps, where they did splendid service. This was better than killing them.”
Col. Johnson, in his report, corroborates this: “several times on the march soldiers made a rush upon the guards to massacre the colored soldiers and their officers. Mississippians did this principally (belonging to Stewart’s Corps), and were often encouraged in these outrages by officers of high rank. I saw an lieutenant-colonel who endeavored to infuriate a mob, and we were only saved from massacre by our guards’ greatest efforts.”
Through the next day (the 14th), Johnson helped several of his men escape, though witnessed several others murdered for not being able to keep up with their new masters. The next day, when Col. Johnson was about to be paroled, he “tried to get the free servants and soldiers in the regiment belonging to the free States (Ohio and Indiana) released, but to no avail.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/hoods-men-murder-black-prisoners-of-war-in-cold-blood/
A. Sunday, October 13, 1861: Sunday, October 13, 1861: Action at Wet Glaze, or Dutch Hollow, or Monday Hollow, near Henrytown, Mo. “General Fremont’s Army of the West (also unofficially called the Army of the Southwest), had been gathering to advance upon the Missouri State Guard army of General Sterling Price, falling back towards the southwest border of the state. Union General Hunter’s Division had gathered around Tipton, but a few regiments, like the 13th Illinois Infantry, under Col. John B. Wyman, were still en route.
The Illinois regiment, along with two battalions of Missouri cavalry, had passed through Rolla on their way to join Hunter’s Division. Rolla was about forty miles east and Hunter’s Division was ordered to Warsaw, about sixty miles west. The previous night had probably been spent around Waynesville.
There had been rumors that the Missouri State Guard was in the area and an attack had been suspected all through the previous night. The morning broke without incident and both the 13th Illinois and the Missouri cavalry battalions broke camp and were on the road by 7am. As they marched west, the First Missouri Cavalry Battalion took the lead, with the 13th Illinois following. Bringing up the rear was the Fremont Cavalry Battalion. The First Missouri Battalion deployed skirmishers as they pushed their way forward. Col. Wyman rode near the head of the column.
Near where the road forks, a left taking the traveler to Lebanon, a right to Linn Creek, the cavalry skirmishers saw a large body of enemy troops in their front. Three cavalry companies were advanced, but the party was gone. After a mile of cautious marching, only about forty of the enemy could be seen scampering over the hills in retreat. Word was sent back to the Fremont Cavalry and they advanced to the front, passing the Illinois infantry.
Before the Fremont Cavalry could move to the front, the First Battalion rode three miles and saw the Missouri State Guard troops forming line of battle. The secessionists fired into the Union cavalry, which then charged the Rebel line, sending them into a retreat. The First Battalion pressed them, but soon found themselves nearly surrounded by 600 Rebels.
As the Rebels drew closer around the Union left, the Battalion fell back to a safer spot and fired two volleys into them. The fire must have bit as their advance stalled and they retired to a wooded hill. During this lull, the Fremont Battalion came up, falling in on the right of the First.
The enemy could be seen moving to the right, but two companies of the Fremont Battalion had managed to get around on the flank and were able to check their movement. The Missouri State Guards drew up in line and gave the impression that they were going to make a stand; that only force would drive them from the ridge.
Though the Union cavalry was greatly outnumbered, they decided to attack. Infantry support was still miles away, so they were on their own.
From their secure position, the Rebels fired a volley into the Fremont Battalion, who returned fire, drew sabers and charged. The Rebels, not expecting such a small force of cavalry to charge, scattered before they could reload their weapons. The 600 Rebels tried to put up a running fight for a mile and half as the two cavalry battalions gave chase. Before long, however, it was a rout. As the 13th Illinois Infantry made camp, the cavalry pursued the Rebels nearly twelve miles towards Lebanon, capturing over forty.
By nightfall, all Union troops, but one killed in the action, were in camp on the road to Linn Creek. The Missouri State Guards never submitted a report of the battle, so their casualty figures are unknown. According to the Union figures submitted by Col. Grenville Dodge, who took care of the wounded in Rolla, sixteen Rebels were killed and about thirty were wounded. [1]
Union Col. Grenville Dodge of the 4th Iowa Infantry had spent most of his adult life working in the West as a railroad surveyor. He worked for the Rock Island Line, the Mississippi & Missouri, and the Union Pacific, always with a mind to finding the perfect path for the future Transcontinental Railroad. When not surveying, he found time in 1856 to form the Council Bluff Guards, an Iowa militia unit. Before Manasass, the 4th Iowa Infantry were mustered into service and the Council Bluff Guards formed Company B. Soon, Dodge commanded the regiment.
In August, Dodge and the 4th Iowa reported to General John C. Fremont in St. Louis, who sent them to the outpost of Rolla, Missouri. There, they built log barracks and commenced incessant drilling. Dodge was soon put in command of the town. [2]
As the battle was a running fight, finding a single name for it was difficult. Dodge referred to it as “Dutch Hollow.” Typically, it’s called “Wet Glaze,” though others report it as “Monday Hollow.”
B. Monday, October 13 1862: Following an intercession, the second session of the First Congress met from August 18 to October 13, 1862. Except for a single six-year term for the President and references to the everlasting legality of the institution of slavery “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America” was written much like the US Constitution. It also included the right of habeas corpus, the rule that persons could only be arrested on specific charges, and had the right to have these heard before a judge. The Congress today renewed a law authorizing the suspension of these rights. Then they adjourned the second session of the First Congress.
C. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: J.E.B Stuart’s cavalry almost trapped at Auburn, Virginia - After the retreat from Gettysburg, the Confederate army concentrated behind Rapidan River in Orange County. On October 13, J.E.B. Stuart, with Fitzhugh Lee and Lomax's brigades, skirmished with the rearguard of the Union III Corps near Auburn. Finding himself cut off by retreating Union columns, Stuart secreted his troopers in a wooded ravine until the unsuspecting Federals moved on.
General Lee was determined to find out how quickly Meade was reacting to his flanking maneuverer, and sent Jeb Stuart to Catlett’s Station, one stop north of Warrenton Junction, to sort it out. By this time, Lee had reached Warrenton, and dispatched Stuart from there. Stuart grabbed the nearest brigade he could find, which turned out to belong to Lunsford L. Lomax, from Fitz Lee’s Division. They were sent via Auburn, which they reached around 2pm, just as French’s III Corps stepped off four miles south. Shortly after, the rest of Fitz Lee’s Division followed.
Just as Stuart continued his march to Catlett’s, bringing along with him two small brigades, he sent scouts toward Warrenton Junction. They spied a feast. Thousands (Stuart gave the number of 2,500) of Federal supply wagons were arrayed in a clearing and ripe for the picking if only Stuart had more men. The supply wagons didn’t seem to be going anywhere, so a message was sent to General Lee: “I believe you can reach the rear if Hill is up.”
What Stuart meant was the entire rear of Meade’s retreating army. Lee’s forces were only nine miles away. The two Confederate corps had met at Warrenton in the afternoon, but instead of carrying onward, Lee rested them. With hours of daylight before them, the troops encamped and were cooking rations.
This was a problem of a bigger sort, and soon would matter little to Stuart, who was about to have some very immediate issues. The supply wagons he was scouting were from Meade’s right column moving north. Stuart, of course, did not know this. He also did not know that the head of the left column, led by French’s III Corps, was about to cut him off from the rest of Lee’s Army.
Stuart had left General Lomax’s brigade at the crossing of Cedar Run just south of Auburn, and there was where French found them. Lomax had noticed the Federals first, and deployed artillery and skirmishers as a greeting. This caught French off guard, but he quickly recovered. One small brigade of cavalry, even with artillery, could do little against an entire corps. In fact, French deployed only a division, and brushed Lomax aside.
Fitz Lee joined Lomax at Auburn, and sent word to General Lee. He requested a division to stop the Federals from crossing Cedar Run, adding that “unless we can stop march of enemy along railroad, he will probably be out of the way by daybreak tomorrow.” But “out of the way” was not a good thing. It actually meant, out of reach. Sometime after that, they got word to Stuart that Auburn had been given up and Fitz Lee’s Division was headed toward Warrenton.
This left Stuart with two brigades trapped between French’s III Corps at Auburn and the rest of the Yankee army at Warrenton Junction. Little was left for Stuart to do, but try to punch a hole through the enemy lines. He decided to try near Auburn, because, as Stuart later reported, “that was the only road of egress toward Warrenton.” It was dark by the time he reached Auburn, and the way was blocked and he was trapped for sure.
“In this predicament,” wrote Stuart, “I was not long in deciding to conceal my whereabouts, if possible, from the enemy.” Though Stuart was in a tight spot, it also placed him between the two Federal columns. This allowed him to intercept several dispatches that detailed the position and intent of the enemy.
The more he thought about it, the less this seemed like a trap, and the more it seemed like an opportunity. It was clear that the Yankees had no idea that he was hiding between their columns. In the dark, he had placed his artillery in a fine position and “was prepared to co-operate with any attack made by our main body upon the flank [of the enemy]. Start dispatched six “bold men” to pass through the marching lines of Yankees to communicate with General Lee. If all went well, the next morning would be a hot surprise for the Federals.
D. Thursday, October 13, 1864: Darbytown Road in Henrico County, Virginia. Union forces advanced to find and feel the new Confederate defensive line in front of Richmond. While mostly a battle of skirmishers, a Union brigade assaulted fortifications north of Darbytown Road and was repulsed with heavy casualties. The Federals retired to their entrenched lines along New Market Road. This was part of Petersburg Campaign
1. Sunday, October 13, 1861: General Charles Fremont (US) had gotten a force together and was moving towards where he thought Missouri Militia commander Sterling Price (CSA) might be. Today telecommunication outages took place near Henrytown, at a locale known variously as Dutch or Monday Hollow, and also as Wet Glaize, Mo. Federal scouts caught Sterling Price's people at it, and a small battle ensued.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-seven
2. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: President Davis approves Braxton Bragg's request to relieve Major General Daniel Harvey Hill [CS] of duty.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186310
3. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: President Davis (CSA) approves Braxton Bragg’s request to relieve Major General Daniel Harvey Hill (CSA) of duty. It seems Longstreet, Hill and others disagreed with Bragg’s handling of the siege of Chattanooga.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-131
4. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: Peace Democrat Clement Vallandigham is defeated by Unionist John Brough, a war Democrat running on the Republican ticket.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186310
5. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: In the North, a great number of elections in different states for governor. They were watched with as much attention in the South as the North, as some candidates were for stopping the war and others for continuing the fight. Clement L. Vallandigham, exiled in Canada, is defeated in his race for Governor of Ohio, is just one of the peace candidates that went down in defeat.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-131
6. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: Arrow Rock, Missouri - On October 13, Brig. Gen. Egbert B. Brown and a sizable Union cavalry force was following Col. Jo Shelby and his Confederate cavalry force. The two sides engaged each other in a brief skirmish at Arrow Rock. Arrow Rock was located just northwest of Boonville.
The Federals were almost able to surround the Shelby's command. Shelby was able to break free and escape with his force. They quickly moved southward to the safety of the Arkansas River.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1863s.html
7. Thursday, October 13, 1864: Maryland, a border state, abolishes slavery in their new constitution.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186410
8. Thursday, October 13, 1864: Lieut. General Jubal Early (CSA) moves into position at his old entrenched lines at Fisher's Hill, Virginia.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-183
9. Thursday, October 13, 1864: In Georgia, the Union surrenders at Dalton and Tilton to Lieut. General John B. Hood’s (CSA) and his men seize the important railroad line in the vicinity.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-183
10. Thursday, October 13, 1864: Indians are fighting in the New Mexico and Nebraska Territories and near Fort Belknap, Texas.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-183
A Sunday, October 13, 1861: Wet Glaize, Missouri - On October 13, a sharp skirmish occurred between a group of Federals and Confederates. The action was at Wet Glaize, also known as Dutch or Monday Hollow, was near Henrytown. The Confederates were trying to raid Federal communications between St. Louis and Springfield. The Confederates were dispersed after a short time.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1861s.html
A+ Sunday, October 13, 1861: Action at Wet Glaze, or Dutch Hollow, or Monday Hollow, near Henrytown, Mo. “General Fremont’s Army of the West (also unofficially called the Army of the Southwest), had been gathering to advance upon the Missouri State Guard army of General Sterling Price, falling back towards the southwest border of the state. Union General Hunter’s Division had gathered around Tipton, but a few regiments, like the 13th Illinois Infantry, under Col. John B. Wyman, were still en route.
The Illinois regiment, along with two battalions of Missouri cavalry, had passed through Rolla on their way to join Hunter’s Division. Rolla was about forty miles east and Hunter’s Division was ordered to Warsaw, about sixty miles west. The previous night had probably been spent around Waynesville.
There had been rumors that the Missouri State Guard was in the area and an attack had been suspected all through the previous night. The morning broke without incident and both the 13th Illinois and the Missouri cavalry battalions broke camp and were on the road by 7am. As they marched west, the First Missouri Cavalry Battalion took the lead, with the 13th Illinois following. Bringing up the rear was the Fremont Cavalry Battalion. The First Missouri Battalion deployed skirmishers as they pushed their way forward. Col. Wyman rode near the head of the column.
Near where the road forks, a left taking the traveler to Lebanon, a right to Linn Creek, the cavalry skirmishers saw a large body of enemy troops in their front. Three cavalry companies were advanced, but the party was gone. After a mile of cautious marching, only about forty of the enemy could be seen scampering over the hills in retreat. Word was sent back to the Fremont Cavalry and they advanced to the front, passing the Illinois infantry.
Before the Fremont Cavalry could move to the front, the First Battalion rode three miles and saw the Missouri State Guard troops forming line of battle. The secessionists fired into the Union cavalry, which then charged the Rebel line, sending them into a retreat. The First Battalion pressed them, but soon found themselves nearly surrounded by 600 Rebels.
As the Rebels drew closer around the Union left, the Battalion fell back to a safer spot and fired two volleys into them. The fire must have bit as their advance stalled and they retired to a wooded hill. During this lull, the Fremont Battalion came up, falling in on the right of the First.
The enemy could be seen moving to the right, but two companies of the Fremont Battalion had managed to get around on the flank and were able to check their movement. The Missouri State Guards drew up in line and gave the impression that they were going to make a stand; that only force would drive them from the ridge.
Though the Union cavalry was greatly outnumbered, they decided to attack. Infantry support was still miles away, so they were on their own.
From their secure position, the Rebels fired a volley into the Fremont Battalion, who returned fire, drew sabers and charged. The Rebels, not expecting such a small force of cavalry to charge, scattered before they could reload their weapons. The 600 Rebels tried to put up a running fight for a mile and half as the two cavalry battalions gave chase. Before long, however, it was a rout. As the 13th Illinois Infantry made camp, the cavalry pursued the Rebels nearly twelve miles towards Lebanon, capturing over forty.
By nightfall, all Union troops, but one killed in the action, were in camp on the road to Linn Creek. The Missouri State Guards never submitted a report of the battle, so their casualty figures are unknown. According to the Union figures submitted by Col. Grenville Dodge, who took care of the wounded in Rolla, sixteen Rebels were killed and about thirty were wounded. [1]
Union Col. Grenville Dodge of the 4th Iowa Infantry had spent most of his adult life working in the West as a railroad surveyor. He worked for the Rock Island Line, the Mississippi & Missouri, and the Union Pacific, always with a mind to finding the perfect path for the future Transcontinental Railroad. When not surveying, he found time in 1856 to form the Council Bluff Guards, an Iowa militia unit. Before Manasass, the 4th Iowa Infantry were mustered into service and the Council Bluff Guards formed Company B. Soon, Dodge commanded the regiment.
In August, Dodge and the 4th Iowa reported to General John C. Fremont in St. Louis, who sent them to the outpost of Rolla, Missouri. There, they built log barracks and commenced incessant drilling. Dodge was soon put in command of the town. [2]
As the battle was a running fight, finding a single name for it was difficult. Dodge referred to it as “Dutch Hollow.” Typically, it’s called “Wet Glaze,” though others report it as “Monday Hollow.”
[1] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 4, p236-241.
[2]A Brief Biographical Sketch of the Life of Major-General Grenville M. Dodge by John Tileston Granger, Press of Styles & Cash, 1893
http://civilwardailygazette.com/action-at-wet-glaze-or-dutch-hollow-or-monday-hollow-near-henrytown-mo/
B Monday, October 13, 1862: Except for a single six-year term for the President and references to the everlasting legality of the institution of slavery “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America” was written much like the US Constitution. It also included the right of habeas corpus, the rule that persons could only be arrested on specific charges, and had the right to have these heard before a judge. The Congress today renewed a law authorizing the suspension of these rights. Then they adjourned the second session of the First Congress.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-nine
B+ Monday, October 13, 1862: Following an intercession, the second session of the First Congress met from August 18 to October 13, 1862. During this period, Union river operations had continued success, capturing Memphis, Tennessee, and Helena, Arkansas. Along the Atlantic Coast, the Union captured Fort Macon-Beaufort, Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, and Norfolk, Virginia. The most strategic breakthrough for the Union was the capture of New Orleans and surrounding territory in Louisiana. By summer 1862, every southern state had some Union occupation.
Background: Following the recommendation of President Davis on March 28, Congress enacted its Conscription Act on April 16, the first military draft on the North American continent. It required three years' military service of all white males from eighteen to thirty-five. Substitutes were allowed. All volunteers, a majority of the army, had their terms of service extended, although they were granted a sixty-day furlough and the privilege of electing their own company-grade officers. In addition to its "class-exemption system" deferring school teachers, pilots and iron foundry workers, Congress in October 1862 exempted owners or overseers of twenty or more slaves. Public opposition exploded, objecting to a system making the War for Independence a "rich man's war" and a "poor man's fight". Conscription Bureau officers often acted like kidnappers or press gangs as they enforced the draft. Southern men began volunteering for military service to avoid the stigma of being labelled a conscript. Many entered state militias where they would be restricted to service within their states, as in Georgia. Nevertheless, the Confederacy managed to mobilize practically the entire Southern military population, generally amounting to over a third of the manpower available to the Union until 1865.
https://www.revolvy.com/topic/Congress%20of%20the%20Confederate%20States&item_type=topic
C Tuesday, October 13, 1863: Auburn, Virginia - After the retreat from Gettysburg, the Confederate army concentrated behind Rapidan River in Orange County. The Federals advanced to Rappahannock River in August, and in mid- September they pushed strong columns forward to confront Lee along the Rapidan. Early September, Lee dispatched two divisions of Longstreet's Corps to reinforce the Confederate army in Georgia; the Federals followed suite, sending the XI and XII Corps to Tennessee by railroad in late September after the Battle of Chickamauga (September 18-20).
Early October, Lee began an offensive sweep around Meade's right flank with his remaining two corps, forcing the Federals to withdraw along the line of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. On October 13, Stuart, with Fitzhugh Lee and Lomax's brigades, skirmished with the rearguard of the Union III Corps near Auburn. Finding himself cut off by retreating Union columns, Stuart secreted his troopers in a wooded ravine until the unsuspecting Federals moved on. This was part of Bristoe Campaign
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1863s.html
Thursday, October 13, 1864: Kearneysville, West Virginia - On October 13, Col. John S. Mosby led his Confederate Rangers into West Virginia. When they were near Kearneysville, west of Harper's Ferry, they took up a section of railroad tracks. They then wrecked a passenger train, and seized $173,000, largely from two army paymasters. After this, Mosby ordered his troops to set fire to the train, burning it up.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
Thursday, October 13, 1864: John Mosby’s (the Gray Ghost) Irregular Confederate Partisans capture and burn the railroad train on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near Kearneysville and west of Harper's Ferry, West Virginia, seizing over $170,000 from the Union paymaster.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-183
D Thursday, October 13, 1864: Darbytown Road in Henrico County, Virginia - On October 13, Union forces advanced to find and feel the new Confederate defensive line in front of Richmond. While mostly a battle of skirmishers, a Union brigade assaulted fortifications north of Darbytown Road and was repulsed with heavy casualties. The Federals retired to their entrenched lines along New Market Road. This was part of Petersburg Campaign
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
D+ Thursday, October 13, 1864: Battle of Darbytown Road. On October 11, under orders from General Robert E. Lee, Maj. Generals Charles Field and Robert Hoke began building a new intermediate line between the old Richmond exterior defense line and the interior line. The purpose of the line was to connect Fort Gilmer to the exterior defense line on Charles City Road. The work proceeded quickly and by the end of the day, the outlines of an earthwork extended from Fort Gilmer and to Darbytown Road. On the morning of October 12, pickets from Gen. August V. Kautz’s cavalry noticed the work and at 9:30 a.m. Kautz reported the fact to Butler who told Grant.
Later in the morning, Grant ordered Butler to make a reconnaissance to Darbytown Road: “I think it advisable to send out a strong reconnaissance of infantry and cavalry to drive the enemy from the work they are doing on the Central road. Such a reconnaissance should not go far enough to endanger their being cut off, however. Weitzel should at the same time hold as much force as he can, ready to move to the support of the reconnoitering party if attacked by a superior force.”
That afternoon, Butler ordered Maj. Gen. Alfred Terry, the X Corps commander, to take two divisions of his corps to drive the enemy away from his new works. He suggested Terry take his 1st and 3rd divisions. Butler informed Terry that Weitzel would support his line if necessary. Butler informed Terry that he would encounter 6,000 Confederates from Hoke’s and Field’s divisions in his front. He also told Terry to inform Kautz that his cavalry division would cooperate with him.
In making his plans for the movement that afternoon, Terry arranged for Kautz to cover his right, between Darbytown and Charles City Road. He planned to place Ames’ 1st Division south of Darbytown Road and Birney’s 3rd Division north of the road to turn the Confederate left. Since after detaching pickets and leaving three regiments behind, by his estimate Terry’s two divisions numbered only 3100 and 1600 respectively, Terry asked Butler for one of Weitzel’s brigades. Butler refused his request.
Anticipating that work on the intermediate line by Darbytown Road would provoke a Union attack, Field asked Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, commander of the field troops north of James River, to order Hoke to extend his line to the left so that he could throw a brigade across the road to protect his left. Anderson failed to issue the order, so just after dark on Oct. 12, Field withdrew Col. Winkler’s Texas brigade from his right and placed it on his extreme left north of the road. The brigade worked in the midst of a rain storm until late in the night building a small work with a ditch in front. On the right of the Texas brigade were the infantry brigades of Bratton and DuBose, along with the Hampton Legion and 24th Virginia Cavalry, both under command of Col. Logan.The Confederate works were located on a crest near the Cunningham house and consisted of a redoubt situated on Darbytown Road, with another near the Darby House.
Although Terry was ready to move by 3:25 p.m., the movement was delayed by a flag of truce on the picket line and postponed until the next day.
Late in the day Butler finally gave Terry specific orders. He was to move near the brick house on Darbytown road and capture the Confederate line. Kautz would move with him, turning the Confederate left. He was to strike the enemy at sunrise.
Terry issued instructions to his corps as well. Ames’ division would form north of the road and turn the Confederate left. Birney’s division would form south of the road and advance at the same time as Ames. Kautz would cover Ames’ right with one brigade and drive back the enemy between Darbytown and Charles City Road. Another brigade would travel up Charles City Road and try to take the Confederate in reverse at Darbytown Road.
Modern Day Map of the Darbytown Road Battlefield with Unit Positions Drawn Over Top. Used with Permission of Bryce Suderow. This map may not be reproduced without his written permission.
Terry set out from his intrenchments at 4 a.m. The weaknesses of the plan were not lost on Terry’s men. If Terry was to make an attack, why was he not accompanied by Weitzel’s XVIII Corps? And why had no one reconnoitered the position prior to the attack?
Gen. Kautz has written, “The hopelessness of the movement was apparent to all as we felt that the enemy’s line must be held by a force equal if not superior in numbers to our own, and that we could do nothing more than make a demonstration in support of some other movement at another point.” Kautz says it was the “feeling on the part of nearly every officer and soldier in the command that we were simply marching out to lose several hundred men and be repulsed.”
The 1st and 3rd divisions marched 1 1/2 to two miles on the road from Cox’s house to Johnson’s field, while the artillery and cavalry took the road from Four Mile Church to Darbytown Road. It halted at the fork of the Mill and Darbytown roads.12 Here Terry placed Brig. Gen. William Birney’s 3rd Division south of Darbytown Road and Adelbert Ames’ 1st Division to the north.
Although the attack was scheduled for dawn, Kautz didn’t arrive on time, so the two infantry divisions remained in position until 6:35 a.m. Of course by now the element of surprise was lost.
Upon reaching Darbytown Road, General Birney formed a line south of Darbytown Road, Col. Ulysses Doubleday’s 2nd Brigade on his left and Col. Alvin C. Vorhis’ 1st Brigade on his right. Vorhis placed his two regiments, the 7th and 9th USCT in line of battle. In Doubleday’s line of battle, the 29th Connecticut held the left and the 45th USCT the right and its flank rested on the road. Doubleday’s 8th USCT was deployed as skirmishers for the division.
Birney’s division then entered a dense piece of woods and soon the 8th USCT drove Confederate skirmishers from a rail fence and two lines of rifle pits and into their line of works 100 yards from the edge of the woods. In examining the Confederates lines, Doubleday spotted a battery sited behind a house in his front and located two battle flags in front. Birney ordered a reconnaissance on his left and Maj. Bates of the 45th USCT and Lt. Marshall of Doubleday’s staff scouted the Union left, looking for an opening. They found the Confederate works extended at least half a mile beyond the left.
Ames’ 1st Division formed line of battle, with Hawley’s 2nd Brigade on the left, their left resting on Darbytown Road. Col. Harris M. Plaisted’s brigade formed the center and Col. Pond’s 1st brigade on Ames’ right.
In Hawley’s line of battle, the first line consisted of the 6th Connecticut on the right and the 16th New York on the left. The 3rd New Hampshire and 7th New Hampshire were held in reserve on the right and left. Hawley put the 7th Connecticut on the skirmish line.
The 1100 men of Hawley’s brigade moved forward slowly over the field in front and over its earthworks into a “thick and troublesome young wood.” Upon nearing Pleasants’ plantation about 500 yards into the brush, Hawley encountered Confederate pickets and drove them in. At about 8 a.m. the brigade encountered a sharp fire from an unseen enemy in the wood. Ordered by Ames to find out what was in front, Hawley ordered Capt. S.S. Atwell to advance his 7th Connecticut. The regiment advanced, but could see little because of ten foot high undergrowth and had to fall back when Plaisted’s troops on the right fired into its rear. Capt. Thompson climbed a tree and discovered a slashing from 100 to 200 yards wide in front of a strong breastwork well lined with the enemy and at least two cannon.
On Hawley’s right, Col. Harris M. Plaisted formed his 3rd Brigade, the 24th Massachusetts and 11th Maine in line and four companies of the 10th Connecticut on the skirmish line. The remainder of the 10th Connecticut remained in reserve. After advancing across an open field at Gerhardt’s house, Plaisted entered a thick growth of scrub oaks. Several hundred yards into the brush, he encountered and drove back Confederate pickets in a line of detached rifle pits. In front of his left and center, Plaisted could see the Confederate line strongly manned with a border of slashing — “It was altogether an ugly looking chance for a charge.” In this position, Plaisted was vulnerable to fire from three sides including case shot and rifle fire.
On Plaisted’s right, Col. Francis B. Pond placed his 1st brigade – 882 muskets – in battle line. The 67th Ohio and 85th Pennsylvania formed the battle line and the 62nd Ohio and two companies of the 39th Illinois formed the skirmish line. The remainder of the 39th Illinois was placed in reserve. Pond moved forward, crossed the Confederate works by the Jordan House and advanced 700 yards.
Once the Federals were in position, Ames’ line extended from Darbytown Road to the north half a mile. He learned from his brigade commanders that the Confederate works in his front were protected by slashing 100-200 yards in width and by rifle pits and a battery. William Birney reported a strong work on Darbytown Road with artillery. Kautz was moving forward on Ames’ right with Col. Robert M. West’s brigade and Col. Samuel Spear’s brigade was advancing on Charles City Road.
At 10:30 a.m. Terry told Butler what he had found and stated: “As at present advised, I think we cannot pierce their works except by massing on some point and attacking in column. I hesitate to do this without further instructions from you after our conversation of last night. Please direct me in regard to it.”
General Charles W. Field commanded most of the Confederate defenses attacked at Darbytown Road.
While Terry was conducting his reconnaissance, General Lee arrived and learned from Field that the Federals were about to flank him. Lee directed him to strengthen his left. Field immediately sent Anderson’s, Perry’s and DuBose’s brigades to the north side of the road. Upon arriving, the men immediately began intrenching the position. Upon the arrival of Bratton’s brigade south of Darbytown Road, Col. Logan left the position with the Hampton Legion and the 24th Virginia Cavalry for Charles City Road. Hoke’s division thinned out its line to fill the trenches vacated by Field’s brigades.
At noon Butler referred the matter to Grant, asking, “Shall I order an attack on the works?” At 12:10 Butler told Terry to stay put: “Dispatch received; contents referred to General Grant. Will send orders.”
Shortly afterwards Grant replied to Butler and stated what should have been clear all along:
“I would not attack the enemy in his intrenchments. The reconnaissance now serves to locate them for any future operation. To attack now we would lose more than the enemy and only gain ground which we are not prepared to hold, nor are we prepared to follow up any advantage we might gain.”
At 1:30 Butler sent Terry a note informing him of Grant’s decision: “I would not attack the enemy in their intrenchments. Having carefully reconnoitered the enemy, found their position, and looked out all the roads, retire at leisure.”
It was too late. Kautz reported to Terry that there was an opening in his front where there appeared to be no slashing. He notified Terry that the Confederates was still intrenching there. Terry ordered Ames to extend his right toward Charles City Road and to try to break through.
Shortly before 2 p.m. Ames ordered Col. Francis Pond to attack with his 1st brigade. Ames reinforced Pond with 70 of the 10th Connecticut under Maj. Henry Camp and the 3rd New Hampshire, which Ames told Pond to keep in reserve.
The point of attack was about half a mile south of Charles City Road. Here the Confederate line was bent back so that attacking troops would present their left flank to the fire of the Confederates. Ames was probably the only officer who thought an assault might work. Lt. Col. Homer A. Plimpton of the 39th Illinois Infantry later wrote in his diary:
“The circumstances surrounding us at this time were discouraging indeed. We were compelled to charge their works at a point where they had a heavy flank fire upon us, and through thick underbrush and small timber, and then over heavy slashing where their artillery could rake us. The men all knew before going in the difficulties ahead; all of the officers of the brigade were opposed to the charge, and reported so to the General commanding the corps; but it made no difference. Charge we must, and charge we did, and Death reaped a rich harvest as the result.”
Pond formed the 10th Connecticut, part of the 62nd Ohio, 39th Illinois and 67th Ohio in double columns at half distance and sent them forward. The position in front was held by Perry’s Alabama Brigade.
A Photo of William A. McClendon in 1895. McClendon and his fellow Alabamians in Perry's Brigade defended the Confederate works in the Union assault.
Pond’s columns advanced about 300 yards into the brush and when the Federals reached the point where the bushes had been cut down, the Alabamians opened fire. Pond’s men were caught in a cross-fire. Some of the men penetrated the abatis and died on the Confederate breastwork. Brave Major Camp of the 10th Connecticut was shot by W.A. McClendon of Co. G, 15th Alabama. Pond lost 228 of his 550 officers and men.
During this time, Gen. Gary and the 7th S.C. Cavalry kept Spear’s brigade at bay on Charles City Road. Having been relived by Bratton’s South Carolina brigade, Col. Logan joined Gary with the 24th Virginia Cavalry and the Hampton Legion. The brigade then attacked Spear who fell back.
After the assault failed, Terry ordered his two divisions to move their wounded to the rear and to be prepared to get ready to retreat.32 At 3 p.m. Terry informed Butler that Ames’ attack had failed and that he would now return to his camp.33 At 3:30 Ames ordered his commanders to fall back into the open field, leaving their skirmishers behind, and form line of battle. The Confederates in front of Ames advanced, but Terry’s artillery, located at the outer line of intrenchments, drove them back with a heavy fire. After retreating, Ames’ division rested at the Johnson House for half an hour. The troops then marched back to their entrenchments, arriving at 6 p.m.
Terry lost 36 killed, 358 wounded, 43 missing, a total of 437. Field lost 50 casualties.
In criticizing the Union plans and performance, it is difficult to know where to begin since both were so lackluster.
First, as usual Grant was in such a hurry to mount the attack that he had not bothered to determine how complete the Confederate earthworks were or how many Confederates held it. Butler had some idea of the Confederate numbers, but knew nothing of the earthwork’s strength.
Second, Grant was not clear in his own mind whether he was ordering a reconnaissance or making an attack. If he was making an attack, why not employ the entire Army of the James? Terry’s force was adequate for a reconnaissance but Terry did not have enough men follow up a breakthrough or to hold the ground that it seized.
Clearly, Butler wasn’t sure whether he was making a reconnaissance or attack, either. According to Butler, the two divisions he recommended for the expedition numbered 7,458 officers and men, not many more than he supposed the Confederates had.37 Why then, since he knew Terry would encounter such a large number of Confederates, didn’t Butler give Terry more men?
Third, once Butler refused to give him more men for his mission, why did not Terry protest? How could his two divisions attack two Confederate divisions in their works and drive them off?
So much for the planning. The tactics were equally weak. Although he had two infantry divisions and a cavalry division, Terry failed to concentrate his troops for an assault on one spot. Instead, he spread his force out over a wide front and attacked with a single brigade which lacked a reserve to exploit a breakthrough.
Hancock had employed these ruinous tactics during the Riddell’s Shop and Fussell’s Mill Campaigns. Grant and Butler later replicated them again on October 27 at Burgess Mill and Second Fair Oaks. Indeed, these sorts of tactics were becoming standard procedure in the Armies of the Potomac and James.
It is difficult to disagree with Kautz’s conclusion that from its inception, everyone, from Butler down to the lowliest private, knew that the expedition would accomplish nothing except sacrifice several hundred men. Yet they all carried out Grant’s half-baked scheme as though it was brilliant strategy.
http://www.beyondthecrater.com/news-and-notes/research/battles/an-ugly-looking-chance-for-a-charge-the-battle-of-darbytown-road-october-13-1864-by-bryce-suderow/
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter LTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard WalkoSSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SFC David Reid, M.S, PHR, SHRM-CP, DTMSgt Christopher Collins SPC (Join to see) SPC Gary C. PO3 Lynn Spalding
In 1863, John Brough was elected Governor over Peace Democrat Clement Vallandigham. Soldiers voting in the field for the first time gave Brough nearly 40% of his vote margin; 44,000 Ohio soldier ballots received. 56th Ohio General Assembly elected (Senate: 29 Repub, 5 Dem; House: 74 Repub, 23 Dem).
Crime and punishment in the Civil War. Deserters tended to be hung after a court martial trial. The body would be left hanging for an appropriate amount of time for all to see.
Pictures:
1864 'Hanging a Deserter';
1861-10-13 The kitchen of Fremont Dragoons, fairgrounds, Tipton, MO;
1864 Franklin–Nashville Campaign map;
1863-10 civil-discourse Bristoe Campaign from Harper's Weekly
Arrow Rock, MO was a popular spot for a fight in the Civil war:
1. July 29, 1862 – Skirmish at Arrow Rock involving Missouri’s 6th State Militia Cavalry (Companies B, D, & E).
2. October 13, 1862 – Action at Arrow Rock involving Missouri’s 1st, 4th (Companies A, B, E, & F), and 7th State Militia Cavalry alongside Missouri’s 5th (Companies D & E) and 9th Enrolled Militia.
3. July 20, 1864 – Attack at Arrow Rock involving Missouri’s 1st State Militia Cavalry alongside Citizen Guard.
4. August 7, 1864 – Skirmish at Arrow Rock involving a detachment of Missouri’s 1st State Militia Cavalry.
5. September 23, 1864 – Skirmish on the Arrow Rock Road involving Missouri’s 7th State Militia Cavalry.
It is a sad commentary that the way some Confederate Commanders and many soldiers treated Federal soldiers who were captures the same way the Nazi’s treated Jews and Slavs in WWII: summary execution and sentenced to slave labor. In 1864, after the surrender of Union forces at Dalton, Georgia, John Bell Hood’s men slaughtered some members of the 44th United States Colored Troops and delivered the rest of slave masters
Thursday, October 13, 1864: Battle of Darbytown Road. On October 11, under orders from General Robert E. Lee, Maj. Generals Charles Field and Robert Hoke began building a new intermediate line between the old Richmond exterior defense line and the interior line. The purpose of the line was to connect Fort Gilmer to the exterior defense line on Charles City Road. The work proceeded quickly and by the end of the day, the outlines of an earthwork extended from Fort Gilmer and to Darbytown Road. On the morning of October 12, pickets from Gen. August V. Kautz’s cavalry noticed the work and at 9:30 a.m. Kautz reported the fact to Butler who told Grant.
Later in the morning, Grant ordered Butler to make a reconnaissance to Darbytown Road: “I think it advisable to send out a strong reconnaissance of infantry and cavalry to drive the enemy from the work they are doing on the Central road. Such a reconnaissance should not go far enough to endanger their being cut off, however. Weitzel should at the same time hold as much force as he can, ready to move to the support of the reconnoitering party if attacked by a superior force.”
That afternoon, Butler ordered Maj. Gen. Alfred Terry, the X Corps commander, to take two divisions of his corps to drive the enemy away from his new works. He suggested Terry take his 1st and 3rd divisions. Butler informed Terry that Weitzel would support his line if necessary. Butler informed Terry that he would encounter 6,000 Confederates from Hoke’s and Field’s divisions in his front. He also told Terry to inform Kautz that his cavalry division would cooperate with him.
In making his plans for the movement that afternoon, Terry arranged for Kautz to cover his right, between Darbytown and Charles City Road. He planned to place Ames’ 1st Division south of Darbytown Road and Birney’s 3rd Division north of the road to turn the Confederate left. Since after detaching pickets and leaving three regiments behind, by his estimate Terry’s two divisions numbered only 3100 and 1600 respectively, Terry asked Butler for one of Weitzel’s brigades. Butler refused his request.
Anticipating that work on the intermediate line by Darbytown Road would provoke a Union attack, Field asked Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, commander of the field troops north of James River, to order Hoke to extend his line to the left so that he could throw a brigade across the road to protect his left. Anderson failed to issue the order, so just after dark on Oct. 12, Field withdrew Col. Winkler’s Texas brigade from his right and placed it on his extreme left north of the road. The brigade worked in the midst of a rain storm until late in the night building a small work with a ditch in front. On the right of the Texas brigade were the infantry brigades of Bratton and DuBose, along with the Hampton Legion and 24th Virginia Cavalry, both under command of Col. Logan.The Confederate works were located on a crest near the Cunningham house and consisted of a redoubt situated on Darbytown Road, with another near the Darby House.
Although Terry was ready to move by 3:25 p.m., the movement was delayed by a flag of truce on the picket line and postponed until the next day.
Late in the day Butler finally gave Terry specific orders. He was to move near the brick house on Darbytown road and capture the Confederate line. Kautz would move with him, turning the Confederate left. He was to strike the enemy at sunrise.
Terry issued instructions to his corps as well. Ames’ division would form north of the road and turn the Confederate left. Birney’s division would form south of the road and advance at the same time as Ames. Kautz would cover Ames’ right with one brigade and drive back the enemy between Darbytown and Charles City Road. Another brigade would travel up Charles City Road and try to take the Confederate in reverse at Darbytown Road.
Modern Day Map of the Darbytown Road Battlefield with Unit Positions Drawn Over Top. Used with Permission of Bryce Suderow. This map may not be reproduced without his written permission.
Terry set out from his intrenchments at 4 a.m. The weaknesses of the plan were not lost on Terry’s men. If Terry was to make an attack, why was he not accompanied by Weitzel’s XVIII Corps? And why had no one reconnoitered the position prior to the attack?
Gen. Kautz has written, “The hopelessness of the movement was apparent to all as we felt that the enemy’s line must be held by a force equal if not superior in numbers to our own, and that we could do nothing more than make a demonstration in support of some other movement at another point.” Kautz says it was the “feeling on the part of nearly every officer and soldier in the command that we were simply marching out to lose several hundred men and be repulsed.”
The 1st and 3rd divisions marched 1 1/2 to two miles on the road from Cox’s house to Johnson’s field, while the artillery and cavalry took the road from Four Mile Church to Darbytown Road. It halted at the fork of the Mill and Darbytown roads.12 Here Terry placed Brig. Gen. William Birney’s 3rd Division south of Darbytown Road and Adelbert Ames’ 1st Division to the north.
Although the attack was scheduled for dawn, Kautz didn’t arrive on time, so the two infantry divisions remained in position until 6:35 a.m. Of course by now the element of surprise was lost.
Upon reaching Darbytown Road, General Birney formed a line south of Darbytown Road, Col. Ulysses Doubleday’s 2nd Brigade on his left and Col. Alvin C. Vorhis’ 1st Brigade on his right. Vorhis placed his two regiments, the 7th and 9th USCT in line of battle. In Doubleday’s line of battle, the 29th Connecticut held the left and the 45th USCT the right and its flank rested on the road. Doubleday’s 8th USCT was deployed as skirmishers for the division.
Birney’s division then entered a dense piece of woods and soon the 8th USCT drove Confederate skirmishers from a rail fence and two lines of rifle pits and into their line of works 100 yards from the edge of the woods. In examining the Confederates lines, Doubleday spotted a battery sited behind a house in his front and located two battle flags in front. Birney ordered a reconnaissance on his left and Maj. Bates of the 45th USCT and Lt. Marshall of Doubleday’s staff scouted the Union left, looking for an opening. They found the Confederate works extended at least half a mile beyond the left.
Ames’ 1st Division formed line of battle, with Hawley’s 2nd Brigade on the left, their left resting on Darbytown Road. Col. Harris M. Plaisted’s brigade formed the center and Col. Pond’s 1st brigade on Ames’ right.
In Hawley’s line of battle, the first line consisted of the 6th Connecticut on the right and the 16th New York on the left. The 3rd New Hampshire and 7th New Hampshire were held in reserve on the right and left. Hawley put the 7th Connecticut on the skirmish line.
The 1100 men of Hawley’s brigade moved forward slowly over the field in front and over its earthworks into a “thick and troublesome young wood.” Upon nearing Pleasants’ plantation about 500 yards into the brush, Hawley encountered Confederate pickets and drove them in. At about 8 a.m. the brigade encountered a sharp fire from an unseen enemy in the wood. Ordered by Ames to find out what was in front, Hawley ordered Capt. S.S. Atwell to advance his 7th Connecticut. The regiment advanced, but could see little because of ten foot high undergrowth and had to fall back when Plaisted’s troops on the right fired into its rear. Capt. Thompson climbed a tree and discovered a slashing from 100 to 200 yards wide in front of a strong breastwork well lined with the enemy and at least two cannon.
On Hawley’s right, Col. Harris M. Plaisted formed his 3rd Brigade, the 24th Massachusetts and 11th Maine in line and four companies of the 10th Connecticut on the skirmish line. The remainder of the 10th Connecticut remained in reserve. After advancing across an open field at Gerhardt’s house, Plaisted entered a thick growth of scrub oaks. Several hundred yards into the brush, he encountered and drove back Confederate pickets in a line of detached rifle pits. In front of his left and center, Plaisted could see the Confederate line strongly manned with a border of slashing — “It was altogether an ugly looking chance for a charge.” In this position, Plaisted was vulnerable to fire from three sides including case shot and rifle fire.
On Plaisted’s right, Col. Francis B. Pond placed his 1st brigade – 882 muskets – in battle line. The 67th Ohio and 85th Pennsylvania formed the battle line and the 62nd Ohio and two companies of the 39th Illinois formed the skirmish line. The remainder of the 39th Illinois was placed in reserve. Pond moved forward, crossed the Confederate works by the Jordan House and advanced 700 yards.
Once the Federals were in position, Ames’ line extended from Darbytown Road to the north half a mile. He learned from his brigade commanders that the Confederate works in his front were protected by slashing 100-200 yards in width and by rifle pits and a battery. William Birney reported a strong work on Darbytown Road with artillery. Kautz was moving forward on Ames’ right with Col. Robert M. West’s brigade and Col. Samuel Spear’s brigade was advancing on Charles City Road.
At 10:30 a.m. Terry told Butler what he had found and stated: “As at present advised, I think we cannot pierce their works except by massing on some point and attacking in column. I hesitate to do this without further instructions from you after our conversation of last night. Please direct me in regard to it.”
General Charles W. Field commanded most of the Confederate defenses attacked at Darbytown Road.
While Terry was conducting his reconnaissance, General Lee arrived and learned from Field that the Federals were about to flank him. Lee directed him to strengthen his left. Field immediately sent Anderson’s, Perry’s and DuBose’s brigades to the north side of the road. Upon arriving, the men immediately began intrenching the position. Upon the arrival of Bratton’s brigade south of Darbytown Road, Col. Logan left the position with the Hampton Legion and the 24th Virginia Cavalry for Charles City Road. Hoke’s division thinned out its line to fill the trenches vacated by Field’s brigades.
At noon Butler referred the matter to Grant, asking, “Shall I order an attack on the works?” At 12:10 Butler told Terry to stay put: “Dispatch received; contents referred to General Grant. Will send orders.”
Shortly afterwards Grant replied to Butler and stated what should have been clear all along:
“I would not attack the enemy in his intrenchments. The reconnaissance now serves to locate them for any future operation. To attack now we would lose more than the enemy and only gain ground which we are not prepared to hold, nor are we prepared to follow up any advantage we might gain.”
At 1:30 Butler sent Terry a note informing him of Grant’s decision: “I would not attack the enemy in their intrenchments. Having carefully reconnoitered the enemy, found their position, and looked out all the roads, retire at leisure.”
It was too late. Kautz reported to Terry that there was an opening in his front where there appeared to be no slashing. He notified Terry that the Confederates was still intrenching there. Terry ordered Ames to extend his right toward Charles City Road and to try to break through.
Shortly before 2 p.m. Ames ordered Col. Francis Pond to attack with his 1st brigade. Ames reinforced Pond with 70 of the 10th Connecticut under Maj. Henry Camp and the 3rd New Hampshire, which Ames told Pond to keep in reserve.
The point of attack was about half a mile south of Charles City Road. Here the Confederate line was bent back so that attacking troops would present their left flank to the fire of the Confederates. Ames was probably the only officer who thought an assault might work. Lt. Col. Homer A. Plimpton of the 39th Illinois Infantry later wrote in his diary:
“The circumstances surrounding us at this time were discouraging indeed. We were compelled to charge their works at a point where they had a heavy flank fire upon us, and through thick underbrush and small timber, and then over heavy slashing where their artillery could rake us. The men all knew before going in the difficulties ahead; all of the officers of the brigade were opposed to the charge, and reported so to the General commanding the corps; but it made no difference. Charge we must, and charge we did, and Death reaped a rich harvest as the result.”
Pond formed the 10th Connecticut, part of the 62nd Ohio, 39th Illinois and 67th Ohio in double columns at half distance and sent them forward. The position in front was held by Perry’s Alabama Brigade.
A Photo of William A. McClendon in 1895. McClendon and his fellow Alabamians in Perry's Brigade defended the Confederate works in the Union assault.
Pond’s columns advanced about 300 yards into the brush and when the Federals reached the point where the bushes had been cut down, the Alabamians opened fire. Pond’s men were caught in a cross-fire. Some of the men penetrated the abatis and died on the Confederate breastwork. Brave Major Camp of the 10th Connecticut was shot by W.A. McClendon of Co. G, 15th Alabama. Pond lost 228 of his 550 officers and men.
During this time, Gen. Gary and the 7th S.C. Cavalry kept Spear’s brigade at bay on Charles City Road. Having been relived by Bratton’s South Carolina brigade, Col. Logan joined Gary with the 24th Virginia Cavalry and the Hampton Legion. The brigade then attacked Spear who fell back.
After the assault failed, Terry ordered his two divisions to move their wounded to the rear and to be prepared to get ready to retreat.32 At 3 p.m. Terry informed Butler that Ames’ attack had failed and that he would now return to his camp.33 At 3:30 Ames ordered his commanders to fall back into the open field, leaving their skirmishers behind, and form line of battle. The Confederates in front of Ames advanced, but Terry’s artillery, located at the outer line of intrenchments, drove them back with a heavy fire. After retreating, Ames’ division rested at the Johnson House for half an hour. The troops then marched back to their entrenchments, arriving at 6 p.m.
Terry lost 36 killed, 358 wounded, 43 missing, a total of 437. Field lost 50 casualties.
In criticizing the Union plans and performance, it is difficult to know where to begin since both were so lackluster.
First, as usual Grant was in such a hurry to mount the attack that he had not bothered to determine how complete the Confederate earthworks were or how many Confederates held it. Butler had some idea of the Confederate numbers, but knew nothing of the earthwork’s strength.
Second, Grant was not clear in his own mind whether he was ordering a reconnaissance or making an attack. If he was making an attack, why not employ the entire Army of the James? Terry’s force was adequate for a reconnaissance but Terry did not have enough men follow up a breakthrough or to hold the ground that it seized.
Clearly, Butler wasn’t sure whether he was making a reconnaissance or attack, either. According to Butler, the two divisions he recommended for the expedition numbered 7,458 officers and men, not many more than he supposed the Confederates had.37 Why then, since he knew Terry would encounter such a large number of Confederates, didn’t Butler give Terry more men?
Third, once Butler refused to give him more men for his mission, why did not Terry protest? How could his two divisions attack two Confederate divisions in their works and drive them off?
So much for the planning. The tactics were equally weak. Although he had two infantry divisions and a cavalry division, Terry failed to concentrate his troops for an assault on one spot. Instead, he spread his force out over a wide front and attacked with a single brigade which lacked a reserve to exploit a breakthrough.
Hancock had employed these ruinous tactics during the Riddell’s Shop and Fussell’s Mill Campaigns. Grant and Butler later replicated them again on October 27 at Burgess Mill and Second Fair Oaks. Indeed, these sorts of tactics were becoming standard procedure in the Armies of the Potomac and James.
It is difficult to disagree with Kautz’s conclusion that from its inception, everyone, from Butler down to the lowliest private, knew that the expedition would accomplish nothing except sacrifice several hundred men. Yet they all carried out Grant’s half-baked scheme as though it was brilliant strategy.
http://www.beyondthecrater.com/news-and-notes/research/battles/an-ugly-looking-chance-for-a-charge-the-battle-of-darbytown-road-october-13-1864-by-bryce-suderow/
Tuesday, October 13, 1863: Robert E. Lee blunders and J.E.B. Stuart is trapped! “I am still moving with the view of throwing him further back toward Washington,” wrote General Lee to President Davis the previous night. His army had successfully slipped around the right flank of George Meade’s Army of the Potomac, and appeared, as the dawn brightened the morning, that it would stream north toward Warrenton. If Meade would only give them another day, if he were slow to move as so many Federal generals had been in the past, Lee could possibly get between the Union army and Washington.
Though Meade had been in a fog the past couple of days, his clarity was sharpened with the dawn. He had formed a line of battle near Fayetteville, facing northwest, but quickly discovered that Lee had no plans to attack him. In fear of being bypassed once more, Meade issued quick orders for a full day of marching. This would shift his entire line (with some exceptions) north by about ten miles.
For most, these orders came while they were still on the march. So even before a corps reached its originally intended destination, they received new orders directing them to their new intended lines. The only corps to have any contact with the enemy during this shift was William French’s III Corps, which skirmished much of the day near Auburn with elements of Jeb Stuart’s Cavalry.
But it was odd how that came to be. General French had been directed to Greenwich, via Auburn, which was itself on the north side of Cedar Run between Warrenton and Warrenton Junction. They stepped off early and were making good time, reaching the branch line to Warrenton around noon. Auburn was only four miles farther, separated only by a thick woods through which ran the road French would be taking. An alarm went up that threw the corps into a line of battle, and they were slow in getting started, unable to leave the railroad before 2pm.
General Lee was determined to find out how quickly Meade was reacting to his flanking maneuverer, and sent Jeb Stuart to Catlett’s Station, one stop north of Warrenton Junction, to sort it out. By this time, Lee had reached Warrenton, and dispatched Stuart from there. Stuart grabbed the nearest brigade he could find, which turned out to belong to Lunsford L. Lomax, from Fitz Lee’s Division. They were sent via Auburn, which they reached around 2pm, just as French’s III Corps stepped off four miles south. Shortly after, the rest of Fitz Lee’s Division followed.
Just as Stuart continued his march to Catlett’s, bringing along with him two small brigades, he sent scouts toward Warrenton Junction. They spied a feast. Thousands (Stuart gave the number of 2,500) of Federal supply wagons were arrayed in a clearing and ripe for the picking if only Stuart had more men. The supply wagons didn’t seem to be going anywhere, so a message was sent to General Lee: “I believe you can reach the rear if Hill is up.”
What Stuart meant was the entire rear of Meade’s retreating army. Lee’s forces were only nine miles away. The two Confederate corps had met at Warrenton in the afternoon, but instead of carrying onward, Lee rested them. With hours of daylight before them, the troops encamped and were cooking rations.
This was a problem of a bigger sort, and soon would matter little to Stuart, who was about to have some very immediate issues. The supply wagons he was scouting were from Meade’s right column moving north. Stuart, of course, did not know this. He also did not know that the head of the left column, led by French’s III Corps, was about to cut him off from the rest of Lee’s Army.
Stuart had left General Lomax’s brigade at the crossing of Cedar Run just south of Auburn, and there was where French found them. Lomax had noticed the Federals first, and deployed artillery and skirmishers as a greeting. This caught French off guard, but he quickly recovered. One small brigade of cavalry, even with artillery, could do little against an entire corps. In fact, French deployed only a division, and brushed Lomax aside.
Fitz Lee joined Lomax at Auburn, and sent word to General Lee. He requested a division to stop the Federals from crossing Cedar Run, adding that “unless we can stop march of enemy along railroad, he will probably be out of the way by daybreak tomorrow.” But “out of the way” was not a good thing. It actually meant, out of reach. Sometime after that, they got word to Stuart that Auburn had been given up and Fitz Lee’s Division was headed toward Warrenton.
This left Stuart with two brigades trapped between French’s III Corps at Auburn and the rest of the Yankee army at Warrenton Junction. Little was left for Stuart to do, but try to punch a hole through the enemy lines. He decided to try near Auburn, because, as Stuart later reported, “that was the only road of egress toward Warrenton.” It was dark by the time he reached Auburn, and the way was blocked and he was trapped for sure.
“In this predicament,” wrote Stuart, “I was not long in deciding to conceal my whereabouts, if possible, from the enemy.” Though Stuart was in a tight spot, it also placed him between the two Federal columns. This allowed him to intercept several dispatches that detailed the position and intent of the enemy.
The more he thought about it, the less this seemed like a trap, and the more it seemed like an opportunity. It was clear that the Yankees had no idea that he was hiding between their columns. In the dark, he had placed his artillery in a fine position and “was prepared to co-operate with any attack made by our main body upon the flank [of the enemy]. Start dispatched six “bold men” to pass through the marching lines of Yankees to communicate with General Lee. If all went well, the next morning would be a hot surprise for the Federals.
Lee received Stuart’s message at 1am. The courier gave Lee the precise location of Stuart’s two brigades, as well as the enemy’s position. Stuart hard requested that artillery be massed upon the Union troops at Auburn. Then, without saying much at all, Lee went into his tent for the night.
Taken aback, the courier continued talking about it with Lee’s aide. After some time, Lee, who was trying to sleep, became annoyed and chastised the two men for talking. After a bit of explaining, Lee decided that he should probably do something about it and ordered Ewell’s entire corps to head to Auburn the next morning.
In the meantime, French’s III Corps had passed Auburn, and Gouverneur K. Warren’s II Corps was to follow, stepping off at the early hour of 2am. [1]
[1] Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 29, Part 1, p403, 447-448; Part 2, p303, 304; Vol. 51, Part 2, p776, 777; The Bristoe Campaign by Adrian Tighe.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lee-blunders-and-stuart-is-trapped/
Below are several journal entries from 1861, 1862, 1863 and 1864 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. … I am including journal entries from Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee for each year. I have been spending some time researching Civil War journals and diaries and editing them to fit into this series of Civil War discussions.
In 1862, President Abraham Lincoln wrote that he would love for McClellan to have a working railroad built all the way from Harpers Ferry to Winchester.
In 1864, CSA General John Bell Hood issues an ultimatum to the Federal defenders at Dalton, Georgia which included the 44th United States Colored Troops “all white officers and soldiers will be paroled in a few days. If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken.”
In 1864 Col. Lewis Johnson reported “I surrendered the command as prisoners of war between 3 and 4pm, under conditions that the men were to be treated humanely, officers and white soldiers to be paroled, officers to retain their swords and such private property as they could carry.”
Knowing that his regiment of Colored Troops would be sent south into slavery, he made clear his desires that he, along with the other white officers, be sent south with them, “but this was refused us, and I was told by general Hood that he would return all slaves belonging to persons in the Confederacy to their masters; and when I protested against this and told him that the United States Government would retaliate, and that I surrendered the men as soldiers, he said I might surrender them as whatever I pleased; that he would have them attended to, &c.”
Sunday, October 13, 1861: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, “Crocker's Brigade,” “We had preaching in camp this morning by the chaplain, and he gave us a good sermon. A great many people came out from town to attend the meeting, and still more came this afternoon to see us on dress parade at 5 o'clock.”
Monday, October 13, 1862: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, “Crocker's Brigade,” “Quite a large mail awaited us here. We cleaned up our camp grounds and pitched our tents in order. All are glad to be in camp again, as sleeping on the damp ground in bivouac, without any protection whatever, as we did the last week, is hard on the health.”
Monday, October 13, 1862: President Abraham Lincoln wrote that he would love for McClellan to have a working railroad built all the way from Harpers Ferry to Winchester, “but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you; and, in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot, and must not be ignored.”
The Rebel army sat in a strange position. From Winchester, they could either move south to Richmond or north into Pennsylvania – a threat that Lincoln was taking all the more seriously with Stuart’s latest raid. Lincoln had a plan for both.
If the Rebels moved north, they would necessarily cut communication with Richmond. This could work to McClellan’s advantage. If General Lee invaded Pennsylvania, wrote Lincoln, “you have nothing to do but to follow, and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon, and beat what is left behind all the easier.”
Should Lee move towards Richmond, McClellan’s army was closer to the Rebel capital than the Confederate army, “I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and, at least, try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track.” To further drive this point home, Lincoln mused, “Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march.”
The point of this whole thing was that the Confederate army needed to be defeated. “We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere,” reminded Lincoln. If McClellan could not beat Lee in the field, there really wasn’t a chance that he could beat him once behind the defenses of Richmond.
From the letter, it was clear that Lincoln wanted McClellan to make a move towards Richmond. He detailed the roads and the mountain passes across the Blue Ridge which the Rebels might take. “I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy,” advised the President, “disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together, for dread of you.”
To sweeten the pot, Lincoln knew that he would have to promise McClellan troops – all the troops he could ever imagine that he would need. “For a great part of the way, you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here.”
If the Federal army moved against Richmond and the Rebels made a play for Washington, all McClellan had to do was fall upon the rear of the enemy. “But,” reminded Lincoln, “I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached.”
In closing, Lincoln boldly asserted that this was all easy “if our troops march as well as the enemy; and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lincoln-gives-mcclellan-one-last-chance/
Tuesday, October 13, 1863: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade “Crocker's Brigade,” “This is election day for the soldiers of Iowa, they having been given the right to vote while in the army. No one is permitted to electioneer for his favorite candidate and those who persisted in doing so were arrested and put in the guard-house. General Tuttle, the commander of a division, is from Iowa and is the candidate for governor of the State on the Democratic ticket, against Colonel Stone, formerly of the Twenty-second Iowa Regiment, who is the Republican candidate for governor. [1]
[1] Col Stone was elected, even without the soldier vote by a large margin”
Thursday, October 13, 1864: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, “Crocker's Brigade,” “We left our teams behind at Kingston and they did not catch up with us till this morning. We lay here in camp all day. About sundown we received marching orders and our division started for Adairsville, some fifteen miles distant from Rome. We left our teams and all artillery behind and marching through on a by-road, reached Adairsville by midnight.”
Thursday, October 13, 1864: Following some skirmishing much closer to Dalton, a flag of truce borne by a messenger was filed across the lines. Along with the flag, he carried an order to surrender written by General Hood. Officer Commanding U.S. Forces, Dalton, Georgia: I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the post and garrison under your command, and should this be acceded to, all white officers and soldiers will be paroled in a few days. If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant, J.B. Hood, General.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/hoods-men-murder-black-prisoners-of-war-in-cold-blood/
Thursday, October 13, 1864: Col. Lewis Johnson reported “I surrendered the command as prisoners of war between 3 and 4pm, under conditions that the men were to be treated humanely, officers and white soldiers to be paroled, officers to retain their swords and such private property as they could carry.”
Knowing that his regiment of Colored Troops would be sent south into slavery, he made clear his desires that he, along with the other white officers, be sent south with them, “but this was refused us, and I was told by general Hood that he would return all slaves belonging to persons in the Confederacy to their masters; and when I protested against this and told him that the United States Government would retaliate, and that I surrendered the men as soldiers, he said I might surrender them as whatever I pleased; that he would have them attended to, &c.”
Just what “would have them attended to” actually meant, Johnson was fairly certain. Being with his men in their immediate capture, Johnson related their ordeal: “Although assured by General Hood in person that the terms of the agreement should be strictly observed, my men, especially the colored soldiers, were immediately robbed and abused in a terrible manner. The treatment of the officers of my regiment exceeded anything in brutality I have ever witnessed, and a General Bate distinguished himself especially by meanness and beastly conduct.
“This General Bate was ordered to take charge of us, and immediately commenced heaping insults upon me and my officers. He had my colored soldiers robbed of their shoes (this was done systematically and by his order), and sent them down to the railroad and made them tear up the track for a distance of nearly two miles. One of my soldiers, who refused to injure the track, was shot on the spot, as were also five others shortly after the surrender, who having been sick, were unable to keep up with the rest of the march.”
Johnson went into more detail in a subsequent report, written on the same date (October 17th): “Not withstanding all this the officers and men were immediately after the surrender deprived of almost every article of clothing they had about them, and when all, about dark, were marching off toward Tunnel Hill, several men who were taken from the hospital and were unable to travel were shot down in cold blood and left on the road.”
Of the first murder, Private Beven alludes: “The prisoners were put to work at tearing up the railroad track. One of the negoes protested against the work as he was a sergeant. When he had paid the penalty for disobeying orders the rest tore up the road readily and rapidly.” Of the five other murders, he made no reference, but chose not to dispute Col. Johnson’s claims, which by the time he wrote his memoirs, were part of the public record.
The prisoners were taken to Villanow, ten miles west, where, as Johnson relates, “a number of my soldiers were returned to their former masters. This I know was done, because I saw it done in a number of instances myself.”
That night, according to Private Beven’s accounting, the Texans moved in to guard the prisoners. “We heard them yelling and singing but did not know what had happened. They were guarding the negro prisoners, and were calling to us, ‘Here are your “no quarter” negroes, come and kill them!’ The poor negroes, with eyes popped out nearly two inches, begged, prayed, and made all sorts of promises for the future. They soon moved on out of sight and the general turned them over to the engineer corps, where they did splendid service. This was better than killing them.”
Col. Johnson, in his report, corroborates this: “several times on the march soldiers made a rush upon the guards to massacre the colored soldiers and their officers. Mississippians did this principally (belonging to Stewart’s Corps), and were often encouraged in these outrages by officers of high rank. I saw an lieutenant-colonel who endeavored to infuriate a mob, and we were only saved from massacre by our guards’ greatest efforts.”
Through the next day (the 14th), Johnson helped several of his men escape, though witnessed several others murdered for not being able to keep up with their new masters. The next day, when Col. Johnson was about to be paroled, he “tried to get the free servants and soldiers in the regiment belonging to the free States (Ohio and Indiana) released, but to no avail.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/hoods-men-murder-black-prisoners-of-war-in-cold-blood/
A. Sunday, October 13, 1861: Sunday, October 13, 1861: Action at Wet Glaze, or Dutch Hollow, or Monday Hollow, near Henrytown, Mo. “General Fremont’s Army of the West (also unofficially called the Army of the Southwest), had been gathering to advance upon the Missouri State Guard army of General Sterling Price, falling back towards the southwest border of the state. Union General Hunter’s Division had gathered around Tipton, but a few regiments, like the 13th Illinois Infantry, under Col. John B. Wyman, were still en route.
The Illinois regiment, along with two battalions of Missouri cavalry, had passed through Rolla on their way to join Hunter’s Division. Rolla was about forty miles east and Hunter’s Division was ordered to Warsaw, about sixty miles west. The previous night had probably been spent around Waynesville.
There had been rumors that the Missouri State Guard was in the area and an attack had been suspected all through the previous night. The morning broke without incident and both the 13th Illinois and the Missouri cavalry battalions broke camp and were on the road by 7am. As they marched west, the First Missouri Cavalry Battalion took the lead, with the 13th Illinois following. Bringing up the rear was the Fremont Cavalry Battalion. The First Missouri Battalion deployed skirmishers as they pushed their way forward. Col. Wyman rode near the head of the column.
Near where the road forks, a left taking the traveler to Lebanon, a right to Linn Creek, the cavalry skirmishers saw a large body of enemy troops in their front. Three cavalry companies were advanced, but the party was gone. After a mile of cautious marching, only about forty of the enemy could be seen scampering over the hills in retreat. Word was sent back to the Fremont Cavalry and they advanced to the front, passing the Illinois infantry.
Before the Fremont Cavalry could move to the front, the First Battalion rode three miles and saw the Missouri State Guard troops forming line of battle. The secessionists fired into the Union cavalry, which then charged the Rebel line, sending them into a retreat. The First Battalion pressed them, but soon found themselves nearly surrounded by 600 Rebels.
As the Rebels drew closer around the Union left, the Battalion fell back to a safer spot and fired two volleys into them. The fire must have bit as their advance stalled and they retired to a wooded hill. During this lull, the Fremont Battalion came up, falling in on the right of the First.
The enemy could be seen moving to the right, but two companies of the Fremont Battalion had managed to get around on the flank and were able to check their movement. The Missouri State Guards drew up in line and gave the impression that they were going to make a stand; that only force would drive them from the ridge.
Though the Union cavalry was greatly outnumbered, they decided to attack. Infantry support was still miles away, so they were on their own.
From their secure position, the Rebels fired a volley into the Fremont Battalion, who returned fire, drew sabers and charged. The Rebels, not expecting such a small force of cavalry to charge, scattered before they could reload their weapons. The 600 Rebels tried to put up a running fight for a mile and half as the two cavalry battalions gave chase. Before long, however, it was a rout. As the 13th Illinois Infantry made camp, the cavalry pursued the Rebels nearly twelve miles towards Lebanon, capturing over forty.
By nightfall, all Union troops, but one killed in the action, were in camp on the road to Linn Creek. The Missouri State Guards never submitted a report of the battle, so their casualty figures are unknown. According to the Union figures submitted by Col. Grenville Dodge, who took care of the wounded in Rolla, sixteen Rebels were killed and about thirty were wounded. [1]
Union Col. Grenville Dodge of the 4th Iowa Infantry had spent most of his adult life working in the West as a railroad surveyor. He worked for the Rock Island Line, the Mississippi & Missouri, and the Union Pacific, always with a mind to finding the perfect path for the future Transcontinental Railroad. When not surveying, he found time in 1856 to form the Council Bluff Guards, an Iowa militia unit. Before Manasass, the 4th Iowa Infantry were mustered into service and the Council Bluff Guards formed Company B. Soon, Dodge commanded the regiment.
In August, Dodge and the 4th Iowa reported to General John C. Fremont in St. Louis, who sent them to the outpost of Rolla, Missouri. There, they built log barracks and commenced incessant drilling. Dodge was soon put in command of the town. [2]
As the battle was a running fight, finding a single name for it was difficult. Dodge referred to it as “Dutch Hollow.” Typically, it’s called “Wet Glaze,” though others report it as “Monday Hollow.”
B. Monday, October 13 1862: Following an intercession, the second session of the First Congress met from August 18 to October 13, 1862. Except for a single six-year term for the President and references to the everlasting legality of the institution of slavery “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America” was written much like the US Constitution. It also included the right of habeas corpus, the rule that persons could only be arrested on specific charges, and had the right to have these heard before a judge. The Congress today renewed a law authorizing the suspension of these rights. Then they adjourned the second session of the First Congress.
C. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: J.E.B Stuart’s cavalry almost trapped at Auburn, Virginia - After the retreat from Gettysburg, the Confederate army concentrated behind Rapidan River in Orange County. On October 13, J.E.B. Stuart, with Fitzhugh Lee and Lomax's brigades, skirmished with the rearguard of the Union III Corps near Auburn. Finding himself cut off by retreating Union columns, Stuart secreted his troopers in a wooded ravine until the unsuspecting Federals moved on.
General Lee was determined to find out how quickly Meade was reacting to his flanking maneuverer, and sent Jeb Stuart to Catlett’s Station, one stop north of Warrenton Junction, to sort it out. By this time, Lee had reached Warrenton, and dispatched Stuart from there. Stuart grabbed the nearest brigade he could find, which turned out to belong to Lunsford L. Lomax, from Fitz Lee’s Division. They were sent via Auburn, which they reached around 2pm, just as French’s III Corps stepped off four miles south. Shortly after, the rest of Fitz Lee’s Division followed.
Just as Stuart continued his march to Catlett’s, bringing along with him two small brigades, he sent scouts toward Warrenton Junction. They spied a feast. Thousands (Stuart gave the number of 2,500) of Federal supply wagons were arrayed in a clearing and ripe for the picking if only Stuart had more men. The supply wagons didn’t seem to be going anywhere, so a message was sent to General Lee: “I believe you can reach the rear if Hill is up.”
What Stuart meant was the entire rear of Meade’s retreating army. Lee’s forces were only nine miles away. The two Confederate corps had met at Warrenton in the afternoon, but instead of carrying onward, Lee rested them. With hours of daylight before them, the troops encamped and were cooking rations.
This was a problem of a bigger sort, and soon would matter little to Stuart, who was about to have some very immediate issues. The supply wagons he was scouting were from Meade’s right column moving north. Stuart, of course, did not know this. He also did not know that the head of the left column, led by French’s III Corps, was about to cut him off from the rest of Lee’s Army.
Stuart had left General Lomax’s brigade at the crossing of Cedar Run just south of Auburn, and there was where French found them. Lomax had noticed the Federals first, and deployed artillery and skirmishers as a greeting. This caught French off guard, but he quickly recovered. One small brigade of cavalry, even with artillery, could do little against an entire corps. In fact, French deployed only a division, and brushed Lomax aside.
Fitz Lee joined Lomax at Auburn, and sent word to General Lee. He requested a division to stop the Federals from crossing Cedar Run, adding that “unless we can stop march of enemy along railroad, he will probably be out of the way by daybreak tomorrow.” But “out of the way” was not a good thing. It actually meant, out of reach. Sometime after that, they got word to Stuart that Auburn had been given up and Fitz Lee’s Division was headed toward Warrenton.
This left Stuart with two brigades trapped between French’s III Corps at Auburn and the rest of the Yankee army at Warrenton Junction. Little was left for Stuart to do, but try to punch a hole through the enemy lines. He decided to try near Auburn, because, as Stuart later reported, “that was the only road of egress toward Warrenton.” It was dark by the time he reached Auburn, and the way was blocked and he was trapped for sure.
“In this predicament,” wrote Stuart, “I was not long in deciding to conceal my whereabouts, if possible, from the enemy.” Though Stuart was in a tight spot, it also placed him between the two Federal columns. This allowed him to intercept several dispatches that detailed the position and intent of the enemy.
The more he thought about it, the less this seemed like a trap, and the more it seemed like an opportunity. It was clear that the Yankees had no idea that he was hiding between their columns. In the dark, he had placed his artillery in a fine position and “was prepared to co-operate with any attack made by our main body upon the flank [of the enemy]. Start dispatched six “bold men” to pass through the marching lines of Yankees to communicate with General Lee. If all went well, the next morning would be a hot surprise for the Federals.
D. Thursday, October 13, 1864: Darbytown Road in Henrico County, Virginia. Union forces advanced to find and feel the new Confederate defensive line in front of Richmond. While mostly a battle of skirmishers, a Union brigade assaulted fortifications north of Darbytown Road and was repulsed with heavy casualties. The Federals retired to their entrenched lines along New Market Road. This was part of Petersburg Campaign
1. Sunday, October 13, 1861: General Charles Fremont (US) had gotten a force together and was moving towards where he thought Missouri Militia commander Sterling Price (CSA) might be. Today telecommunication outages took place near Henrytown, at a locale known variously as Dutch or Monday Hollow, and also as Wet Glaize, Mo. Federal scouts caught Sterling Price's people at it, and a small battle ensued.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-seven
2. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: President Davis approves Braxton Bragg's request to relieve Major General Daniel Harvey Hill [CS] of duty.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186310
3. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: President Davis (CSA) approves Braxton Bragg’s request to relieve Major General Daniel Harvey Hill (CSA) of duty. It seems Longstreet, Hill and others disagreed with Bragg’s handling of the siege of Chattanooga.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-131
4. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: Peace Democrat Clement Vallandigham is defeated by Unionist John Brough, a war Democrat running on the Republican ticket.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186310
5. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: In the North, a great number of elections in different states for governor. They were watched with as much attention in the South as the North, as some candidates were for stopping the war and others for continuing the fight. Clement L. Vallandigham, exiled in Canada, is defeated in his race for Governor of Ohio, is just one of the peace candidates that went down in defeat.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-131
6. Tuesday, October 13, 1863: Arrow Rock, Missouri - On October 13, Brig. Gen. Egbert B. Brown and a sizable Union cavalry force was following Col. Jo Shelby and his Confederate cavalry force. The two sides engaged each other in a brief skirmish at Arrow Rock. Arrow Rock was located just northwest of Boonville.
The Federals were almost able to surround the Shelby's command. Shelby was able to break free and escape with his force. They quickly moved southward to the safety of the Arkansas River.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1863s.html
7. Thursday, October 13, 1864: Maryland, a border state, abolishes slavery in their new constitution.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186410
8. Thursday, October 13, 1864: Lieut. General Jubal Early (CSA) moves into position at his old entrenched lines at Fisher's Hill, Virginia.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-183
9. Thursday, October 13, 1864: In Georgia, the Union surrenders at Dalton and Tilton to Lieut. General John B. Hood’s (CSA) and his men seize the important railroad line in the vicinity.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-183
10. Thursday, October 13, 1864: Indians are fighting in the New Mexico and Nebraska Territories and near Fort Belknap, Texas.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-183
A Sunday, October 13, 1861: Wet Glaize, Missouri - On October 13, a sharp skirmish occurred between a group of Federals and Confederates. The action was at Wet Glaize, also known as Dutch or Monday Hollow, was near Henrytown. The Confederates were trying to raid Federal communications between St. Louis and Springfield. The Confederates were dispersed after a short time.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1861s.html
A+ Sunday, October 13, 1861: Action at Wet Glaze, or Dutch Hollow, or Monday Hollow, near Henrytown, Mo. “General Fremont’s Army of the West (also unofficially called the Army of the Southwest), had been gathering to advance upon the Missouri State Guard army of General Sterling Price, falling back towards the southwest border of the state. Union General Hunter’s Division had gathered around Tipton, but a few regiments, like the 13th Illinois Infantry, under Col. John B. Wyman, were still en route.
The Illinois regiment, along with two battalions of Missouri cavalry, had passed through Rolla on their way to join Hunter’s Division. Rolla was about forty miles east and Hunter’s Division was ordered to Warsaw, about sixty miles west. The previous night had probably been spent around Waynesville.
There had been rumors that the Missouri State Guard was in the area and an attack had been suspected all through the previous night. The morning broke without incident and both the 13th Illinois and the Missouri cavalry battalions broke camp and were on the road by 7am. As they marched west, the First Missouri Cavalry Battalion took the lead, with the 13th Illinois following. Bringing up the rear was the Fremont Cavalry Battalion. The First Missouri Battalion deployed skirmishers as they pushed their way forward. Col. Wyman rode near the head of the column.
Near where the road forks, a left taking the traveler to Lebanon, a right to Linn Creek, the cavalry skirmishers saw a large body of enemy troops in their front. Three cavalry companies were advanced, but the party was gone. After a mile of cautious marching, only about forty of the enemy could be seen scampering over the hills in retreat. Word was sent back to the Fremont Cavalry and they advanced to the front, passing the Illinois infantry.
Before the Fremont Cavalry could move to the front, the First Battalion rode three miles and saw the Missouri State Guard troops forming line of battle. The secessionists fired into the Union cavalry, which then charged the Rebel line, sending them into a retreat. The First Battalion pressed them, but soon found themselves nearly surrounded by 600 Rebels.
As the Rebels drew closer around the Union left, the Battalion fell back to a safer spot and fired two volleys into them. The fire must have bit as their advance stalled and they retired to a wooded hill. During this lull, the Fremont Battalion came up, falling in on the right of the First.
The enemy could be seen moving to the right, but two companies of the Fremont Battalion had managed to get around on the flank and were able to check their movement. The Missouri State Guards drew up in line and gave the impression that they were going to make a stand; that only force would drive them from the ridge.
Though the Union cavalry was greatly outnumbered, they decided to attack. Infantry support was still miles away, so they were on their own.
From their secure position, the Rebels fired a volley into the Fremont Battalion, who returned fire, drew sabers and charged. The Rebels, not expecting such a small force of cavalry to charge, scattered before they could reload their weapons. The 600 Rebels tried to put up a running fight for a mile and half as the two cavalry battalions gave chase. Before long, however, it was a rout. As the 13th Illinois Infantry made camp, the cavalry pursued the Rebels nearly twelve miles towards Lebanon, capturing over forty.
By nightfall, all Union troops, but one killed in the action, were in camp on the road to Linn Creek. The Missouri State Guards never submitted a report of the battle, so their casualty figures are unknown. According to the Union figures submitted by Col. Grenville Dodge, who took care of the wounded in Rolla, sixteen Rebels were killed and about thirty were wounded. [1]
Union Col. Grenville Dodge of the 4th Iowa Infantry had spent most of his adult life working in the West as a railroad surveyor. He worked for the Rock Island Line, the Mississippi & Missouri, and the Union Pacific, always with a mind to finding the perfect path for the future Transcontinental Railroad. When not surveying, he found time in 1856 to form the Council Bluff Guards, an Iowa militia unit. Before Manasass, the 4th Iowa Infantry were mustered into service and the Council Bluff Guards formed Company B. Soon, Dodge commanded the regiment.
In August, Dodge and the 4th Iowa reported to General John C. Fremont in St. Louis, who sent them to the outpost of Rolla, Missouri. There, they built log barracks and commenced incessant drilling. Dodge was soon put in command of the town. [2]
As the battle was a running fight, finding a single name for it was difficult. Dodge referred to it as “Dutch Hollow.” Typically, it’s called “Wet Glaze,” though others report it as “Monday Hollow.”
[1] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 4, p236-241.
[2]A Brief Biographical Sketch of the Life of Major-General Grenville M. Dodge by John Tileston Granger, Press of Styles & Cash, 1893
http://civilwardailygazette.com/action-at-wet-glaze-or-dutch-hollow-or-monday-hollow-near-henrytown-mo/
B Monday, October 13, 1862: Except for a single six-year term for the President and references to the everlasting legality of the institution of slavery “The Constitution of the Confederate States of America” was written much like the US Constitution. It also included the right of habeas corpus, the rule that persons could only be arrested on specific charges, and had the right to have these heard before a judge. The Congress today renewed a law authorizing the suspension of these rights. Then they adjourned the second session of the First Congress.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-nine
B+ Monday, October 13, 1862: Following an intercession, the second session of the First Congress met from August 18 to October 13, 1862. During this period, Union river operations had continued success, capturing Memphis, Tennessee, and Helena, Arkansas. Along the Atlantic Coast, the Union captured Fort Macon-Beaufort, Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, and Norfolk, Virginia. The most strategic breakthrough for the Union was the capture of New Orleans and surrounding territory in Louisiana. By summer 1862, every southern state had some Union occupation.
Background: Following the recommendation of President Davis on March 28, Congress enacted its Conscription Act on April 16, the first military draft on the North American continent. It required three years' military service of all white males from eighteen to thirty-five. Substitutes were allowed. All volunteers, a majority of the army, had their terms of service extended, although they were granted a sixty-day furlough and the privilege of electing their own company-grade officers. In addition to its "class-exemption system" deferring school teachers, pilots and iron foundry workers, Congress in October 1862 exempted owners or overseers of twenty or more slaves. Public opposition exploded, objecting to a system making the War for Independence a "rich man's war" and a "poor man's fight". Conscription Bureau officers often acted like kidnappers or press gangs as they enforced the draft. Southern men began volunteering for military service to avoid the stigma of being labelled a conscript. Many entered state militias where they would be restricted to service within their states, as in Georgia. Nevertheless, the Confederacy managed to mobilize practically the entire Southern military population, generally amounting to over a third of the manpower available to the Union until 1865.
https://www.revolvy.com/topic/Congress%20of%20the%20Confederate%20States&item_type=topic
C Tuesday, October 13, 1863: Auburn, Virginia - After the retreat from Gettysburg, the Confederate army concentrated behind Rapidan River in Orange County. The Federals advanced to Rappahannock River in August, and in mid- September they pushed strong columns forward to confront Lee along the Rapidan. Early September, Lee dispatched two divisions of Longstreet's Corps to reinforce the Confederate army in Georgia; the Federals followed suite, sending the XI and XII Corps to Tennessee by railroad in late September after the Battle of Chickamauga (September 18-20).
Early October, Lee began an offensive sweep around Meade's right flank with his remaining two corps, forcing the Federals to withdraw along the line of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. On October 13, Stuart, with Fitzhugh Lee and Lomax's brigades, skirmished with the rearguard of the Union III Corps near Auburn. Finding himself cut off by retreating Union columns, Stuart secreted his troopers in a wooded ravine until the unsuspecting Federals moved on. This was part of Bristoe Campaign
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1863s.html
Thursday, October 13, 1864: Kearneysville, West Virginia - On October 13, Col. John S. Mosby led his Confederate Rangers into West Virginia. When they were near Kearneysville, west of Harper's Ferry, they took up a section of railroad tracks. They then wrecked a passenger train, and seized $173,000, largely from two army paymasters. After this, Mosby ordered his troops to set fire to the train, burning it up.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
Thursday, October 13, 1864: John Mosby’s (the Gray Ghost) Irregular Confederate Partisans capture and burn the railroad train on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near Kearneysville and west of Harper's Ferry, West Virginia, seizing over $170,000 from the Union paymaster.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-183
D Thursday, October 13, 1864: Darbytown Road in Henrico County, Virginia - On October 13, Union forces advanced to find and feel the new Confederate defensive line in front of Richmond. While mostly a battle of skirmishers, a Union brigade assaulted fortifications north of Darbytown Road and was repulsed with heavy casualties. The Federals retired to their entrenched lines along New Market Road. This was part of Petersburg Campaign
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
D+ Thursday, October 13, 1864: Battle of Darbytown Road. On October 11, under orders from General Robert E. Lee, Maj. Generals Charles Field and Robert Hoke began building a new intermediate line between the old Richmond exterior defense line and the interior line. The purpose of the line was to connect Fort Gilmer to the exterior defense line on Charles City Road. The work proceeded quickly and by the end of the day, the outlines of an earthwork extended from Fort Gilmer and to Darbytown Road. On the morning of October 12, pickets from Gen. August V. Kautz’s cavalry noticed the work and at 9:30 a.m. Kautz reported the fact to Butler who told Grant.
Later in the morning, Grant ordered Butler to make a reconnaissance to Darbytown Road: “I think it advisable to send out a strong reconnaissance of infantry and cavalry to drive the enemy from the work they are doing on the Central road. Such a reconnaissance should not go far enough to endanger their being cut off, however. Weitzel should at the same time hold as much force as he can, ready to move to the support of the reconnoitering party if attacked by a superior force.”
That afternoon, Butler ordered Maj. Gen. Alfred Terry, the X Corps commander, to take two divisions of his corps to drive the enemy away from his new works. He suggested Terry take his 1st and 3rd divisions. Butler informed Terry that Weitzel would support his line if necessary. Butler informed Terry that he would encounter 6,000 Confederates from Hoke’s and Field’s divisions in his front. He also told Terry to inform Kautz that his cavalry division would cooperate with him.
In making his plans for the movement that afternoon, Terry arranged for Kautz to cover his right, between Darbytown and Charles City Road. He planned to place Ames’ 1st Division south of Darbytown Road and Birney’s 3rd Division north of the road to turn the Confederate left. Since after detaching pickets and leaving three regiments behind, by his estimate Terry’s two divisions numbered only 3100 and 1600 respectively, Terry asked Butler for one of Weitzel’s brigades. Butler refused his request.
Anticipating that work on the intermediate line by Darbytown Road would provoke a Union attack, Field asked Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, commander of the field troops north of James River, to order Hoke to extend his line to the left so that he could throw a brigade across the road to protect his left. Anderson failed to issue the order, so just after dark on Oct. 12, Field withdrew Col. Winkler’s Texas brigade from his right and placed it on his extreme left north of the road. The brigade worked in the midst of a rain storm until late in the night building a small work with a ditch in front. On the right of the Texas brigade were the infantry brigades of Bratton and DuBose, along with the Hampton Legion and 24th Virginia Cavalry, both under command of Col. Logan.The Confederate works were located on a crest near the Cunningham house and consisted of a redoubt situated on Darbytown Road, with another near the Darby House.
Although Terry was ready to move by 3:25 p.m., the movement was delayed by a flag of truce on the picket line and postponed until the next day.
Late in the day Butler finally gave Terry specific orders. He was to move near the brick house on Darbytown road and capture the Confederate line. Kautz would move with him, turning the Confederate left. He was to strike the enemy at sunrise.
Terry issued instructions to his corps as well. Ames’ division would form north of the road and turn the Confederate left. Birney’s division would form south of the road and advance at the same time as Ames. Kautz would cover Ames’ right with one brigade and drive back the enemy between Darbytown and Charles City Road. Another brigade would travel up Charles City Road and try to take the Confederate in reverse at Darbytown Road.
Modern Day Map of the Darbytown Road Battlefield with Unit Positions Drawn Over Top. Used with Permission of Bryce Suderow. This map may not be reproduced without his written permission.
Terry set out from his intrenchments at 4 a.m. The weaknesses of the plan were not lost on Terry’s men. If Terry was to make an attack, why was he not accompanied by Weitzel’s XVIII Corps? And why had no one reconnoitered the position prior to the attack?
Gen. Kautz has written, “The hopelessness of the movement was apparent to all as we felt that the enemy’s line must be held by a force equal if not superior in numbers to our own, and that we could do nothing more than make a demonstration in support of some other movement at another point.” Kautz says it was the “feeling on the part of nearly every officer and soldier in the command that we were simply marching out to lose several hundred men and be repulsed.”
The 1st and 3rd divisions marched 1 1/2 to two miles on the road from Cox’s house to Johnson’s field, while the artillery and cavalry took the road from Four Mile Church to Darbytown Road. It halted at the fork of the Mill and Darbytown roads.12 Here Terry placed Brig. Gen. William Birney’s 3rd Division south of Darbytown Road and Adelbert Ames’ 1st Division to the north.
Although the attack was scheduled for dawn, Kautz didn’t arrive on time, so the two infantry divisions remained in position until 6:35 a.m. Of course by now the element of surprise was lost.
Upon reaching Darbytown Road, General Birney formed a line south of Darbytown Road, Col. Ulysses Doubleday’s 2nd Brigade on his left and Col. Alvin C. Vorhis’ 1st Brigade on his right. Vorhis placed his two regiments, the 7th and 9th USCT in line of battle. In Doubleday’s line of battle, the 29th Connecticut held the left and the 45th USCT the right and its flank rested on the road. Doubleday’s 8th USCT was deployed as skirmishers for the division.
Birney’s division then entered a dense piece of woods and soon the 8th USCT drove Confederate skirmishers from a rail fence and two lines of rifle pits and into their line of works 100 yards from the edge of the woods. In examining the Confederates lines, Doubleday spotted a battery sited behind a house in his front and located two battle flags in front. Birney ordered a reconnaissance on his left and Maj. Bates of the 45th USCT and Lt. Marshall of Doubleday’s staff scouted the Union left, looking for an opening. They found the Confederate works extended at least half a mile beyond the left.
Ames’ 1st Division formed line of battle, with Hawley’s 2nd Brigade on the left, their left resting on Darbytown Road. Col. Harris M. Plaisted’s brigade formed the center and Col. Pond’s 1st brigade on Ames’ right.
In Hawley’s line of battle, the first line consisted of the 6th Connecticut on the right and the 16th New York on the left. The 3rd New Hampshire and 7th New Hampshire were held in reserve on the right and left. Hawley put the 7th Connecticut on the skirmish line.
The 1100 men of Hawley’s brigade moved forward slowly over the field in front and over its earthworks into a “thick and troublesome young wood.” Upon nearing Pleasants’ plantation about 500 yards into the brush, Hawley encountered Confederate pickets and drove them in. At about 8 a.m. the brigade encountered a sharp fire from an unseen enemy in the wood. Ordered by Ames to find out what was in front, Hawley ordered Capt. S.S. Atwell to advance his 7th Connecticut. The regiment advanced, but could see little because of ten foot high undergrowth and had to fall back when Plaisted’s troops on the right fired into its rear. Capt. Thompson climbed a tree and discovered a slashing from 100 to 200 yards wide in front of a strong breastwork well lined with the enemy and at least two cannon.
On Hawley’s right, Col. Harris M. Plaisted formed his 3rd Brigade, the 24th Massachusetts and 11th Maine in line and four companies of the 10th Connecticut on the skirmish line. The remainder of the 10th Connecticut remained in reserve. After advancing across an open field at Gerhardt’s house, Plaisted entered a thick growth of scrub oaks. Several hundred yards into the brush, he encountered and drove back Confederate pickets in a line of detached rifle pits. In front of his left and center, Plaisted could see the Confederate line strongly manned with a border of slashing — “It was altogether an ugly looking chance for a charge.” In this position, Plaisted was vulnerable to fire from three sides including case shot and rifle fire.
On Plaisted’s right, Col. Francis B. Pond placed his 1st brigade – 882 muskets – in battle line. The 67th Ohio and 85th Pennsylvania formed the battle line and the 62nd Ohio and two companies of the 39th Illinois formed the skirmish line. The remainder of the 39th Illinois was placed in reserve. Pond moved forward, crossed the Confederate works by the Jordan House and advanced 700 yards.
Once the Federals were in position, Ames’ line extended from Darbytown Road to the north half a mile. He learned from his brigade commanders that the Confederate works in his front were protected by slashing 100-200 yards in width and by rifle pits and a battery. William Birney reported a strong work on Darbytown Road with artillery. Kautz was moving forward on Ames’ right with Col. Robert M. West’s brigade and Col. Samuel Spear’s brigade was advancing on Charles City Road.
At 10:30 a.m. Terry told Butler what he had found and stated: “As at present advised, I think we cannot pierce their works except by massing on some point and attacking in column. I hesitate to do this without further instructions from you after our conversation of last night. Please direct me in regard to it.”
General Charles W. Field commanded most of the Confederate defenses attacked at Darbytown Road.
While Terry was conducting his reconnaissance, General Lee arrived and learned from Field that the Federals were about to flank him. Lee directed him to strengthen his left. Field immediately sent Anderson’s, Perry’s and DuBose’s brigades to the north side of the road. Upon arriving, the men immediately began intrenching the position. Upon the arrival of Bratton’s brigade south of Darbytown Road, Col. Logan left the position with the Hampton Legion and the 24th Virginia Cavalry for Charles City Road. Hoke’s division thinned out its line to fill the trenches vacated by Field’s brigades.
At noon Butler referred the matter to Grant, asking, “Shall I order an attack on the works?” At 12:10 Butler told Terry to stay put: “Dispatch received; contents referred to General Grant. Will send orders.”
Shortly afterwards Grant replied to Butler and stated what should have been clear all along:
“I would not attack the enemy in his intrenchments. The reconnaissance now serves to locate them for any future operation. To attack now we would lose more than the enemy and only gain ground which we are not prepared to hold, nor are we prepared to follow up any advantage we might gain.”
At 1:30 Butler sent Terry a note informing him of Grant’s decision: “I would not attack the enemy in their intrenchments. Having carefully reconnoitered the enemy, found their position, and looked out all the roads, retire at leisure.”
It was too late. Kautz reported to Terry that there was an opening in his front where there appeared to be no slashing. He notified Terry that the Confederates was still intrenching there. Terry ordered Ames to extend his right toward Charles City Road and to try to break through.
Shortly before 2 p.m. Ames ordered Col. Francis Pond to attack with his 1st brigade. Ames reinforced Pond with 70 of the 10th Connecticut under Maj. Henry Camp and the 3rd New Hampshire, which Ames told Pond to keep in reserve.
The point of attack was about half a mile south of Charles City Road. Here the Confederate line was bent back so that attacking troops would present their left flank to the fire of the Confederates. Ames was probably the only officer who thought an assault might work. Lt. Col. Homer A. Plimpton of the 39th Illinois Infantry later wrote in his diary:
“The circumstances surrounding us at this time were discouraging indeed. We were compelled to charge their works at a point where they had a heavy flank fire upon us, and through thick underbrush and small timber, and then over heavy slashing where their artillery could rake us. The men all knew before going in the difficulties ahead; all of the officers of the brigade were opposed to the charge, and reported so to the General commanding the corps; but it made no difference. Charge we must, and charge we did, and Death reaped a rich harvest as the result.”
Pond formed the 10th Connecticut, part of the 62nd Ohio, 39th Illinois and 67th Ohio in double columns at half distance and sent them forward. The position in front was held by Perry’s Alabama Brigade.
A Photo of William A. McClendon in 1895. McClendon and his fellow Alabamians in Perry's Brigade defended the Confederate works in the Union assault.
Pond’s columns advanced about 300 yards into the brush and when the Federals reached the point where the bushes had been cut down, the Alabamians opened fire. Pond’s men were caught in a cross-fire. Some of the men penetrated the abatis and died on the Confederate breastwork. Brave Major Camp of the 10th Connecticut was shot by W.A. McClendon of Co. G, 15th Alabama. Pond lost 228 of his 550 officers and men.
During this time, Gen. Gary and the 7th S.C. Cavalry kept Spear’s brigade at bay on Charles City Road. Having been relived by Bratton’s South Carolina brigade, Col. Logan joined Gary with the 24th Virginia Cavalry and the Hampton Legion. The brigade then attacked Spear who fell back.
After the assault failed, Terry ordered his two divisions to move their wounded to the rear and to be prepared to get ready to retreat.32 At 3 p.m. Terry informed Butler that Ames’ attack had failed and that he would now return to his camp.33 At 3:30 Ames ordered his commanders to fall back into the open field, leaving their skirmishers behind, and form line of battle. The Confederates in front of Ames advanced, but Terry’s artillery, located at the outer line of intrenchments, drove them back with a heavy fire. After retreating, Ames’ division rested at the Johnson House for half an hour. The troops then marched back to their entrenchments, arriving at 6 p.m.
Terry lost 36 killed, 358 wounded, 43 missing, a total of 437. Field lost 50 casualties.
In criticizing the Union plans and performance, it is difficult to know where to begin since both were so lackluster.
First, as usual Grant was in such a hurry to mount the attack that he had not bothered to determine how complete the Confederate earthworks were or how many Confederates held it. Butler had some idea of the Confederate numbers, but knew nothing of the earthwork’s strength.
Second, Grant was not clear in his own mind whether he was ordering a reconnaissance or making an attack. If he was making an attack, why not employ the entire Army of the James? Terry’s force was adequate for a reconnaissance but Terry did not have enough men follow up a breakthrough or to hold the ground that it seized.
Clearly, Butler wasn’t sure whether he was making a reconnaissance or attack, either. According to Butler, the two divisions he recommended for the expedition numbered 7,458 officers and men, not many more than he supposed the Confederates had.37 Why then, since he knew Terry would encounter such a large number of Confederates, didn’t Butler give Terry more men?
Third, once Butler refused to give him more men for his mission, why did not Terry protest? How could his two divisions attack two Confederate divisions in their works and drive them off?
So much for the planning. The tactics were equally weak. Although he had two infantry divisions and a cavalry division, Terry failed to concentrate his troops for an assault on one spot. Instead, he spread his force out over a wide front and attacked with a single brigade which lacked a reserve to exploit a breakthrough.
Hancock had employed these ruinous tactics during the Riddell’s Shop and Fussell’s Mill Campaigns. Grant and Butler later replicated them again on October 27 at Burgess Mill and Second Fair Oaks. Indeed, these sorts of tactics were becoming standard procedure in the Armies of the Potomac and James.
It is difficult to disagree with Kautz’s conclusion that from its inception, everyone, from Butler down to the lowliest private, knew that the expedition would accomplish nothing except sacrifice several hundred men. Yet they all carried out Grant’s half-baked scheme as though it was brilliant strategy.
http://www.beyondthecrater.com/news-and-notes/research/battles/an-ugly-looking-chance-for-a-charge-the-battle-of-darbytown-road-october-13-1864-by-bryce-suderow/
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“An Ugly Looking Chance for a Charge”: The Battle of Darbytown Road, October 13, 1864 by Bryce...
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