What was the most significant event on September 21 during the U.S. Civil War?

Sept 22 during the civil war was a day of recovery from the battle of Antietam, Maryland in 1862 and the battles of Iuka, Mississippi and Chickamauga, Georgia in 1863. It was also a day of preparations, planning and strategic decisions in the CSA desire to bring Tennessee firmly into its fold in 1861; the CSA invasion of Kentucky in 1862; the Federal defense of Chattanooga, Tennessee in 1863 and Jubal Early’s defense of Fisher’s Hill, Virginia in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864.
Monday, September 21, 1863: ‘Every hour is worth a thousand men’ – The confusion continues at Chattanooga. “Be of good cheer,” wrote President Lincoln to the defeated General William Rosecrans. “We have unabated confidence in you, and in your soldiers and officers.” The President had received news of the Federal retreat from Chickamauga Creek to Chattanooga the previous evening and was doing everything in his power to see a silver lining. While he left it up to the general to decide what was best, his advice was to “save your army by taking strong positions until Burnside joins you, when, I hope, you can turn the tide.”
Ambrose Burnside, commanding the Army of the Ohio, had taken Knoxville before dispersing his forces across Eastern Tennessee. Now, however, Lincoln was adamant – Burnside must go to Chattanooga. “Go to Rosecrans with your force without a moment’s delay,” he wired Burnside.
To Washington, Rosecrans sent a message explaining that if Burnside did not come soon, he would have to give up Chattanooga and retreat down the north bank of the Tennessee River. General-in-Chief Henry Halleck joined the chorus, and attempted to convince Burnside to hurry along. Helleck was concerned that with Rosecrans bottled up at Chattanooga, Confederate General Braxton Bragg might “throw a force immediately into East Tennessee” cutting off one Federal army from the other. “General Rosecrans will require all the assistance you can give him to hold Chattanooga.”
Burnside replied quickly, but had little to offer. He could only send several thousand troops at the present moment, but figured that more could be rounded up. The problem was the lack of a pontoon bridge. “When you remember the size of our forces,” wrote Burnside, “the amount of work which it has had to do, and the length of line occupied, you will not be surprised that I have not helped General Rosecrans.” He also reminded Halleck that Rosecrans had claimed the Rebels under Bragg to be in full retreat.
In conclusion, Burnside wished that he could get troops there in three to four days, but admitted that it simply wasn’t possible. “I sincerely hope that he will be able to at least check the enemy for seven or eight days,” he ended, “within which time I shall be able to make considerable diversion in his favor.” While even a considerable diversion wasn’t an actual reinforcement, it was probably all they were going to get from General Burnside.
Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland had fled the field of battle in two waves. The first had retreated all the way back to Chattanooga, while the second, under General George Thomas, had stopped short at Rossville, taking up a fine defensive position.
Through the night, Rosecrans remained in Chattanooga, sending his chief of staff, James A. Garfield, to see how Thomas was getting along. Garfield tried to coax Rosecrans to join Thomas, to bring his army, or even just himself to the scene. The storm was coming. Bragg wouldn’t let this opportunity slip by.
Though the President’s words did little to lift his spirits, Rosecrans seemed to put some kind of faith in the belief that Burnside would soon join him. Also, there was hope that William Tecumseh Sherman was marching on Chattanooga with 20,000. But hope was not enough to raise Rosecrans’ morale or even enough to convince him to let Thomas defend his position at Rossville.
Braxton Bragg’s Confederates had not yet made an appearance. True, there was some minor skirmishing, but there was no real test of Thomas’ lines. The Confederate victory was one of confusion. When Thomas’ troops left the field, it was after dark. Several commanders sent scouts to uncover the new location of the Federals, and several scouts returned with the knowledge that the enemy was either in Chattanooga or Rossville.
James Longstreet, who commanded half of Bragg’s army, was convinced that Thomas was still in his front, that the Federals may have fallen back, but were still in the immediate area. Leonidas Polk, commanding the other half of Bragg’s army, simply didn’t know what to think. Bragg himself seemed to latch onto Polk’s indecision.
Once it was sorted out that Rosecrans was in or very near to Chattanooga, things grew even less clear. Longstreet claimed that he wanted to sent a portion of the army toward East Tennessee, cutting Burnside off from Rosecrans, as Halleck had feared. Bragg claimed that Longstreet’s actual suggestion was to march on Nashville. Whichever (if either) was the truth, Bragg’s army was hardly in any condition to start a new offensive campaign.
Half of his number was made up of reinforcements hastily tossed together to win some sort of victory against Rosecrans. There was no transportation, ammunition was low, and food was even lower. But at least a pursuit to Chattanooga was in order – or so believed Nathan Bedford Forrest, who had taken part of his cavalry within a mile of Rossville to scout the enemy position.
The scene he beheld was one of confusion and disarray. “Every hour is worth a thousand men,” he wrote to Bragg, hoping to convince him that now was the time to attack. Union prisoners claimed that Rosecrans had thrown two pontoon bridges across the Tennessee River to aid in the retreat, as it was his plan to abandon Chattanooga. Forrest apparently rode back to Bragg’s headquarters to see for himself why the infantry wasn’t following. Bragg responded, citing that lack of supplies as the reason no pursuit could be given.
“General Bragg,” Forrest supposedly replied, “we can get all the supplies our army needs in Chattanooga.” But Bragg would still not move.
Through the day, things had calmed down along General Thomas’ line at Rossville. Stragglers had come in that morning and afternoon, returning to their units following a harrowing night. The position was good, but Thomas was worried about his flanks. When Forrest’s men probed farther, he became more and more convinced that his line could not hold. By late afternoon, he was strongly suggesting to Rosecrans that he withdraw into the city. Rosecrans agreed, and at 9pm, Thomas abandoned Rossville and joined the rest of the Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga. Soon, they and the city would be under siege.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/every-hour-is-worth-a-thousand-men-the-confusion-continues-at-chattanooga/

Below are several journal entries from 1861, 1862, 1863 and 1864 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. President Abraham Lincoln writes a letter to Gen. Halleck, with the strong suggestion that Gen. Rosecrans be sure to hold on to Chattanooga. Additionally, I am including journal entries from Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee for each year. I have been spending some time researching Civil War journals and diaries and editing them to fit into this series of Civil War discussions.
Saturday, September 21. 1861: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee. “We had company drill this morning. In the afternoon, we had a big loyal mass-meeting in town, and we had speaking by Captain Stearns. He talked of our duty to sustain the Government. Quite a number enlisted as a result of the meeting, and it is hoped that the company may be completed so as to leave for Davenport in about eight days.”
Sunday, September 21, 1862: The New York Herald publishes this rather overconfident editorial about the Union’s prospects after the victory at Antietam: “The expulsion of the grand rebel army from Maryland is one of the most important and decisive events in the history of this rebellion. It marks the limit of General Lee’s advance to the northward, it secures Washington, it [.....] Maryland, it destroys the prestige of rebel invincibility, it demoralizes this hitherto successful and powerful rebel army of Virginia, it restores confidence, solidity and enthusiasm to our own troops, it breaks up the whole of this last audacious rebel programme of a winter campaign on the northern side of the Potomac and the Ohio, it opens our way to the easy occupation of the rebel capital, and it marks that final turn in the tide upon which, from the Potomac to the Mississippi, we may pursue our advantages down to the Gulf of Mexico.
The loss on the part of General McClellan of the great battle of Wednesday last might have involved the loss of Baltimore, of Maryland, and of Washington; it might have been a loss which a thousand millions of money and another year or two of war on the grandest scale would have failed to repair. But with the victory on our side the losses to the rebel cause, as we have indicated, are correspondingly great. The game is now in the hands of President Lincoln, his Secretary of War and his General-in-Chief, and especially is their opportunity for the capture of Richmond so clear and inviting that if they neglect it they will surely be called to account for it by a disappointed and justly indignant people.
The editorial then goes on to suggest buoyantly that a swift march could bring Federal troops into Richmond in less time it would take Lee to return, and that Richmond was guarded by no more than 10,000 troops—and that the time to strike is now. The North would have all of the advantages in the race to Richmond. The editorial thus recognizes the prime issue at hand: Now that Lee has been forced out of Maryland, the whole point of McClellan’s victory is to follow it up by moving with speed and deliberation—which are not the Young Napoleon’s strong suits.”
Sunday, September 21, 1862: James A. Graham, a soldier in the 27th North Carolina Infantry, writes home to his mother about the ghastly battle at Antietam: “Camp near Martinsburg Va, Sept 21st 1862, My dear Mother, I would have written before this but we have been on the march ever since we left Rapidan Station and I have had no chance to send a letter. We have been marching every day this month and several times we have marched all night. We were at Harper’s Ferry when it was taken, but our Reg’t was not engaged. Our Reg’t was in the fight at Sharpsburg Md. last Wednesday (17th) and lost nearly 200 men killed and wounded. I escaped without a single scratch. Our company lost 3 killed and 20 wounded. . . . It was the hottest time I ever saw and I am very thankful that I came out unhurt for I hardly thought I could escape where so many were falling. Our Reg’t took a battery from the enemy and in fact covered themselves with honor. No troops could display more cool determination & bravery than they did. Four of our men viz Shields, W.T. Patterson Merrit & G.W. Woods were left in the hospital on the other side of the river when we crossed to this side and fell into the hands of the enemy, but they will be well cared for as our Surgeon stayed with them. The rest of our company are getting along very well.
There is no news. I will write as often as I can and if I should get hurt will get somebody to write for me. Love to all. I remain, Your affectionate Son, James A. Graham”
Sunday, September 21, 1862: Sarah Morgan, staying with friends in the countryside, relates this interesting example of Southern chivalry: “Many officers were in church, and as I passed out, Colonel Breaux joined me, and escorted Miriam and me to the carriage, where we stood talking some time under the trees before getting in. He gave us a most pressing invitation to name a day to visit the camp that he might "have the pleasure of showing us the fortifications," and we said we would beg the General’s permission to do so. Charming Colonel Breaux! Like all nice men, he is married, of course. He and another officer drove just behind our carriage in coming home, until we came to the fork of the road. Then, leaning from their buggy, both gentlemen bowed profoundly, which we as cordially returned. Two more behind followed their example, and to our great surprise, ten, who were seated in a small wagon drawn by two diminutive mules, bowed also, and, not content with that, rose to their feet as the distance between the two roads increased, and raised their caps, though in the most respectful silence. Rather queer; and I would have said impertinent had they been any others than Confederates fighting for us, who, of course, are privileged people.”
Sunday, September 1862: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee. “We lay around all day in the camp which the rebels vacated. Their tents are badly torn, but the wooden bunks are in good condition. The wounded have all been cared for and the dead were buried today. A detachment of our army is still in pursuit of the rebels. Our brigade has been detailed to garrison this place and we expect our tents to arrive soon. I was detailed on camp guard this morning.”
Monday, September 21, 1863: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee. “Three companies were sent out on picket today. I was on camp guard today. It is reported that the battle south of Chattanooga is still in progress, and also that our gunboats are throwing shells into Charleston, South Carolina. We hear that there was a riot in Mobile, when six hundred women and children demanded bread of the city.”
Monday, September 21, 1863: President Lincoln writes a letter to Gen. Halleck, with the strong suggestion that Gen. Rosecrans be sure to hold on to Chattanooga: TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK. From EXECUTIVE MANSION WASHINGTON, D. C., September 21, 1863. MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK: “I think it very important for General Rosecrans to hold his position at or about Chattanooga, because if held from that place to Cleveland, both inclusive, it keeps all Tennessee clear of the enemy, and also breaks one of his most important railroad lines. To prevent these consequences is so vital to his cause that he cannot give up the effort to dislodge us from the position, thus bringing him to us and saving us the labor, expense, and hazard of going farther to find him, and also giving us the advantage of choosing our own ground and preparing it to fight him upon. The details must, of course, be left to General Rosecrans, while we must furnish him the means to the utmost of our ability. If you concur, I think he would better be informed that we are not pushing him beyond this position; and that, in fact, our judgment is rather against his going beyond it. If he can only maintain this position, without more, this rebellion can only eke out a short and feeble existence, as an animal sometimes may with a thorn in its vitals.
Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.”
Monday, September 21, 1863: Gideon Welles, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, writes in his journal, worried about the President and the results of the battle in Chickamauga: “The President came to me this afternoon with the latest news. He was feeling badly. Tells me a dispatch was sent to him at the Soldiers’ Home shortly after he got asleep, and so disturbed him that he had no more rest, but arose and came to the city and passed the remainder of the night awake and watchful. He has a telegram this P.M. which he brings me that is more encouraging. Our men stood well their ground and fought like Union heroes for their country and cause. We conclude the Rebels have concentrated a large force to overpower Rosecrans and recapture Chattanooga. While this has been doing, Halleck has frittered away time and dispersed our forces. Most of Grant’s effective force appears to have been sent across the Mississippi, where a large force is not needed. Burnside is in northeastern Tennessee, two hundred miles away from Chattanooga. While our men are thus scattered, a large division from Lee’s army in our front has been sent under Longstreet to Bragg. . . .”
Wednesday, September 21, 1864: Journal of Sergeant Alexander G. Downing, Company E, Eleventh Iowa Infantry, Third Brigade, "Crocker's Brigade," Sixth Division of the Seventeenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee. “It rained all day. There is a rumor flying in the air here that the veterans of the Seventeenth Army Corps are to be mustered out of the service this fall, on account of not having been sworn in right. But we cannot yet believe such a report to be true; that would be too good a thing all at once. We hear that all is quiet in the East, on the Rappahannock.”


Pictures: 1864 The-Battle-of-Waynesboro-Jubal-Earlys-Last-Stand-4; 1863-09 Federals at Chattanooga, TN #2; 1862-09-21 Plan of the battle of Fisher's Hill VA; 1864-09-21 Fisher’s Hill looking north. - present day

A. Saturday, September 21, 1861: The CSA calls upon Tennessee for troops. Since taking command of all Confederate troops in the Trans-Mississippi, General Albert Sidney Johnston had decided upon making a full scale invasion of Kentucky. Thus far, three small armies held three strategic positions in the state, creating a thinly stretched line from Cumberland Gap in the east to the Mississippi River in the west. His numbers were probably not efficient enough to even hold his positions, let alone advance forward. It was plain, he would need more troops.
After receiving approval to do so from President Davis, General Johnston called upon the state of Tennessee for volunteers. He informed Governor Isham Harris that the troops would be used in the defense of the Mississippi River and the states within his Department (the Mississippi River Valley, along with parts of Arkansas, Mississippi and Tennessee).
Harris was called upon to furnish 30,000 troops for the Southern cause. Though Johnston wished for the men to volunteer for the duration of the war, he realized that many might not be so willing to offer a sacrifice. In that light, he informed Harris that he would accept soldiers pledging a twelve-month term of enlistment.
There was, however, another matter. Johnston had been attempting to secure more guns and ammunition, but was so far luckless. He begged Harris’s “influence with the volunteers,” to induce them to bring along their own guns. Most men in Tennessee owned and knew how to deftly handle a firearm. “Rifles and shot-guns, double-barreled guns in particular, can be made effective weapons in the hands of our skilled horsemen,” reasoned Johnston. This hodge podge of weaponry, he assured, would soon be made uniform, making the task of supplying proper ammunition much simpler.
In his letter to Governor Harris, Johnston specified several cities of recruitment and training. The new volunteers could find their ways to either Knoxville, Nashville, Jackson, Trenton or Memphis. There, they would be outfitted, taught a quick school of soldiery and send on their way to the front.
Tennessee was, so far, the only state that Johnston had contacted, but two others were on his mind. [1]
[1] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 4, p417-418.
B. Sunday, September 21, 1862: Campaigning in Kentucky - Gen. Braxton Bragg and his 26,000 men of the Army of Mississippi are now deep into Kentucky, and Gen. Don Carlos Buell and the U.S. Army of the Ohio are following timidly behind. Buell has a problem, and he knows it: by following Bragg, he has put Bragg between himself and Louisville, his main supply base. Bragg has an opportunity, but even after leaving a large garrison in Nashville, Buell’s troops number about 40,000, which are too many for Bragg to take on alone. Bragg is also aware that large Union forces are accumulating in Louisville under Gen. Nelson (in Lousiville) and Gen. Lew Wallace (in Cincinnati), so the danger that he could get caught between the Federals to the north and to the south was palpable. At the moment, since they did not bother to coordinate, Kirby-Smith and his troops were too far away from Bragg for either of them to come quickly to the aid of the other. So Bragg decides that he must effect a junction with Kirby-Smith farther north, in Bardstown. He evacuates Munfordville, which is uncomfortably close to Bowling Green, where Buell is.
Details: Sunday, Kentucky & Tennessee '62 Race To Louisville? What Race To Louisville? After capturing the Union garrison at Munfordville, Kentucky, Confederate General Bragg’s Army of Mississippi seemingly cut off the Union Army of the Ohio from Louisville, where Bragg believed the Federals under General Don Carlos Buell were headed.
Here, Bragg was faced with a choice. He could dive his 26,000 men back south to Nashville, easily capturing the city, or he could hold Munfordville. If he chose Nashville, he would hold Middle Tennessee, his original objective. It would also allow him to link up with the combining armies under Sterling Price and Earl Van Dorn, somewhere in the vicinity of Corinth, Mississippi. This would leave Kirby Smith’s Confederate force at Lexington completely isolated.
If he chose to hold Munfordville, he would have to fight Buell, who numbered upwards of 40,000. Though Bragg was fairly confident that his defenses were solid, he also believed Buell greatly outnumbered him. Whatever reinforcements Bragg would receive would come from Kirby Smith at Lexington, around 100 miles away. They would probably not arrive in time.
Attacking Louisville was also an option, but if he did, Buell’s army could simply bypass Munfordville and fall upon him on the way there.
Whatever he was going to decide, he believed Buell’s Union army would remain in their defenses at Bowling Green. But he was mistaken. Buell was on the move, and was slowly moving towards Munfordville. Bragg soon realized this, but didn’t realize that Buell had no strong desire to attack.
To Bragg’s understanding, the Federals had three choices. They could stay put at Bowling Green, behind defenses Bragg didn’t believe his Rebels could carry. They could move around him, forcing the Rebels out of their position and into the open – something Bragg, who believed he was outnumbered two-to-one, did not want. Or, they could simply attack Bragg, pinning him to the Green River, while the gathering Union force at Louisville fell upon him from the rear.
Whatever Buell decided, Bragg thought, it wasn’t good. On the 19th, Bragg made up his mind, and ordered his army to combine with Kirby Smith’s force at Bardstown. The next day, Munfordville was empty of Rebels and Buell could breath a huge sigh of relief. His fears that Bragg and Smith would unite to defend the town along the Green River were dissipated.
The problem was that Bragg had no real objective. Originally, he wanted to retake Nashville and Middle Tennessee, but Kirby Smith persuaded him to come up into Kentucky. Now that he was there, he didn’t seem real sure about what he should do next.
Buell’s Federals picked up their pace, leaving Bowling Green for Louisville, on this date. He fully believed that Bragg was making a dash for Louisville. In truth, Bragg was moving northeast, rather than north.
Not knowing this, the city of Louisville was in an understandable panic. Banks closed their doors. Stores and shops cleared all merchandise off their shelves. Women and children were ordered across the Ohio River, and many men fled along with them.
“Bull” Nelson, in command of the hastily thrown together volunteers defending the city, was anything but confident that it could be held. He gave it two hours. Even so, he and his men (including many black men impressed into “service”) dug entrenchments and prepared for battle. All believed that Bragg and Buell were racing to Louisville. It simply wasn’t true. Bragg never had any real intension to fall upon the city. If he had any objective at all, Louisville wasn’t it.1
[1] Sources: Army of the Heartland by Thomas Lawrence Connelly; War in Kentucky by James Lee McDonough; All for the Regiment by Gerry Prokopowicz; Perryville by Kenneth W. Noe; Days of Glory by Larry J. Daniel; Braxton Bragg and the Confederate Defeat by Grady McWhiney.
C. Monday, September 21, 1863: Union forces took advantage of previous Confederate works to erect strong defensive positions in a tight, 3-mile-long semicircle around Chattanooga, Tennessee. CSA Gen Braxton Bragg did not cut off the escape routes from Chickamauga to Chattanooga and did not organize a pursuit that might have seriously damaged the Union army before it could regroup and prepare its defenses in the city.
Bragg had three courses of action. He could outflank Rosecrans by crossing the Tennessee either below or above the city, assault the Union force directly in their fortifications, or starve the Federals by establishing a siege line. The flanking option was deemed to be impracticable because Bragg's army was short on ammunition, they had no pontoons for river crossing, and Longstreet's corps from Virginia had arrived at Chickamauga without wagons. A direct assault was too costly against a well-fortified enemy. Receiving intelligence that Rosecrans's men had only six days of rations, Bragg chose the siege option, while attempting to accumulate sufficient logistical capability to cross the Tennessee.
Bragg's army besieged the city, threatening to starve the Union forces into surrender. The Confederates established themselves on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, both of which had excellent views of the city, the Tennessee River flowing north of the city, and the Union's supply lines. Bragg also had little inclination to take offensive action against the Federal army because he was occupied in leadership quarrels within his army.
Background: Chickamauga: CSA Gen Braxton Bragg achieved a major victory when a gap was opened mistakenly in the Union line and a strong assaulting force commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet drove through it and routed a good portion of the Union army. A determined defensive stand by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas on Snodgrass Hill saved the army from total destruction, earning him the nickname "Rock of Chickamauga" and allowing time for most of Rosecrans's army to retreat to Chattanooga.
D. Wednesday, September 21, 1864: Jubal Early prepares to defend Fisher’s Hill, Virginia.
Jubal Early had decided upon Fisher’s Hill, and who might blame him? It was ground with which they were familiar, and he was confident he could hold. However, there were many fewer now than there had been before. “My infantry was not able to occupy the whole line at Fisher’s Hill,” wrote Early in his memoirs, “notwithstanding it was extended out in an attenuated line, with considerable intervals.” So over-extended were they, that much of his cavalry had to be dismounted and formed along side the infantry. But even so, “the line could not then be fully occupied.”
Jubal Early’s position was a fine one, but with one flaw. While the Confederate left was as secure as it could be, the hill itself flowed into a series of valleys running perpendicular to their position. Had Early more troops, he certainly would have covered it, blocking those passage ways around his left. Instead, it was there where he placed his cavalry.
The troopers under Lunsford Lomax had been blamed for the late defeat, and Early was disgusted in their performance. However, he did not let that stop him from placing them on his left flank. He even took an entire brigade away from them, still expecting them to hold. In truth, he wasn’t expecting them to have to hold.
His choices were few. “This was the only position in the whole Valley where a defensive line could be taken against an enemy moving up the Valley, and it had several weak point,” Early confessed. He could have retreated farther south, but that would mean falling back to one of the gaps in the Blue Ridge Mountains. He was also bolstered by recent history. A month before, the Federals threatened to attack him in position on Fisher’s Hill, but never did. Early was hopeful that their fears would yet remain.
To make matters worse, Robert Rodes had been killed in the previous battle and John Breckenridge was ordered by Richmond to Southwestern Virginia. But Early held out that geography might tip the balance. He also learned that soon enough, Kershaw’s Brigade, which was ordered back to Petersburg, was soon to be turned around and send back into the Valley. It would take a few days, and perhaps he could hold off the Federals until then.
For the Federals, victoriously holding Winchester, there was no rest. Philip Sheridan saw to it that the bulk of his army was up and marching by dawn on the 20th. He pushed his cavalry south, and they found little trace of the Southerners until finally reaching Fisher’s Hill.
From noon till after dark of the 20th, the Federal cavalry was busied by reconnaissance, sussing out Early’s lines. There was even a thoughtful attempt to capture an entire brigade of infantry, but upon further consideration, the subject was forgotten.
Come the morning of this date, Union cavalry tangled with their Confederate counterparts near Front Royal, driving them south up the Luray Valley. Nearer to Fisher’s Hill, the Sixth Corps initiated a sharp skirmish with the Rebels. By evening, Sheridan was concerned.
“The enemy’s infantry occupy a ver strongly fortified position in my front, across the Strasburg Valley,” he wrote to General Grant. Before long, he was calling for reinforcements to the tune of 5,000 men. This was, at least in part, due to his belief that Early’s army consisted of at least 25,000 men. In truth, that was over 10,000 too high.
Sheridan gathered together his corps commanders, Horatio Wright, George Crook and William Emory to consider what they might do next. Sheridan had scouted the ground around Fisher’s Hill for himself and was doubtful that it could be taken by a frontal assault. That the Confederate right flank was firmly anchored upon the North Fork of the Shenandoah River left him but one choice. Fortunately for him, the Confederate left was held by a thin line of gray cavalry.
It was General Crook who suggested the wide swing around Early’s left. Sheridan thought it might work, while Wright and Emory wanted nothing to do with it. After a parlay with Crook’s division commanders, Rutherford B. Hayes and Joseph Thoburn, they ironed out the plan for the following morning. They would march at 5am the next morning. [1]




1. Saturday, September, 21, 1861: For eight days the Confederates of Sterling Price had had a small Federal unit, the “Irish Guard” under Col. James A. Mulligan, surrounded and besieged in Lexington, Mo. Mulligan, hopelessly outnumbered, refused to surrender because he was expecting a relief column to be sent by James Fremont (US) from St. Louis. Fremont never showed up. Lexington finally fell to Confederate forces. Along with 1,600 prisoners, the Confederates also found $1 million – the Union forces payroll. Fremont’s perceived failure to help the Union defenders at Lexington badly counted against him in Washington DC.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-23
2. Sunday, September 21, 1862: Mississippi: Gen. Price and his army march southwest, burning and looting the countryside as they go (yes, ravaging the Southern citizens they are supposed to protect), until they end up in Baldwyn, Mississippi, about 70 miles away from Van Dorn, with whom they are supposed to rendezvous. Grant turns his attention back to Corinth, wary of Van Dorn and Price and what might happen if they combine.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+21%2C+1862
3. Sunday, September 21, 1862: The New York Herald publishes this rather overconfident editorial about the Union’s prospects after the victory at Antietam: “The expulsion of the grand rebel army from Maryland is one of the most important and decisive events in the history of this rebellion. It marks the limit of General Lee’s advance to the northward, it secures Washington, it [.....] Maryland, it destroys the prestige of rebel invincibility, it demoralizes this hitherto successful and powerful rebel army of Virginia, it restores confidence, solidity and enthusiasm to our own troops, it breaks up the whole of this last audacious rebel programme of a winter campaign on the northern side of the Potomac and the Ohio, it opens our way to the easy occupation of the rebel capital, and it marks that final turn in the tide upon which, from the Potomac to the Mississippi, we may pursue our advantages down to the Gulf of Mexico.
The loss on the part of General McClellan of the great battle of Wednesday last might have involved the loss of Baltimore, of Maryland, and of Washington; it might have been a loss which a thousand millions of money and another year or two of war on the grandest scale would have failed to repair. But with the victory on our side the losses to the rebel cause, as we have indicated, are correspondingly great. The game is now in the hands of President Lincoln, his Secretary of War and his General-in-Chief, and especially is their opportunity for the capture of Richmond so clear and inviting that if they neglect it they will surely be called to account for it by a disappointed and justly indignant people.
The editorial then goes on to suggest buoyantly that a swift march could bring Federal troops into Richmond in less time it would take Lee to return, and that Richmond was guarded by no more than 10,000 troops—and that the time to strike is now. The North would have all of the advantages in the race to Richmond. The editorial thus recognizes the prime issue at hand: Now that Lee has been forced out of Maryland, the whole point of McClellan’s victory is to follow it up by moving with speed and deliberation—which are not the Young Napoleon’s strong suits.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+21%2C+1862
4. Sunday, September 21, 1862: James A. Graham, a soldier in the 27th North Carolina Infantry, writes home to his mother about the ghastly battle at Antietam: “Camp near Martinsburg Va, Sept 21st 1862, My dear Mother, I would have written before this but we have been on the march ever since we left Rapidan Station and I have had no chance to send a letter. We have been marching every day this month and several times we have marched all night. We were at Harper’s Ferry when it was taken, but our Reg’t was not engaged. Our Reg’t was in the fight at Sharpsburg Md. last Wednesday (17th) and lost nearly 200 men killed and wounded. I escaped without a single scratch. Our company lost 3 killed and 20 wounded. . . . It was the hottest time I ever saw and I am very thankful that I came out unhurt for I hardly thought I could escape where so many were falling. Our Reg’t took a battery from the enemy and in fact covered themselves with honor. No troops could display more cool determination & bravery than they did. Four of our men viz Shields, W.T. Patterson Merrit & G.W. Woods were left in the hospital on the other side of the river when we crossed to this side and fell into the hands of the enemy, but they will be well cared for as our Surgeon stayed with them. The rest of our company are getting along very well.
There is no news. I will write as often as I can and if I should get hurt will get somebody to write for me. Love to all. I remain, Your affectionate Son, James A. Graham”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+21%2C+1862
5. Sunday, September 21, 1862: Sarah Morgan, staying with friends in the countryside, relates this interesting example of Southern chivalry: “Many officers were in church, and as I passed out, Colonel Breaux joined me, and escorted Miriam and me to the carriage, where we stood talking some time under the trees before getting in. He gave us a most pressing invitation to name a day to visit the camp that he might "have the pleasure of showing us the fortifications," and we said we would beg the General’s permission to do so. Charming Colonel Breaux! Like all nice men, he is married, of course. He and another officer drove just behind our carriage in coming home, until we came to the fork of the road. Then, leaning from their buggy, both gentlemen bowed profoundly, which we as cordially returned. Two more behind followed their example, and to our great surprise, ten, who were seated in a small wagon drawn by two diminutive mules, bowed also, and, not content with that, rose to their feet as the distance between the two roads increased, and raised their caps, though in the most respectful silence. Rather queer; and I would have said impertinent had they been any others than Confederates fighting for us, who, of course, are privileged people.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+21%2C+1862
6. Monday, September 21, 1863: President Lincoln writes a letter to Gen. Halleck, with the strong suggestion that Gen. Rosecrans be sure to hold on to Chattanooga: TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK. From EXECUTIVE MANSION WASHINGTON, D. C., September 21, 1863. MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK: “I think it very important for General Rosecrans to hold his position at or about Chattanooga, because if held from that place to Cleveland, both inclusive, it keeps all Tennessee clear of the enemy, and also breaks one of his most important railroad lines. To prevent these consequences is so vital to his cause that he cannot give up the effort to dislodge us from the position, thus bringing him to us and saving us the labor, expense, and hazard of going farther to find him, and also giving us the advantage of choosing our own ground and preparing it to fight him upon. The details must, of course, be left to General Rosecrans, while we must furnish him the means to the utmost of our ability. If you concur, I think he would better be informed that we are not pushing him beyond this position; and that, in fact, our judgment is rather against his going beyond it. If he can only maintain this position, without more, this rebellion can only eke out a short and feeble existence, as an animal sometimes may with a thorn in its vitals.
Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+21%2C+1863
7. Monday, September 21, 1863: Gideon Welles, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, writes in his journal, worried about the President and the results of the battle in Chickamauga: “The President came to me this afternoon with the latest news. He was feeling badly. Tells me a dispatch was sent to him at the Soldiers’ Home shortly after he got asleep, and so disturbed him that he had no more rest, but arose and came to the city and passed the remainder of the night awake and watchful. He has a telegram this P.M. which he brings me that is more encouraging. Our men stood well their ground and fought like Union heroes for their country and cause. We conclude the Rebels have concentrated a large force to overpower Rosecrans and recapture Chattanooga. While this has been doing, Halleck has frittered away time and dispersed our forces. Most of Grant’s effective force appears to have been sent across the Mississippi, where a large force is not needed. Burnside is in northeastern Tennessee, two hundred miles away from Chattanooga. While our men are thus scattered, a large division from Lee’s army in our front has been sent under Longstreet to Bragg. . . .”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+21%2C+1863
8. Monday, September 21, 1863: Mortally wounded at Chickamauga, Confederate Brigadier General Benjamin "Ben" Hardin Helms dies. He was Abraham Lincoln's brother-in-law.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186309
9. Monday, September 21, 1863: Union forces head for Chattanooga. Observer’s for Bragg (CSA) sent him word that Rosecrans Army of the Cumberland (US) was disorganised and scattered and that a robust chase could destroy what was left. Brigadier-General Nathan Bedford Forrest (CSA) wrote to Bragg “every hour (lost) is worth a thousand men.” Bragg did not seem to fully comprehend the magnitude of the South’s victory. Some elements of the Confederate Army did attempt a follow up, but Bragg had just lost more than 20% of his men and 10 generals. He just wanted to regroup around Chattanooga and besiege the town. In 1890, the Chickamauga Battlefield would become a part of the very first National Military Park established by the Federal government, soon followed by Shiloh, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Antietam.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-128
10. Wednesday, September 21, 1864: General Forrest crosses the Tennessee River at Muscle Shoals and heads toward Athens, Alabama. In the Shenandoah Valley, General Early (CSA) now was in a desperate race to move back to Lee in Petersburg, but the Union army is still advancing, driving back Southern skirmishers and capturing important high ground.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-180

A Saturday, September, 21, 1861: The CSA calls upon Tennessee for troops. “Since taking command of all Confederate troops in the Trans-Mississippi, General Albert Sidney Johnston had decided upon making a full scale invasion of Kentucky. Thus far, three small armies held three strategic positions in the state, creating a thinly stretched line from Cumberland Gap in the east to the Mississippi River in the west. His numbers were probably not efficient enough to even hold his positions, let alone advance forward. It was plain, he would need more troops.
After receiving approval to do so from President Davis, General Johnston called upon the state of Tennessee for volunteers. He informed Governor Isham Harris that the troops would be used in the defense of the Mississippi River and the states within his Department (the Mississippi River Valley, along with parts of Arkansas, Mississippi and Tennessee).
Harris was called upon to furnish 30,000 troops for the Southern cause. Though Johnston wished for the men to volunteer for the duration of the war, he realized that many might not be so willing to offer a sacrifice. In that light, he informed Harris that he would accept soldiers pledging a twelve-month term of enlistment.
There was, however, another matter. Johnston had been attempting to secure more guns and ammunition, but was so far luckless. He begged Harris’s “influence with the volunteers,” to induce them to bring along their own guns. Most men in Tennessee owned and knew how to deftly handle a firearm. “Rifles and shot-guns, double-barreled guns in particular, can be made effective weapons in the hands of our skilled horsemen,” reasoned Johnston. This hodge podge of weaponry, he assured, would soon be made uniform, making the task of supplying proper ammunition much simpler.
In his letter to Governor Harris, Johnston specified several cities of recruitment and training. The new volunteers could find their ways to either Knoxville, Nashville, Jackson, Trenton or Memphis. There, they would be outfitted, taught a quick school of soldiery and send on their way to the front.
Tennessee was, so far, the only state that Johnston had contacted, but two others were on his mind. [1]
[1] Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 4, p417-418.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/the-csa-calls-upon-tennessee-for-troops/
B Sunday, September 21, 1862: Campaigning in Kentucky - Gen. Braxton Bragg and his 26,000 men of the Army of Mississippi are now deep into Kentucky, and Gen. Don Carlos Buell and the U.S. Army of the Ohio are following timidly behind. Buell has a problem, and he knows it: by following Bragg, he has put Bragg between himself and Louisville, his main supply base. Bragg has an opportunity, but even after leaving a large garrison in Nashville, Buell’s troops number about 40,000, which are too many for Bragg to take on alone. Bragg is also aware that large Union forces are accumulating in Louisville under Gen. Nelson (in Lousiville) and Gen. Lew Wallace (in Cincinnati), so the danger that he could get caught between the Federals to the north and to the south was palpable. At the moment, since they did not bother to coordinate, Kirby-Smith and his troops were too far away from Bragg for either of them to come quickly to the aid of the other. So Bragg decides that he must effect a junction with Kirby-Smith farther north, in Bardstown. He evacuates Munfordville, which is uncomfortably close to Bowling Green, where Buell is.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+21%2C+1862
B+ Sunday, September 21, 1862: Kentucky & Tennessee '62 Race To Louisville? What Race To Louisville? After capturing the Union garrison at Munfordville, Kentucky, Confederate General Bragg’s Army of Mississippi seemingly cut off the Union Army of the Ohio from Louisville, where Bragg believed the Federals under General Don Carlos Buell were headed.
Here, Bragg was faced with a choice. He could dive his 26,000 men back south to Nashville, easily capturing the city, or he could hold Munfordville. If he chose Nashville, he would hold Middle Tennessee, his original objective. It would also allow him to link up with the combining armies under Sterling Price and Earl Van Dorn, somewhere in the vicinity of Corinth, Mississippi. This would leave Kirby Smith’s Confederate force at Lexington completely isolated.
If he chose to hold Munfordville, he would have to fight Buell, who numbered upwards of 40,000. Though Bragg was fairly confident that his defenses were solid, he also believed Buell greatly outnumbered him. Whatever reinforcements Bragg would receive would come from Kirby Smith at Lexington, around 100 miles away. They would probably not arrive in time.
Attacking Louisville was also an option, but if he did, Buell’s army could simply bypass Munfordville and fall upon him on the way there.
Whatever he was going to decide, he believed Buell’s Union army would remain in their defenses at Bowling Green. But he was mistaken. Buell was on the move, and was slowly moving towards Munfordville. Bragg soon realized this, but didn’t realize that Buell had no strong desire to attack.
To Bragg’s understanding, the Federals had three choices. They could stay put at Bowling Green, behind defenses Bragg didn’t believe his Rebels could carry. They could move around him, forcing the Rebels out of their position and into the open – something Bragg, who believed he was outnumbered two-to-one, did not want. Or, they could simply attack Bragg, pinning him to the Green River, while the gathering Union force at Louisville fell upon him from the rear.
Whatever Buell decided, Bragg thought, it wasn’t good. On the 19th, Bragg made up his mind, and ordered his army to combine with Kirby Smith’s force at Bardstown. The next day, Munfordville was empty of Rebels and Buell could breath a huge sigh of relief. His fears that Bragg and Smith would unite to defend the town along the Green River were dissipated.
The problem was that Bragg had no real objective. Originally, he wanted to retake Nashville and Middle Tennessee, but Kirby Smith persuaded him to come up into Kentucky. Now that he was there, he didn’t seem real sure about what he should do next.
Buell’s Federals picked up their pace, leaving Bowling Green for Louisville, on this date. He fully believed that Bragg was making a dash for Louisville. In truth, Bragg was moving northeast, rather than north.
Not knowing this, the city of Louisville was in an understandable panic. Banks closed their doors. Stores and shops cleared all merchandise off their shelves. Women and children were ordered across the Ohio River, and many men fled along with them.
“Bull” Nelson, in command of the hastily thrown together volunteers defending the city, was anything but confident that it could be held. He gave it two hours. Even so, he and his men (including many black men impressed into “service”) dug entrenchments and prepared for battle. All believed that Bragg and Buell were racing to Louisville. It simply wasn’t true. Bragg never had any real intension to fall upon the city. If he had any objective at all, Louisville wasn’t it.1
[1] Sources: Army of the Heartland by Thomas Lawrence Connelly; War in Kentucky by James Lee McDonough; All for the Regiment by Gerry Prokopowicz; Perryville by Kenneth W. Noe; Days of Glory by Larry J. Daniel; Braxton Bragg and the Confederate Defeat by Grady McWhiney.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/race-to-louisville-what-race-to-louisville/
Sunday, September 21, 1862: Last week, the “Bloodiest Day in America’s History ~ The Battle of Antietam,” was fought left the dead and wounded with Union losses: 12,410 and Confederate losses: 10,700. General Lee (CSA) pulls back across the Photonic River to Virginia. Nothing is really gained from this bloody day in our history. Lee holds most of his army close to the river. In Bolivar, a Union Expedition that left the day before, run into to skirmishes at Van Buren.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-six
C Monday, September 21, 1863: After withdrawing from Chickamauga, Georgia, Gen. George Thomas forms a line in Rossville. He abandons the position that evening.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186309
C Monday, September 21, 1863: The Union forces took advantage of previous Confederate works to erect strong defensive positions in a tight, 3-mile-long semicircle around Chattanooga, Tennessee. CSA Gen Braxton Bragg did not cut off the escape routes from Chickamauga to Chattanooga and did not organize a pursuit that might have seriously damaged the Union army before it could regroup and prepare its defenses in the city.
Bragg had three courses of action. He could outflank Rosecrans by crossing the Tennessee either below or above the city, assault the Union force directly in their fortifications, or starve the Federals by establishing a siege line. The flanking option was deemed to be impracticable because Bragg's army was short on ammunition, they had no pontoons for river crossing, and Longstreet's corps from Virginia had arrived at Chickamauga without wagons. A direct assault was too costly against a well-fortified enemy. Receiving intelligence that Rosecrans's men had only six days of rations, Bragg chose the siege option, while attempting to accumulate sufficient logistical capability to cross the Tennessee.
Bragg's army besieged the city, threatening to starve the Union forces into surrender. The Confederates established themselves on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, both of which had excellent views of the city, the Tennessee River flowing north of the city, and the Union's supply lines. Bragg also had little inclination to take offensive action against the Federal army because he was occupied in leadership quarrels within his army.
Background: Chickamauga: CSA Gen Braxton Bragg achieved a major victory when a gap was opened mistakenly in the Union line and a strong assaulting force commanded by Lt. Gen. James Longstreet drove through it and routed a good portion of the Union army. A determined defensive stand by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas on Snodgrass Hill saved the army from total destruction, earning him the nickname "Rock of Chickamauga" and allowing time for most of Rosecrans's army to retreat to Chattanooga.
Monday, September 21, 1863: Chickamauga Campaign: In Northern Georgia, Bragg has his army bury the dead and take care of all the wounded, rather than pursue the fleeing Army of the Cumberland. Gen. Thomas has stopped at Rossville, and begins digging in. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s mounted troopers harass the retreating Yankees, and he sends back urgent messages, insisting that “every hour is worth a thousand men,” urging Bragg to send infantry to attack Thomas, whose forces are in disarray---but Bragg ignores Forrest’s entreaties.
Gen. Rosecrans immediately begins strengthening the city’s fortifications. He sends messages back to Washington that Bragg is in full retreat, but that he also needs Burnside, with his small Army of the Ohio, to march to Chattanooga without delay from Knoxville, which Burnside has just captured. But Burnside tells Washington that his forces are spread out over eastern Tennessee, and that he has little to send.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+21%2C+1863
D Wednesday, September 21, 1864: Jubal Early prepares to defend Fisher’s Hill, Virginia. “Jubal Early had decided upon Fisher’s Hill, and who might blame him? It was ground with which they were familiar, and he was confident he could hold. However, there were many fewer now than there had been before. “My infantry was not able to occupy the whole line at Fisher’s Hill,” wrote Early in his memoirs, “notwithstanding it was extended out in an attenuated line, with considerable intervals.” So over-extended were they, that much of his cavalry had to be dismounted and formed along side the infantry. But even so, “the line could not then be fully occupied.”
Jubal Early’s position was a fine one, but with one flaw. While the Confederate left was as secure as it could be, the hill itself flowed into a series of valleys running perpendicular to their position. Had Early more troops, he certainly would have covered it, blocking those passage ways around his left. Instead, it was there where he placed his cavalry.
The troopers under Lunsford Lomax had been blamed for the late defeat, and Early was disgusted in their performance. However, he did not let that stop him from placing them on his left flank. He even took an entire brigade away from them, still expecting them to hold. In truth, he wasn’t expecting them to have to hold.
His choices were few. “This was the only position in the whole Valley where a defensive line could be taken against an enemy moving up the Valley, and it had several weak point,” Early confessed. He could have retreated farther south, but that would mean falling back to one of the gaps in the Blue Ridge Mountains. He was also bolstered by recent history. A month before, the Federals threatened to attack him in position on Fisher’s Hill, but never did. Early was hopeful that their fears would yet remain.
To make matters worse, Robert Rodes had been killed in the previous battle and John Breckenridge was ordered by Richmond to Southwestern Virginia. But Early held out that geography might tip the balance. He also learned that soon enough, Kershaw’s Brigade, which was ordered back to Petersburg, was soon to be turned around and send back into the Valley. It would take a few days, and perhaps he could hold off the Federals until then.
For the Federals, victoriously holding Winchester, there was no rest. Philip Sheridan saw to it that the bulk of his army was up and marching by dawn on the 20th. He pushed his cavalry south, and they found little trace of the Southerners until finally reaching Fisher’s Hill.
From noon till after dark of the 20th, the Federal cavalry was busied by reconnaissance, sussing out Early’s lines. There was even a thoughtful attempt to capture an entire brigade of infantry, but upon further consideration, the subject was forgotten.
Come the morning of this date, Union cavalry tangled with their Confederate counterparts near Front Royal, driving them south up the Luray Valley. Nearer to Fisher’s Hill, the Sixth Corps initiated a sharp skirmish with the Rebels. By evening, Sheridan was concerned.
“The enemy’s infantry occupy a ver strongly fortified position in my front, across the Strasburg Valley,” he wrote to General Grant. Before long, he was calling for reinforcements to the tune of 5,000 men. This was, at least in part, due to his belief that Early’s army consisted of at least 25,000 men. In truth, that was over 10,000 too high.
Sheridan gathered together his corps commanders, Horatio Wright, George Crook and William Emory to consider what they might do next. Sheridan had scouted the ground around Fisher’s Hill for himself and was doubtful that it could be taken by a frontal assault. That the Confederate right flank was firmly anchored upon the North Fork of the Shenandoah River left him but one choice. Fortunately for him, the Confederate left was held by a thin line of gray cavalry.
It was General Crook who suggested the wide swing around Early’s left. Sheridan thought it might work, while Wright and Emory wanted nothing to do with it. After a parlay with Crook’s division commanders, Rutherford B. Hayes and Joseph Thoburn, they ironed out the plan for the following morning. They would march at 5am the next morning. [1]
[1] Sources: Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 43, Part 2, p119, 121-122; Personal Memoirs by Philip Sheridan; A Memoir of the Last Year of the War For Independence by Jubal A. Early; Sheridan in the Shenandoah by Edward Stackpole; From Winchester to Cedar Creek by Jeffry D. Wert.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/early-prepares-to-defend-fishers-hill/
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter LTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard WalkoSSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SFC David Reid, M.S, PHR, SHRM-CP, DTMSgt Christopher Collins SPC (Join to see) SPC Gary C. PO3 Lynn Spalding

LTC Stephen F. thanks as usual for this solid read and share, I am going with 1862: Campaigning in Kentucky - Gen. Braxton Bragg and his 26,000 men of the Army of Mississippi are now deep into Kentucky, and Gen. Don Carlos Buell and the U.S. Army of the Ohio are following timidly behind. Buell has a problem, and he knows it: by fo

very significant force/and of strategic importance as well IMHO.

a House divided... before the war we said... "The United States Is"... after the War we started saying... "These United States Are"
Thanks for the touch of History