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LTC Stephen F.
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Thank you my friend SGT (Join to see) for making us aware that on August 26, 1910 American psychologist and philosopher William James died at the age of 68.

William James His Life and Philosophy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSJnEFEtGJc

Images:
1. 1900's William James
2. William James 'The greatest weapon against stress is our ability to choose one thought over another'
3. Henry James (left) and brother William James, University of Albany, New York
4. William James 'The great use of life is to spend it for something that will outlast it.'

Background from {[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/james/]}
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
William James
First published Thu Sep 7, 2000; substantive revision Fri Oct 20, 2017
William James was an original thinker in and between the disciplines of physiology, psychology and philosophy. His twelve-hundred page masterwork, The Principles of Psychology (1890), is a rich blend of physiology, psychology, philosophy, and personal reflection that has given us such ideas as “the stream of thought” and the baby’s impression of the world “as one great blooming, buzzing confusion” (PP 462). It contains seeds of pragmatism and phenomenology, and influenced generations of thinkers in Europe and America, including Edmund Husserl, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. James studied at Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific School and the School of Medicine, but his writings were from the outset as much philosophical as scientific. “Some Remarks on Spencer’s Notion of Mind as Correspondence” (1878) and “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879, 1882) presage his future pragmatism and pluralism, and contain the first statements of his view that philosophical theories are reflections of a philosopher’s temperament.
James hints at his religious concerns in his earliest essays and in The Principles, but they become more explicit in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897), Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine (1898), The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) and A Pluralistic Universe (1909). James oscillated between thinking that a “study in human nature” such as Varieties could contribute to a “Science of Religion” and the belief that religious experience involves an altogether supernatural domain, somehow inaccessible to science but accessible to the individual human subject.
James made some of his most important philosophical contributions in the last decade of his life. In a burst of writing in 1904–5 (collected in Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912)) he set out the metaphysical view most commonly known as “neutral monism,” according to which there is one fundamental “stuff” that is neither material nor mental. In “A Pluralistic Universe” he defends the mystical and anti-pragmatic view that concepts distort rather than reveal reality, and in his influential Pragmatism (1907), he presents systematically a set of views about truth, knowledge, reality, religion, and philosophy that permeate his writings from the late 1870s onwards.
• 1. Chronology of James’s Life
• 2. Early Writings
o “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence” (1878)
o “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879, 1882)
• 3. The Principles of Psychology
• 4. Essays in Popular Philosophy
• 5. The Varieties of Religious Experience
• 6. Late Writings
o Pragmatism (1907)
o A Pluralistic Universe (1909)
o Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912)
• Bibliography
o Primary Literature: Works by William James
o Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries
________________________________________

1. Chronology of James’s Life
• 1842. Born in New York City, first child of Henry James and Mary Walsh. James. Educated by tutors and at private schools in New York.
• 1843. Brother Henry born.
• 1848. Sister Alice born.
• 1855–8. Family moves to Europe. William attends school in Geneva, Paris, and Boulogne-sur-Mer; develops interests in painting and science.
• 1858. Family settles in Newport, Rhode Island, where James studies painting with William Hunt.
• 1859–60. Family settles in Geneva, where William studies science at Geneva Academy; then returns to Newport when William decides he wishes to resume his study of painting.
• 1861. William abandons painting and enters Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard.
• 1864. Enters Harvard School of Medicine.
• 1865. Joins Amazon expedition of his teacher Louis Agassiz, contracts a mild form of smallpox, recovers and travels up the Amazon, collecting specimens for Agassiz’s zoological museum at Harvard.
• 1866. Returns to medical school. Suffers eye strain, back problems, and suicidal depression in the fall.
• 1867–8. Travels to Europe for health and education: Dresden, Bad Teplitz, Berlin, Geneva, Paris. Studies physiology at Berlin University, reads philosophy, psychology and physiology (Wundt, Kant, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, Renan, Renouvier).
• 1869. Receives M. D. degree, but never practices. Severe depression in the fall.
• 1870–1. Depression and poor health continue.
• 1872. Accepts offer from President Eliot of Harvard to teach undergraduate course in comparative physiology.
• 1873. Accepts an appointment to teach full year of anatomy and physiology, but postpones teaching for a year to travel in Europe.
• 1874–5. Begins teaching psychology; establishes first American psychology laboratory.
• 1878. Marries Alice Howe Gibbens. Publishes “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence” in Journal of Speculative Philosophy.
• 1879. Publishes “The Sentiment of Rationality” in Mind.
• 1880. Appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Harvard. Continues to teach psychology.
• 1882. Travels to Europe. Meets with Ewald Hering, Carl Stumpf, Ernst Mach, Wilhelm Wundt, Joseph Delboeuf, Jean Charcot, George Croom Robertson, Shadworth Hodgson, Leslie Stephen.
• 1884. Lectures on “The Dilemma of Determinism” and publishes “On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology” in Mind.
• 1885–92. Teaches psychology and philosophy at Harvard: logic, ethics, English empirical philosophy, psychological research.
• 1890. Publishes The Principles of Psychology with Henry Holt of Boston, twelve years after agreeing to write it.
• 1892. Publishes Psychology: Briefer Course with Henry Holt.
• 1897. Publishes The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, with Longmans, Green & Co. Lectures on “Human Immortality” (published in 1898).
• 1898. Identifies himself as a pragmatist in “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” given at the University of California, Berkeley. Develops heart problems.
• 1899. Publishes Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals (including “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings” and “What Makes Life Worth Living?”) with Henry Holt. Becomes active member of the Anti-Imperialist League, opposing U. S. policy in Philippines.
• 1901–2. Delivers Gifford lectures on “The Varieties of Religious Experience” in Edinburgh (published in 1902).
• 1904–5 Publishes “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?,” “A World of Pure Experience,” “How Two Minds Can Know the Same Thing,” “Is Radical Empiricism Solipsistic?” and “The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience” in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. All were reprinted in Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912).
• 1907. Resigns Harvard professorship. Publishes Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking with Longmans, Green & Co., based on lectures given in Boston and at Columbia.
• 1909. Publishes A Pluralistic Universe with Longmans, Green & Co., based on Hibbert Lectures delivered in England and at Harvard the previous year.
• 1910. Publishes “A Pluralistic Mystic” in Hibbert Journal. Abandons attempt to complete a “system” of philosophy. (His partially completed manuscript published posthumously as Some Problems of Philosophy). Dies of heart failure at summer home in Chocorua, New Hampshire.

2. Early Writings

“Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence” (1878)
Although he was officially a professor of psychology when he published it, James’s discussion of Herbert Spencer broaches characteristic themes of his philosophy: the importance of religion and the passions, the variety of human responses to life, and the idea that we help to “create” the truths that we “register” (E 21). Taking up Spencer’s view that the adjustment of the organism to the environment is the basic feature of mental evolution, James charges that Spencer projects his own vision of what ought to be onto the phenomena he claims to describe. Survival, James asserts, is merely one of many interests human beings have: “The social affections, all the various forms of play, the thrilling intimations of art, the delights of philosophic contemplation, the rest of religious emotion, the joy of moral self-approbation, the charm of fancy and of wit—some or all of these are absolutely required to make the notion of mere existence tolerable;…” (E 13). We are all teleological creatures at base, James holds, each with a set of a priori values and categories. Spencer “merely takes sides with the telos he happens to prefer” (E 18).
James’s characteristic empiricism appears in his claim that values and categories fight it out in the course of human experience, and that their conflicts “can only be solved ambulando, and not by any a priori definition.” The “formula which proves to have the most massive destiny,” he concludes, “will be the true one” (E 17). Yet James wishes to defend his sense that any such formulation will be determined as much by a freely-acting human mind as by the world, a position he later (in Pragmatism) calls “humanism”: “there belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a vote. It is in the game, and not a mere looker-on; and its judgments of the should-be, its ideals, cannot be peeled off from the body of the cogitandum as if they were excrescences…” (E 21).

“The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879, 1882)
The substance of this essay was first published in Mind in 1879 and in the Princeton Review in 1882, and then republished in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy in 1897. Although he never quite says that rationality is a sentiment, James holds that a sentiment—really a set of sentiments—is a “mark” of rationality. The philosopher, James writes, will recognize the rationality of a conception “as he recognizes everything else, by certain subjective marks with which it affects him. When he gets the marks, he may know that he has got the rationality.” These marks include a “strong feeling of ease, peace, rest” (WB 57), and a “feeling of the sufficiency of the present moment, of its absoluteness” (WB 58). There is also a “passion for parsimony” (WB 58) that is felt in grasping theoretical unifications, as well as a passion for distinguishing, a “loyalty to clearness and integrity of perception, dislike of blurred outlines, of vague identifications” (WB 59). The ideal philosopher, James holds, blends these two passions of rationality, and even some great philosophers go too far in one direction or another: Spinoza’s unity of all things in one substance is “barren,” as is Hume’s “‘looseness and separateness’ of everything…” (WB 60).
Sentiments of rationality operate not just in logic or science, but in ordinary life. When we first move into a room, for example, “we do not know what draughts may blow in upon our back, what doors may open, what forms may enter, what interesting objects may be found in cupboards and corners.” These minor uncertainties act as “mental irritant[s],” which disappear when we come to know our way around the room, to “feel at home” there (WB 67–8).
James begins the second part of his essay by considering the case when “two conceptions [are] equally fit to satisfy the logical demand” for fluency or unification. At this point, he holds, one must consider a “practical” component of rationality. The conception that “awakens the active impulses, or satisfies other aesthetic demands better than the other, will be accounted the more rational conception, and will deservedly prevail” (WB 66). James puts the point both as one of psychology—a prediction of what will occur—and as one of judgment, for he holds that it will prevail “deservedly.”
As in his essay on Spencer, James explores the relations between temperaments and philosophical theorizing. Idealism, he holds, “will be chosen by a man of one emotional constitution, materialism by another.” Idealism offers a sense of intimacy with the universe, the feeling that ultimately I “am all.” But materialists find in idealism “a narrow, close, sick-room air,” and prefer to conceive of an uncertain, dangerous and wild universe that has “no respect for our ego.” Let “the tides flow,” the materialist thinks, “even though they flow over us” (WB 76). James is sympathetic both to the idea that the universe is something we can be intimate with and to the idea that it is wild and unpredictable. If he criticizes idealism for its “sick-room air,” he criticizes reductive forms of materialism for denying to “our most intimate powers…all relevancy in universal affairs” (WB 71). The intimacy and the wildness portrayed in these contrasting philosophies answer to propensities, passions, and powers in human beings, and the “strife” of these two forms of “mental temper,” James predicts, will always be seen in philosophy (WB 76). Certainly it is always seen in the philosophy of William James.

3. The Principles of Psychology
In 1878, James agreed to write a psychology textbook for the American publisher Henry Holt, but it took him twelve years to produce the manuscript, and when he did he described it to Holt as “a loathsome, distended, tumefied, bloated, dropsical mass, testifying to nothing but two facts: 1st, that there is no such thing as a science of psychology, and 2nd, that W. J. is an incapable” (The Letters of William James, ed. Henry James. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1926, pp. 393–4). Nevertheless, this thousand page volume of psychology, physiology and philosophy has proved to be James’s masterwork, containing early statements of his main philosophical ideas in extraordinarily rich chapters on “The Stream of Thought,” “The Consciousness of Self,” “Emotion,” “Will,” and many other topics.
James tells us that he will follow the psychological method of introspection in The Principles, which he defines as “the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover” (PP 185). In fact he takes a number of methodological approaches in the book. Early on, he includes chapters on “The Functions of the Brain” and “On Some General Conditions of Brain Activity” that reflect his years as a lecturer in anatomy and physiology at Harvard, and he argues for the reductive and materialist thesis that habit is “at bottom a physical principle” (PP 110). As the book moves along, he involves himself in discussions with philosophers—for example with Hume and Kant in his hundred-page chapter on the self, and he finds himself making metaphysical claims that anticipate his later pragmatism, as when he writes: “There is no property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing. The same property which figures as the essence of a thing on one occasion becomes a very inessential feature on the other” (PP 959).
Even “introspection” covers a range of reports. James discusses the experiments that his contemporaries Wundt, Stumpf and Fechner were performing in their laboratories, which led them to results such as that “sounds are less delicately discriminated in intensity than lights” (PP 513). But many of James’s most important and memorable introspective observations come from his own life. For example:
The rhythm of a lost word may be there without a sound to clothe it…. Everyone must know the tantalizing effect of the blank rhythm of some forgotten verse, restlessly dancing in one’s mind, striving to be filled out with words (PP 244).
Our father and mother, our wife and babes, are bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. When they die, a part of our very selves is gone. If they do anything wrong, it is our shame. If they are insulted, our anger flashes forth as readily as if we stood in their place. (PP 280).
There is an excitement during the crying fit which is not without a certain pungent pleasure of its own; but it would take a genius for felicity to discover any dash of redeeming quality in the feeling of dry and shrunken sorrow (PP 1061).
“Will you or won’t you have it so?” is the most probing question we are ever asked; we are asked it every hour of the day, and about the largest as well as the smallest, the most theoretical as well as the most practical, things. We answer by consents or non-consents and not by words. What wonder that these dumb responses should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things! (PP, p. 1182).
In this last quotation, James tackles a philosophical problem from a psychological perspective. Although he refrains from answering the question of whether these “responses” are in fact deep organs of communication with the nature of things—reporting only that they seem to us to be so—in his later writings, such as Varieties of Religious Experience and A Pluralistic Universe, he confesses, and to some degree defends, his belief that the question should be answered affirmatively.
In the deservedly famous chapter on “The Stream of Thought” James takes himself to be offering a richer account of experience than those of traditional empiricists such as Hume. He believes relations, vague fringes, and tendencies are experienced directly (a view he would later defend as part of his “radical empiricism.”) James finds consciousness to be a stream rather than a succession of “ideas.” Its waters blend, and our individual consciousness—or, as he prefers to call it sometimes, our “sciousness”—is “steeped and dyed” in the waters of sciousness or thought that surround it. Our psychic life has rhythm: it is a series of transitions and resting-places, of “flights and perchings” (PP 236). We rest when we remember the name we have been searching for; and we are off again when we hear a noise that might be the baby waking from her nap.
Interest—and its close relative, attention—is a major component not only of James’s psychology, but of the epistemology and metaphysics that seep into his discussion. A thing, James states in “The Stream of Thought,” is a group of qualities “which happen practically or aesthetically to interest us, to which we therefore give substantive names…”. (PP 274). And reality “means simply relation to our emotional and active life…whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real” (PP 924). Our capacity for attention to one thing rather than another is for James the sign of an “active element in all consciousness,…a spiritual something…which seems to go out to meet these qualities and contents, whilst they seem to come in to be received by it.” (PP 285). Faced with the tension between scientific determinism and our belief in our own freedom or autonomy, James—speaking not as a psychologist but as the philosopher he had become—argues that science “must be constantly reminded that her purposes are not the only purposes, and that the order of uniform causation which she has use for, and is therefore right in postulating, may be enveloped in a wider order, on which she has no claims at all” (PP 1179).
In his discussions of consciousness James appears at various times to be a reductive materialist, a dualist, a proto-phenomenologist, and a neutral psychologist who wouldn’t dare to consider philosophical questions. One of the most original layers of The Principles lies in James’s pursuit of a “pure” description of the stream of thought that does not presuppose it to be either mental or material, a pursuit that anticipates not only his own later “radical empiricism,” but Husserl’s phenomenology. In his chapter on “Sensation,” for example, James is at pains to deny that sensations are “in the mind” and then “by a special act on our part ‘extradited’ or ‘projected’ so as to appear located in an outer world” (PP 678). He argues that our original experiences are objective, that “only as reflection becomes developed do we become aware of an inner world at all” (PP 679). However, the objective world originally experienced is not the world of spatial relations that we think:
Certainly a child newly born in Boston, who gets a sensation from the candle-flame which lights the bedroom, or from his diaper-pin [who] does not feel either of these objects to be situated in longitude 71 W. and latitude 42 N.….The flame fills its own place, the pain fills its own place; but as yet these places are neither identified with, nor discriminated from, any other places. That comes later. For the places thus first sensibly known are elements of the child’s space-world which remain with him all his life. (PP 681–2)
James’s chapter on “Habit,” early in the book, begins with habit as a physical matter but ends by considering its ethical implications. James argues that the laws of nature are themselves habits, “nothing but the immutable habits which the different elementary sorts of matter follow in their actions and reactions upon each other” (PP 109). In our brains, habits are paths of nervous energy, as rivers and streams are the paths of water’s flow. At skin level, even a scar is a kind of habit, “more likely to be abraded, inflamed, to suffer pain and cold, than are the neighboring parts” (PP 111). On the psychological level as well, “any sequence of mental action which has been frequently repeated, tends to perpetuate itself ...” (PP 116). Habits are useful in diminishing the attention that we have to devote to our actions, thereby allowing us to develop “our higher powers of mind” (PP 126). On the social level, habit is “the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor” (PP 125). The “ethical implications of the law of habit,” (PP 124) as James sees them, concern which habits we choose to develop, and when. Many habits must begin early in life: “Hardly ever is a language learned after twenty spoken without a foreign accent” (PP 126). We should strive to make our “nervous system our ally instead of our enemy” by forming as many good habits as we can, as early in life as we can. Even later in life, we are to keep our capacity for resolution in shape by every day or two doing “something for no other reason than that you would rather not do it” (PP 130).
Two noteworthy chapters late in The Principles are “The Emotions” and “Will.” The first sets out the theory—also enunciated by the Danish physiologist Carl Lange—that emotion follows, rather than causes, its bodily expression: “Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect…that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble…” (PP 1065–6). The significance of this view, according to James, is that our emotions are tied in with our bodily expressions. What, he asks, would grief be “without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of the heart, its pang in the breast-bone?” Not an emotion, James answers, for a “purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity” (PP 1068).
In his chapter on “Will” James opposes the theory of his contemporary Wilhelm Wundt that there is one special feeling—a “feeling of innervation”—present in all intentional action. In his survey of a range of cases, James finds that some actions involve an act of resolve or of outgoing nervous energy, but others do not. For example:
I sit at table after dinner and find myself from time to time taking nuts or raisins out of the dish and eating them. My dinner properly is over, and in the heat of the conversation I am hardly aware of what I do; but the perception of the fruit, and the fleeting notion that I may eat it, seem fatally to bring the act about. There is certainly no express fiat here;… (PP 1131).
The chapter on “Will” also contains striking passages that anticipate the concerns of The Varieties of Religious Experience: about moods, “changes of heart,” and “awakenings of conscience.” These, James observes, may affect the “whole scale of values of our motives and impulses” (PP 1140).

4. Essays in Popular Philosophy
James’s popular and influential, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, published in 1897, collects previously published essays from the previous nineteen years, including “The Sentiment of Rationality” (discussed above), “The Dilemma of Determinism,” “Great Men and Their Environment” and “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life.” The title essay—published just two years earlier—proved to be controversial for seeming to recommend irresponsible or irrationally held beliefs. James later wrote that he should have called the essay “the right to believe,” to indicate his intent to justify holding certain beliefs in certain circumstances, not to claim that we can (or should) believe things simply by an act of will.
In science, James notes, we can afford to await the outcome of investigation before coming to a belief, but in other cases we are “forced,” in that we must come to some belief even if all the relevant evidence is not in. If I am on an isolated mountain trail, faced with an icy ledge to cross, and do not know whether I can make it, I may be forced to consider the question whether I can or should believe that I can cross the ledge. This question is not only forced, it is “momentous”: if I am wrong I may fall to my death, and if I believe rightly that I can cross the ledge, my holding of the belief may itself contribute to my success. In such a case, James asserts, I have the “right to believe”—precisely because such a belief may help bring about the fact believed in. This is a case “where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming” (WB, 25).
James applies his analysis to religious belief, particularly to the possible case in which one’s salvation depends on believing in God in advance of any proof that God exists. In such a case the belief may be justified by the outcome to which having the belief leads. He extends his analysis beyond the religious domain, however, to a wide range of secular human life:
A social organism of any sort is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs…. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted (WB 24).
Moral questions too are both momentous and unlikely to be sustained by “sensible proof.” They are not matters of science but of “what Pascal calls our heart” (WB 22). James defends our right to believe in certain answers to these questions anyway.
Another essay in the collection, “Reflex Action and Theism,” attempts a reconciliation of science and religion. James’s expression “reflex action” alludes to the biological picture of the organism as responding to sensations with a series of actions. In the higher animals a theoretical or thinking stage intervenes between sensation and action, and this is where, in human beings, the thought of God arises. James maintains that this thought is a natural human response to the universe, independent of any proof that God exists, and he predicts that God will be the “centre of gravity of all attempts to solve the riddle of life” (WB, 116). He ends the essay by advocating a “theism” that posits “an ultimate opacity in things, a dimension of being which escapes our theoretic control” (WB 143).
The Will to Believe also contains James’s most developed account of morality, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life.” Morality for James rests on sentience—without it there are no moral claims and no moral obligations. But once sentience exists, a claim is made, and morality gets “a foothold in the universe” (WB 198). Although James insists that there is no common essence to morality, he does find a guiding principle for ethical philosophy in the principle that we “satisfy at all times as many demands as we can” (WB 205). This satisfaction is to be achieved by working towards a “richer universe…the good which seems most organizable, most fit to enter into complex combinations, most apt to be a member of a more inclusive whole” (WB 210). This work proceeds by a series of experiments, by means of which we have learned to live (for the most part) without “polygamy and slavery, private warfare and liberty to kill, judicial torture and arbitrary royal power.” (WB 205) . However, James holds that there is “nothing final in any actually given equilibrium of human ideals, [so that] as our present laws and customs have fought and conquered other past ones, so they will in their turn be overthrown by any newly discovered order which will hush up the complaints that they still give rise to, without producing others louder still” (WB 206).
James’s essay “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” published in his Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals in 1899, illustrates another important element of James’s moral outlook. The blindness to which James draws attention is that of one human being to another, a blindness he illustrates with a story from his own life. Riding in the mountains of North Carolina he comes upon a devastated landscape, with no trees, scars in the earth, here and there a patch of corn growing in the sunlight. But after talking to the settlers who had cleared the forest to make room for their farm, James comes to see it their way (at least temporarily): not as devastation but as a manifestation of “duty, struggle, and success.” James concludes: “I had been as blind to the peculiar ideality of their conditions as they certainly would also have been to the ideality of mine, had they had a peep at my strange indoor academic ways of life at Cambridge” (TT 233–4). James portrays a plurality of outlooks in the essay to which he attaches both a metaphysical/epistemological and an ethical import. This plurality, he writes:
commands us to tolerate, respect, and indulge those whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in their own ways, however unintelligible these may be to us. Hands off: neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands. Even prisons and sick-rooms have their special revelations (TT 264).
Although “On a Certain Blindness” is about toleration and the appreciation of different points of view, James sets out his own romantic point of view in his choice of heroes in the essay: Wordsworth and Shelley, Emerson, and W. H. Hudson, all of whom are said to have a sense of the “limitless significance in natural things” (TT 244). Even in the city, there is “unfathomable significance and importance” (TT 254) in the daily events of the streets, the river, and the crowds of people. James praises Walt Whitman, “a hoary loafer,” for knowing how to profit by life’s common opportunities: after a morning of writing and a bath, Whitman rides the omnibus down Broadway from 23rd street to Bowling Green and back, just for the pleasure and the spectacle of it. “[W]ho knows the more of truth,” James asks, “Whitman on his omnibus-top, full of the inner joy with which the spectacle inspires him, or you, full of the disdain which the futility of his occupation excites?” (TT 252). James’s interest in the inner lives of others, and in writers like Tolstoy who share his understanding of their “mysterious ebbs and flows” (TT 255), leads him to the prolonged study of human religious experience that he presented as the Gifford Lectures in 1901–2, published as The Varieties of Religious Experience in 1902.

5. The Varieties of Religious Experience
Like The Principles of Psychology, Varieties is “A Study in Human Nature,” as its subtitle says. But at some five hundred pages it is only half the length of The Principles of Psychology, befitting its more restricted, if still large, scope. For James studies that part of human nature that is, or is related to, religious experience. His interest is not in religious institutions, ritual, or, even for the most part, religious ideas, but in “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (V 31).
James sets out a central distinction of the book in early chapters on “The Religion of Healthy-Mindedness” and “The Sick Soul.” The healthy-minded religious person—Walt Whitman is one of James’s main examples—has a deep sense of “the goodness of life,” (V 79) and a soul of “sky-blue tint” (V 80). Healthy-mindedness can be involuntary, just natural to someone, but often comes in more willful forms. Liberal Christianity, for example, represents the triumph of a resolute devotion to healthy-mindedness over a morbid “old hell-fire theology” (V 91). James also cites the “mind-cure movement” of Mary Baker Eddy, for whom “evil is simply a lie, and any one who mentions it is a liar” (V 107). For “The Sick Soul,” in contrast, “radical evil gets its innings” (V 163). No matter how secure one may feel, the sick soul finds that “[u]nsuspectedly from the bottom of every fountain of pleasure, as the old poet said, something bitter rises up: a touch of nausea, a falling dead of the delight, a whiff of melancholy….” These states are not simply unpleasant sensations, for they bring “a feeling of coming from a deeper region and often have an appalling convincingness” (V 136). James’s main examples are Leo Tolstoy’s “My Confession,” John Bunyan’s autobiography, and a report of terrifying “dread”—allegedly from a French correspondent but actually from James himself. Some sick souls never get well, while others recover or even triumph: these are the “twice-born.” In chapters on “The Divided Self, and the Process of Its Unification” and on “Conversion,” James discusses St. Augustine, Henry Alline, Bunyan, Tolstoy, and a range of popular evangelists, focusing on what he calls “the state of assurance” (V 247) they achieve. Central to this state is “the loss of all the worry, the sense that all is ultimately well with one, the peace, the harmony, the willingness to be, even though the outer conditions should remain the same” (V 248).
Varieties’ classic chapter on “Mysticism” offers “four marks which, when an experience has them, may justify us in calling it mystical…” (V 380). The first is ineffability: “it defies expression…its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others.” Second is a “noetic quality”: mystical states present themselves as states of knowledge. Thirdly, mystical states are transient; and, fourth, subjects are passive with respect to them: they cannot control their coming and going. Are these states, James ends the chapter by asking, “windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world[?]” (V 428).
In chapters entitled “Philosophy”—devoted in large part to pragmatism—and “Conclusions,” James finds that religious experience is on the whole useful, even “amongst the most important biological functions of mankind,” but he concedes that this does not make it true. Nevertheless, James articulates his own belief—which he does not claim to prove—that religious experiences connect us with a greater, or further, reality not accessible in our normal cognitive relations to the world: “The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely ‘understandable’ world” (V 515).

6. Late Writings

Pragmatism (1907)
James first announced his commitment to pragmatism in a lecture at Berkeley in 1898, entitled “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results.” Later sources for Pragmatism were lectures at Wellesley College in 1905, and at the Lowell Institute and Columbia University in 1906 and 1907. Pragmatism emerges in James’s book as six things: a philosophical temperament, a theory of truth, a theory of meaning, a holistic account of knowledge, a metaphysical view, and a method of resolving philosophical disputes.
The pragmatic temperament appears in the book’s opening chapter, where (following a method he first set out in “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence”) James classifies philosophers according to their temperaments: in this case “tough-minded” or “tender-minded.” The pragmatist is the mediator between these extremes, someone, like James himself, with “scientific loyalty to facts,” but also “the old confidence in human values and the resultant spontaneity, whether of the religious or romantic type” (P 17). The method of resolving disputes and the theory of meaning are on display in James’s discussion of an argument about whether a man chasing a squirrel around a tree goes around the squirrel too. Taking meaning as the “conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve,” the pragmatist philosopher finds that two “practical” meanings of “go around” are in play: either the man goes North, East, South, and West of the squirrel, or he faces first the squirrel’s head, then one of his sides, then his tail, then his other side. “Make the distinction,” James writes, “and there is no occasion for any further dispute.”
The pragmatic theory of truth is the subject of the book’s sixth (and to some degree its second) chapter. Truth, James holds, is “a species of the good,” like health. Truths are goods because we can “ride” on them into the future without being unpleasantly surprised. They “lead us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters as well as directly up to useful sensible termini. They lead to consistency, stability and flowing human intercourse. They lead away from excentricity and isolation, from foiled and barren thinking” (103). Although James holds that truths are “made” (104) in the course of human experience, and that for the most part they live “on a credit system” in that they are not currently being verified, he also holds the empiricistic view that “beliefs verified concretely by somebody are the posts of the whole superstructure” (P 100).
James’s chapter on “Pragmatism and Humanism” sets out his voluntaristic epistemology. “We carve out everything,” James states, “just as we carve out constellations, to serve our human purposes” (P, 100). Nevertheless, he recognizes “resisting factors in every experience of truth-making” (P, 117), including not only our present sensations or experiences but the whole body of our prior beliefs. James holds neither that we create our truths out of nothing, nor that truth is entirely independent of humanity. He embraces “the humanistic principle: you can’t weed out the human contribution” (P, 122). He also embraces a metaphysics of process in the claim that “for pragmatism [reality] is still in the making,” whereas for “rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity” (P 123). Pragmatism’s final chapter on “Pragmatism and Religion” follows James’s line in Varieties in attacking “transcendental absolutism” for its unverifiable account of God, and in defending a “pluralistic and moralistic religion” (144) based on human experience. “On pragmatistic principles,” James writes, “if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true” (143).

A Pluralistic Universe (1909)
Originally delivered in Oxford as a set of lectures “On the Present Situation in Philosophy,” James begins his book, as he had begun Pragmatism, with a discussion of the temperamental determination of philosophical theories, which, James states, “are just so many visions, modes of feeling the whole push … forced on one by one’s total character and experience, and on the whole preferred—there is no other truthful word—as one’s best working attitude” (PU 15). Maintaining that a philosopher’s “vision” is “the important thing” about him (PU 3), James condemns the “over-technicality and consequent dreariness of the younger disciples at our American universities…” (PU 13).
James passes from critical discussions of Josiah Royce’s idealism and the “vicious intellectualism” of Hegel to philosophers whose visions he admires: Gustav Fechner and Henri Bergson. He praises Fechner for holding that “the whole universe in its different spans and wave-lengths, exclusions and developments, is everywhere alive and conscious” (PU, 70), and he seeks to refine and justify Fechner’s idea that separate human, animal and vegetable consciousnesses meet or merge in a “consciousness of still wider scope” (72). James employs Henri Bergson’s critique of “intellectualism” to argue that the “concrete pulses of experience appear pent in by no such definite limits as our conceptual substitutes are confined by. They run into one another continuously and seem to interpenetrate” (PU 127). James concludes by embracing a position that he had more tentatively set forth in The Varieties of Religious Experience: that religious experiences “point with reasonable probability to the continuity of our consciousness with a wider spiritual environment from which the ordinary prudential man (who is the only man that scientific psychology, so called, takes cognizance of) is shut off” (PU 135). Whereas in Pragmatism James subsumes the religious within the pragmatic (as yet another way of successfully making one’s way through the world), in A Pluralistic Universe he suggests that the religious offers a superior relation to the universe.

Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912)
This posthumous collection includes James’s groundbreaking essays on “pure experience,” originally published in 1904–5. James’s fundamental idea is that mind and matter are both aspects of, or structures formed from, a more fundamental stuff—pure experience—that (despite being called “experience”) is neither mental nor physical. Pure experience, James explains, is “the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories… a that which is not yet any definite what, tho’ ready to be all sorts of whats…” (ERE 46). That “whats” pure experience may be are minds and bodies, people and material objects, but this depends not on a fundamental ontological difference among these “pure experiences,” but on the relations into which they enter. Certain sequences of pure experiences constitute physical objects, and others constitute persons; but one pure experience (say the perception of a chair) may be part both of the sequence constituting the chair and of the sequence constituting a person. Indeed, one pure experience might be part of two distinct minds, as James explains in a chapter entitled “How Two Minds Can Know One Thing.”
James’s “radical empiricism” is distinct from his “pure experience” metaphysics. It is never precisely defined in the Essays, and is best explicated by a passage from The Meaning of Truth where James states that radical empiricism consists of a postulate, a statement of fact, and a conclusion. The postulate is that “the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience,” the fact is that relations are just as directly experienced as the things they relate, and the conclusion is that “the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience” (MT, 6–7).
James was still working on objections to his “pure experience” doctrine, replying to critics of Pragmatism, and writing an introduction to philosophical problems when he died in 1910. His legacy extends into psychology and the study of religion, and in philosophy not only throughout the pragmatist tradition that he founded (along with Charles Peirce), but into phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Edmund Husserl incorporated James’s notions of the “fringe” and “halo” into his phenomenology (Moran, pp. 276–80), Bertrand Russell’s The Analysis of Mind is indebted to James’s doctrine of “pure experience,” (Russell, 1921, pp. 22–6), Ludwig Wittgenstein learned about “the absence of the will act” from James’s Psychology (Goodman, Wittgenstein and William James, p. 81), and the versions of “neopragmatism” set out by Nelson Goodman, Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam are saturated with James’s ideas. James is one of the most attractive and endearing of philosophers: for his vision of a “wild,” “open” universe that is nevertheless shaped by our human powers and answers to some of our deepest needs, but also, as Russell observed in his obituary, because of the “large tolerance and … humanity” with which he sets that vision out. (The Nation (3 September 1910: 793–4).

Bibliography

Primary Literature: Works by William James
• The Works of William James, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 17 vol., 1975–.
• William James: Writings 1878–1899. New York: Library of America, 1992.
• William James: Writings 1902–1910. New York: Library of America, 1987
• “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence,” first published in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1878. Contained in Essays in Philosophy, pp. 7–22.
• The Principles of Psychology, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. Originally published in 1890 [PP].
• The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1979; first published in 1897 [WB].
• “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” 1898. Contained in Pragmatism, in The Works of William James, pp. 255–70.
• Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals. New York: Henry Holt, 1899 [TT].
• The Varieties of Religious Experience, New York: Longmans, Green, 1916. Originally published in 1902 [V].
• Pragmatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979. Originally published in 1907 [P].
• A Pluralistic Universe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977. Originally published in 1909 [PU].
• The Meaning of Truth, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1979 [MT]. Originally published in 1909.
• Essays in Philosophy. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1978 [E].
• Some Problems of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1979. Originally published in 1911.
• The Letters of William James, ed. Henry James, Boston: Little Brown, 1926.
• The Correspondence of William James, ed. Ignas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley, 12 volumes. Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 1992–.
• Selected Letters of William and Henry James, Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 1997.
Secondary Literature
• Baghramian, Maria and Sarin Marchetti (eds.), 2017, Pragmatism and the European Traditions: Encounters with Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology Before the Great Divide, New York and London: Routledge.
• Barzun, Jacques, 1983, A Stroll with William James New York: Harper and Row.
• Benoist, Jocelyn, 2005, “A Phenomenology or Pragmatism?” in Pragmatism, Critical Concepts in Philosophy, vol. 2, Russell B. Goodman (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, pp. 89–112.
• Bernstein, Richard, 2010, The Pragmatic Turn, Cambridge, U.K. and Malden, MA: Polity Press.
• Bird, Graham, 1986, William James (The Arguments of the Philosophers). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
• Carrette, Jeremy, 2013, William James’s Hidden Religious Imagination: A Universe of Relations, New York: Routledge.
• Edie, James, 1987, William James and Phenomenology, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
• Feinstein, Howard M., 1984, Becoming William James, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• Gale, Richard M., 1999, The Divided Self of William James, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2004, The Philosophy of William James: An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Girel, Mathias, 2004, “Les Angles de l’acte. Usages d’Emerson dans la Philosophie de William James,” Cahier Charles V, XXXVII (October): 207–245.
• Goodman, Russell B., 1990, American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 3.
• –––, 2002, Wittgenstein and William James, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2004, “James on the Nonconceptual,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXVIII: 137–148.
• –––, 2008, “Emerson, Romanticism, and Classical American Pragmatism,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy, ed. Cheryl Misak, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 19–37.
• –––, 2010, “William James’s Pluralisms,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 2: 155–76.
• Jackman, Henry, 2008, “William James,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy, Cheryl Misak (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 60–86.
• Klein, Alexander, 2009, “On Hume on Space: Green’s Attack, James’s Empirical Response,” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 47(3): 415–49.
• Levinson, Henry S., 1981, The Religious Investigations of William James, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
• Madelrieux, Stéphane, 2008, William James, l’attitude empiriste, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
• Marchetti, Sarin, 2015, Ethics and Philosophical Critique in William James, New York: Palmgrave Macmillan.
• Matthiessen, F. O., 1947, The James Family, New York: Knopf.
• McDermott, John, 1986, Streams of Experience: Reflections on the History and Philosophy of American Culture, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
• Misak, Cheryl, 2013, The American Pragmatists, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Moore, G. E., 1922, “William James’ ‘Pragmatism’”, in Philosophical Studies, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 138.
• Moran, Dermot, 2017, “Phenomenology and Pragmatism: Two Interactions. From Horizontal Intentionality to Practical Coping,” in Baghramian and Marchetti 2017, pp. 272–93.
• Myers, Gerald, 1986, William James: His Life and Thought, New Haven: Yale University Press.
• Pawelski, James O., 2007, The Dynamic Individualism of William James, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
• Perry, Ralph Barton, 1935, The Thought and Character of William James, Boston: Little, Brown, 2 vols.
• Pihlström, Sami, 2008, The Trail of the Human Serpent is over Everything: Jamesian Perspectives on Mind, World, and Religion, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
• Poirier, Richard, 1992, Poetry and Pragmatism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Proudfoot, Wayne, ed., 2004, William James and a Science of Religions, New York: Columbia University Press.
• Putnam, Hilary, 1987, The Many Faces of Realism, La Salle, IL: Open Court.
• ––– (with Ruth Anna Putnam), 1990, “William James’s Ideas,” in Putnam, Hilary, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 217–231.
• Putnam, Ruth Anna, 1997, The Cambridge Companion to William James, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Richardson, Robert D., 2006, William James: In the Maelstrom of American Modernism, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
• Russell, Bertrand, 1921, The Analysis of Mind, London: George Allen and Unwin.
• –––, 1986, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell (Volume 6), London: George Allen and Unwin, pp. 257–306.
• Simon, Linda, 1998, Genuine Reality: a life of William James , New York: Harcourt Brace.
• Seigfried, Charlene Haddock, 1990, William James’s Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press.
• Skillen, Anthony, 1996, “William James, ‘A Certain Blindness’ and an Uncertain Pluralism,” in Philosophy and Pluralism, ed. David Archard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33–45.
• Slater, Michael R., 2009, William James on Ethics and Faith, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Sprigge, T. L. S., 1993, James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality, Chicago: Open Court.
• Suckiel, Ellen Kappy, 1982, The Pragmatic Philosophy of William James, Notre Dame, IN and London: University of Notre Dame Press.
• –––, 1996, Heaven’s Champion, Notre Dame, IN and London: University of Notre Dame Press.
• Tarver, Erin C. and Shannon Sullivan (eds.), 2015, Feminist Interpretations of William James, University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
• Taylor, Eugene, 1996, William James on Consciousness Beyond the Fringe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Wilshire, Bruce, 1979, William James and Phenomenology: A Study of “The Principles of Psychology”, New York: AMS Press, 1979.

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Does Consciousness Exist? By William James
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RZyYs47bLgk
Images:
1. William James left with Josiah Royce, September 1903. photographed by Margaret Mary James
2. William James circa 1895
3. William James 'As the art of reading (after a certain stage in one's education) is the art of skipping, so the art of being wise is the art of knowing what to overlook.'
4. William James in 1858, age 16

Background from {[ https://www.uky.edu/~eushe2/Pajares/jphotos.html/]}
BIOGRAPHY, CHRONOLOGY, of WILLIAM JAMES
1842 - Born. New York City, January 11.

William's father, Henry James Sr., was one of 13 children born to an Irish immigrant. By the time his own children were born, Henry had inherited wealth from his father. At the time of William's birth, Henry and his wife Mary lived in New York City, where Henry studied theology, philosophy, and mysticism. Having rejected his fathe's Presbyterianism, he followed the teachings of Swedish Christian mystic Emanuel Swedenborg.
["Born in New York City in 1842, William James was a child of privilege and by all odds should have become a playboy or, at best, a dilettante."]
William James was born in New York City on January 11, 1842, to an affluent, cosmopolitan, and deeply religious family. His father Henry dabbled in theology, doted on his five children, was well connected to literary and philosophical luminaries of the day, and often took the family for extended stays in Europe. His journeys to the continent were primarily theological and philosophical odysseys intended to resolve his conflicting spiritual bouts. His right leg had been amputated after burns suffered in a boyhood accident failed to heal. His spirit never quite recovered. A devoted father, he sought to provide his children with the sort of education that might enable them some day to outdistance their countrymen both in erudition and in breadth of knowledge. To this end, he enrolled them in fine schools, obtained for them gifted tutors, and saw to it that they frequented museums and attended lectures and the theater with regularity. William and two of his siblings would give fruit to their father's liberal educational efforts. Brother Henry became one of America's most famed novelists, and sister Alice acquired a literary reputation of her own after her diaries were posthumously published.
1843 - His brother Henry is born. New York City, April 15.
1843-1845 - Father Henry Sr. takes the family to Europe.
1845 - Brother Garth Wilkinson is born.
1846 - Brother Robertson is born.
Whenever Henry became deeply troubled, his immediate environment became intolerable, and his first move was flight. He not only needed to get out of the house, he needed to get out of New York City. In May, 1843, a month after Harry was born, Henry put his house up for sale. The profit on the transaction, he decided, would finance a radical change for the Jameses. At first, he thought he might move to the country, separating himself physically from the intellectual centers that he found so hostile, and "communicate with my living kind, not my talking kind—by life only." But he realized that living an exemplary life, unheralded, would not satisfy him.
There was, of course, another route, one sanctioned by many Americans of his class: settling in Europe. By the summer of 1843, he decided to leave America. "Mr. James talks of going to Germany soon with his wife—to learn the language," Thoreau told Emerson. "He says he must know it—can never learn it here—there he may absorb it and is very anxious to learn beforehand where he had best locate himself, to enjoy the advantage of the highest culture, learn the language in its purity, and not exceed his limited means." But by the of the summer, Henry had changed his mind about the destination. It would not be Germany, where without the language, he would be at a serious disadvantage in participating in "the highest culture"; instead, he would take his family to England. [from Linda Simon's Genuine Reality]
1847 - The James family rents a house at 11 Fifth Avenue in Manhattan.
By late autumn, Mary was pregnant with her fifth child, and the Jameses finally decided to settle in New York City. Their long visits to Albany had been crucial for Henry: at last, he had proved to his many relatives that he was not the ne'er-do-well who had shamed his father, but the respectable head of a quickly growing family and an industrious writer and lecturer.
1848 - Sister Alice is born August 7.
1852-1855 - William attends school in New York.
In 1852, Henry decided that the boys should learn languages more systematically than they did with one or another of their tutors, and to that end sent them, finally, to the Institution Vergnes, not far from the Jameses' home. The school was presided over by Vergnes himself, and elderly, irritable schoolmaster who set a rigid curriculum for his charges, mostly boys from well-to-do Mexican and Cuban families. Harry [Henry Jr.] remembered a "complete failure of blondness" in the generally gloomy atmosphere. The boys learned some French, but Henry, dissatisfied as usual, allowed them to attend only for one year.
Richard Pulling Jenks ran a smaller school nearby, with only a few rooms, staffed by only a few teachers. A Mr. Dolmidge, lean, beardless, and mild mannered, taught writing; a Mr. Coe, drawing. Coe, a large man with a shock of thick white hair and a commanding presence, was a talented teacher, inspiring by encouragement and by involving the students in his own work, which ranged from tiny "drawing cards" to larger oils on panel boards. At eleven, William discovered that he loved to draw. Now, anyone looking for him at home could be sure to find him in the back parlor, bent over his pad, drawing for hours on end, absorbed and totally content.
The boys had attended the Pulling Jenks school for a year when Henry again decided to withdraw them and try another school. At the ages of ten and eleven, Harry and William began to inquire about why they were taken away from a school they so much enjoyed. Their parents gave them no reason, however, and the boys were left to draw their own conclusions. But if we look at later patterns of Henry's separating William from schools and mentors, it is likely that William's enthusiasm for art and for Mr. Coe frightened his father. If Coe gave William the emotional support that he needed, if he affirmed the child's talents, he threatened to supplant Henry's influence over his son. Henry could not allow that to happen. [from Genuine Reality]
1855-1858 - School and private tutors in England and France.

When William departed on the Atlantic with his family in the summer of 1855, he left not only his friends and the home where he had spent most of his childhood, but a sense of independence that he would not recapture in Europe. [from Genuine Reality]
During 1857-58 he attended school in Boulogne.
1858-1859 - Family to Newport, Rhode Island. James attends school in Newport.

William was exuberant when his father decided that instead of leaving London at the end of July, the family would depart six weeks earlier. On June 30, 1858, he was back in America at last. The family spent July reunited with their many relatives in Albany.
James had toyed with the idea of becoming a painter, and while taking lessons in the Newport, Rhode Island, studio of William Morris Hunt in 1859 and 1860, he and his younger brother and fellow student Henry met John La Farge, who had recently returned from studying art in Paris. ["He was seventeen when Darwin's Origin of Species appeared (1859)."]
1859-1860 - Back overseas. School and private tutors in Switerland and Germany.
Attends Geneva Academy (a European university)
By early September of 1858 Henry Sr. was so irritated that he decided he had made a mistake to come back to America at all. "I have grown so discouraged about the education of my children here, and dread so those inevitable habits of extravagance and insubordination which appear to be the characteristics of American youth," he wrote to his friend Samuel Ward, "that I have come to the conclusion to retrace my steps to Europe, and keep them there a few years longer." Keeping his children isolated from a world that offered them choices, temptations, and satisfactions had become a consuming struggle.
A day after landing at Le Havre, the family went to Paris and then on to Geneva, this time to try different schools from the one the children had attended during their last educational experiment. William went to the Academy, precursor of the University of Geneva. Of the four children, William had the best match: he studied science and mathematics with as much success as he had before and by spring had been invited to join the Societe des Zoffingues, a social club for Swiss students. Although William later complained that during his entire stay in Switzerland, he had never seen the inside of a Swiss home ("the aristocratic and respectable Genevese are very exclusive and reserved in their demeanor towards strangers," he wrote), the club afforded him the experience of informal student life. When William found out that he could invite a friend to one of the society's festivals, he chose Harry, who remembered a rowdy gathering where "drinking, smoking big German pipes and singing" were the main activities." [from Genuine Reality]
["William James attended schools in the United States, England, France, Switzerland, and Germany, and was also privately tutored; became familiar with the major museums and galleries in every city the family visited; acquired fluency in five languages, met, listened to, and talked to such frequenters of the James household as Thoreau, Emerson, Greeley, Hawthorne, Carlyle, Tennyson, and J. S. Mill; and through his father's influence became widely read and well versed in philosophy. Not that Henry James, Sr., was a taskmaster or disciplinarian; for his time, he was an unusually permissive and loving father, who encouraged dinner table arguments by the children about every kind of issue and, to his friends' horror, allowed his children to attend theater."]

["But a loving and permissive father can wield distressing influence over a child. At seventeen William James wanted to become a painter, but Henry James, Sr., who wanted him to seek a career in the sciences or philosophy, disapproved and took the family to Europe for a year as a distraction. Only because William persisted was he reluctantly allowed to study with an artist in Newport."]
1860-1861 - Studies painting with William Morris Hunt, Newport, R.I.

["After half a year William decided he was not gifted, perhaps more because of guilt feelings than a lack of talent, and, obeying his father's wishes, entered Harvard and began the study of chemistry."]
Before William James entered the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard University to begin medical school at the age of 19, he was familiar with nearly every major museum in Europe and was fluent in five languages.
1861- Enters Lawrence Scientific School, Harvard University.
James began his studies at Harvard at the same time that the American Civil War began to rage. Although his brothers Wilky and Bob enlisted, William and Henry Jr. did not, pleading health issues—William suffered from neurasthenia and a host of ailments, including weak vision, digestive disorders, and a severe depression that brought about thoughts of suicide.
1864 - James family moves to Boston.

["After a while, because the family fortune was dwindling and William realized he would someday have to earn his own living, he switched to Harvard Medical School."]
1864 - William enters Harvard Medical School. [The Letters of William James gives the date as 1863]

["Medicine, too, failed to arouse his enthusiasm, and he took off much of a year to travel to the Amazon with Louis Agassiz, the eminent Harvard naturalist, hoping that natural history might be his true love. It proved not to be; he hated collecting specimens."]
1865-1866 - Joins Louis Agassiz on an expedition to the Amazon.

As James began his second year in medical school, he was offered another chance to test his interest in becoming a naturalist: Agassiz was recruiting volunteers to join him on an expedition to Brazil to collect specimens. The trip would cost James some six hundred dollars, but the expense, he decided, would be worth it. "W.J.," he said to himself, "in this excursion you will learn to know yourself and your resources somewhat more intimately than you do now, and will come back with your character considerably evolved and established." His family agreed—at the very least, James would be participating in research with one of the greatest living naturalists—and his father and Aunt Kate came up with the necessry funds to make the trip possible.
The Thayer Expedition would take James the farthest he ever had been from his family. As soon as the Colorado departed from New York on April 1, 1865, James found himself in "isolated circumstances" that sent him spiraling into depression. The passage was rough, he reported home, but he did not suffer nausea, only homesickness. "For twelve mortal days," he wrote, "I was, body and soul, in a more indescribably hopeless, homeless and friendless tate than I ever want to be in again." [from Genuine Reality]
1866 - James family moves to Cambridge (20 Quincy Street).

["He resumed medical school but was beset by assorted ailments—back pain, weak vision, digestive disorders, and thoughts of suicide—some or most of which were exacerbated by his indecision about his future. Seeking relief, he went to France and Germany for nearly two years, took the baths, studied under Helmholtz and other leading physiologists, and became thoroughly conversant with the New Psychology."]
1867-1868 - James in Europe, mainly Germany. Studies medicine.

On Tuesday, April 16, 1867, James sailed for Europe. Because he swore his family to secrecy about his latest collapse, hardly anyone knew why he left. Never as adventuresome a traveler as his brother Harry, William searched for safe places: he preferred small provincial cities to European capitals, and homey pensions run by grandmotherly women to any kind of hotel. After a few days in Paris, he went to Dresden, where he spent the summer of 1867.
1869 - James receives his MD from Harvard.

In June, when at last he earned his degree, James became a member of what he acknowledge was "an important profession." But the achievement had little impact on the volatility of his emotional life. He was left, he said, with "a good deal of intellectual hunger" that he did not know how to satisfy. Still, he believed that he had not found a way to reconcile his essential nature with his contribution to humanity. First, of course, he needed to define that essential nature, a daunting task. [from Genuine Reality]
1869-1872 - Ill-health and recovery.
["Finally he returned and at twenty-seven completed medical school. He made no effort to practice because of his poor health, but spent his time studying psychology, sunk in gloom about his prospects and troubled by the profound differences between his scientific views of the mind and the world and his father's mystical and spiritual ones. In 1870, at twenty-eight, after nearly a year in these doldrums, he had an abrupt emotional crisis very much like his father's."
For almost three years after graduation, James lived in the family home. His bouts of depression increased after a young woman whom he had befriended died following a prolonged illness. He would later describe his depression as a descent into a profound crisis—of spirituality, of being, of meaning, of will. He suffered panic attacks and even hallucinations that left him mentally crippled. His father had suffered similar attacks and had sought refuge from them in spiritual quests. William feared that his infirmity was rooted in a biological destiny he would be unable to overcome. He also shrouded his angst with secrecy and used only his reading and journal writing to deal with the mental anguish. One day in April of 1870, the psychological fever began to brake. He recorded in his journal that, after reading an essay by Charles Renouvier, he had come to believe that free will was no illusion and that he could use his will to alter his mental state. He need not be a slave to a presumed biological destiny. "My first act of free will," he wrote, "shall be to believe in free will."

1872 - James accepts position as instructor of comparative anatomy and physiology at Harvard College.
James was now 30, three years out of medical school, still financially dependent on his father, and with no career prospects or plans except for a vague desire to devote himself to philosophy in some fashion. It was at this propitious time that Harvard president Charles Eliot, a neighbor and former teacher of James, offered him a post at Harvard teaching physiology for the modest sum of $600 per year. His acceptance signaled the start of a prestigious career, for James was to become a gifted teacher, a skilled orator, and, of course, a prodigious thinker and writer. It signaled also the renewal of his spirit. James took to teaching. He began teaching in Fall of 1872 (August). His students described him as a rigorous instructor, a lively and humorous lecturer, and a caring soul mate. As it does to most new teachers, however, the first year left him utterly exhausted. [see James's schedule of courses during his 34 years at Harvard]
"Lack of confidence in his own authority generated anxiety about his ability to succeed as a teacher. He was, however, pleasantly surprised. Even by his own high standrds, he performed successfully in the classroom; performing, after all, was one of his most impressive skills. While he complained that he could not excite some of his dull students, he managed to engage the attention of many others. 'So far,' he reported to Harry, 'I seem to have succeeded in interesting them ... and I hear expressions of satisfaction on their part.' Teaching was stimulating for James, as well: 'I should think it not unpleasant as a permanent thing,' he admitted. 'The authority is at first rather flattering to one.'" [from Linda Simon's A Genuine Reality]
["Within three years of arriving at Harvard, he began offering courses in physiological psychology and performing demonstrations for students in his little laboratory in Lawrence Hall."]
1873-1874 - Depression returns. Recuperating in Europe, primarily Italy. Traveling with Henry.
1874 - Returns to teaching at Harvard for Fall term.
1875 - Establishes first laboratory of experimental psychology.

["There were no professors of psychology in American universities before James began teaching the subject in 1875. The only forms of psychology then taught in the United States were phrenology and Scottish mental philosophy, an offshoot of associationism used chiefly as a defense of revealed religion. James himself had never taken a course in the New Psychology because none was available; as he once jested, 'The first lecture in psychology that I ever heard was the first I ever gave.'"]
1876 - Assistant professor of physiology.
1878 - Undertakes treatise on psychology.
1878 - Marries Alice Howe Gibbens, Boston, July 20.

["The year James began the [Principles], 1878, was a landmark in another way. At thirty-six, he married. Despite his belief in free will, he seems to have been something less than a free agent in his choice of mate. Two years earlier his father had come home from a meeting of the Radical Club in Boston and announced that he had met William's future wife, Alice Gibbens, a Boston schoolteacher and accomplished pianist. Although William dragged his feet about meeting her, once he did so the die was cast. After a prolonged courtship, Alice became his dutiful, strong wife and helpmeet, mother of his five children, amanuensis, and lifelong intellectual companion."]
James had warned Alice that, should she deign to accept his proposal of marriage, she should be well aware of his mental condition. He confessed to her his neurasthenia, his bouts of deep depression, his thoughts of suicide, his lingering spiritual crisis. He cautioned her that he could as easily get worse as better. Alice threw caution to the wind and married William on July 20 of 1878. His neurasthenia got better very quickly.
1879 - Begins teaching philosophy.

No academic field could easily contain James's interests. He had switched from teaching physiology to psychology and, in 1879, he shifted to philosophy. The following year he was made assistant professor of philosophy. He saw the new decade in with the birth of the first of his five children. It was a decade devoted to teaching, writing numerous articles for the best journals, and meeting with the finest minds at home and in Europe. But it was also a decade marked by personal tragedy. He lost his mother early in 1882 and his father before that year was out. Three years later, his third child Herman, less than a year old, died of bronchial pneumonia. At decade's end, the family moved to a new home in Cambridge.
1879 - Birth of his first son, Henry ["Harry"].
James's sense of independence and manliness were affirmed by the birth of his first child, Henry III, on May 18, 1879, which elicited this description to his brother Bob:
My domestic catastrophe is now a week old. Babe and Mar [mother] both doing very well indeed. The former has a rich orange complexion, a black head of hair, weight 8 1/2 lbs keeps his eyes tight shut on the wicked world and is of a musical, but not too musical disposition . . . I find I have strong affection for the little animal—and tho' I say it who should not, he has a very lovely and benignant little expression on his face.
James, genuinely enchanted by his offspring, told Alice that he hoped "little Embry," as they called their infant son, soon might have a sibling. [from Genuine Reality]
1880 - Assistant professor of philosophy.

1882 - Death of mother in January.
Mary James died in January 1882, after a brief bout with bronchitis. During her illness, she was nursed by her daughter, her sister, and her husband. "It has been a severe loss to all of us," William remarked, "but father and my sister, the two who presumably might suffer most from it, are bearing it very well." If the two who grieved most deeply were very well, one can only surmise that William himself suffered little. Mary's death elicited a response from her son that would be repeated after many future losses: a sudden sentimental epiphany about the value of the person lost, regret over the quality of their relationship, and a promise to treat others with more generosity. Years later, James admitted that after Mary's death "every thing about her seemed so different to me from what it ever had before, that I was indignant at my blindness, and resolved as far as possible to feel my human relations during life as I should after death, in order to feel them after death more as I did during life." [from Genuine Reality]
["He drew upon all his reading in both philosophical and physiological psychology; spent half a year in Europe in 1882-1883 visiting universities, attending laboratory sessions and lectures, and meeting and talking to dozens of leading psychologists and other scientists; corresponded regularly with many of them; and gathered reports and clinical studies of abnormal minds, and of normal ones under hypnosis, drugs, or stress.
1882 - Birth of second son, William ["Billy"].
1882-1883 - Sabbatical in Europe. Visits European universities and colleges.
William again sailed to Europe in September 1882, leaving Alice at home with four-year-old Harry and three-month-old Billy. Finally taking the sabbatical that had been refused him the year before, James told his friends and family that he was going abroad to confer again with his European colleagues, learn more about their work and ideas, and especially to make progress on The Principles of Psychology, already years behind its due date. As in the past, however, the threat of a nervous collapse figured significantly in his decision to go to Europe.
1882 - Father dies in December, while William is in London.
On Sunday, December 10, a short time after William arrived in London to visit with Harry [Henry James], they received an ominous telegram: "Brain softening possibly live months all insist Wm. shall not come." Although William admitted that he and Harry had long anticipated their father's final heart attack or stroke, they were not prepared for this sudden news with its frightening diagnosis. Worrying as much about Alice's reaction as about their father's deterioration, Harry quickly booked passage home. Despite the admonition that William stay in London, his first impulse was to return, as well. "I wanted to get to see him if possible before the end, & to let him see me and get a ray of pleasure from the thought that I had come," he said. But on quick reflection, he changed his mind: his father, after all, might not even recognize him; and his father's recognition was essential for William.
Henry Sr. never saw his son's farewell. At the end, according to Aunt Kate, he murmured, "Oh, I have such good boys—such good boys!" Those were his last recorded words. He died, more peacefully than his boys imagined he would, on December 18. William, who learned of his father's death from an announcement in the London Standard, felt momentary shock and an initial reaction of grief "more, much more than I expected." But the grief was not enough to keep him from lunching and dining with friends. In the next days, sadness gave way to a new sense of power and freedom. His father, whose admonitions echoed in his mind each time he made a decision, whose censure he had feared and whose praise he so coveted, became transformed at once from a looming presence to an image "smaller, less potent, more pathetic." [from Genuine Reality]

1884 - Birth of his third son, Hermann.
1885 - Professor of philosophy (after only five years as assistant professor - go figure).


1885 - Death of his son, Hermann.

1886 - Acquires place in Chocorua, New Hampshire.

1887 - Birth of daughter Peggy [Margaret Mary - named for her two maternal aunts].
1889 - Builds and moves into new house at 95 Irving Street, Cambridge.


1890 - Publication of The Principles of Psychology.
1890 - Birth of his fifth child and fourth son, Alexander Robertson ["Tweedie"; "Francois"].
On September 25 of 1890, Holt began distribution of The Principles of Psychology at $6 for the 2-volume set ($5 after dealer discount). In many ways, the two-volume work was as much psychology as it was philosophy. It was also literature, autobiography, self-help manual, and confessional tale. It was widely admired and generally positively reviewed, although a number of readers found it too personal in tone and substance. The literary tone that James used in this and future works earned for him the accolade that he was actually the real novelist of the James brothers, a novelist who wrote about psychology. Henry, on the other hand, was the real psychologist who wrote novels. But it was not an accolade typically given by members of his discipline. "It is literature," the renown psychologist Wilhelm Wundt said of the Principles, "it is beautiful, but it is not psychology." At the urging of his publisher to create a more digestible book with greater classroom appeal, James later condensed the two volumes into one, Psychology: The Briefer Course. Soon the complete work came to be known as The James, and the abridged tome as The Jimmy.



There were no boundaries to James's interest in psychological processes, and no areas to which his mind would not travel. He was criticized broadly for his interest in psychical research, and he was known to have attended seances. In the Principles, he devoted chapters to habit, attention, perception, association, memory, reasoning, instinct, emotion, imagination, psychological methods, and even hypnotism. Of all psychological processes, however, one was clearly central to a Jamesian psychology—the self.


It bears noting that "The Consciousness of Self" is the longest chapter in the two volumes of the Principles. In it, James described an individual's sense of self as "duplex," composed of objective and subjective selves. He differentiated between the self as knower, or the I, and the self as known, or me. The I is pure ego, consciousness itself. The me is one of the many things that the I may be conscious of, and it consists of three components, one physical or material, one social, and one spiritual. James was careful to point out that the two selves are discriminated aspects of self rather than "separate things." The self is also purposive, dynamic, and active. James was also one of the first writers to use the term self-esteem, which he described as a self-feeling that depends on what one decides to be and to accomplish. Self-esteem may be raised, James argued, either by succeeding in our endeavors or, in the face of incessant disappointments, by lowering our sights and surrendering certain pretensions. James' belief in God permeates his psychology and plays an important role in his understanding of self (particularly of the I). For example, his discussion of the soul as a combining medium of thought or consciousness is permeated with references to a spiritual being and the role that such a being may play in understanding an individual's self. He argued that psychology must "admit" the Soul.
By the time that William James published The Principles of Psychology in 1890, Rousseau's doctrine of innate ideas was under attack in the field of psychology from associationists who favored Locke's model of the human mind as a tabula rasa. The Russian school of reflexology, known today to psychology students primarily through the work of Ivan Pavlov and his discovery of the principle of conditioned reflexes, was having a profound influence on European elementist psychologists such as Wilhelm Wundt. Theirs was an antimentalist view of human functioning in which only observable experience was deemed worthy of scientific scrutiny. This decidedly positivist perspective would travel to the United States by way of structuralist Edward Titchener and others. The intellectual precursors of John Watson's and B. F. Skinner's brand of radical behaviorism were well on their way to capturing the discipline, and they wanted a discipline in which self-perceptions and other internal mental states played no meaningful role in a scientific psychology. Moreover, notions of mind-body dualism were still well entrenched within the discipline.
These were not ideas that sat well with James, a man who had come to psychology by way of art and philosophy and who believed that a psychology without introspection could not aspire to explain the complexities of human functioning. It was by looking into his own conscious mind that he made sense of his own psychology, and it was primarily through this method that he developed the principles of psychology that governed others. After all, he argued, "introspective observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always."
1892 - Death of sister Alice in London. Publishes Psychology, Briefer Course, later known as The Jimmy.

1892 - In July, James begins his talks to Cambridge teachers.

The year 1892 should be an auspicious one to students of education and educational psychology because it was on July of that year that William James delivered the first of a series of lectures on psychology to teachers in Cambridge. With the appointment of Paul Henry Hanus as assistant professor of the History and Art of Teaching in 1891, only a year after the debut of the Principles, Harvard University began a process that culminated in the creation of a Division of Education in 1906 and a Graduate School of Education in 1920. At the time of the appointment, the Harvard administration also proposed to its instructors that they address issues of concern to teaching from the perspectives of their own disciplines. James did so and incorporated the fruits of his labors into his own teaching (James was perhaps the first university professor ever to elicit evaluations of his teaching from his students). It is safe to say that William James was the first American psychologist to directly address educational issues.
When Harvard also suggested to James that a series of lectures to classroom teachers on the relationship between psychology and teaching would be well-received, James saw the opportunity to promote attention to his newly published Principles and to increase his university income. On July of 1892, he delivered the first lecture to a group of Cambridge teachers under the title of "Talks on Psychology of Interest to Teachers." According to Harvard's university calendar, the first lecture was delivered on a Tuesday evening; lectures then followed every Thursday. He would subsequently deliver the lectures throughout the country.
James began his talks by declaring to the teachers in his audience that they held the future of the country in their hands. Shrewdly, he went on to lower their expectations of what they could hope to take from his lectures. He cautioned them that knowledge of psychology does not ensure effective teaching. Indeed, they would make a "great, very great" mistake if they believed that scientific psychology could offer them teaching strategies or instructional methods they could readily incorporate into their teaching. After all, "psychology is a science, and teaching is an art; and sciences never generate arts directly out of themselves." Moreover, knowledge of psychology cannot help anyone develop ingenuity or tact, and these are skills central to the art of teaching. He went even further: The amount of psychology necessary to effective teaching "might almost be written on the palm of one's hand." What psychology can do is to "save us from mistakes. It makes us, moreover, more clear as to what we are about. We gain confidence in respect to any method which we are using as soon as we believe that it has theory as well as practice."
James's speaker's fee was $50. Such was his eloquence and appeal that the size of his audiences increased after each lecture. After the success of Principles and of the lectures, James was exhilarated but exhausted, and an exhausted James always turned to travel. He obtained a year's sabbatical from Harvard, turned his laboratory over to Hugo Münsterberg, and, as had his father before him, he took the entire family to Europe, where he enrolled his boys in an English school in Florence.
1892-1893 - Travels to Europe with wife and children.
Turns lab over to Hugo Münsterberg.
Receives Ph.D. and Litt. D. from University of Padua.

When the family returned from Europe in 1893, James found an America ravaged by a financial depression that had severely depleted his savings. Moreover, he feared he was losing touch with his own national identity. "One should not be a cosmopolitan," he wrote, "one's soul becomes 'disaggregated'" and "one's land seems foreign." He determined to reclaim his cultural identity and began a period of intense activity in social and political causes. The increase in political activism was also marked by decreased interest in psychology–"I wish to get relieved of psychology as soon as possible," he wrote to a friend. European experimental psychology, spearheaded by Wundt, was now in full bloom in American psychology. It emphasized an objectivist view of human functioning in which only observable experience merited scientific interest. James found it trivial, mindless, and intellectually indigestible. Though disheartened by the growing success of the behaviorist movement, he continued throughout his life to fight for his introspective view of psychology, and he remained an active member both of the American Philosophical Association and of the American Psychological Association, even serving as President of each organization.
1894-1899 - Intense activity in social and political causes.
["In 1894 he was the first American to call attention to the work of the then obscure Viennese physician Sigmund Freud, and in 1909, though ailing, he went to Clark University to meet Freud on his only visit to the United States and to hear him speak."]

1896-1897 - Lowell Institute Lectures on "Exceptional Mental States."

During the closing years of the century, James lectured widely, remained politically active, and published The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, a book more in keeping with his growing spiritual and philosophical concerns. His lectures to teachers were collected and published in Talks to Teachers on Psychology: And to Students on Some of Life's Ideals. At a lecture delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, entitled "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," he put forth his first explanation of the method of pragmatism, an idea that he credited to Charles Sanders Peirce but which James appropriated and transformed. In 1896, he was named Doctor of Laws by Princeton University.
1897 - Publication of Will to Believe and Other Essays.
The ten essays that James included in The Will to Believe contain some of his most eloquent statements on the intellectual and emotional risks of religious belief; the philosopher's contribution to a society's moral life; the genesis and importance of genius; and the accomplishments of psychical research. Although all of the essays had been published before, some as early as 1879, and delivered as talks to colleagues, students, and religious groups, together they sum up the issues that concerned James during the first twenty years of his professional career and stand as preface to the writings on pragmatism and pluralism that earned him enduring fame.
The most compelling piece in the collection is the title essay, James's response to Pascal's wager, and his defense of faith. At one point, he considered calling the essay "The Duty to Believe," but that title implied an obligation—perhaps to self, perhaps to society—that James did not intend. Then he thought he might call the essay "The Right to Believe," but that title could imply a right bestowed—and by whom? James meant something else: All human beings, he wrote, want to believe in a universe in which truth can be apprehended and, as Royce had persuaded him, in which goodness exists. Without the possibility of finding truth and achieving goodness, moral decisions would be futile exercises. Such a universe, however, cannot be defended by reason nor logic; it may exist for us only if we have faith, only if we show "a passionate affirmation of desire" for both truth and goodness, only if we will to believe that those qualities exist. [from Genuine Reality]

1898 - Injury to heart.
1898 - Lecture on "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" (pragmatism) - Berkeley, CA.

As the 19th century came to a close, it was primarily James's functionalism that stood in opposition to prevailing notions of mind-body dualism and to the growing positivist theories that would rule American psychology during the better part of the 20th century. Initially influenced by Darwin's evolutionary thought that established a connection between structure and function, functionalism emphasized the interactive nature of mind and body and the unity and dynamic nature of what James would describe as "the stream of consciousness." According to James, mental processes are functional in the sense that they aid individuals in their attempts to adapt themselves to their world and their environments—"Man, whatever else he may be, is primarily a practical being, whose mind is given him to aid in adapting him to this world's life."
Perhaps the most identifiable feature of functionalism is its claim that mental states are characterized by their interactions with and causal relations to other mental states. Moreover, because mental events must be understood in terms of their relation to the sensory inputs from which they emanate and to the behavioral outputs that they produce, functionalists argued that elements of mental functioning and rules for the association of ideas cannot be investigated in isolation. These elements are but a function of a continuous stream of thought that can only be understood in relation to the conscious actions of human beings as they go about the business of day-to-day living. Consciousness itself, argued James, is adaptive and functional and makes it possible for individuals to engage in self-regulation.
1899 - Publication of Talks to Teachers.

After being published in installments in the Atlantic Monthly, his lectures to the teachers of Cambridge were collected and published in 1899 as Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals. Talks became popular with teacher educators, who used it prominently in teacher training programs throughout the nation for the next thirty years. By 1929 it had been reprinted 23 times.
Most readers familiar with the Principles quickly realize that, had William James had access to a personal computer, he would have made frequent use of the cut and paste feature to compose the lectures. As he had done for the Jimmy, James used scissors and paste to produce the bulk of the text, adding where appropriate exemplars, aphorisms, and instructive maxims relevant to education. Some have argued that both the lectures and book may have been prompted more by financial considerations than by an abiding interest in teaching and in education. Indeed, in his private correspondence James revealed that he had little patience with or admiration for teachers as a whole, and he could be dismissive both of the lectures and the subsequent book—"Pray do not wade through the Teacher part, which is incarnate boredom," he wrote to a friend about Talks. Others contend that James was genuinely interested in the work of teachers and in the workings of education. His essays related to university education (such as "The Ph.D. Octopus") attest to the fact that he was interested in how American students were educated, at least at the university level.
1899-1901 - Sabbatical and convalescence in Europe, especially Nauheim.
1901-1902 - Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh.
James ended the college year in the spring of 1899 feeling hopeful and energetic, but ill-health again beset him in the form of a heart condition, and he welcomed the new century convalescing in Europe, where he remained for two years. Proclaiming himself a "piecemeal supernaturalist," his interest in spirituality and religion deepened during this time. He spent his sabbatical in Europe, where he wrote and delivered the Gifford lectures and then set to work on a new book, his philosophical "message to the world." At fifty-seven, James did not want to face the regret of "postponed achievements." However, his "slight cardiac trouble" severely worsened. By the time he landed in Hamburg, his condition had declined. He could not walk more than a few feet without pain; he could not concentrate on his work; he was irritable and depressed. [from Genuine Reality]

James was appointed a lecturer on Natural Religion at the University of Edinburgh. He originally planned to deliver ten lectures on two topics. He got involved in "Man's Religious Appetites" and postponed the second part on "Their Satisfaction through Philosophy." He then delivered all twenty lectures on man's religious constitution.
In June 1902, James returned from Europe exhausted. Despite an effusive reception in Edinburgh—a hearty rendition of "He's a jolly good fellow" followed him from the hall at the conclusion of his last talk—he ended the trip in low spirits. The intellectual strain of writing, the emotional strain of self-analysis, and the physical strain of travel took a serious toll on his energies. "I was less well than I tho't I was when I started," he wrote to Pauline Goldmark, "having consumed my margin of improvement by writing that terrible book, so I rather went to pieces when I tried to plunge into social actitivies over there [in England] . . . But a sexagenarian is no longer a boy, no longer an expansionist . . . " [from Genuine Reality]

1902 - Publication of Varieties of Religious Experiences. LL.D. from from Edinburgh University.
The Gifford lectures delivered in Scotland formed the basis for a new book entitled The Varieties of Religious Experience. Back on home soil, his social activism continued, and he wrote a series of pieces against what he perceived to be America's growing aggression and imperialism. But intellectual expansion was his goal: he was tired, he said, of the "squashy, popular-lecture style" of the books he had produced for the last ten years. Even the Varieties was not, in his estimation, a "serious, systematic, and syllogistic" contribution to the field of philosophy. "I am convinced that the desire to formulate truths is a virulent disease," he told Sarah Whitman. "It has contracted an alliance lately in me with a feverish personal ambition, which I never had before, and which I recognize as an unholy thing in such a connection. I actually dread to die until I have settled the Universe's hash in one more book." And, he hoped, a book that was nothing less than "epoch making."
In the Varieties, James expanded upon the thesis of his Will to Believe, essentially for the same readers. As usual, he mined his own life and experiences for anecdotes and conclusions; supplementing this material, he drew upon a huge cache of data—amassed by one of his students, who, for a research project of his own, had circulated throughout the Harvard community a questionnaire about religious practices. The sheer weight of these sources made the book appear, James said, "objective" and even superficially "scientific."
His aim, however, was not to defend religion by scientific proof but to serve a volley in his long "battle of the Absolute" with such philosophical antagonists as Royce. In that battle, against naturalists, on the one hand, and philosophers whom James called "refined supernaturalists," on the other, James created for himself a special position. He was a "piecemeal supernaturalist," he said, one who "admits miracles and providential leadings, and finds no intellectual difficulty in mixing the ideal and the real worlds together." As a piecemeal supernaturalist, he set himself the task of locating those places where the "ideal region" forced itself into "the real world's details" to cause experiences—prayer, epiphany, or visions, for examples—that generated faith. [from Genuine Reality]
1903 - LL.D. from Harvard University.

1904 - Henry James returns to the USA after 20 year absence.
James was delighted when in 1903 Harvard conferred on him an honorary doctorate, but soon after that he was back on a European sabbatical with brother Henry.

1905 - Trip to Mediterranean (with Henry). Congress at Rome.
James received a welcome boost during a three-month trip to Europe in the spring of 1905. At the end of April, in Rome for the Fifth International Congress of Psychology, he went to the conference hall to register, "and when I gave my name," he told Alice, "the lady who was taking them almost fainted, saying that all Italy loved me, or words to that effect." His effusive admirer called in one of the officers of the congress, who, just as impressed, implored James to give a talk at one of the general meetings. "So I'm in for it again," James admitted with delight, "having no power to resist flattery." [from Genuine Reality]

1906 - Acting professor for half term at Stanford University. Experiences the San Francisco earthquake.

In 1906, James accepted an invitation to spend a term at Stanford University ad, while there, he experienced the earthquake that very nearly destroyed San Francisco. James and Alice survived unscathed, losing only some pottery to the calamity. Later that year he delivered the Lowell Lectures in Boston—lectures which subsequently served as the foundation for Pragmatism: A New Name for Old Ways of Thinking. James was now at the height of his eminence both in philosophy and psychology. Although pragmatism had more than its share of detractors, it was also promoted by powerful allies such as the up and coming English philosopher Canning Schiller and the American educator, philosopher, and psychologist John Dewey. But James was the preeminent voice.

1906-1907 - Lectures on Pragmatism, Lowell Institute and Columbia.
When James returned to Cambridge at the end of September, he set to work, finally, on a series of Lowell lectures scheduled for early November, to be repeated at Columbia University in January. Although he complained, as usual, that the lectures demanded nothing more than a popularized version of his ideas, he found himself newly inspired by this effort to write a coherent exposition about pragmatism. "I didn't know, until I came to prepare them," he told Flournoy, "how full of power to found a 'school' and to become a 'cause,' the pragmatistic idea was. But now I am all aflame with it, as displacing all rationalistic systems . . . and I mean to turn the lectures into a solid little cube of a book . . . which will, I am confident, make the pragmatic method appear, to you also, as the philosophy of the future.
"Pragmatism," he said, was nothing more than a new name for aold ways of thinking, ways of thinking that preceded the separation of science from its origins in philosophy. This attempt to ensure the status of philosophy by drawing it closer to its scientific origins was, as Charles Peirce observed, trendy scholarship, and not unique to James. "Today," Peirce remarked, "the animating endeavor of the younger philosophers is to bring their queen within the circle of the genuine sciences." Certainly James, even at the age of sixty-four, saw himself among those "younger" philosophers (he was "eternally young," Royce said enviously) who argued that philosophy and science essentially rely on the same methods: "observing, comparing, classifying, tracing analogies, making hypotheses." But philosophy, for at least three hundred years, had been focused on developing "closed systems" that increasingly divorced it from the vicious, tangled, painful" exigencies of real life. "Philosophy," James insisted, "should become as empirical as any science.
For James, pragmatism tempered empiricism with humanism; the observer, the thinker, the seeker after truth, was necessarily implicated in the process of inquiry and experimentation. Pragmatism, then, invested each individual with the authority to determine truths; privileged what James called "percepts" over abstract concepts; and linked philosophical decisions to moral actions. [from Genuine Reality]
1907 - Publication of Pragmatism.
Just as he is acknowledged as the father of American psychology, William James is also recognized as the father of American pragmatism, an idea that he credited to Charles Sanders Peirce but which, in James's hands, became one of the prevailing philosophical movements of the 20th century. It became also one of the most criticized, misinterpreted, and ill-used philosophical movements of the 20th century to the point where, in modern parlance, being "pragmatic" has become synonymous with being practical, expedient, and relativistic, each independent of moral and ethical ramifications.
Of course, that is not how James viewed or expounded pragmatism, which was for him more method than philosophy, a method for resolving philosophical disputes, for arriving at the meaning and truth of ideas. Originally expounded by Peirce in 1878 in an article entitled "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," the pragmatic method, as James came to define it, aimed to discover the truth of an idea by determining its agreement with reality, "be such realities concrete or abstract." Ideas, argued James, are ultimately functional. They do not possess innate or fixed qualities. Rather, "truth happens to an idea," and it happens when "we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify" it. Pragmatism also asks its practitioners to consider the value of an idea in terms of its personal utility—"Grant an idea or belief to be true, it says, what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?" But determining the cash value of an idea also involves determining its practical, ethical/moral, and intellectual consequences.
When Jamesian passages are lifted out of their contextual moorings, they can be used to illustrate and defend the view that pragmatism asks nothing of truth but that it be practical, useful, and personally self-serving. James wrote that "truth in our ideas means their power to work"; "A new opinion counts as 'true' just in proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock"; "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons"; "'What would be better for us to believe!' This sounds very like a definition of truth."
James himself was aware of "how odd it must seem to some of you to hear me say that an idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives," and he worked both to clarify his definition of pragmatism and to emphasize the moral element that accompanies it. But it was not James's pragmatism that caught the fancy of America as it turned into a new century. The land of the individual, of the entrepreneur, and of the competitive marketplace preferred the wrongly understood, self-oriented, practical, expedient approach. James would struggle through his remaining years both against critics whom he believed misinterpreted his pragmatism and against admirers who sang its praises and used a mutated form to defend and promulgate their political or philosophical agendas.
He would also struggle against the growing atomistic and mechanistic tendencies in psychology. He dreaded the encroachment of this "microscopic psychology" that was "carried on by experimental methods, asking of course every moment for introspective data, but eliminating their uncertainty by operating on a large scale and taking statistical means. This method taxes patience at the utmost, and could hardly have arisen in a country whose natives could be bored" (Perry, 1935b, p. 114). Nonetheless, the growing successes of behaviorist psychology, which was turning the new experimental laboratories into laboratories geared at discovering the roots of animal learning, isolated James from many of his colleagues and from the discipline. In time, he began to lose interest in formal psychology and turned his attention to philosophical pursuits. He developed as well a curiosity for unusual states of consciousness, psychic phenomena, and religious experience. He began also to apply the principles of his psychology and the fruits of his philosophical thinking to other areas of human endeavor.
1907 - Final resignation from Harvard.
William James taught his last class at Harvard on Tuesday, January 22, 1907. On that day his classroom in Emerson Hall overflowed with his own students, former students, colleagues, and Harvard administrators. Even Alice snuck in to view the proceedings. A committee of his graduate students and teaching assistants presented him with a silver-mounted inkwell. His undergraduates gave him a loving cup. Sigmund Freud would have deemed it most appropriate. The gifts represented an acknowledgment by his students of the quality of their professor's work and the appreciation for his love. James was genuinely touched and surprised, remarking on "how warm-hearted the world around one is."

1908-1909 - Hibbert Lectures at Oxford.
By the Spring of 1909, James's cardiac symptoms had returned, and he became "tormented by desire to go to Nauheim." The usually reliable Hawley Lymph Compound provided no improvement, and by fall he had descended to "a state of nervous prostration like that which I fell into after Nauheim 10 years ago." One physician prescribed laxatives, but they only made the symptoms worse.
It is no surprise that James's collapse coincided with the publication of the Hibbert lectures and the hostile reaction the book [A Pluralistic Universe] received. James tried to convince himself that the criticism really indicated the significance of his work. "It is already evident from the letters I am getting about the 'Pluralistic Universe,'" he informed Flournoy, "that the book will 1) be read; 2) be rejected almost unanimously at first, and for very diverse reasons; but 3) will continue to be bought and referred to, and will end by strongly influencing english philosophy."
Henry understood immediately that his brother needed praise and more praise. "t may sustain & inspire you a little to know that I'm with you, all along the line—& can conceive of no sense in any philosophy that is not yours!" he told William. "As an artist & a 'creator' I can catch on, hold on, to pragmatism, & can work in the light of it & apply it." [from Genuine Reality]
1909 - Publication of A Pluralistic Universe.

It is consistent with James's interdisciplinary mind, his "catholicity of spirit," that he should view the solution to each question in psychology from a variety of perspectives and that he should urge others to do likewise. He had wrestled with the problem of monism, the view that reality represents a unified whole, and found it deficient for a number of reasons. It violated the dynamic nature of personal experience, constrained the character and expression of reality, and resulted in mechanistic and absolute conceptions of the world. This was for James "the most central of all philosophical problems," and one he had resolved by proposing a pluralistic view of the universe—"the world of concrete personal experiences . . . is multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful, and perplexed." How could understandings of these experiences be otherwise? Pluralism represented for James a belief in concert with his brand of radical empiricism and with the pragmatist philosophy he would adopt. It represented also his conviction that the facts of the world can be understood only when they are embedded in their local conditions.
1909 - Publication of The Meaning of Truth.
James wanted praise for his work from all quarters. That praise, however, did not come after the publication of A Pluralistic Universe. Nor did it come the following September, when James published a sequel to his maligned Pragmatism. He hoped The Meaning of Truth would "keep the pot of public interest in the subject boiling." Perhaps the pot was boiling, but James felt scorched by some critics, notably his former student Dickinson Miller; the young American philosopher Boyd Henry Bode, who aired his objections to James in the Journal of Philosophy; and the brilliant, thirty-six-year-old British philosopher Bertrand Russell, who had met James during a visit to America in 1896, and whose Principles of Mathematics, when it appeared in 1902, established him as a logician of formidable stature. [from Genuine Reality]
On July 8, James startled the scientific community by announcing that he had communicated with the spirit of Richard Hodgson. James wrote a 100-page account of this communication in the "Proceedings of the American for Psychical Research," including verbatim records of the conversation.

1910 - In Europe, March to August.


But James was not well, and his health was deteriorating. He made one final, brief trip to Europe to look in on an ailing Henry and take the baths at Nauheim before he returned to his country home in Chocoura, New Hampshire. There, just before 2:30 in the afternoon of August 26 of 1910, William James passed away cradled in the arms of his wife Alice. He was 68. An autopsy revealed that he had died of an enlarged heart. Two years after his death, a number of his articles were collected and posthumously published as Essays in Radical Empiricism.
1910 - Died. Chocorua, August 26, at the age of 68.
Alice and Henry knew that William was dying: "he suffered so & only wanted, wanted more & more, to go," Henry said. The next day, he was worse. He told Alice he longed to die and asked her to rejoice for him. Early in the afternoon of August 26, Alice came into William's bedroom with some milk, the only sustenance he had been able to take since he came home. At first she thought he was alseep, but suddenly she realized that something had changed: he was unconscious. She cradled his head in her arms, listening to his quiet breathing. Just before 2:30, still lying in Alice's arms, he died.
Billy photographed his father's body as it lay in rumpled white sheets on the iron bed; he made a death mask, and then the body was removed for the autopsy that Alice had requested. "Acute enlargement of the heart," she recorded in her diary. "He had worn himself out." [from Genuine Reality]

1912 - Posthumous publication of Essays in Radical Empiricism.
As did John Locke's empiricism, James's radical empiricism represented a break with Cartesian notions that the real world is an extension of a larger world that exists within the mind. Whereas Locke's empiricism became foundational to positivist views that would focus exclusively on an individuals' experienced reality as the fons et origo of their psychologies, James's "radical" view of reality had a pronounced phenomenological bent. For James, mental events stood on an equal footing with observable events as representations of reality. Consequently, "ideas, feelings, sensations, perceptions, concepts, art, science, faith, conscious, unconscious, objects, and so-called illusions" each merited attention and investigation (Barzun, 1983, p. 111). James believed that an individual's immediate experience represented the essence of psychological truth. Moreover, the mental and physical events—the immediate experiences—that an individual uses both for self-understanding and to understand others are selected and interpreted by the individual.
Radical empiricism represented a break with Cartesian notions of mind-body duality. According to James, whether mental events were or were not simply a function of the external world, they could influence human functioning independently of that world and so merited attention on their own terms. Although the dominance of positivist psychology throughout many of the decades that followed James resulted in a large part of the discipline eschewing his brand of radical empiricism, James's argument that mental states were appropriate subjects of investigation won the day in a number of areas within psychology. It was, of course, a basic staple in Freud's psychodynamic theories, and it has adherents in personality research; social, clinical, and child psychology; abnormal psychology; and educational and school psychology.________________________________________
Quoted passages in brackets are from Morton Hunt's (1994)
"The Psychologist Malgré Lui: William James,"
from The Story of Psychology.

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Excellent share Sir!
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Lt Col Charlie Brown
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Read his principles of psychology in Grad school.
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Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen
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My BS degree showing again, never had to take Psychology so never studied him.
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My BA required him in both psychology and philosophy. And my English degree required me to read most of his brother Henry's novels! Lol! Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen
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