Posted on Oct 19, 2020
Napoleon's Russian Campaign: The Retreat - napoleon.org
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On October19, 1812, Napoleon's forces began their retreat from Moscow. From the article:
"Napoleon’s Russian Campaign: The Retreat
Entering Moscow
On the 15th September, a week after the bloody battle of Borodino, Napoleon entered Moscow. He had expected to enter with glory, met by a delegation of the city's highest officials assembled in recognition of his victory and ready to negotiate peace. But there was no delegation; in fact, there was hardly anyone left there at all. Of Moscow's 200,000 inhabitants from before the war, only 2% remained, predominantly wounded soldiers and some remaining to plunder the homes of those who had fled.
Even less could Napoleon have predicted how soon he would also be leaving the city; since it was also on the day he arrived that the first fires were lit, doubtless under the supervision of Moscow's governor Rostopchin (although at the time it was circulated in Russia, to incite more patriotic feeling against the enemy, that the fault lay with the French). Initially, Napoleon installed himself in the Kremlin, but the spreading blaze forced him to leave for the outskirts of the city only the next day. Thus on the 16th September he moved into the Petroff palace to the north-west of Moscow on the St Petersburg road with his troops camped nearby. Moscow burned for six days.
Waiting for Peace
On the 18th September, Major General Ivan Tutolmin was received at the Petroff Palace. The subsequent letter he wrote to the Tsar's mother Maria Feodorovna, on Napoleon's request, regarding the opening of peace talks received no reply. A similar attempt by Napoleon to open dialogue around peace came on the 22nd September, soon after the end of the fires, when Ivan Alekseevich Yakovlev, former captain of the guard, wrote to the Tsar on Napoleon's behalf, but again to no avail.
Meanwhile, in the terrible weather and mud which hampered the troops from 18th-23rd September, Napoleon turned his attention to Russian manoeuvres, hoping to crush any resistance. Cossack bands, however, continued to thwart French attempts at control led by Murat. By the 26th September, Napoleon had discovered that Kutuzov's main forces were on the main Kaluga road. Over the end of September and the beginning of October, the Russian Army slowly retreated to Tarutino, where it took up a defensive position on 3rd October after clashes with Murat's troops.
During this period, Napoleon was also thinking about the pursuance of the campaign. Several options were open: retreat to Smolensk in order to winter in safety before continuing the campaign the following year; a drive on St Petersburg in order to take Russia's second capital, and finally force Alexander into submission; or to engage Alexander in peace negotiations.
Napoleon's preference for the final option led to his sending Lauriston to Kutuzov's headquarters to discuss possibilities for peace. Caulaincourt had refused the Emperor's plan to approach the Tsar on the grounds that it would be in vain. On the 4th October, Napoleon wrote to Kutuzov (CG, 31792):
‘Prince Kutuzov, I send one of my aides de camp to you in order to discuss several important matters. I hope that Your Highness will believe what he is to say to you, above all when he expresses the high esteem and particular respect I have for a long time held for your person. Moscow, 3rd October 1812. Signed: Napoleon.'
On the 5th October, Kutuzov received the letter. On reading it he agreed to a secret meeting with Lauriston, and suggested to the French that he would take their peace proposals to the Tsar. Alexander had already stated that he had no intention of any negotiation with Napoleon as long as there was a single French soldier left in Russia, and was furious when Kutuzov informed him of this meeting; in meeting with Lauriston, Kutuzov had acted in direct contravention to an imperial order. But Kutuzov was in fact playing for time and had no intention of negotiating peace, indeed he guessed that Napoleon's keenness on negotiation was in the end a sign of weakness. Keeping French hopes for peace alive allowed him precious time to organise Russian forces for the next stage of the campaign while the Grande Armée remained in the ashes of Moscow.
It gradually dawned on Napoleon that peace talks would not be forthcoming; and with the Russian winter approaching he was left with the dilemma of what to do next. The circle surrounding him spoke of Napoleon's initial determination to stay in Moscow for the winter months, not because of its military value, but because of the political blow that would be dealt him should he leave; this would look like an admission of defeat, and could harm his standing in Europe. But arrangements did also begin to be made for a retreat, although too little too late. The horses did not have horseshoes which would allow them to cross the ice safely, and the men were not appropriately equipped for the bitter cold to come.
But finally, on the 14th October, Napoleon decided to leave Moscow. He directed Berthier to organise the evacuation of a convoy of 1,500 injured soldiers to Smolensk, accompanied by 200-300 men. The convoy departed Moscow on the 16th October a few days before the army.
The Battle of Tarutino
On the 18th October, the Battle of Tarutino (also known as Vinkovo) took place. The Russian army had arrived at Tarutino on 2-3 October, and began to make entrenchments to defend it immediately. Murat pursued (and indeed harried) the Russian rearguard as far as the outskirts of Tarutino, but was unable to capitalise on his superiority. Setting up outposts in and around the village of Vinkovo, Murat paused for breath. The following two weeks gave the much depleted and exhausted Russian Army a crucial period in which to recuperate, encamped as they were in a strong position, well-fed and receiving reinforcements. Murat and the Grande Armée, however, were camped nearby in far less advantageous position, and without the same access to food or resources. Kutuzov, aware of the increasingly superior position of his own troops, organised an ambush by Russian troops of Murat's advance guard. Although losses were fairly even, Murat was forced to abandon his position so as to avoid being surrounded.
Leaving Moscow
On the 19th October, the French evacuated Moscow and its surrounding area. As the Grande Armée was leaving the city, Mortier, governor of Moscow, set up explosives around the Kremlin to carry out Napoleon's (strategically irrelevant) orders to destroy it. Whilst light rain and some intervention by Muscovites prevented all the fuses from firing, nevertheless, large parts of it were destroyed, and a stretch of the surrounding wall collapsed completely. The last regiments of the Grande Armée left the city at around 1am on the 23rd, about half an hour after the fuses were lit in the Kremlin. When Russian troops re-entered the city, they found scenes of terrible destruction, as many dead lay unburied in the streets and those buildings which were not burnt had sustained significant damage or were blackened with smoke; inside, everywhere was plundered and many churches had been defiled. The Moscow rabble also played a role in this. Heading the evacuation of Moscow, Napoleon settled first in the ‘chateau' in Troitsk, then in Ignatovo on 21st October. After two nights spent in Fominskoye, Napoleon then reached Borovsk.
On the 24th October came clashes at Maloyaroslavets, a small town to the southwest of Moscow. The allies under the Viceroy of Italy, Eugène de Beauharnais, were outnumbered by the Russian side under Kutuzov, 24,000 Italians against 32,000 Russians. Troops led by Davout arrived late in the day to ensure that Eugène's exhausted men could hold their position in the town. Each side lost about 7,000 men, and although the French side managed to hold on to their position, the Russians fell back just south of Maloyaroslavets, importantly blocking the Kaluga road.
Retreat
The French retreat began on the following day, and on the 26th October, Napoleon informed Berthier of his intention to go on the route to Viazma (fatefully, the same road by which the Grande Armée had entered Russia); fighting ensued on the way there later that day. On the 28th October, Napoleon reached Vereya, while Davout and Prince Poniatowski both brought their men to join up at Mozhaysk. Two days later, Napoleon was in the town of Gzhatsk (renamed ‘Gargarin' in 1968), situated 230km from Smolensk. From there he led a part of the Grande Armée to Viazma, where he was eventually to be joined by the remainder of his forces. On the 31st October, the corps led by Davout was at Gzhatsk to protect the rear guard of the Grande Armée; after leaving the city the corps was attacked by Cossacks. The following day, on the 1st November, Napoleon reached Viazma. On the Russian side, Miloradovitch leading Kutuzov's advance guard was approaching. He was far from the rest of the army however, since they had marched further south.
By the 3rd November, Napoleon passed the village of Semelevo, a few kilometres north-east of Smolensk, then arrived at Slavkovo, where he stayed until the next day. Meanwhile, Eugène de Beauharnais's troops assisted Davout at Viazma, where there are signs of the growing weakness of the Grande Armée as they began to struggle against repeated Russian attacks. This same day also saw the winter's first significant snowfall. This marked a dramatic change to the earlier milder weather, which some have argued lulled the Emperor into a false sense of security. The winter of 1812 became an unusually cold and bitter one. On the 5th November, Napoleon reached Dorogobuzh.
News from Paris…
On the 6th November, in Mikhaïlovka, Napoleon received news of General Malet's coup d'état. A fortnight earlier, on the 23rd October, a radical army general with a history of opposition to the Napoleonic regime, Claude-François Malet, had attempted to bluff his way into power by announcing that the Emperor had been killed in Russia. His plot was foiled in less than twenty-four hours and Malet and his main accomplices were executed less than a week later, on the 29th October, following trial by a military commission. The news of the failed coup d'état unsettled Napoleon and exposed the shallow roots of the First Empire. Thus this event was perhaps an important factor in his decision to return to Paris not long afterwards.
Smolensk and Beyond
On the 9th November, Napoleon arrived at Smolensk, where he remained for several days. There he learned of the setbacks affecting General Augereau and Eugène de Beauharnais, and reorganised the Grande Armée accordingly for retreat.
On the 12th November, the advance guard of Napoleon's Grande Armée left Smolensk with the intention crossing the river Dnieper for Orsha.
The French troops left behind, as the main body rushed to Moscow, had been involved in a stand off around the town of Polotsk. The assault sometimes called the Second Battle of Polotsk had taken place on the 18th October (the first having taken place in early August), in which Russian forces, under Wittgenstein, outnumbered Napoleon's troops, under Oudinot and Gouvion Saint-Cyr, by almost five to one.
On the 13th – 14th November, Victor attempted an attack on Wittgenstein's men near Smoliany, further east on the Ulla, trying to move the Russians away from the Grande Armée's line of retreat. Despite his efforts, however, Victor did not manage to dislodge the Russian forces from their position.
On the 14th November, Napoleon left Smolensk, and over the following days there were a series of engagements at Krasnoye. The state of the Grande Armée was rapidly declining, while Wittgenstein's men, holding their position at Ulla during the first three weeks of November, had been sent supplies from the Governor of Pskov, and therefore were far better fed than the French troops, and also far warmer due to supplies of fur coats sent to them in September.
Napoleon arrived at Orsha on the 20th November. Realising that the army was disintegrating and that his baggage train could soon be captured, he ordered the destruction of his official papers.
Berezina
On the 22nd November, Admiral Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov, in command of newly created Russian Third Western Army, moved his headquarters across the river Berezina and into the town of Borisov on his arrival there. However, some of his men were overwhelmed by Napoleon's advance guard, so he and his staff were forced to decamp back over the river, left to puzzle over Napoleon's next move.
On the 25th November, the Grande Armée arrived at Borisov, on the edge of the Berezina river. Chichagov's task of defending the bank was made very difficult as he was unsure as to where Napoleon would cross and which route the retreat would take. The movement of Russian troops from south to north to protect Borisov shows Chichagov's assumption (shared by Ermolov and Wittgenstein) that Napoleon would continue his retreat along the Minsk road. Instead, when the French emperor went along the Zembin road towards Vilna (modern Vilnius), Russian troops arrived too late to regain control of the route, despite fierce fighting from 26th – 28th November. On the 27th November, 50,000 men led by Ney, Oudinot and Victor crossed the Berezina near the small village of Studienka; the small Russian force there to meet them had no chance of preventing their crossing. In many ways, the crossing of the Berezina was disastrous for Napoleon, with the loss of between 25,000 and 40,000 men and most of their baggage. However, it was one of his most brilliant victories, since the crossing actually took place, and the Grande Armée were even able to take some advantages in their position, despite huge losses in both men and supplies.
The Incredible Ride
On the 5th December, Napoleon left the army at Smorgon to return to Paris. Unsettled by Malet's attempted coup, he confided to Caulaincourt that ‘in the current state of affairs, I can command in Europe only from the Tuileries palace.' The journey was swift; Napoleon was accompanied by Caulaincourt in a series of vehicles (changed according to the terrain, at first on runners then on wheels) and a small entourage travelling separately, including thirty (soon to become fifteen) Chasseurs de la Garde. The party traversed some 2,500 km, over thirteen days and thirteen nights of almost uninterrupted travel.
The party departed around 9pm, reaching Ashmiany at about midnight. Ignoring his entourage, Napoleon pressed on to Miedniki (not far from Vilna), arriving there at dawn and thereby avoiding capture at Ashmiany. After two hours of conversation with Maret, talking politics and the state of affairs at Vilna.
The Emperor had hoped that the remnants of the Grande Armée would be able to recuperate and regroup at Vilna, only one day's march to the West. However, with his departure morale dropped significantly, and in Vilna the soldiers fared little better. There is evidence that thousands of men had died of typhus, and the hospital in Vilna was overflowing with the dead and dying. General Robert Wilson visited a monastery that was being used as a makeshift hospital by the French, and there reported that ‘The hospital at St. Bazile presented the most awful and hideous sight: seven thousand five hundred bodies were piled like pigs of lead over one another in the corridors… and all the broken windows and walls were stuffed with feet , legs, arms , hands , trunks and heads to fit the apertures, and keep out the air from the yet living.'
Upon seeing the conditions at Vilna, several days after the Emperor's departure, Murat (who had been left in charge of the Grande Armée) decided to abandon Napoleon's plan and evacuate the town. On the 12th December, Kutuzov made his triumphant entrance into Vilna. And the day after, what was left of the Grande Armée limped back across the Niemen.
At 10am on Sunday 6th December, Napoleon changed horses in the outskirts of Vilna and then headed for Kovno (modern Kaunas). After receiving military reinforcements during the night at Rumšiškes, he arrived at Kovno at 5am on Monday 7th December. The temperature had dropped to -30°. Having crossed the frozen Niemen, and so leaving Russian territory, the cortège headed for Marijampole, where the passengers were forced to step out to push the wheels. On the 8th December, the party reached Goldapp, then to Augustowo the following day, and finally Pultusk on the 10th December, heading for Warsaw. It was on this part of the journey, cramped in what Caulaincourt called a ‘cage', that the Emperor and the diplomat had their famous conversations, later published by Caulaincourt as ‘En traîneau avec l'Empereur'. Every day between 8 and 9 Napoleon and Caulaincourt took coffee at a post-house, and between 5 and 9 every evening they would dine. On entering Warsaw, he went on foot to the Hôtel d'Angleterre, with no fear of recognition given his somewhat altered appearance, and received certain Polish ministers and the French ambassador l'abbé de Pradt. Napoleon was back in his carriage at 7pm heading for Lowicz and Kutno, reaching Posen (modern Poznan) in the early morning of 12th December. Leaving Posen at lunchtime, he reached Glogow that evening. He reached Bunzlau (modern Boleslawiec) on the morning of the 13th December, passing through Bautzen the following day, finally reaching Dresden at midnight. In a comic scene, Napoleon's carriage searched desperately for the French minister's residence in the dark city for several hours.
After receiving the Saxon king briefly very early in the morning, Napoleon set off again at 8 in the morning, in a carriage with runners lent by the King, reaching Leipzig, having a brief meeting and then setting off for Lützen, which they reached on the 15th December. After another change of carriage brought about by broken runners, Napoleon held a brief meeting in Erfurt before heading (now on wheels) towards Hanau, arriving at noon on the 16th December. He reached Frankfurt at 3pm. After crossing the Rhine on a boat, Napoleon set off again at 7pm, finally in French territory. From Mainz thereon the carriage stopped only for dispatches and to grease the wheels. On the 17th December, Napoleon lunched at Saint-Avold and dined at Verdun. That same day, the Moniteur of the 29th bulletin of the Grande Armée revealed the full details of the Russian catastrophe to the French public. On the 18th December, Napoleon halted at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre for a broken axle, and changed to a post cabriolet. He dined that evening at Chateau-Thierry, just to the north of Paris. At Meaux, the postmaster handed over his chaise, but since Napoleon no longer had any money Caulaincourt was forced to ask for credit. This unmarked post-chaise passed through the gates of the Tuileries Palace at midnight, with no announcement, to reassert his power in Europe in the face of this most crushing defeat.
"Napoleon’s Russian Campaign: The Retreat
Entering Moscow
On the 15th September, a week after the bloody battle of Borodino, Napoleon entered Moscow. He had expected to enter with glory, met by a delegation of the city's highest officials assembled in recognition of his victory and ready to negotiate peace. But there was no delegation; in fact, there was hardly anyone left there at all. Of Moscow's 200,000 inhabitants from before the war, only 2% remained, predominantly wounded soldiers and some remaining to plunder the homes of those who had fled.
Even less could Napoleon have predicted how soon he would also be leaving the city; since it was also on the day he arrived that the first fires were lit, doubtless under the supervision of Moscow's governor Rostopchin (although at the time it was circulated in Russia, to incite more patriotic feeling against the enemy, that the fault lay with the French). Initially, Napoleon installed himself in the Kremlin, but the spreading blaze forced him to leave for the outskirts of the city only the next day. Thus on the 16th September he moved into the Petroff palace to the north-west of Moscow on the St Petersburg road with his troops camped nearby. Moscow burned for six days.
Waiting for Peace
On the 18th September, Major General Ivan Tutolmin was received at the Petroff Palace. The subsequent letter he wrote to the Tsar's mother Maria Feodorovna, on Napoleon's request, regarding the opening of peace talks received no reply. A similar attempt by Napoleon to open dialogue around peace came on the 22nd September, soon after the end of the fires, when Ivan Alekseevich Yakovlev, former captain of the guard, wrote to the Tsar on Napoleon's behalf, but again to no avail.
Meanwhile, in the terrible weather and mud which hampered the troops from 18th-23rd September, Napoleon turned his attention to Russian manoeuvres, hoping to crush any resistance. Cossack bands, however, continued to thwart French attempts at control led by Murat. By the 26th September, Napoleon had discovered that Kutuzov's main forces were on the main Kaluga road. Over the end of September and the beginning of October, the Russian Army slowly retreated to Tarutino, where it took up a defensive position on 3rd October after clashes with Murat's troops.
During this period, Napoleon was also thinking about the pursuance of the campaign. Several options were open: retreat to Smolensk in order to winter in safety before continuing the campaign the following year; a drive on St Petersburg in order to take Russia's second capital, and finally force Alexander into submission; or to engage Alexander in peace negotiations.
Napoleon's preference for the final option led to his sending Lauriston to Kutuzov's headquarters to discuss possibilities for peace. Caulaincourt had refused the Emperor's plan to approach the Tsar on the grounds that it would be in vain. On the 4th October, Napoleon wrote to Kutuzov (CG, 31792):
‘Prince Kutuzov, I send one of my aides de camp to you in order to discuss several important matters. I hope that Your Highness will believe what he is to say to you, above all when he expresses the high esteem and particular respect I have for a long time held for your person. Moscow, 3rd October 1812. Signed: Napoleon.'
On the 5th October, Kutuzov received the letter. On reading it he agreed to a secret meeting with Lauriston, and suggested to the French that he would take their peace proposals to the Tsar. Alexander had already stated that he had no intention of any negotiation with Napoleon as long as there was a single French soldier left in Russia, and was furious when Kutuzov informed him of this meeting; in meeting with Lauriston, Kutuzov had acted in direct contravention to an imperial order. But Kutuzov was in fact playing for time and had no intention of negotiating peace, indeed he guessed that Napoleon's keenness on negotiation was in the end a sign of weakness. Keeping French hopes for peace alive allowed him precious time to organise Russian forces for the next stage of the campaign while the Grande Armée remained in the ashes of Moscow.
It gradually dawned on Napoleon that peace talks would not be forthcoming; and with the Russian winter approaching he was left with the dilemma of what to do next. The circle surrounding him spoke of Napoleon's initial determination to stay in Moscow for the winter months, not because of its military value, but because of the political blow that would be dealt him should he leave; this would look like an admission of defeat, and could harm his standing in Europe. But arrangements did also begin to be made for a retreat, although too little too late. The horses did not have horseshoes which would allow them to cross the ice safely, and the men were not appropriately equipped for the bitter cold to come.
But finally, on the 14th October, Napoleon decided to leave Moscow. He directed Berthier to organise the evacuation of a convoy of 1,500 injured soldiers to Smolensk, accompanied by 200-300 men. The convoy departed Moscow on the 16th October a few days before the army.
The Battle of Tarutino
On the 18th October, the Battle of Tarutino (also known as Vinkovo) took place. The Russian army had arrived at Tarutino on 2-3 October, and began to make entrenchments to defend it immediately. Murat pursued (and indeed harried) the Russian rearguard as far as the outskirts of Tarutino, but was unable to capitalise on his superiority. Setting up outposts in and around the village of Vinkovo, Murat paused for breath. The following two weeks gave the much depleted and exhausted Russian Army a crucial period in which to recuperate, encamped as they were in a strong position, well-fed and receiving reinforcements. Murat and the Grande Armée, however, were camped nearby in far less advantageous position, and without the same access to food or resources. Kutuzov, aware of the increasingly superior position of his own troops, organised an ambush by Russian troops of Murat's advance guard. Although losses were fairly even, Murat was forced to abandon his position so as to avoid being surrounded.
Leaving Moscow
On the 19th October, the French evacuated Moscow and its surrounding area. As the Grande Armée was leaving the city, Mortier, governor of Moscow, set up explosives around the Kremlin to carry out Napoleon's (strategically irrelevant) orders to destroy it. Whilst light rain and some intervention by Muscovites prevented all the fuses from firing, nevertheless, large parts of it were destroyed, and a stretch of the surrounding wall collapsed completely. The last regiments of the Grande Armée left the city at around 1am on the 23rd, about half an hour after the fuses were lit in the Kremlin. When Russian troops re-entered the city, they found scenes of terrible destruction, as many dead lay unburied in the streets and those buildings which were not burnt had sustained significant damage or were blackened with smoke; inside, everywhere was plundered and many churches had been defiled. The Moscow rabble also played a role in this. Heading the evacuation of Moscow, Napoleon settled first in the ‘chateau' in Troitsk, then in Ignatovo on 21st October. After two nights spent in Fominskoye, Napoleon then reached Borovsk.
On the 24th October came clashes at Maloyaroslavets, a small town to the southwest of Moscow. The allies under the Viceroy of Italy, Eugène de Beauharnais, were outnumbered by the Russian side under Kutuzov, 24,000 Italians against 32,000 Russians. Troops led by Davout arrived late in the day to ensure that Eugène's exhausted men could hold their position in the town. Each side lost about 7,000 men, and although the French side managed to hold on to their position, the Russians fell back just south of Maloyaroslavets, importantly blocking the Kaluga road.
Retreat
The French retreat began on the following day, and on the 26th October, Napoleon informed Berthier of his intention to go on the route to Viazma (fatefully, the same road by which the Grande Armée had entered Russia); fighting ensued on the way there later that day. On the 28th October, Napoleon reached Vereya, while Davout and Prince Poniatowski both brought their men to join up at Mozhaysk. Two days later, Napoleon was in the town of Gzhatsk (renamed ‘Gargarin' in 1968), situated 230km from Smolensk. From there he led a part of the Grande Armée to Viazma, where he was eventually to be joined by the remainder of his forces. On the 31st October, the corps led by Davout was at Gzhatsk to protect the rear guard of the Grande Armée; after leaving the city the corps was attacked by Cossacks. The following day, on the 1st November, Napoleon reached Viazma. On the Russian side, Miloradovitch leading Kutuzov's advance guard was approaching. He was far from the rest of the army however, since they had marched further south.
By the 3rd November, Napoleon passed the village of Semelevo, a few kilometres north-east of Smolensk, then arrived at Slavkovo, where he stayed until the next day. Meanwhile, Eugène de Beauharnais's troops assisted Davout at Viazma, where there are signs of the growing weakness of the Grande Armée as they began to struggle against repeated Russian attacks. This same day also saw the winter's first significant snowfall. This marked a dramatic change to the earlier milder weather, which some have argued lulled the Emperor into a false sense of security. The winter of 1812 became an unusually cold and bitter one. On the 5th November, Napoleon reached Dorogobuzh.
News from Paris…
On the 6th November, in Mikhaïlovka, Napoleon received news of General Malet's coup d'état. A fortnight earlier, on the 23rd October, a radical army general with a history of opposition to the Napoleonic regime, Claude-François Malet, had attempted to bluff his way into power by announcing that the Emperor had been killed in Russia. His plot was foiled in less than twenty-four hours and Malet and his main accomplices were executed less than a week later, on the 29th October, following trial by a military commission. The news of the failed coup d'état unsettled Napoleon and exposed the shallow roots of the First Empire. Thus this event was perhaps an important factor in his decision to return to Paris not long afterwards.
Smolensk and Beyond
On the 9th November, Napoleon arrived at Smolensk, where he remained for several days. There he learned of the setbacks affecting General Augereau and Eugène de Beauharnais, and reorganised the Grande Armée accordingly for retreat.
On the 12th November, the advance guard of Napoleon's Grande Armée left Smolensk with the intention crossing the river Dnieper for Orsha.
The French troops left behind, as the main body rushed to Moscow, had been involved in a stand off around the town of Polotsk. The assault sometimes called the Second Battle of Polotsk had taken place on the 18th October (the first having taken place in early August), in which Russian forces, under Wittgenstein, outnumbered Napoleon's troops, under Oudinot and Gouvion Saint-Cyr, by almost five to one.
On the 13th – 14th November, Victor attempted an attack on Wittgenstein's men near Smoliany, further east on the Ulla, trying to move the Russians away from the Grande Armée's line of retreat. Despite his efforts, however, Victor did not manage to dislodge the Russian forces from their position.
On the 14th November, Napoleon left Smolensk, and over the following days there were a series of engagements at Krasnoye. The state of the Grande Armée was rapidly declining, while Wittgenstein's men, holding their position at Ulla during the first three weeks of November, had been sent supplies from the Governor of Pskov, and therefore were far better fed than the French troops, and also far warmer due to supplies of fur coats sent to them in September.
Napoleon arrived at Orsha on the 20th November. Realising that the army was disintegrating and that his baggage train could soon be captured, he ordered the destruction of his official papers.
Berezina
On the 22nd November, Admiral Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov, in command of newly created Russian Third Western Army, moved his headquarters across the river Berezina and into the town of Borisov on his arrival there. However, some of his men were overwhelmed by Napoleon's advance guard, so he and his staff were forced to decamp back over the river, left to puzzle over Napoleon's next move.
On the 25th November, the Grande Armée arrived at Borisov, on the edge of the Berezina river. Chichagov's task of defending the bank was made very difficult as he was unsure as to where Napoleon would cross and which route the retreat would take. The movement of Russian troops from south to north to protect Borisov shows Chichagov's assumption (shared by Ermolov and Wittgenstein) that Napoleon would continue his retreat along the Minsk road. Instead, when the French emperor went along the Zembin road towards Vilna (modern Vilnius), Russian troops arrived too late to regain control of the route, despite fierce fighting from 26th – 28th November. On the 27th November, 50,000 men led by Ney, Oudinot and Victor crossed the Berezina near the small village of Studienka; the small Russian force there to meet them had no chance of preventing their crossing. In many ways, the crossing of the Berezina was disastrous for Napoleon, with the loss of between 25,000 and 40,000 men and most of their baggage. However, it was one of his most brilliant victories, since the crossing actually took place, and the Grande Armée were even able to take some advantages in their position, despite huge losses in both men and supplies.
The Incredible Ride
On the 5th December, Napoleon left the army at Smorgon to return to Paris. Unsettled by Malet's attempted coup, he confided to Caulaincourt that ‘in the current state of affairs, I can command in Europe only from the Tuileries palace.' The journey was swift; Napoleon was accompanied by Caulaincourt in a series of vehicles (changed according to the terrain, at first on runners then on wheels) and a small entourage travelling separately, including thirty (soon to become fifteen) Chasseurs de la Garde. The party traversed some 2,500 km, over thirteen days and thirteen nights of almost uninterrupted travel.
The party departed around 9pm, reaching Ashmiany at about midnight. Ignoring his entourage, Napoleon pressed on to Miedniki (not far from Vilna), arriving there at dawn and thereby avoiding capture at Ashmiany. After two hours of conversation with Maret, talking politics and the state of affairs at Vilna.
The Emperor had hoped that the remnants of the Grande Armée would be able to recuperate and regroup at Vilna, only one day's march to the West. However, with his departure morale dropped significantly, and in Vilna the soldiers fared little better. There is evidence that thousands of men had died of typhus, and the hospital in Vilna was overflowing with the dead and dying. General Robert Wilson visited a monastery that was being used as a makeshift hospital by the French, and there reported that ‘The hospital at St. Bazile presented the most awful and hideous sight: seven thousand five hundred bodies were piled like pigs of lead over one another in the corridors… and all the broken windows and walls were stuffed with feet , legs, arms , hands , trunks and heads to fit the apertures, and keep out the air from the yet living.'
Upon seeing the conditions at Vilna, several days after the Emperor's departure, Murat (who had been left in charge of the Grande Armée) decided to abandon Napoleon's plan and evacuate the town. On the 12th December, Kutuzov made his triumphant entrance into Vilna. And the day after, what was left of the Grande Armée limped back across the Niemen.
At 10am on Sunday 6th December, Napoleon changed horses in the outskirts of Vilna and then headed for Kovno (modern Kaunas). After receiving military reinforcements during the night at Rumšiškes, he arrived at Kovno at 5am on Monday 7th December. The temperature had dropped to -30°. Having crossed the frozen Niemen, and so leaving Russian territory, the cortège headed for Marijampole, where the passengers were forced to step out to push the wheels. On the 8th December, the party reached Goldapp, then to Augustowo the following day, and finally Pultusk on the 10th December, heading for Warsaw. It was on this part of the journey, cramped in what Caulaincourt called a ‘cage', that the Emperor and the diplomat had their famous conversations, later published by Caulaincourt as ‘En traîneau avec l'Empereur'. Every day between 8 and 9 Napoleon and Caulaincourt took coffee at a post-house, and between 5 and 9 every evening they would dine. On entering Warsaw, he went on foot to the Hôtel d'Angleterre, with no fear of recognition given his somewhat altered appearance, and received certain Polish ministers and the French ambassador l'abbé de Pradt. Napoleon was back in his carriage at 7pm heading for Lowicz and Kutno, reaching Posen (modern Poznan) in the early morning of 12th December. Leaving Posen at lunchtime, he reached Glogow that evening. He reached Bunzlau (modern Boleslawiec) on the morning of the 13th December, passing through Bautzen the following day, finally reaching Dresden at midnight. In a comic scene, Napoleon's carriage searched desperately for the French minister's residence in the dark city for several hours.
After receiving the Saxon king briefly very early in the morning, Napoleon set off again at 8 in the morning, in a carriage with runners lent by the King, reaching Leipzig, having a brief meeting and then setting off for Lützen, which they reached on the 15th December. After another change of carriage brought about by broken runners, Napoleon held a brief meeting in Erfurt before heading (now on wheels) towards Hanau, arriving at noon on the 16th December. He reached Frankfurt at 3pm. After crossing the Rhine on a boat, Napoleon set off again at 7pm, finally in French territory. From Mainz thereon the carriage stopped only for dispatches and to grease the wheels. On the 17th December, Napoleon lunched at Saint-Avold and dined at Verdun. That same day, the Moniteur of the 29th bulletin of the Grande Armée revealed the full details of the Russian catastrophe to the French public. On the 18th December, Napoleon halted at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre for a broken axle, and changed to a post cabriolet. He dined that evening at Chateau-Thierry, just to the north of Paris. At Meaux, the postmaster handed over his chaise, but since Napoleon no longer had any money Caulaincourt was forced to ask for credit. This unmarked post-chaise passed through the gates of the Tuileries Palace at midnight, with no announcement, to reassert his power in Europe in the face of this most crushing defeat.
Napoleon's Russian Campaign: The Retreat - napoleon.org
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Napoleon - Disaster In Russia - Full Documentary - Ep5
Napoleon - Disaster In Russia - Full Documentary - Ep5 This documentary series tells the complete and powerful story of the man who gave his name to an entir...
Thank you my friend SGT (Join to see) for reminding us that on October 19, 1812 the remnants of Napoleon Bonaparte's Grand Armee began their retreat from Moscow.
Napoleon - Disaster In Russia - Full Documentary - Ep5
This documentary series tells the complete and powerful story of the man who gave his name to an entire era. Providing a compelling portrait of the man and the legend from the early years of his life, through the glorious Imperial years, to the misery of defeat at Waterloo and exile on Elba.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DGNlfoGR0Nw
Images:
1. In 1812 Napoleon Bonaparte led the Grande Armee in Russia
2. 1812 Napoleon retreats from Moscow. The Grand Armee suffered catastrophic losses in the invasion of Russia.
3. 'Napoleon’s Retreat from Moscow' painting by Adolph Northen
4. French retreat from Russia, by Alexander Chagadayev
Background from {[https://slate.com/technology/2012/12/napoleon-march-to-russia-in-1812-typhus-spread-by-lice-was-more-powerful-than-tchaikovskys-cannonfire.html]}
Napoleon Wasn’t Defeated by the Russians
Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture gives too much credit to cannons.
By JOE KNIGHT
DEC 11, 2012 3:47 PM
History has taught us that Napoleon, in his invasion of Russia in 1812, marched into Moscow with his army largely intact and retreated only because the citizens of Moscow burned three-fourths of the city, depriving the army of food and supplies. The harsh Russian winter then devastated the army as it retreated. The Russians’ victory, commemorated by Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture, was one of the great upsets of military history.
But no one recognized the truly great power in this war.
In Vilnius, Lithuania, during the winter of 2001, workers were digging trenches for telephone lines and demolishing the old Soviet barracks that had stood for decades. A bulldozer scraped-up something white, so the operator hopped down and, to his surprise, saw the skull and other bones of a human being. Another worker later claimed that “the things just kept coming out of the ground—there were thousands of them.” Eight years earlier, a grave had been found with the remains of 700 people killed by the Soviet Committee for State Security, commonly known as the KGB. Could this be one of those secret places where the KGB disposed of its victims? Or could it be one the mass burials of Jews murdered by the Nazis?
When archeologists from the University of Vilnius arrived, they found that the bodies were stacked three deep in V-shaped trenches that were apparently dug as defensive positions. It appeared that the skeletons were the remains of soldiers. Two thousand skeletons were excavated, along with belt buckles with regimental numbers on them. Along with the finds were 20-franc coins dating from the early 1800s. It finally dawned on the scientists what they had found: the remains of Napoleon’s Grande Armée. Napoleon had led 600,000 men into Russia with the intent of conquering the country; of these, only about 30,000 survived, and of that number, it is said that fewer than 1,000 were ever able to return to duty.
What incredible circumstances could have caused the defeat of one of the greatest armies on the European continent, led by one of the greatest generals of all time? Surprisingly, it wasn’t enemy soldiers or the normal privations soldiers experience that devastated Napoleon’s army. Most of his soldiers were battle-hardened young men, so they should have been able to tolerate the cold, hunger, long marches, and fatigue. No, it was a microscopic organism that wreaked havoc and annihilated Napoleon’s army and his grand plans for conquest. A microbe called typhus, spread by a scourge of lice.
Napoleon initially had no real reason to invade Russia. During the Battle of Friedland in June of 1807, Napoleon’s army defeated the Russian army, and on July 7, 1807, France and Alexander I of Russia signed the Treaties of Tilsit, which made the two countries allies (and, among other things, prohibited Russia from doing business with Britain). Surprisingly, Napoleon did not take any land from Russia or request war reparations. By early 1812, Napoleon controlled most of the land between Spain and Russia. However, England controlled the seas, and Napoleon wanted India, which was then an English colony. Napoleon’s only hope of taking India was to take it by land, which meant controlling Russia.
Since the Treaty of Tilsit, France and Russia had been tense allies. Russia had been violating the treaty by trading with England, and Napoleon, finally fed up, used this as an excuse to invade Russia. In June, 1812, Napoleon’s army assembled in eastern Germany. With magnificent fanfare, Napoleon reviewed his troops on the west bank of the Niemen River on June 22, 1812. Napoleon’s engineers built a pontoon bridge over the river and the army entered Russian-controlled Poland the next day. Things were going well—the summer, though hot and dry, made marching over the roads easy. The supply columns stayed slightly ahead of the soldiers, so food was readily available, and the soldiers were in good health. Though military hospitals were established along the route to Poland in Magdeburg, Erfurt, Posen, and Berlin, there was little need for their services. The army reached Vilnius in four days, meeting no resistance from Russian troops.
Poland is where things started going badly for Napoleon. He found the region filthy beyond belief. The peasants were unwashed, with matted hair and ridden with lice and fleas, and the wells were fouled. Since the army was now in enemy territory, the supply trains had to move to the rear. The roads were soft with loose dust or were deeply rutted from the spring rains; the supply trains lagged farther and farther behind the main body of soldiers, and it became difficult to provide food and water. The army was so huge that it was nearly impossible to keep military formation intact, and the greater part of the army dissolved into straggling, sprawling mobs. Many of the soldiers pillaged the homes, livestock, and fields of the local peasants. Nearly 20,000 army horses died from lack of water and fodder on the way to Vilnius. The homes of the peasants were so filthy that they seemed to be alive with cockroaches. The typical battlefield diseases of dysentery and other intestinal diseases began to appear, and though new hospitals were set up in Danzig, Königsberg, and Thorn, they were unable to deal with the large numbers of sick soldiers sent back to the rear.
But Napoleon’s problems were just beginning.
Several days after crossing the Nieman, a number of soldiers began to develop high fevers and a red rash on their bodies. Some of them developed a bluish tinge to their faces and then rapidly died. Typhus had made its appearance.
Typhus had been present in Poland and Russia for many years, but it had gotten worse since the Russian army had devastated Poland while retreating from Napoleon’s forces. A lack of sanitation combined with the unusually hot summer made an ideal environment for the spread of lice. Typhus is caused by the organism Rickettsia prowazekii. It would be an entire century after the 1812 campaign before scientists realized that typhus is found in the feces of lice.
The typical French soldier was dirty and sweaty and lived in the same clothes for days; this is the perfect environment for lice to feed on his body and find a home in the seams of his clothing. Once the clothes and skin of the soldier were contaminated with lice excrement, the smallest scratch or abrasion would have been enough for the typhus germ to enter the soldier’s body. To compound the problem, the soldiers were sleeping in large groups in confined spaces for safety; they were concerned that the Russians would attack or the Poles would retaliate. This closeness allowed the lice to jump quickly to soldiers who were not infested. Only a month into the campaign, Napoleon lost 80,000 soldiers who were either incapacitated or had died from typhus. Under military surgeon Baron D.J. Larrey, the army’s medical and sanitary measures were the finest in the world, but no one could have coped with the scale of the epidemic. An eyewitness account gives details of one soldier’s experience with a lice infestation:
Bourgogne went to sleep on a reed mat and was soon awakened by the activities of the lice. Finding himself literally covered with them, he stripped off his shirt and trousers and threw them into the fire. They exploded like the fire of two ranks of infantry. He could not get rid of them for two months. All of his companions swarmed with lice; many were bitten and developed spotted fever (typhus).
On July 28, three of Napoleon’s officers raised concerns with him that the fight with the Russians was becoming dangerous. The loss of troops from disease and desertion had reduced his effective fighting strength to about half. Adding to this difficulty, the problem of finding provisions in hostile territory was becoming daunting. Napoleon listened to their arguments and agreed to end the campaign, but only two days later, he changed his mind and told his generals: “The very danger pushes us on to Moscow. The die is cast. Victory will justify and save us.”
So Napoleon and his sick, weary soldiers continued on. Smolensk fell to Napoleon on Aug. 17, and Valutino fell quickly after that. The Russians retreated as the French advanced, drawing Napoleon deeper into Russian territory. Napoleon had split his army into three parts. By Aug. 25, Napoleon had lost 105,000 of his main army of 265,000, leaving just 160,000 soldiers. Within two weeks, typhus had reduced the army to 103,000.
Gen. Mikhail Kutusov of the Russian forces set up a defensive position in Borodino, about 70 miles west of Moscow. On Sept. 7, French forces engaged the Russians. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. Napoleon then marched into Moscow, but it was a Pyrrhic victory; only approximately 90,000 French soldiers remained. Napoleon expected the Russians to surrender; however, the citizens of the city simply left Moscow to Napoleon. Three-fourths of the city had been burned by the time Napoleon’s army arrived and there was no food or other provisions for them. Fifteen thousand reinforcements joined Napoleon in Moscow, but of those, 10,000 died of disease. With the Russian winter rapidly approaching, Napoleon had no choice but to retreat back to France. Napoleon and the remains of his army stumbled into Smolensk, hoping to find food and shelter. Arriving on Nov. 8 during the bitter cold, Napoleon found the hospitals already crowded with sick and injured. Discipline was deteriorating, and the final blow came when Napoleon found that the supplies he had hoped were waiting for him had been consumed by reserve and communication troops. Leaving Smolensk on Nov. 13, the army arrived in Vilnius on Dec. 8. Only 20,000 soldiers remained that could be considered fit enough to fight. Having heard of an impending coup d’etat in France by Gen. Claude François de Malet, Napoleon left Gen. Joachim Murat in charge and hastened to Paris. Murat refused to make a stand in Vilnius—he left his guns and the booty obtained in Moscow to the advancing Russians and retreated back toward the Nieman, crossing on Dec. 14 with fewer than 40,000 men, mostly incapacitated. So ended Napoleon’s great dream of reaching India through Russia.
Many of the dead soldiers were buried in defensive trenches that were dug during the retreat. It was in one of these trenches that, almost two centuries later, construction workers found the remains of Napoleon’s Grande Armée.
Didier Raoult from the Université de la Méditerranée in Marseille, France analyzed the dental pulp of 72 teeth taken from the bodies of 35 of the soldiers found in Vilnius. The pulp from seven soldiers included the DNA from Bartonella quintana, an organism responsible for trench fever, another louse-borne disease that was common during World War I. The DNA from three soldiers contained the sequences from R. prowazakii, which causes epidemic typhus. Overall, 29 percent of the remains had evidence of R. prowazkii or B. quintana infection, implying that a major contributing factor to Napoleon’s defeat was lice.
Most Americans are familiar with the ending of Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture, commissioned by Russia to celebrate Russia’s defeat of Napoleon. The musical score ends with the sounds of cannons booming and bells pealing; however, if Tchaikovsky wanted to accurately record the sound of Napoleon’s defeat, one would only hear the soft, quiet sound of lice munching on human flesh. An organism too small to be seen by the human eye had changed the course of human history.
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs SMSgt Lawrence McCarter SPC Michael Duricko, Ph.D GySgt Thomas Vick MSG Felipe De Leon Brown SGT Denny Espinosa SSG Stephen Rogerson SPC Matthew Lamb LTC (Join to see) LTC Greg Henning Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D. Maj Kim Patterson PO1 William "Chip" Nagel PO2 (Join to see) SSG Franklin Briant SPC Woody Bullard TSgt David L. MSgt Robert "Rock" Aldi
Napoleon - Disaster In Russia - Full Documentary - Ep5
This documentary series tells the complete and powerful story of the man who gave his name to an entire era. Providing a compelling portrait of the man and the legend from the early years of his life, through the glorious Imperial years, to the misery of defeat at Waterloo and exile on Elba.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DGNlfoGR0Nw
Images:
1. In 1812 Napoleon Bonaparte led the Grande Armee in Russia
2. 1812 Napoleon retreats from Moscow. The Grand Armee suffered catastrophic losses in the invasion of Russia.
3. 'Napoleon’s Retreat from Moscow' painting by Adolph Northen
4. French retreat from Russia, by Alexander Chagadayev
Background from {[https://slate.com/technology/2012/12/napoleon-march-to-russia-in-1812-typhus-spread-by-lice-was-more-powerful-than-tchaikovskys-cannonfire.html]}
Napoleon Wasn’t Defeated by the Russians
Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture gives too much credit to cannons.
By JOE KNIGHT
DEC 11, 2012 3:47 PM
History has taught us that Napoleon, in his invasion of Russia in 1812, marched into Moscow with his army largely intact and retreated only because the citizens of Moscow burned three-fourths of the city, depriving the army of food and supplies. The harsh Russian winter then devastated the army as it retreated. The Russians’ victory, commemorated by Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture, was one of the great upsets of military history.
But no one recognized the truly great power in this war.
In Vilnius, Lithuania, during the winter of 2001, workers were digging trenches for telephone lines and demolishing the old Soviet barracks that had stood for decades. A bulldozer scraped-up something white, so the operator hopped down and, to his surprise, saw the skull and other bones of a human being. Another worker later claimed that “the things just kept coming out of the ground—there were thousands of them.” Eight years earlier, a grave had been found with the remains of 700 people killed by the Soviet Committee for State Security, commonly known as the KGB. Could this be one of those secret places where the KGB disposed of its victims? Or could it be one the mass burials of Jews murdered by the Nazis?
When archeologists from the University of Vilnius arrived, they found that the bodies were stacked three deep in V-shaped trenches that were apparently dug as defensive positions. It appeared that the skeletons were the remains of soldiers. Two thousand skeletons were excavated, along with belt buckles with regimental numbers on them. Along with the finds were 20-franc coins dating from the early 1800s. It finally dawned on the scientists what they had found: the remains of Napoleon’s Grande Armée. Napoleon had led 600,000 men into Russia with the intent of conquering the country; of these, only about 30,000 survived, and of that number, it is said that fewer than 1,000 were ever able to return to duty.
What incredible circumstances could have caused the defeat of one of the greatest armies on the European continent, led by one of the greatest generals of all time? Surprisingly, it wasn’t enemy soldiers or the normal privations soldiers experience that devastated Napoleon’s army. Most of his soldiers were battle-hardened young men, so they should have been able to tolerate the cold, hunger, long marches, and fatigue. No, it was a microscopic organism that wreaked havoc and annihilated Napoleon’s army and his grand plans for conquest. A microbe called typhus, spread by a scourge of lice.
Napoleon initially had no real reason to invade Russia. During the Battle of Friedland in June of 1807, Napoleon’s army defeated the Russian army, and on July 7, 1807, France and Alexander I of Russia signed the Treaties of Tilsit, which made the two countries allies (and, among other things, prohibited Russia from doing business with Britain). Surprisingly, Napoleon did not take any land from Russia or request war reparations. By early 1812, Napoleon controlled most of the land between Spain and Russia. However, England controlled the seas, and Napoleon wanted India, which was then an English colony. Napoleon’s only hope of taking India was to take it by land, which meant controlling Russia.
Since the Treaty of Tilsit, France and Russia had been tense allies. Russia had been violating the treaty by trading with England, and Napoleon, finally fed up, used this as an excuse to invade Russia. In June, 1812, Napoleon’s army assembled in eastern Germany. With magnificent fanfare, Napoleon reviewed his troops on the west bank of the Niemen River on June 22, 1812. Napoleon’s engineers built a pontoon bridge over the river and the army entered Russian-controlled Poland the next day. Things were going well—the summer, though hot and dry, made marching over the roads easy. The supply columns stayed slightly ahead of the soldiers, so food was readily available, and the soldiers were in good health. Though military hospitals were established along the route to Poland in Magdeburg, Erfurt, Posen, and Berlin, there was little need for their services. The army reached Vilnius in four days, meeting no resistance from Russian troops.
Poland is where things started going badly for Napoleon. He found the region filthy beyond belief. The peasants were unwashed, with matted hair and ridden with lice and fleas, and the wells were fouled. Since the army was now in enemy territory, the supply trains had to move to the rear. The roads were soft with loose dust or were deeply rutted from the spring rains; the supply trains lagged farther and farther behind the main body of soldiers, and it became difficult to provide food and water. The army was so huge that it was nearly impossible to keep military formation intact, and the greater part of the army dissolved into straggling, sprawling mobs. Many of the soldiers pillaged the homes, livestock, and fields of the local peasants. Nearly 20,000 army horses died from lack of water and fodder on the way to Vilnius. The homes of the peasants were so filthy that they seemed to be alive with cockroaches. The typical battlefield diseases of dysentery and other intestinal diseases began to appear, and though new hospitals were set up in Danzig, Königsberg, and Thorn, they were unable to deal with the large numbers of sick soldiers sent back to the rear.
But Napoleon’s problems were just beginning.
Several days after crossing the Nieman, a number of soldiers began to develop high fevers and a red rash on their bodies. Some of them developed a bluish tinge to their faces and then rapidly died. Typhus had made its appearance.
Typhus had been present in Poland and Russia for many years, but it had gotten worse since the Russian army had devastated Poland while retreating from Napoleon’s forces. A lack of sanitation combined with the unusually hot summer made an ideal environment for the spread of lice. Typhus is caused by the organism Rickettsia prowazekii. It would be an entire century after the 1812 campaign before scientists realized that typhus is found in the feces of lice.
The typical French soldier was dirty and sweaty and lived in the same clothes for days; this is the perfect environment for lice to feed on his body and find a home in the seams of his clothing. Once the clothes and skin of the soldier were contaminated with lice excrement, the smallest scratch or abrasion would have been enough for the typhus germ to enter the soldier’s body. To compound the problem, the soldiers were sleeping in large groups in confined spaces for safety; they were concerned that the Russians would attack or the Poles would retaliate. This closeness allowed the lice to jump quickly to soldiers who were not infested. Only a month into the campaign, Napoleon lost 80,000 soldiers who were either incapacitated or had died from typhus. Under military surgeon Baron D.J. Larrey, the army’s medical and sanitary measures were the finest in the world, but no one could have coped with the scale of the epidemic. An eyewitness account gives details of one soldier’s experience with a lice infestation:
Bourgogne went to sleep on a reed mat and was soon awakened by the activities of the lice. Finding himself literally covered with them, he stripped off his shirt and trousers and threw them into the fire. They exploded like the fire of two ranks of infantry. He could not get rid of them for two months. All of his companions swarmed with lice; many were bitten and developed spotted fever (typhus).
On July 28, three of Napoleon’s officers raised concerns with him that the fight with the Russians was becoming dangerous. The loss of troops from disease and desertion had reduced his effective fighting strength to about half. Adding to this difficulty, the problem of finding provisions in hostile territory was becoming daunting. Napoleon listened to their arguments and agreed to end the campaign, but only two days later, he changed his mind and told his generals: “The very danger pushes us on to Moscow. The die is cast. Victory will justify and save us.”
So Napoleon and his sick, weary soldiers continued on. Smolensk fell to Napoleon on Aug. 17, and Valutino fell quickly after that. The Russians retreated as the French advanced, drawing Napoleon deeper into Russian territory. Napoleon had split his army into three parts. By Aug. 25, Napoleon had lost 105,000 of his main army of 265,000, leaving just 160,000 soldiers. Within two weeks, typhus had reduced the army to 103,000.
Gen. Mikhail Kutusov of the Russian forces set up a defensive position in Borodino, about 70 miles west of Moscow. On Sept. 7, French forces engaged the Russians. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. Napoleon then marched into Moscow, but it was a Pyrrhic victory; only approximately 90,000 French soldiers remained. Napoleon expected the Russians to surrender; however, the citizens of the city simply left Moscow to Napoleon. Three-fourths of the city had been burned by the time Napoleon’s army arrived and there was no food or other provisions for them. Fifteen thousand reinforcements joined Napoleon in Moscow, but of those, 10,000 died of disease. With the Russian winter rapidly approaching, Napoleon had no choice but to retreat back to France. Napoleon and the remains of his army stumbled into Smolensk, hoping to find food and shelter. Arriving on Nov. 8 during the bitter cold, Napoleon found the hospitals already crowded with sick and injured. Discipline was deteriorating, and the final blow came when Napoleon found that the supplies he had hoped were waiting for him had been consumed by reserve and communication troops. Leaving Smolensk on Nov. 13, the army arrived in Vilnius on Dec. 8. Only 20,000 soldiers remained that could be considered fit enough to fight. Having heard of an impending coup d’etat in France by Gen. Claude François de Malet, Napoleon left Gen. Joachim Murat in charge and hastened to Paris. Murat refused to make a stand in Vilnius—he left his guns and the booty obtained in Moscow to the advancing Russians and retreated back toward the Nieman, crossing on Dec. 14 with fewer than 40,000 men, mostly incapacitated. So ended Napoleon’s great dream of reaching India through Russia.
Many of the dead soldiers were buried in defensive trenches that were dug during the retreat. It was in one of these trenches that, almost two centuries later, construction workers found the remains of Napoleon’s Grande Armée.
Didier Raoult from the Université de la Méditerranée in Marseille, France analyzed the dental pulp of 72 teeth taken from the bodies of 35 of the soldiers found in Vilnius. The pulp from seven soldiers included the DNA from Bartonella quintana, an organism responsible for trench fever, another louse-borne disease that was common during World War I. The DNA from three soldiers contained the sequences from R. prowazakii, which causes epidemic typhus. Overall, 29 percent of the remains had evidence of R. prowazkii or B. quintana infection, implying that a major contributing factor to Napoleon’s defeat was lice.
Most Americans are familiar with the ending of Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture, commissioned by Russia to celebrate Russia’s defeat of Napoleon. The musical score ends with the sounds of cannons booming and bells pealing; however, if Tchaikovsky wanted to accurately record the sound of Napoleon’s defeat, one would only hear the soft, quiet sound of lice munching on human flesh. An organism too small to be seen by the human eye had changed the course of human history.
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs SMSgt Lawrence McCarter SPC Michael Duricko, Ph.D GySgt Thomas Vick MSG Felipe De Leon Brown SGT Denny Espinosa SSG Stephen Rogerson SPC Matthew Lamb LTC (Join to see) LTC Greg Henning Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D. Maj Kim Patterson PO1 William "Chip" Nagel PO2 (Join to see) SSG Franklin Briant SPC Woody Bullard TSgt David L. MSgt Robert "Rock" Aldi
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In Our Time: S22/01 Napoleon's Retreat from Moscow (Sept 19 2019)
Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss how, in September 1812, Napoleon captured Moscow and waited a month for the Russians to meet him, to surrender and why, to hi...
In Our Time: S22/01 Napoleon's Retreat from Moscow (Sept 19 2019)
Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss how, in September 1812, Napoleon captured Moscow and waited a month for the Russians to meet him, to surrender and why, to his dismay, no-one came. Soon his triumph was revealed as a great defeat; winter was coming, supplies were low; he ordered his Grande Armée of six hundred thousand to retreat and, by the time he crossed back over the border, desertion, disease, capture, Cossacks and cold had reduced that to twenty thousand. Napoleon had shown his weakness; his Prussian allies changed sides and, within eighteen months they, the Russians and Austrians had captured Paris and the Emperor was exiled to Elba.
With Janet Hartley, Professor Emeritus of International History, LSE; Michael Rowe, Reader in European History, King’s College London; and Michael Rapport, Reader in Modern European History, University of Glasgow. Producer: Simon Tillotson.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cj2MkV40jII
Images:
1. The gravely depleted French army depicted retreating from Moscow through the bitter cold Russian winter
2. Vasily Vereshchagin. Wait. Let them come nearer painted by Pavel Balabanov
3. Marshal Ney with the rear guard, by Yvon. Published in Napoleon - La Campagne de Russie 1812, by General Comte Philippe de Segur
4. The retreat of Napoleon from Russia, 3 November 1812. hand-colored lithograph by Victor Adam, mid 19th century
Background from {[ https://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the-two-empires/timelines/napoleons-russian-campaign-the-retreat/]}
NAPOLEON’S RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN: THE RETREAT
Entering Moscow
On the 15th September, a week after the bloody battle of Borodino, Napoleon entered Moscow. He had expected to enter with glory, met by a delegation of the city's highest officials assembled in recognition of his victory and ready to negotiate peace. But there was no delegation; in fact, there was hardly anyone left there at all. Of Moscow's 200,000 inhabitants from before the war, only 2% remained, predominantly wounded soldiers and some remaining to plunder the homes of those who had fled.
Even less could Napoleon have predicted how soon he would also be leaving the city; since it was also on the day he arrived that the first fires were lit, doubtless under the supervision of Moscow's governor Rostopchin (although at the time it was circulated in Russia, to incite more patriotic feeling against the enemy, that the fault lay with the French). Initially, Napoleon installed himself in the Kremlin, but the spreading blaze forced him to leave for the outskirts of the city only the next day. Thus on the 16th September he moved into the Petroff palace to the north-west of Moscow on the St Petersburg road with his troops camped nearby. Moscow burned for six days.
Waiting for Peace
On the 18th September, Major General Ivan Tutolmin was received at the Petroff Palace. The subsequent letter he wrote to the Tsar's mother Maria Feodorovna, on Napoleon's request, regarding the opening of peace talks received no reply. A similar attempt by Napoleon to open dialogue around peace came on the 22nd September, soon after the end of the fires, when Ivan Alekseevich Yakovlev, former captain of the guard, wrote to the Tsar on Napoleon's behalf, but again to no avail.
Meanwhile, in the terrible weather and mud which hampered the troops from 18th-23rd September, Napoleon turned his attention to Russian manoeuvres, hoping to crush any resistance. Cossack bands, however, continued to thwart French attempts at control led by Murat. By the 26th September, Napoleon had discovered that Kutuzov's main forces were on the main Kaluga road. Over the end of September and the beginning of October, the Russian Army slowly retreated to Tarutino, where it took up a defensive position on 3rd October after clashes with Murat's troops.
During this period, Napoleon was also thinking about the pursuance of the campaign. Several options were open: retreat to Smolensk in order to winter in safety before continuing the campaign the following year; a drive on St Petersburg in order to take Russia's second capital, and finally force Alexander into submission; or to engage Alexander in peace negotiations.
Napoleon's preference for the final option led to his sending Lauriston to Kutuzov's headquarters to discuss possibilities for peace. Caulaincourt had refused the Emperor's plan to approach the Tsar on the grounds that it would be in vain. On the 4th October, Napoleon wrote to Kutuzov (CG, 31792):
‘Prince Kutuzov, I send one of my aides de camp to you in order to discuss several important matters. I hope that Your Highness will believe what he is to say to you, above all when he expresses the high esteem and particular respect I have for a long time held for your person. Moscow, 3rd October 1812. Signed: Napoleon.'
On the 5th October, Kutuzov received the letter. On reading it he agreed to a secret meeting with Lauriston, and suggested to the French that he would take their peace proposals to the Tsar. Alexander had already stated that he had no intention of any negotiation with Napoleon as long as there was a single French soldier left in Russia, and was furious when Kutuzov informed him of this meeting; in meeting with Lauriston, Kutuzov had acted in direct contravention to an imperial order. But Kutuzov was in fact playing for time and had no intention of negotiating peace, indeed he guessed that Napoleon's keenness on negotiation was in the end a sign of weakness. Keeping French hopes for peace alive allowed him precious time to organise Russian forces for the next stage of the campaign while the Grande Armée remained in the ashes of Moscow.
It gradually dawned on Napoleon that peace talks would not be forthcoming; and with the Russian winter approaching he was left with the dilemma of what to do next. The circle surrounding him spoke of Napoleon's initial determination to stay in Moscow for the winter months, not because of its military value, but because of the political blow that would be dealt him should he leave; this would look like an admission of defeat, and could harm his standing in Europe. But arrangements did also begin to be made for a retreat, although too little too late. The horses did not have horseshoes which would allow them to cross the ice safely, and the men were not appropriately equipped for the bitter cold to come.
But finally, on the 14th October, Napoleon decided to leave Moscow. He directed Berthier to organise the evacuation of a convoy of 1,500 injured soldiers to Smolensk, accompanied by 200-300 men. The convoy departed Moscow on the 16th October a few days before the army.
The Battle of Tarutino
On the 18th October, the Battle of Tarutino (also known as Vinkovo) took place. The Russian army had arrived at Tarutino on 2-3 October, and began to make entrenchments to defend it immediately. Murat pursued (and indeed harried) the Russian rearguard as far as the outskirts of Tarutino, but was unable to capitalise on his superiority. Setting up outposts in and around the village of Vinkovo, Murat paused for breath. The following two weeks gave the much depleted and exhausted Russian Army a crucial period in which to recuperate, encamped as they were in a strong position, well-fed and receiving reinforcements. Murat and the Grande Armée, however, were camped nearby in far less advantageous position, and without the same access to food or resources. Kutuzov, aware of the increasingly superior position of his own troops, organised an ambush by Russian troops of Murat's advance guard. Although losses were fairly even, Murat was forced to abandon his position so as to avoid being surrounded.
Leaving Moscow
On the 19th October, the French evacuated Moscow and its surrounding area. As the Grande Armée was leaving the city, Mortier, governor of Moscow, set up explosives around the Kremlin to carry out Napoleon's (strategically irrelevant) orders to destroy it. Whilst light rain and some intervention by Muscovites prevented all the fuses from firing, nevertheless, large parts of it were destroyed, and a stretch of the surrounding wall collapsed completely. The last regiments of the Grande Armée left the city at around 1am on the 23rd, about half an hour after the fuses were lit in the Kremlin. When Russian troops re-entered the city, they found scenes of terrible destruction, as many dead lay unburied in the streets and those buildings which were not burnt had sustained significant damage or were blackened with smoke; inside, everywhere was plundered and many churches had been defiled. The Moscow rabble also played a role in this. Heading the evacuation of Moscow, Napoleon settled first in the ‘chateau' in Troitsk, then in Ignatovo on 21st October. After two nights spent in Fominskoye, Napoleon then reached Borovsk.
On the 24th October came clashes at Maloyaroslavets, a small town to the southwest of Moscow. The allies under the Viceroy of Italy, Eugène de Beauharnais, were outnumbered by the Russian side under Kutuzov, 24,000 Italians against 32,000 Russians. Troops led by Davout arrived late in the day to ensure that Eugène's exhausted men could hold their position in the town. Each side lost about 7,000 men, and although the French side managed to hold on to their position, the Russians fell back just south of Maloyaroslavets, importantly blocking the Kaluga road.
Retreat
The French retreat began on the following day, and on the 26th October, Napoleon informed Berthier of his intention to go on the route to Viazma (fatefully, the same road by which the Grande Armée had entered Russia); fighting ensued on the way there later that day. On the 28th October, Napoleon reached Vereya, while Davout and Prince Poniatowski both brought their men to join up at Mozhaysk. Two days later, Napoleon was in the town of Gzhatsk (renamed ‘Gargarin' in 1968), situated 230km from Smolensk. From there he led a part of the Grande Armée to Viazma, where he was eventually to be joined by the remainder of his forces. On the 31st October, the corps led by Davout was at Gzhatsk to protect the rear guard of the Grande Armée; after leaving the city the corps was attacked by Cossacks. The following day, on the 1st November, Napoleon reached Viazma. On the Russian side, Miloradovitch leading Kutuzov's advance guard was approaching. He was far from the rest of the army however, since they had marched further south.
By the 3rd November, Napoleon passed the village of Semelevo, a few kilometres north-east of Smolensk, then arrived at Slavkovo, where he stayed until the next day. Meanwhile, Eugène de Beauharnais's troops assisted Davout at Viazma, where there are signs of the growing weakness of the Grande Armée as they began to struggle against repeated Russian attacks. This same day also saw the winter's first significant snowfall. This marked a dramatic change to the earlier milder weather, which some have argued lulled the Emperor into a false sense of security. The winter of 1812 became an unusually cold and bitter one. On the 5th November, Napoleon reached Dorogobuzh.
News from Paris…
On the 6th November, in Mikhaïlovka, Napoleon received news of General Malet's coup d'état. A fortnight earlier, on the 23rd October, a radical army general with a history of opposition to the Napoleonic regime, Claude-François Malet, had attempted to bluff his way into power by announcing that the Emperor had been killed in Russia. His plot was foiled in less than twenty-four hours and Malet and his main accomplices were executed less than a week later, on the 29th October, following trial by a military commission. The news of the failed coup d'état unsettled Napoleon and exposed the shallow roots of the First Empire. Thus this event was perhaps an important factor in his decision to return to Paris not long afterwards.
Smolensk and Beyond
On the 9th November, Napoleon arrived at Smolensk, where he remained for several days. There he learned of the setbacks affecting General Augereau and Eugène de Beauharnais, and reorganised the Grande Armée accordingly for retreat.
On the 12th November, the advance guard of Napoleon's Grande Armée left Smolensk with the intention crossing the river Dnieper for Orsha.
The French troops left behind, as the main body rushed to Moscow, had been involved in a stand off around the town of Polotsk. The assault sometimes called the Second Battle of Polotsk had taken place on the 18th October (the first having taken place in early August), in which Russian forces, under Wittgenstein, outnumbered Napoleon's troops, under Oudinot and Gouvion Saint-Cyr, by almost five to one.
On the 13th – 14th November, Victor attempted an attack on Wittgenstein's men near Smoliany, further east on the Ulla, trying to move the Russians away from the Grande Armée's line of retreat. Despite his efforts, however, Victor did not manage to dislodge the Russian forces from their position.
On the 14th November, Napoleon left Smolensk, and over the following days there were a series of engagements at Krasnoye. The state of the Grande Armée was rapidly declining, while Wittgenstein's men, holding their position at Ulla during the first three weeks of November, had been sent supplies from the Governor of Pskov, and therefore were far better fed than the French troops, and also far warmer due to supplies of fur coats sent to them in September.
Napoleon arrived at Orsha on the 20th November. Realising that the army was disintegrating and that his baggage train could soon be captured, he ordered the destruction of his official papers.
Berezina
On the 22nd November, Admiral Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov, in command of newly created Russian Third Western Army, moved his headquarters across the river Berezina and into the town of Borisov on his arrival there. However, some of his men were overwhelmed by Napoleon's advance guard, so he and his staff were forced to decamp back over the river, left to puzzle over Napoleon's next move.
On the 25th November, the Grande Armée arrived at Borisov, on the edge of the Berezina river. Chichagov's task of defending the bank was made very difficult as he was unsure as to where Napoleon would cross and which route the retreat would take. The movement of Russian troops from south to north to protect Borisov shows Chichagov's assumption (shared by Ermolov and Wittgenstein) that Napoleon would continue his retreat along the Minsk road. Instead, when the French emperor went along the Zembin road towards Vilna (modern Vilnius), Russian troops arrived too late to regain control of the route, despite fierce fighting from 26th – 28th November. On the 27th November, 50,000 men led by Ney, Oudinot and Victor crossed the Berezina near the small village of Studienka; the small Russian force there to meet them had no chance of preventing their crossing. In many ways, the crossing of the Berezina was disastrous for Napoleon, with the loss of between 25,000 and 40,000 men and most of their baggage. However, it was one of his most brilliant victories, since the crossing actually took place, and the Grande Armée were even able to take some advantages in their position, despite huge losses in both men and supplies.
The Incredible Ride
On the 5th December, Napoleon left the army at Smorgon to return to Paris. Unsettled by Malet's attempted coup, he confided to Caulaincourt that ‘in the current state of affairs, I can command in Europe only from the Tuileries palace.' The journey was swift; Napoleon was accompanied by Caulaincourt in a series of vehicles (changed according to the terrain, at first on runners then on wheels) and a small entourage travelling separately, including thirty (soon to become fifteen) Chasseurs de la Garde. The party traversed some 2,500 km, over thirteen days and thirteen nights of almost uninterrupted travel.
The party departed around 9pm, reaching Ashmiany at about midnight. Ignoring his entourage, Napoleon pressed on to Miedniki (not far from Vilna), arriving there at dawn and thereby avoiding capture at Ashmiany. After two hours of conversation with Maret, talking politics and the state of affairs at Vilna.
The Emperor had hoped that the remnants of the Grande Armée would be able to recuperate and regroup at Vilna, only one day's march to the West. However, with his departure morale dropped significantly, and in Vilna the soldiers fared little better. There is evidence that thousands of men had died of typhus, and the hospital in Vilna was overflowing with the dead and dying. General Robert Wilson visited a monastery that was being used as a makeshift hospital by the French, and there reported that ‘The hospital at St. Bazile presented the most awful and hideous sight: seven thousand five hundred bodies were piled like pigs of lead over one another in the corridors… and all the broken windows and walls were stuffed with feet , legs, arms , hands , trunks and heads to fit the apertures, and keep out the air from the yet living.'
Upon seeing the conditions at Vilna, several days after the Emperor's departure, Murat (who had been left in charge of the Grande Armée) decided to abandon Napoleon's plan and evacuate the town. On the 12th December, Kutuzov made his triumphant entrance into Vilna. And the day after, what was left of the Grande Armée limped back across the Niemen.
At 10am on Sunday 6th December, Napoleon changed horses in the outskirts of Vilna and then headed for Kovno (modern Kaunas). After receiving military reinforcements during the night at Rumšiškes, he arrived at Kovno at 5am on Monday 7th December. The temperature had dropped to -30°. Having crossed the frozen Niemen, and so leaving Russian territory, the cortège headed for Marijampole, where the passengers were forced to step out to push the wheels. On the 8th December, the party reached Goldapp, then to Augustowo the following day, and finally Pultusk on the 10th December, heading for Warsaw. It was on this part of the journey, cramped in what Caulaincourt called a ‘cage', that the Emperor and the diplomat had their famous conversations, later published by Caulaincourt as ‘En traîneau avec l'Empereur'. Every day between 8 and 9 Napoleon and Caulaincourt took coffee at a post-house, and between 5 and 9 every evening they would dine. On entering Warsaw, he went on foot to the Hôtel d'Angleterre, with no fear of recognition given his somewhat altered appearance, and received certain Polish ministers and the French ambassador l'abbé de Pradt. Napoleon was back in his carriage at 7pm heading for Lowicz and Kutno, reaching Posen (modern Poznan) in the early morning of 12th December. Leaving Posen at lunchtime, he reached Glogow that evening. He reached Bunzlau (modern Boleslawiec) on the morning of the 13th December, passing through Bautzen the following day, finally reaching Dresden at midnight. In a comic scene, Napoleon's carriage searched desperately for the French minister's residence in the dark city for several hours.
After receiving the Saxon king briefly very early in the morning, Napoleon set off again at 8 in the morning, in a carriage with runners lent by the King, reaching Leipzig, having a brief meeting and then setting off for Lützen, which they reached on the 15th December. After another change of carriage brought about by broken runners, Napoleon held a brief meeting in Erfurt before heading (now on wheels) towards Hanau, arriving at noon on the 16th December. He reached Frankfurt at 3pm. After crossing the Rhine on a boat, Napoleon set off again at 7pm, finally in French territory. From Mainz thereon the carriage stopped only for dispatches and to grease the wheels. On the 17th December, Napoleon lunched at Saint-Avold and dined at Verdun. That same day, the Moniteur of the 29th bulletin of the Grande Armée revealed the full details of the Russian catastrophe to the French public. On the 18th December, Napoleon halted at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre for a broken axle, and changed to a post cabriolet. He dined that evening at Chateau-Thierry, just to the north of Paris. At Meaux, the postmaster handed over his chaise, but since Napoleon no longer had any money Caulaincourt was forced to ask for credit. This unmarked post-chaise passed through the gates of the Tuileries Palace at midnight, with no announcement, to reassert his power in Europe in the face of this most crushing defeat."
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Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss how, in September 1812, Napoleon captured Moscow and waited a month for the Russians to meet him, to surrender and why, to his dismay, no-one came. Soon his triumph was revealed as a great defeat; winter was coming, supplies were low; he ordered his Grande Armée of six hundred thousand to retreat and, by the time he crossed back over the border, desertion, disease, capture, Cossacks and cold had reduced that to twenty thousand. Napoleon had shown his weakness; his Prussian allies changed sides and, within eighteen months they, the Russians and Austrians had captured Paris and the Emperor was exiled to Elba.
With Janet Hartley, Professor Emeritus of International History, LSE; Michael Rowe, Reader in European History, King’s College London; and Michael Rapport, Reader in Modern European History, University of Glasgow. Producer: Simon Tillotson.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cj2MkV40jII
Images:
1. The gravely depleted French army depicted retreating from Moscow through the bitter cold Russian winter
2. Vasily Vereshchagin. Wait. Let them come nearer painted by Pavel Balabanov
3. Marshal Ney with the rear guard, by Yvon. Published in Napoleon - La Campagne de Russie 1812, by General Comte Philippe de Segur
4. The retreat of Napoleon from Russia, 3 November 1812. hand-colored lithograph by Victor Adam, mid 19th century
Background from {[ https://www.napoleon.org/en/history-of-the-two-empires/timelines/napoleons-russian-campaign-the-retreat/]}
NAPOLEON’S RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN: THE RETREAT
Entering Moscow
On the 15th September, a week after the bloody battle of Borodino, Napoleon entered Moscow. He had expected to enter with glory, met by a delegation of the city's highest officials assembled in recognition of his victory and ready to negotiate peace. But there was no delegation; in fact, there was hardly anyone left there at all. Of Moscow's 200,000 inhabitants from before the war, only 2% remained, predominantly wounded soldiers and some remaining to plunder the homes of those who had fled.
Even less could Napoleon have predicted how soon he would also be leaving the city; since it was also on the day he arrived that the first fires were lit, doubtless under the supervision of Moscow's governor Rostopchin (although at the time it was circulated in Russia, to incite more patriotic feeling against the enemy, that the fault lay with the French). Initially, Napoleon installed himself in the Kremlin, but the spreading blaze forced him to leave for the outskirts of the city only the next day. Thus on the 16th September he moved into the Petroff palace to the north-west of Moscow on the St Petersburg road with his troops camped nearby. Moscow burned for six days.
Waiting for Peace
On the 18th September, Major General Ivan Tutolmin was received at the Petroff Palace. The subsequent letter he wrote to the Tsar's mother Maria Feodorovna, on Napoleon's request, regarding the opening of peace talks received no reply. A similar attempt by Napoleon to open dialogue around peace came on the 22nd September, soon after the end of the fires, when Ivan Alekseevich Yakovlev, former captain of the guard, wrote to the Tsar on Napoleon's behalf, but again to no avail.
Meanwhile, in the terrible weather and mud which hampered the troops from 18th-23rd September, Napoleon turned his attention to Russian manoeuvres, hoping to crush any resistance. Cossack bands, however, continued to thwart French attempts at control led by Murat. By the 26th September, Napoleon had discovered that Kutuzov's main forces were on the main Kaluga road. Over the end of September and the beginning of October, the Russian Army slowly retreated to Tarutino, where it took up a defensive position on 3rd October after clashes with Murat's troops.
During this period, Napoleon was also thinking about the pursuance of the campaign. Several options were open: retreat to Smolensk in order to winter in safety before continuing the campaign the following year; a drive on St Petersburg in order to take Russia's second capital, and finally force Alexander into submission; or to engage Alexander in peace negotiations.
Napoleon's preference for the final option led to his sending Lauriston to Kutuzov's headquarters to discuss possibilities for peace. Caulaincourt had refused the Emperor's plan to approach the Tsar on the grounds that it would be in vain. On the 4th October, Napoleon wrote to Kutuzov (CG, 31792):
‘Prince Kutuzov, I send one of my aides de camp to you in order to discuss several important matters. I hope that Your Highness will believe what he is to say to you, above all when he expresses the high esteem and particular respect I have for a long time held for your person. Moscow, 3rd October 1812. Signed: Napoleon.'
On the 5th October, Kutuzov received the letter. On reading it he agreed to a secret meeting with Lauriston, and suggested to the French that he would take their peace proposals to the Tsar. Alexander had already stated that he had no intention of any negotiation with Napoleon as long as there was a single French soldier left in Russia, and was furious when Kutuzov informed him of this meeting; in meeting with Lauriston, Kutuzov had acted in direct contravention to an imperial order. But Kutuzov was in fact playing for time and had no intention of negotiating peace, indeed he guessed that Napoleon's keenness on negotiation was in the end a sign of weakness. Keeping French hopes for peace alive allowed him precious time to organise Russian forces for the next stage of the campaign while the Grande Armée remained in the ashes of Moscow.
It gradually dawned on Napoleon that peace talks would not be forthcoming; and with the Russian winter approaching he was left with the dilemma of what to do next. The circle surrounding him spoke of Napoleon's initial determination to stay in Moscow for the winter months, not because of its military value, but because of the political blow that would be dealt him should he leave; this would look like an admission of defeat, and could harm his standing in Europe. But arrangements did also begin to be made for a retreat, although too little too late. The horses did not have horseshoes which would allow them to cross the ice safely, and the men were not appropriately equipped for the bitter cold to come.
But finally, on the 14th October, Napoleon decided to leave Moscow. He directed Berthier to organise the evacuation of a convoy of 1,500 injured soldiers to Smolensk, accompanied by 200-300 men. The convoy departed Moscow on the 16th October a few days before the army.
The Battle of Tarutino
On the 18th October, the Battle of Tarutino (also known as Vinkovo) took place. The Russian army had arrived at Tarutino on 2-3 October, and began to make entrenchments to defend it immediately. Murat pursued (and indeed harried) the Russian rearguard as far as the outskirts of Tarutino, but was unable to capitalise on his superiority. Setting up outposts in and around the village of Vinkovo, Murat paused for breath. The following two weeks gave the much depleted and exhausted Russian Army a crucial period in which to recuperate, encamped as they were in a strong position, well-fed and receiving reinforcements. Murat and the Grande Armée, however, were camped nearby in far less advantageous position, and without the same access to food or resources. Kutuzov, aware of the increasingly superior position of his own troops, organised an ambush by Russian troops of Murat's advance guard. Although losses were fairly even, Murat was forced to abandon his position so as to avoid being surrounded.
Leaving Moscow
On the 19th October, the French evacuated Moscow and its surrounding area. As the Grande Armée was leaving the city, Mortier, governor of Moscow, set up explosives around the Kremlin to carry out Napoleon's (strategically irrelevant) orders to destroy it. Whilst light rain and some intervention by Muscovites prevented all the fuses from firing, nevertheless, large parts of it were destroyed, and a stretch of the surrounding wall collapsed completely. The last regiments of the Grande Armée left the city at around 1am on the 23rd, about half an hour after the fuses were lit in the Kremlin. When Russian troops re-entered the city, they found scenes of terrible destruction, as many dead lay unburied in the streets and those buildings which were not burnt had sustained significant damage or were blackened with smoke; inside, everywhere was plundered and many churches had been defiled. The Moscow rabble also played a role in this. Heading the evacuation of Moscow, Napoleon settled first in the ‘chateau' in Troitsk, then in Ignatovo on 21st October. After two nights spent in Fominskoye, Napoleon then reached Borovsk.
On the 24th October came clashes at Maloyaroslavets, a small town to the southwest of Moscow. The allies under the Viceroy of Italy, Eugène de Beauharnais, were outnumbered by the Russian side under Kutuzov, 24,000 Italians against 32,000 Russians. Troops led by Davout arrived late in the day to ensure that Eugène's exhausted men could hold their position in the town. Each side lost about 7,000 men, and although the French side managed to hold on to their position, the Russians fell back just south of Maloyaroslavets, importantly blocking the Kaluga road.
Retreat
The French retreat began on the following day, and on the 26th October, Napoleon informed Berthier of his intention to go on the route to Viazma (fatefully, the same road by which the Grande Armée had entered Russia); fighting ensued on the way there later that day. On the 28th October, Napoleon reached Vereya, while Davout and Prince Poniatowski both brought their men to join up at Mozhaysk. Two days later, Napoleon was in the town of Gzhatsk (renamed ‘Gargarin' in 1968), situated 230km from Smolensk. From there he led a part of the Grande Armée to Viazma, where he was eventually to be joined by the remainder of his forces. On the 31st October, the corps led by Davout was at Gzhatsk to protect the rear guard of the Grande Armée; after leaving the city the corps was attacked by Cossacks. The following day, on the 1st November, Napoleon reached Viazma. On the Russian side, Miloradovitch leading Kutuzov's advance guard was approaching. He was far from the rest of the army however, since they had marched further south.
By the 3rd November, Napoleon passed the village of Semelevo, a few kilometres north-east of Smolensk, then arrived at Slavkovo, where he stayed until the next day. Meanwhile, Eugène de Beauharnais's troops assisted Davout at Viazma, where there are signs of the growing weakness of the Grande Armée as they began to struggle against repeated Russian attacks. This same day also saw the winter's first significant snowfall. This marked a dramatic change to the earlier milder weather, which some have argued lulled the Emperor into a false sense of security. The winter of 1812 became an unusually cold and bitter one. On the 5th November, Napoleon reached Dorogobuzh.
News from Paris…
On the 6th November, in Mikhaïlovka, Napoleon received news of General Malet's coup d'état. A fortnight earlier, on the 23rd October, a radical army general with a history of opposition to the Napoleonic regime, Claude-François Malet, had attempted to bluff his way into power by announcing that the Emperor had been killed in Russia. His plot was foiled in less than twenty-four hours and Malet and his main accomplices were executed less than a week later, on the 29th October, following trial by a military commission. The news of the failed coup d'état unsettled Napoleon and exposed the shallow roots of the First Empire. Thus this event was perhaps an important factor in his decision to return to Paris not long afterwards.
Smolensk and Beyond
On the 9th November, Napoleon arrived at Smolensk, where he remained for several days. There he learned of the setbacks affecting General Augereau and Eugène de Beauharnais, and reorganised the Grande Armée accordingly for retreat.
On the 12th November, the advance guard of Napoleon's Grande Armée left Smolensk with the intention crossing the river Dnieper for Orsha.
The French troops left behind, as the main body rushed to Moscow, had been involved in a stand off around the town of Polotsk. The assault sometimes called the Second Battle of Polotsk had taken place on the 18th October (the first having taken place in early August), in which Russian forces, under Wittgenstein, outnumbered Napoleon's troops, under Oudinot and Gouvion Saint-Cyr, by almost five to one.
On the 13th – 14th November, Victor attempted an attack on Wittgenstein's men near Smoliany, further east on the Ulla, trying to move the Russians away from the Grande Armée's line of retreat. Despite his efforts, however, Victor did not manage to dislodge the Russian forces from their position.
On the 14th November, Napoleon left Smolensk, and over the following days there were a series of engagements at Krasnoye. The state of the Grande Armée was rapidly declining, while Wittgenstein's men, holding their position at Ulla during the first three weeks of November, had been sent supplies from the Governor of Pskov, and therefore were far better fed than the French troops, and also far warmer due to supplies of fur coats sent to them in September.
Napoleon arrived at Orsha on the 20th November. Realising that the army was disintegrating and that his baggage train could soon be captured, he ordered the destruction of his official papers.
Berezina
On the 22nd November, Admiral Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov, in command of newly created Russian Third Western Army, moved his headquarters across the river Berezina and into the town of Borisov on his arrival there. However, some of his men were overwhelmed by Napoleon's advance guard, so he and his staff were forced to decamp back over the river, left to puzzle over Napoleon's next move.
On the 25th November, the Grande Armée arrived at Borisov, on the edge of the Berezina river. Chichagov's task of defending the bank was made very difficult as he was unsure as to where Napoleon would cross and which route the retreat would take. The movement of Russian troops from south to north to protect Borisov shows Chichagov's assumption (shared by Ermolov and Wittgenstein) that Napoleon would continue his retreat along the Minsk road. Instead, when the French emperor went along the Zembin road towards Vilna (modern Vilnius), Russian troops arrived too late to regain control of the route, despite fierce fighting from 26th – 28th November. On the 27th November, 50,000 men led by Ney, Oudinot and Victor crossed the Berezina near the small village of Studienka; the small Russian force there to meet them had no chance of preventing their crossing. In many ways, the crossing of the Berezina was disastrous for Napoleon, with the loss of between 25,000 and 40,000 men and most of their baggage. However, it was one of his most brilliant victories, since the crossing actually took place, and the Grande Armée were even able to take some advantages in their position, despite huge losses in both men and supplies.
The Incredible Ride
On the 5th December, Napoleon left the army at Smorgon to return to Paris. Unsettled by Malet's attempted coup, he confided to Caulaincourt that ‘in the current state of affairs, I can command in Europe only from the Tuileries palace.' The journey was swift; Napoleon was accompanied by Caulaincourt in a series of vehicles (changed according to the terrain, at first on runners then on wheels) and a small entourage travelling separately, including thirty (soon to become fifteen) Chasseurs de la Garde. The party traversed some 2,500 km, over thirteen days and thirteen nights of almost uninterrupted travel.
The party departed around 9pm, reaching Ashmiany at about midnight. Ignoring his entourage, Napoleon pressed on to Miedniki (not far from Vilna), arriving there at dawn and thereby avoiding capture at Ashmiany. After two hours of conversation with Maret, talking politics and the state of affairs at Vilna.
The Emperor had hoped that the remnants of the Grande Armée would be able to recuperate and regroup at Vilna, only one day's march to the West. However, with his departure morale dropped significantly, and in Vilna the soldiers fared little better. There is evidence that thousands of men had died of typhus, and the hospital in Vilna was overflowing with the dead and dying. General Robert Wilson visited a monastery that was being used as a makeshift hospital by the French, and there reported that ‘The hospital at St. Bazile presented the most awful and hideous sight: seven thousand five hundred bodies were piled like pigs of lead over one another in the corridors… and all the broken windows and walls were stuffed with feet , legs, arms , hands , trunks and heads to fit the apertures, and keep out the air from the yet living.'
Upon seeing the conditions at Vilna, several days after the Emperor's departure, Murat (who had been left in charge of the Grande Armée) decided to abandon Napoleon's plan and evacuate the town. On the 12th December, Kutuzov made his triumphant entrance into Vilna. And the day after, what was left of the Grande Armée limped back across the Niemen.
At 10am on Sunday 6th December, Napoleon changed horses in the outskirts of Vilna and then headed for Kovno (modern Kaunas). After receiving military reinforcements during the night at Rumšiškes, he arrived at Kovno at 5am on Monday 7th December. The temperature had dropped to -30°. Having crossed the frozen Niemen, and so leaving Russian territory, the cortège headed for Marijampole, where the passengers were forced to step out to push the wheels. On the 8th December, the party reached Goldapp, then to Augustowo the following day, and finally Pultusk on the 10th December, heading for Warsaw. It was on this part of the journey, cramped in what Caulaincourt called a ‘cage', that the Emperor and the diplomat had their famous conversations, later published by Caulaincourt as ‘En traîneau avec l'Empereur'. Every day between 8 and 9 Napoleon and Caulaincourt took coffee at a post-house, and between 5 and 9 every evening they would dine. On entering Warsaw, he went on foot to the Hôtel d'Angleterre, with no fear of recognition given his somewhat altered appearance, and received certain Polish ministers and the French ambassador l'abbé de Pradt. Napoleon was back in his carriage at 7pm heading for Lowicz and Kutno, reaching Posen (modern Poznan) in the early morning of 12th December. Leaving Posen at lunchtime, he reached Glogow that evening. He reached Bunzlau (modern Boleslawiec) on the morning of the 13th December, passing through Bautzen the following day, finally reaching Dresden at midnight. In a comic scene, Napoleon's carriage searched desperately for the French minister's residence in the dark city for several hours.
After receiving the Saxon king briefly very early in the morning, Napoleon set off again at 8 in the morning, in a carriage with runners lent by the King, reaching Leipzig, having a brief meeting and then setting off for Lützen, which they reached on the 15th December. After another change of carriage brought about by broken runners, Napoleon held a brief meeting in Erfurt before heading (now on wheels) towards Hanau, arriving at noon on the 16th December. He reached Frankfurt at 3pm. After crossing the Rhine on a boat, Napoleon set off again at 7pm, finally in French territory. From Mainz thereon the carriage stopped only for dispatches and to grease the wheels. On the 17th December, Napoleon lunched at Saint-Avold and dined at Verdun. That same day, the Moniteur of the 29th bulletin of the Grande Armée revealed the full details of the Russian catastrophe to the French public. On the 18th December, Napoleon halted at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre for a broken axle, and changed to a post cabriolet. He dined that evening at Chateau-Thierry, just to the north of Paris. At Meaux, the postmaster handed over his chaise, but since Napoleon no longer had any money Caulaincourt was forced to ask for credit. This unmarked post-chaise passed through the gates of the Tuileries Palace at midnight, with no announcement, to reassert his power in Europe in the face of this most crushing defeat."
FYI MSG (Join to see) FYI SSG Franklin Briant SSG Michael Noll LTC Wayne Brandon LTC (Join to see) SCPO Morris Ramsey SGT (Join to see) SFC William Farrell PO1 H Gene LawrenceMaj Marty Hogan SMSgt David A Asbury Cpl (Join to see)SSG Jeffrey LeakeCPL Dave Hoover SSG Samuel KermonSSG Donald H "Don" Bates SGT Gregory Lawritson SGT John " Mac " McConnell CWO3 Dennis M. SPC Matthew Lamb
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