Posted on Jul 14, 2016
What was the most significant event on July 10 during the U.S. Civil War?
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In 1863 the Army of Northern Virginia is retreating through Maryland towards the swollen Potomac River and fighting rear guard battles with the cautious Gen Meade’s Army of the Potomac. In 1864 the situation is reversed as Maj Gen Jubal Early’s division resting after the Battle of Monocacy on its way toward Washington, D.C. This delay would cost the Confederates dearly as Grant was moving forces along internal lines of communication from Petersburg. It was rare for the Federal forces to have the advantage of internal lines of communication in the Civil War and Grant took advantage of the opportunity.
Amphibious assault on Morris Island part of Charleston, S.C. defenses in 1863: “Maj Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore's second diversion, an amphibious expedition against a railroad bridge on the South Edisto River below Morris Island, occurred on the 10th. On that dark, fog-shrouded morning, a small fleet out of Beaufort- a steamer, a tug, and a transport carrying 250 members of the 1st South Carolina Colored Infantry, plus 2 guns of the 1st Connecticut battery- passed up the South Edisto under Col. Thomas Wentworth Higginson. The little flotilla had smooth sailing until about 4:00 A.M., when it reached Willstown Bluff, about 20 miles up the Edisto, at its confluence with the Pon Pon River. There, Higginson found his way blocked by spiked timbers sunk across the river's neck, as well as by a 3-gun battery, which withdrew when Higginson landed the troops on the bluff and took possession of the area.
The obstruction posed greater difficulties. The expeditionary force worked till 1:00 P.M. to clear them, with the aid of high tide, and only after the tugboat, the Governor Milton, had run aground. after passing the spikes, Higginson's transport, the Enoch Dean, moved barely a mile before again encountering Confederate artillery. and likewise running aground. Finally, early in the afternoon, the fleet cleared the shoals, and ascended the river, moving to within 2 miles of its objective, before the Dean grounded a second time. Unable to free the vessel, Higginson dispatched a tug to attack the rail bridge on its own.
It did not get far. Under an intense shelling by the gunners ashore, members of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans and South Carolina’s Chestnut and Marion batteries, the tug was forced to retreat soon after starting out. With the Dean free once again, both ships returned downriver, only to have the Milton became entangled in the same obstructions it had cleared earlier. When Higginson's steamer, the John Adams, failed to pry the vessel loose, Higginson set the tug afire, transferred its crew to the transport, and returned in disgust, his expedition a failure.”
Thursday, July 10, 1862: Senator Wright of Indiana, in the U.S. Senate, objects to Sen. Chandler’s defamation of McClellan and his strategic failures: “Mr. Wright, of Indiana: Mr. President, when the resolution was read the other day, I could not refrain an expression of surprise that in the midst of such a crisis as the present that an inquiry should be set on foot, the result of which must be to divide the friends of Union and to unite the enemies of the Union. The Senator proceeded in language and manner sufficiently violent and declamatory, to give the impression he meant to bring contempt and dishonor upon General McClellan. It is not to my taste to go back to the field of Manassas and to say that two hundred thousand men were held at bay by less than 30,000 rebels. I know little of the art of war. I am willing to trust the men in command of the Army. Judging from the explosive rhetoric of the Senator who takes pains to call General McClellan a criminal.
Mr. President, General McClellan has not been a newspaper general. He has not sought to write himself into renown, or court others so to do. Not one word has General McClellan offered to defend himself against the charges of the Senator. His reticence and silence has been remarkable. A more implusive man―and we are told that youth is most impulsive and General McClellan is a very young man—would have rushed into print and insisted upon such a defense of his conduct as would at least assure his friends that was not indifferent to his fame. His studied silence is probably his surest vindication.
I will say that, in my humble opinion, that his ten day’s campaign upon the peninsula, with an army that he tells us was so much smaller than that of the rebel enemy, out-tongues complaint, and will arouse admiration among our loyal people. Some will say that the general was surprised and taken unaware, and that all the allegations that his moves were planned are untrue. I will say only that the conflict displayed on his part uncommon genius, perseverance, and ability; that his troops were heroic and that he saved them from annihilation and captivity. Sir, I know not where in the history of nations you can point to a seven days' conflict, with the same number of men engaged, where there was more science and skill exhibited by the commander than General McClellan exhibited in this contest.”
Friday, July 10, 1863: Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, again frets about the sluggish pursuit of the Rebels, who are still stuck by high waters on the Maryland side of the Potomac: “I am assured that our army is steadily, but I fear too slowly, moving upon Lee and the Rebels. There are, I hope, substantial reasons for this tardiness. Why cannot our army move as rapidly as the Rebels? The high water in the river has stopped them, yet our troops do not catch up. It has been the misfortune of our generals to linger, never to avail themselves of success, —to waste, or omit to gather, the fruits of victory. Only success at Gettysburg and Vicksburg will quiet the country for the present hesitancy. No light or explanation is furnished by the General-in-Chief or the War Department.”
Sunday, July 10, 1864: Atlanta campaign: Per General Sherman: “Johnston evacuated his trenches, crossed over the Chattahoochee, burned the railroad bridge and his pontoon and trestle bridges, and left us in full possession of the north or west bank – besides which, we had already secured possession of the two good crossings at Roswell and Soap’s Creek.
I have always thought Johnston neglected his opportunity there, for he had lain comparatively idle while we got control of both banks of the river above.”
Sunday, July 10, 1864: Early’s raid on Washington: Lincoln to Grant: “Cypher” War Department; Lieut. Gen. Grant Washington City, City-Point, Va July 10—2.P.M. 1864 “Your despatch to Gen. Halleck, referring to what I may think in the present emergency, is shown me. Gen. Halleck says we have absolutely no force here fit to go to the field. He thinks that with the hundred day-men, and invalids we have here, we can defend Washington, and scarcely Baltimore. Besides these, there are about eight thousand not very reliable, under Howe at Harper’s Ferry, with Hunter approaching that point very slowly, with what number I suppose you know better than I. Wallace with some odds and ends, and part of what came up with Ricketts, [5] was so badly beaten yesterday at Monocacy, that what is left can attempt no more than to defend Baltimore. What we shall get in from Penn. & N.Y. will scarcely [be] worth counting, I fear. Now what I think is that you should provide to retain your hold where you are certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemie’s force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this if the movement is prompt. This is what I think, upon your suggestion, and is not an order A. LINCOLN
Sunday, July 10, 1864: Grant to Lincoln: “I have sent from here a whole corps commanded by an excellent officer, besides over three thousand other troops. One Division of the Nineteenth Corps, six thousand strong is now on its way to Washington. One Steamer loaded with these troops having passed Ft. Monroe today. They will probably reach Washington tomorrow night. This force under [Horatio G.] Wright will be able to compete with the whole force with [Richard S.] Ewell.
Before more troops can be sent from here [David] Hunter will be able to join Wright in rear of the Enemy, with at least ten thousand men, besides a force sufficient to hold Maryland Heights.
I think on reflection it would have a bad effect for me to leave here, and with Gen [Edward O. C.] Ord at Baltimore and Hunter and Wright with the forces following the enemy up, could do no good
I have great faith that the enemy will never be able to get back with much of his force.
Sunday, July 10, 1864: Grant to Halleck: “Forces enough to defeat all that Early has with him should get in his rear south of him, and follow him up sharply, leaving him to go north, defending depots, towns, &c., with small garrisons and the militia. If the President thinks it advisable that I should go to Washington in person I can start in an hour after receiving notice, leaving everything here on the defensive.”
Pictures: 1863-07-10 Charleston Harbor and Its Defenses. The Navy Battery is on the left and the ironclads can be seen on the far right; 1863-07 Fort Wagner, S.C. Map; 1863-07 Jackson, Mississippi siege Map 1863; 1863-07-10 Navy gun crews with the Whitworth Rifles 2
A. 1862: Siege of Jackson, Mississippi begins. Maj Gen William T. Sherman’s army reached Jackson on July 10, and a reconnaissance of the Confederate earthworks convinced the general that the position was too strong to assault. General Sherman’s disposition of troops to surround the Confederate fortifications at Jackson placed two Union divisions near Lynch Creek: Brigadier General Alvin P. Hovey’s division of the XIII Army Corps, and Brigadier General Jacob G. Lauman’s division of the XVI Army Corps, which was attached to the XIII Army Corps during the Siege of Jackson. Hovey’s division was approximately 3,600 men strong, while General Lauman had over 6,000 men in his division. Hovey’s and Lauman’s divisions arrived in the vicinity of Jackson on July 10, marching down the Robinson Road until they reached the outskirts of the city.
Sherman wrote in his official report: “I soon satisfied myself that General Johnston had taken refuge in Jackson, that he had resolved to fight behind intrenchments, and that his intrenched position was the same substantially that we found last May, only that it had been much strengthened and extended, so that its flanks reached Pearl River. The works were too good to be assaulted, and orders were given to deploy and form lines of circumvallation about 1,500 yards from the enemy’s parapet, with skirmishers close up, and their supports within 500 yards, also that each corps should construct covered batteries for their guns and trenches for their men.”
Background: The fiery Sherman was chomping at the bit to go after General Johnston’s Army of Relief, and the only thing holding him back was word from General Grant that Pemberton had surrendered Vicksburg. On July 4, 1863, Sherman received notice that the Rebel general had in fact surrendered, and Grant ordered him to start after Johnston’s army. Sherman’s troops, augmented by reinforcements to about 50,000 men, began moving that same day.
General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Relief had started moving toward Vicksburg on June 29, and on July 2-3 he had scouts looking for a place to cross the Big Black River. On the west side of the waterway was General Sherman’s Army of Observation, and Johnston was still trying to find a safe crossing of the Big Black when he was notified on July 5 that Pemberton had given up Vicksburg.
On receiving this news General Johnston immediately began a retreat back to Jackson, his men arriving in the city on the evening of July 7. The next day he had his soldiers hard at work with picks and shovels improving the earthworks around Jackson. The general had decided to hold the city in the hope that Sherman could be goaded into attacking his entrenched troops.
Knowing that Sherman’s soldiers would soon reach Jackson, General Johnston had his men file into the trenches around the city on July 9. Two of the divisions of Johnston’s army were directly involved in the fighting that impacts the area near Lynch Creek: Major General Samuel G. French’s division, of approximately 4,000 men, held the section of trenches that ran from the Southern Railroad of Mississippi to the Raymond Road. Major General John C. Breckinridge’s division, approximately 5,000 men strong, manned the trenches from the Raymond Road to the Pearl River.
B. 1863: Amphibious assault on Morris Island, S.C.: Brig. Gen. George C. Strong and his large brigade of 2,500 men launch an amphibious landing on the southern end of Morris Island. Strong establishes a strong beachhead at the southern end of the island. By late afternoon the Confederates have been driven back to forts Wagner and Gregg. President Davis asks South Carolina Governor Bonham to dispatch local troops to Charleston. Union artillery on Folly Island (which had been occupied in April 1863) and naval gunfire from Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren's four ironclad warships bombarded the Confederate defenses protecting the southern end of Morris Island. This provided cover for the landing of Brig. Gen. George C. Strong's brigade, which crossed Lighthouse Inlet and landed at the southern tip of the island. Strong's troops advanced, capturing several batteries, moving about three miles to within range of Fort Wagner. Also known as Battery Wagner, it was a heavily gunned redoubt that covered nearly the entire width of the northern end of Morris Island, facing Sumter. Strong's report described the advance: “The two columns now moved forward, under a lively discharge of shell, grape, and canister, converging toward the works nearest the southern extremity of the island, and thence along its commanding ridge and eastern coast, capturing successively the eight batteries, of one heavy gun each, occupying the commanding points of that ridge, besides two batteries, mounting, together, three 10-inch seacoast mortars.”
C. 1864: Early’s raid on Washington, D.C. Monocacy, Maryland was a decisive rebel victory; but, it had come with a heavy price, and not only the 900 Confederate casualties. The Union troops, at the cost of 1,300 casualties, had delayed Early’s attack on Washington by an entire day. After camping on the battlefield, the exhausted Confederates resumed their march to Washington on Sunday morning, July 10, but they made limited progress in beastly heat. That night they camped spread out between Gaithersburg and Rockville.
D. 1864: Atlanta campaign: Approaching the Chattahoochee River, Maj Gen William T. Sherman feinted right but got troops across upstream. The Southern army retreated back toward Atlanta July 9-10. CSA General Joe Johnston pulls his troops back to consolidate his force at Peachtree Creek, about four miles from downtown Atlanta. There is panic in Atlanta and consternation in Richmond.
Background: Maj Gen William T. Sherman enjoyed clear numerical superiority, but he did not use it in blunt frontal attacks as Grant was doing against Lee in Virginia. Rather, he used Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland and Maj Gen. John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio to demonstrate against the Rebel lines, while he sent Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee to maneuver around Johnston's left flank and threaten his supply line, the Western & Atlantic Railroad. This worked repeatedly throughout the campaign, beginning at Dalton, from which Johnston retreated May 12-13. While the two armies traded short, sharp attacks at Resaca May 14-15, McPherson crossed the Oostanaula River and Johnston retreated again. After Johnston's failed attempt to attack Sherman's army at Cassville on May 19, the front shifted to the area of Dallas-New Hope Church, where fighting inconclusively occurred May 25-28. Johnston dug in at Kennesaw Mountain, repelling Sherman's assaults June 27 before being flanked again.
FYI MSG Roy Cheever Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. PO3 Edward Riddle SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL Maj William W. 'Bill' Price COL (Join to see) COL Lisandro MurphySSgt David M. MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D. SPC Maurice Evans SPC Jon O. SGT David A. 'Cowboy' GrothSSG Trevor S.PO3 Phyllis Maynard SPC Miguel C. 1SG Steven Imerman SSgt Charles Ankner SGM Steve Wettstein SGT Jim Arnold
Amphibious assault on Morris Island part of Charleston, S.C. defenses in 1863: “Maj Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore's second diversion, an amphibious expedition against a railroad bridge on the South Edisto River below Morris Island, occurred on the 10th. On that dark, fog-shrouded morning, a small fleet out of Beaufort- a steamer, a tug, and a transport carrying 250 members of the 1st South Carolina Colored Infantry, plus 2 guns of the 1st Connecticut battery- passed up the South Edisto under Col. Thomas Wentworth Higginson. The little flotilla had smooth sailing until about 4:00 A.M., when it reached Willstown Bluff, about 20 miles up the Edisto, at its confluence with the Pon Pon River. There, Higginson found his way blocked by spiked timbers sunk across the river's neck, as well as by a 3-gun battery, which withdrew when Higginson landed the troops on the bluff and took possession of the area.
The obstruction posed greater difficulties. The expeditionary force worked till 1:00 P.M. to clear them, with the aid of high tide, and only after the tugboat, the Governor Milton, had run aground. after passing the spikes, Higginson's transport, the Enoch Dean, moved barely a mile before again encountering Confederate artillery. and likewise running aground. Finally, early in the afternoon, the fleet cleared the shoals, and ascended the river, moving to within 2 miles of its objective, before the Dean grounded a second time. Unable to free the vessel, Higginson dispatched a tug to attack the rail bridge on its own.
It did not get far. Under an intense shelling by the gunners ashore, members of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans and South Carolina’s Chestnut and Marion batteries, the tug was forced to retreat soon after starting out. With the Dean free once again, both ships returned downriver, only to have the Milton became entangled in the same obstructions it had cleared earlier. When Higginson's steamer, the John Adams, failed to pry the vessel loose, Higginson set the tug afire, transferred its crew to the transport, and returned in disgust, his expedition a failure.”
Thursday, July 10, 1862: Senator Wright of Indiana, in the U.S. Senate, objects to Sen. Chandler’s defamation of McClellan and his strategic failures: “Mr. Wright, of Indiana: Mr. President, when the resolution was read the other day, I could not refrain an expression of surprise that in the midst of such a crisis as the present that an inquiry should be set on foot, the result of which must be to divide the friends of Union and to unite the enemies of the Union. The Senator proceeded in language and manner sufficiently violent and declamatory, to give the impression he meant to bring contempt and dishonor upon General McClellan. It is not to my taste to go back to the field of Manassas and to say that two hundred thousand men were held at bay by less than 30,000 rebels. I know little of the art of war. I am willing to trust the men in command of the Army. Judging from the explosive rhetoric of the Senator who takes pains to call General McClellan a criminal.
Mr. President, General McClellan has not been a newspaper general. He has not sought to write himself into renown, or court others so to do. Not one word has General McClellan offered to defend himself against the charges of the Senator. His reticence and silence has been remarkable. A more implusive man―and we are told that youth is most impulsive and General McClellan is a very young man—would have rushed into print and insisted upon such a defense of his conduct as would at least assure his friends that was not indifferent to his fame. His studied silence is probably his surest vindication.
I will say that, in my humble opinion, that his ten day’s campaign upon the peninsula, with an army that he tells us was so much smaller than that of the rebel enemy, out-tongues complaint, and will arouse admiration among our loyal people. Some will say that the general was surprised and taken unaware, and that all the allegations that his moves were planned are untrue. I will say only that the conflict displayed on his part uncommon genius, perseverance, and ability; that his troops were heroic and that he saved them from annihilation and captivity. Sir, I know not where in the history of nations you can point to a seven days' conflict, with the same number of men engaged, where there was more science and skill exhibited by the commander than General McClellan exhibited in this contest.”
Friday, July 10, 1863: Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, again frets about the sluggish pursuit of the Rebels, who are still stuck by high waters on the Maryland side of the Potomac: “I am assured that our army is steadily, but I fear too slowly, moving upon Lee and the Rebels. There are, I hope, substantial reasons for this tardiness. Why cannot our army move as rapidly as the Rebels? The high water in the river has stopped them, yet our troops do not catch up. It has been the misfortune of our generals to linger, never to avail themselves of success, —to waste, or omit to gather, the fruits of victory. Only success at Gettysburg and Vicksburg will quiet the country for the present hesitancy. No light or explanation is furnished by the General-in-Chief or the War Department.”
Sunday, July 10, 1864: Atlanta campaign: Per General Sherman: “Johnston evacuated his trenches, crossed over the Chattahoochee, burned the railroad bridge and his pontoon and trestle bridges, and left us in full possession of the north or west bank – besides which, we had already secured possession of the two good crossings at Roswell and Soap’s Creek.
I have always thought Johnston neglected his opportunity there, for he had lain comparatively idle while we got control of both banks of the river above.”
Sunday, July 10, 1864: Early’s raid on Washington: Lincoln to Grant: “Cypher” War Department; Lieut. Gen. Grant Washington City, City-Point, Va July 10—2.P.M. 1864 “Your despatch to Gen. Halleck, referring to what I may think in the present emergency, is shown me. Gen. Halleck says we have absolutely no force here fit to go to the field. He thinks that with the hundred day-men, and invalids we have here, we can defend Washington, and scarcely Baltimore. Besides these, there are about eight thousand not very reliable, under Howe at Harper’s Ferry, with Hunter approaching that point very slowly, with what number I suppose you know better than I. Wallace with some odds and ends, and part of what came up with Ricketts, [5] was so badly beaten yesterday at Monocacy, that what is left can attempt no more than to defend Baltimore. What we shall get in from Penn. & N.Y. will scarcely [be] worth counting, I fear. Now what I think is that you should provide to retain your hold where you are certainly, and bring the rest with you personally, and make a vigorous effort to destroy the enemie’s force in this vicinity. I think there is really a fair chance to do this if the movement is prompt. This is what I think, upon your suggestion, and is not an order A. LINCOLN
Sunday, July 10, 1864: Grant to Lincoln: “I have sent from here a whole corps commanded by an excellent officer, besides over three thousand other troops. One Division of the Nineteenth Corps, six thousand strong is now on its way to Washington. One Steamer loaded with these troops having passed Ft. Monroe today. They will probably reach Washington tomorrow night. This force under [Horatio G.] Wright will be able to compete with the whole force with [Richard S.] Ewell.
Before more troops can be sent from here [David] Hunter will be able to join Wright in rear of the Enemy, with at least ten thousand men, besides a force sufficient to hold Maryland Heights.
I think on reflection it would have a bad effect for me to leave here, and with Gen [Edward O. C.] Ord at Baltimore and Hunter and Wright with the forces following the enemy up, could do no good
I have great faith that the enemy will never be able to get back with much of his force.
Sunday, July 10, 1864: Grant to Halleck: “Forces enough to defeat all that Early has with him should get in his rear south of him, and follow him up sharply, leaving him to go north, defending depots, towns, &c., with small garrisons and the militia. If the President thinks it advisable that I should go to Washington in person I can start in an hour after receiving notice, leaving everything here on the defensive.”
Pictures: 1863-07-10 Charleston Harbor and Its Defenses. The Navy Battery is on the left and the ironclads can be seen on the far right; 1863-07 Fort Wagner, S.C. Map; 1863-07 Jackson, Mississippi siege Map 1863; 1863-07-10 Navy gun crews with the Whitworth Rifles 2
A. 1862: Siege of Jackson, Mississippi begins. Maj Gen William T. Sherman’s army reached Jackson on July 10, and a reconnaissance of the Confederate earthworks convinced the general that the position was too strong to assault. General Sherman’s disposition of troops to surround the Confederate fortifications at Jackson placed two Union divisions near Lynch Creek: Brigadier General Alvin P. Hovey’s division of the XIII Army Corps, and Brigadier General Jacob G. Lauman’s division of the XVI Army Corps, which was attached to the XIII Army Corps during the Siege of Jackson. Hovey’s division was approximately 3,600 men strong, while General Lauman had over 6,000 men in his division. Hovey’s and Lauman’s divisions arrived in the vicinity of Jackson on July 10, marching down the Robinson Road until they reached the outskirts of the city.
Sherman wrote in his official report: “I soon satisfied myself that General Johnston had taken refuge in Jackson, that he had resolved to fight behind intrenchments, and that his intrenched position was the same substantially that we found last May, only that it had been much strengthened and extended, so that its flanks reached Pearl River. The works were too good to be assaulted, and orders were given to deploy and form lines of circumvallation about 1,500 yards from the enemy’s parapet, with skirmishers close up, and their supports within 500 yards, also that each corps should construct covered batteries for their guns and trenches for their men.”
Background: The fiery Sherman was chomping at the bit to go after General Johnston’s Army of Relief, and the only thing holding him back was word from General Grant that Pemberton had surrendered Vicksburg. On July 4, 1863, Sherman received notice that the Rebel general had in fact surrendered, and Grant ordered him to start after Johnston’s army. Sherman’s troops, augmented by reinforcements to about 50,000 men, began moving that same day.
General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Relief had started moving toward Vicksburg on June 29, and on July 2-3 he had scouts looking for a place to cross the Big Black River. On the west side of the waterway was General Sherman’s Army of Observation, and Johnston was still trying to find a safe crossing of the Big Black when he was notified on July 5 that Pemberton had given up Vicksburg.
On receiving this news General Johnston immediately began a retreat back to Jackson, his men arriving in the city on the evening of July 7. The next day he had his soldiers hard at work with picks and shovels improving the earthworks around Jackson. The general had decided to hold the city in the hope that Sherman could be goaded into attacking his entrenched troops.
Knowing that Sherman’s soldiers would soon reach Jackson, General Johnston had his men file into the trenches around the city on July 9. Two of the divisions of Johnston’s army were directly involved in the fighting that impacts the area near Lynch Creek: Major General Samuel G. French’s division, of approximately 4,000 men, held the section of trenches that ran from the Southern Railroad of Mississippi to the Raymond Road. Major General John C. Breckinridge’s division, approximately 5,000 men strong, manned the trenches from the Raymond Road to the Pearl River.
B. 1863: Amphibious assault on Morris Island, S.C.: Brig. Gen. George C. Strong and his large brigade of 2,500 men launch an amphibious landing on the southern end of Morris Island. Strong establishes a strong beachhead at the southern end of the island. By late afternoon the Confederates have been driven back to forts Wagner and Gregg. President Davis asks South Carolina Governor Bonham to dispatch local troops to Charleston. Union artillery on Folly Island (which had been occupied in April 1863) and naval gunfire from Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren's four ironclad warships bombarded the Confederate defenses protecting the southern end of Morris Island. This provided cover for the landing of Brig. Gen. George C. Strong's brigade, which crossed Lighthouse Inlet and landed at the southern tip of the island. Strong's troops advanced, capturing several batteries, moving about three miles to within range of Fort Wagner. Also known as Battery Wagner, it was a heavily gunned redoubt that covered nearly the entire width of the northern end of Morris Island, facing Sumter. Strong's report described the advance: “The two columns now moved forward, under a lively discharge of shell, grape, and canister, converging toward the works nearest the southern extremity of the island, and thence along its commanding ridge and eastern coast, capturing successively the eight batteries, of one heavy gun each, occupying the commanding points of that ridge, besides two batteries, mounting, together, three 10-inch seacoast mortars.”
C. 1864: Early’s raid on Washington, D.C. Monocacy, Maryland was a decisive rebel victory; but, it had come with a heavy price, and not only the 900 Confederate casualties. The Union troops, at the cost of 1,300 casualties, had delayed Early’s attack on Washington by an entire day. After camping on the battlefield, the exhausted Confederates resumed their march to Washington on Sunday morning, July 10, but they made limited progress in beastly heat. That night they camped spread out between Gaithersburg and Rockville.
D. 1864: Atlanta campaign: Approaching the Chattahoochee River, Maj Gen William T. Sherman feinted right but got troops across upstream. The Southern army retreated back toward Atlanta July 9-10. CSA General Joe Johnston pulls his troops back to consolidate his force at Peachtree Creek, about four miles from downtown Atlanta. There is panic in Atlanta and consternation in Richmond.
Background: Maj Gen William T. Sherman enjoyed clear numerical superiority, but he did not use it in blunt frontal attacks as Grant was doing against Lee in Virginia. Rather, he used Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland and Maj Gen. John M. Schofield's Army of the Ohio to demonstrate against the Rebel lines, while he sent Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee to maneuver around Johnston's left flank and threaten his supply line, the Western & Atlantic Railroad. This worked repeatedly throughout the campaign, beginning at Dalton, from which Johnston retreated May 12-13. While the two armies traded short, sharp attacks at Resaca May 14-15, McPherson crossed the Oostanaula River and Johnston retreated again. After Johnston's failed attempt to attack Sherman's army at Cassville on May 19, the front shifted to the area of Dallas-New Hope Church, where fighting inconclusively occurred May 25-28. Johnston dug in at Kennesaw Mountain, repelling Sherman's assaults June 27 before being flanked again.
FYI MSG Roy Cheever Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. PO3 Edward Riddle SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL Maj William W. 'Bill' Price COL (Join to see) COL Lisandro MurphySSgt David M. MAJ Dale E. Wilson, Ph.D. SPC Maurice Evans SPC Jon O. SGT David A. 'Cowboy' GrothSSG Trevor S.PO3 Phyllis Maynard SPC Miguel C. 1SG Steven Imerman SSgt Charles Ankner SGM Steve Wettstein SGT Jim Arnold
Edited >1 y ago
Posted >1 y ago
Responses: 9
LTC Stephen F. I am going to go with: 1864: Atlanta campaign: Approaching the Chattahoochee River, Maj Gen William T. Sherman feinted right but got troops across upstream. The Southern army retreated back toward Atlanta July 9-10. CSA General Joe Johnston pulls his troops back to consolidate-- I think it was a strategic move to go forward for the next campaign.
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Note. The siege of Jackson, Mississippi occurred in July 1863 not July 1862. Unfortunately I do not have administrative privileges to change the date in the survey response.
COL Mikel J. Burroughs COL Jean (John) F. B. LTC Stephen C. Maj William W. "Bill" Price Capt Seid Waddell SGM David W. Carr LOM, DMSM MP SGT 1stSgt Eugene Harless MSG Brad Sand SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSLSFC William Farrell SSG Leo Bell SSgt Robert Marx SGT John " Mac " McConnell SP5 Mark Kuzinski SGT Forrest Stewart SrA Christopher Wright SGT Robert George SPC (Join to see) Kim Bolen RN CCM ACM PO2 Ed C.
COL Mikel J. Burroughs COL Jean (John) F. B. LTC Stephen C. Maj William W. "Bill" Price Capt Seid Waddell SGM David W. Carr LOM, DMSM MP SGT 1stSgt Eugene Harless MSG Brad Sand SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSLSFC William Farrell SSG Leo Bell SSgt Robert Marx SGT John " Mac " McConnell SP5 Mark Kuzinski SGT Forrest Stewart SrA Christopher Wright SGT Robert George SPC (Join to see) Kim Bolen RN CCM ACM PO2 Ed C.
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Gen. Sherman's march to the sea only ended right before the end of the war at Appomattox CH with the Battle of Bentonville, NC. I toured the battlefield in the 1990's. There was not a lot there. It still moved me immensely to be on spot where such a historical event occurred.
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LTC Stephen F.
Thanks SSgt Robert Marx for your response and your comments on Capt Seid Waddell's response.
Many associate total warfare with the twentieth century conflicts of WWI and WWII.
In our Civil War, the South embarked on a total warfare quest in 1862 an Antietam, and in July, 1863 they tried again in what has been known as the Gettysburg campaign.
While in the western theater of operations Grant waged total warfare along the Mississippi and Sherman's march to the sea became the most famous or infamous depending upon perspective.
Many associate total warfare with the twentieth century conflicts of WWI and WWII.
In our Civil War, the South embarked on a total warfare quest in 1862 an Antietam, and in July, 1863 they tried again in what has been known as the Gettysburg campaign.
While in the western theater of operations Grant waged total warfare along the Mississippi and Sherman's march to the sea became the most famous or infamous depending upon perspective.
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Capt Seid Waddell
SSgt Robert Marx, LTC Stephen F., the total war concept of Sherman's march to the sea actually officially started in the Shenandoah Valley in March 1864.
"The Shenandoah Valley became a prime target in 1864 as the American Civil War took a turn from a limited war to ‘Total War.’
This new ‘Total War’ policy called for broader war effort against the Southern populace and allowed the direct targeting of civilian property, if it was deemed useful to the Confederate war effort. This change was devised not only to destroy supplies, livestock and food meant for Confederate armies, but also to break the will power of the Southern people to fight on.
After Gen. Jubal Early's raid on Washington in mid-July, Grant advised Chief-of-Staff Henry Halleck to see to it that Early was pursued by ‘veterans, militia men, men on horseback, and everything that can be got to follow,’ with specific instructions to ‘eat out Virginia clean and clear as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to carry their own provender with them’.
When Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan took command of the Army of the Shenandoah on August 6, Grant's orders were to, ‘Give the enemy no rest.… Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste’."
https://www.nps.gov/cebe/learn/historyculture/the-burning.htm
"The Shenandoah Valley became a prime target in 1864 as the American Civil War took a turn from a limited war to ‘Total War.’
This new ‘Total War’ policy called for broader war effort against the Southern populace and allowed the direct targeting of civilian property, if it was deemed useful to the Confederate war effort. This change was devised not only to destroy supplies, livestock and food meant for Confederate armies, but also to break the will power of the Southern people to fight on.
After Gen. Jubal Early's raid on Washington in mid-July, Grant advised Chief-of-Staff Henry Halleck to see to it that Early was pursued by ‘veterans, militia men, men on horseback, and everything that can be got to follow,’ with specific instructions to ‘eat out Virginia clean and clear as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to carry their own provender with them’.
When Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan took command of the Army of the Shenandoah on August 6, Grant's orders were to, ‘Give the enemy no rest.… Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste’."
https://www.nps.gov/cebe/learn/historyculture/the-burning.htm
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