Posted on Nov 25, 2016
What was the most significant event on September 20 during the U.S. Civil War?
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In 1862, the Union ironclad USS Lancer arrived near Shiloh, North Carolina. It sent a landing party ashore and quickly engaged a small Confederate force. The Confederates were soon driven away.
In 1863, the battle at the “River of Death” AKA Chickamauga Creek, GA was fought until nightfall. The total casualties from this two-day battle were second to Gettysburg, PA alone which lasted longer than two days. “The bloodiest two days in American history cost the Federals 1,657 dead, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing for a total of 16,170 casualties out of 58,000 troops. The Confederate losses were 2,312 dead, 14,674 wounded and 1,468 for a total of 18,545 out of 66,000 troops.”
In 1862, near Shepherdstown, VA. “As the sun rose over their camps in Maryland on the 20th, Union soldiers finished their coffee and fell into line to march across Boteler’s Ford again. First, a detachment of infantry took some horses from Battery D, 5th U.S. Artillery, to scoop up the Rebel guns abandoned the day before. It was sweet revenge, as one of the guns had been captured from Battery D at the First Battle of Manassason July 21, 1861. Brigadier General George Sykes’ division of U.S. Regulars followed close behind. The Regular regiments, while tough and reliable, were understrength because many of their companies were still scattered in distant frontier posts. Sykes expected some cavalry to scout the area ahead of him, but orders reached the horsemen so late that they crossed about the same time as the infantry. It was the first in a chain of mistakes that would plague the Federals that day.
The bluecoats headed toward Shepherdstown along a road that ran along a narrow strip of bottomland underneath a tall cliff split by a ravine. The Federals filed past a large abandoned brick building that had once housed a cement mill. A dam across the river had diverted water to power the mill. Also nearby stood three stone limekilns with large arched openings that faced the river. A steep road twisted its way up the ravine to the top of the cliffs.
Major Charles S. Lovell took the 2nd Brigade of Sykes’ division to a belt of woods a mile or so from the river and sent out a skirmish line to within what he thought was ‘30 or 40 paces’ from the edge of the woods. They had expected their cavalry to reconnoiter the area, but to their surprise, Lovell’s skirmishers spotted enemy troops approaching them. Lovell quickly sent word to Sykes. A short distance upriver, a woman forded the Potomac at Shepherdstown to alert the Union army that a large force of Confederates was marching to Boteler’s Ford. A quick look through a spyglass was enough to confirm her warning.
Meanwhile, other units were crossing the Potomac, including Colonel James Barnes’ brigade of Maj. Gen. George W. Morell’s division. Among Barnes’ regiments was the 118th Pennsylvania, a green regiment that had left Philadelphia for the war only three weeks before, after barely a month of training. The Philadelphia Corn Exchange, a financial market that speculated in agricultural futures, paid for their equipment and a $10 bonus for each man, and the regiment was therefore nicknamed the ‘Corn Exchange Regiment.’ During the Battle of Antietam, they had been in the reserve and so had not yet 'seen the elephant.'
The 118th splashed into the Potomac River with orders to march to Shepherdstown. Despite the cold water, they were in high spirits and laughed when any unfortunate comrades slipped and stumbled into the river. Not knowing that Lovell’s pickets had spotted enemy troops, they thought it looked like the Rebs had skedaddled and it would just be an easy day’s march. The Pennsylvanians waded ashore, then halted long enough to replace their socks and shoes before being hustled off to take a position atop the cliffs.
Captain Francis A. Donaldson of Company H of the 118th, however, felt uneasy about the circumstances; the lay of the land was all too familiar. On October 21, 1861, Donaldson had been with the 71st Pennsylvania at the Battle of Ball’s Bluff. Now he found himself once again with his back to a high cliff overlooking the Potomac, with the Army of Northern Virginia somewhere to the west.
Donaldson had good reason to worry. Lovell’s pickets had spotted Hill’s Light Division. The brigades of Brig. Gens. Maxcy Gregg and William D. Pender and Colonel Edward L. Thomas were marching out of a cornfield toward the Union pickets. Right behind them were Brig. Gen. James J. Archer’s and Colonels James H. Lane’s and John M. Brockenbrough’s brigades. A veteran of the 33rd North Carolina recalled that the day ‘was extremely hot, and the sufferings of the men were great.’
Pendleton’s cannons had moved so far to the rear that no Confederate artillery was in position to support Hill’s infantry, and the Yankee guns across the river poured shot and shell into the Confederate ranks with no concern for counterbattery fire. The shell fire was 'so accurate that they’d hit a litter carrying off our wounded, or our canteen men, going across a ridge in our rear for water,' according to a man of the 18th North Carolina. Hill wrote that his men were unflinching in the face of 'the most tremendous fire of artillery I ever saw….It was as if each man felt that the fate of the army was centered in himself.'
Porter, seeing the unexpectedly aggressive Confederates sweeping toward his forces, ordered a withdrawal. The Regulars extricated themselves with so little trouble that one of them felt like going back for more. Private Daniel Webster Burke of the 2nd U.S. Infantry was back on the Maryland side when he realized that one abandoned Rebel cannon had not been spiked. He got permission to go back and take care of the gun. Confederate lead tore through the air around him as he forded the river, spiked the cannon and turned back to rejoin his comrades. In 1892 Burke, who had stayed in the Army and had attained the rank of colonel, was awarded the Medal of Honor for his conspicuous bravery that day in 1862.
Among the other bluecoat regiments getting their baptism by fire that day was the 20th Maine Infantry. Ten months later, they would win immortal fame for their crucial stand on Little Round Top at the Battle of Gettysburg. Their second in command, Lt. Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, rode a borrowed horse partway across the ford to direct reinforcements who were being sent to cover the withdrawal. The ford there was passable, but deep enough that the infantrymen were in danger of being swept off their feet and lost in the current. After the infantry had waded past Chamberlain, a bullet struck his mount. The wounded horse dumped Chamberlain into the river, but the officer dragged himself dripping wet but unhurt to the bank. Chamberlain’s regiment performed well during its first time under fire. Despite some initial fear and confusion, only three of his men were wounded; one had accidentally shot himself with his musket.
The 118th Pennsylvania would not get off so easily. They were positioned across a ravine from their compatriots when couriers brought orders for neighboring regiments to retire across the river. The messenger sent to the 118th delivered the orders to a line officer, who relayed them to the colonel. Men from other regiments yelled across a ravine to relay the same orders. When word reached Colonel Charles Mallet Prevost, he spurned the messages, saying: ‘I do not receive orders in that way. If Colonel Barnes has any message to give me, let his aide come to me.’
Prevost’s men quickly regretted his cavalier attitude toward the orders. Not only were the rookies facing Hill’s veterans, but half the Enfield rifles issued to the 118th had defective mainsprings, and the hammers could not strike hard enough to pop the percussion caps. Some men, dazed by the shock of their first combat, were not even aware that their rifles were not firing and rammed cartridge after cartridge into them. As men gave up and tossed away their useless weapons, others grimly held on and pounded on the hammers with rocks to force them to fire. Officers searched desperately for rifles dropped by the dead or wounded, hoping to find some that still worked.
Colonel Prevost grasped the regimental standard, waving the banner to steady his men and urge them forward. A musket ball slammed into his shoulder and ended the brief rally. Command passed to Lt. Col. James Gwyn. An aide brought new orders to retreat; Gwyn made no pompous objections to their form and heeded them. The intensity of Hill’s attack and the inexperience of the regiment began to tell. The 118th fell back to the edge of the cliff and broke up in panic and confusion. Men rushed and tumbled down the steep hillside and streamed into the river as Hill’s men reached the edge of the cliff and unleashed their fire at the fleeing Pennsylvanians. A Tar Heel soldier of Pender’s Brigade watched ‘them take the water like ducks.’ Other Confederates took cover in the cement mill, firing out of the windows. It was the repeat of Ball’s Bluff that Donaldson had feared.
Some of the 118th took shelter in the old limekilns near the cement factory. There, they had to dodge not only Rebel fire but also their own artillery. The gunners across the river were cutting the fuses too short, and shells exploded among the men trying to take shelter along the riverbank. Donaldson believed one Union shell alone killed 12 or 15 of their own soldiers, and he watched several of his men rush with a white flag to the Rebel lines to escape the friendly fire.
Crossing the Potomac under combined enemy and friendly fire seemed less dangerous than staying, and most of the Pennsylvanians decided to risk it. Some waded into the water, while others threaded their way across the mill dam, which in places was knee deep in water. Musket balls tore splinters from the slippery planks of the dam as Colonel Prevost was carried across. Many men were shot down before they could get to safety. Lieutenant J. Rudhall White only had time to give thanks to God for reaching the other side when a musket ball fatally struck him.
The 118th began the fight with 737 men. When the fighting died down around 2 p.m., three officers and 60 men had been killed, 101 were wounded and 105 were missing. Their 269 casualties constituted the bulk of the 361 Union men lost during the battle. Hill was satisfied at driving the Yankees back across the Potomac, and made no attempt to follow. Confederate losses numbered 30 dead and 261 wounded.
The Confederates, jubilant with victory, believed the Union cost was even higher. Hill thought that he had seen ‘the most terrible slaughter that this war has yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating bodies of our foe.’
Some of Prevost’s men blamed his stubbornness for the regiment’s losses. The wound he received while waving the regiment’s flag in the teeth of the enemy attack, however, not only saved Prevost from any official censure but eventually got him a brevet promotion to brigadier general.
The Battle of Shepherdstown was the last bloodshed of the 1862 Maryland campaign. The minor disaster convinced McClellan that caution should be the byword when pursuing Lee’s army. His Union forces reoccupied Harpers Ferry but went no farther, and the Federal general seemed content with reports from his signal posts that the Army of Northern Virginia was remaining static.”
http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/index/shepherdstown-history-articles/battle-of-shepherdstown.html
Pictures: 1863-09-20 Battle of Chickamauga - River Of Death; 1863-09-20 Chickamauga 0900-1100 Early Confederate attacks on the Union left Map 1; 1863-09-20 Chickamauga 1100 to mid-afternoon - Longstreet's Assault Map 2; 1863-09-20 Chickamauga Mid-afternoon till dark Map 3
A. 1861: Battle of Lexington, MO ends in Confederate Victory. After laying siege for nearly a week, Confederate forces of 18,000 men commanded by CSA Maj Gen Sterling Price captured the hills around Lexington, Mo, thus making the city even more open to artillery attacks. An attempt to get supplies to Colonel James Mulligan’s 3,600 Union defenders via the river system failed when the Confederates captured the supply boats along with their supplies. After fighting intensified on September 19, Mulligan surrendered on the 20th.
B. 1862: Confederate victory at Battle of Shepherdstown [Boteler's Ford]. On September 19, a detachment of Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rearguard commanded by Brig. Gen. William Pendleton, and captured four guns. Early on the 20th, Porter pushed elements of two divisions across the Potomac to establish a bridgehead. Hill's division counterattacked while many of the Federals were crossing and nearly annihilated the 118th Pennsylvania (the "Corn Exchange" Regiment), inflicting 269 casualties. This rearguard action discouraged Federal pursuit.
C. 1863: Battle of Chickamauga, GA ends in Confederate Victory. Battle of Chickamauga, GA ends in Confederate Victory. The fighting was essentially toe to toe from one end to the other until, due to a mistaken order, Union troops right in the center under Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood were pulled out of position. In the Confederate center were the forces of Lt Gen James Longstreet, who lost no time capitalizing on this opening. The Union line nearly dissolved, except for Maj Gen George Henry Thomas. Gathering his men on a rise called Snodgrass Hill, they formed a defensive line that held all afternoon; getting for Thomas the nickname “The Rock of Chickamauga.” After dark, under orders, Thomas withdrew to rejoin the rest of the Union army in Chattanooga. CSA Maj Gen Braxton Bragg had won his battle, but it come at a terrible cost. The Battle of Chickamauga was the second costliest battle of the Civil War, ranking only behind Gettysburg, and was by far the deadliest battle fought in the West. These bloody two days in American history cost the Federals 1,657 dead, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing for a total of 16,170 casualties out of 58,000 troops. The Confederate losses were 2,312 dead, 14,674 wounded and 1,468 missing for a total of 18,545 out of 66,000 troops.
Details: Following the successful Tullahoma Campaign, Union Gen. William S. Rosecrans hoped to continue the offensive and force Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga. Rosecrans consolidated Union forces that had been scattered throughout Tennessee and Georgia, and forced Bragg to evacuate the city. Bragg concentrated his forces in LaFayette, Georgia, and determined to reoccupy the valuable Chattanooga. He followed the Union army north, skirmishing with them at Davis’ Cross Roads. The Battle of Chickamauga resumed at 9:30 a.m. the next morning, with coordinated Confederate attacks on the Union left flank. About an hour later, Rosecrans, believing a gap existed in his line, ordered Brig. Gen. Thomas Wood’s division to fill the gap. Wood, however, knew that the order was a mistake; no such gap existed in the Federal line, and moving his division would, in turn, open a large swath in the Union position. However, Wood had already been berated twice in the campaign for not promptly following orders. To avoid further reprimand, he immediately moved, creating a division wide hole in the Union line. This was the chance that the Confederates needed. Longstreet massed a striking force, led by Gen. Hood, of eight brigades divided into three lines. Longstreet’s men hammered through the gap that Wood had created, and Union resistance at the southern end of the battlefield evaporated as Federal troops, including Rosecrans himself, were pushed off the field.
George H. Thomas, in a move that would earn him the name “The Rock of Chickamauga,” took command and began consolidating the scattered Union forces on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. Thomas and his men formed a defensive position, and although Confederates continued to assault and pressed to within feet of the Union line, the Yankees held firm. Thomas withdrew as darkness fell. Although Thomas urged Rosecrans to lead the army in an attack the next day, Rosecrans rejected the idea and remained in Chattanooga. Bragg’s victorious army occupied the heights surrounding Chattanooga, blocking Federal supply lines, but did not pursue Rosecrans.
While Chickamauga was a decided Confederate victory, the results of the battle were staggering. With over 16,000 Union and 18,000 Confederate casualties, Chickamauga reached the highest losses of any battle in the Western theater. Although the Confederates had driven Rosecrans from the field, they had not succeeded in Bragg’s goals of destroying Rosecrans’s army or reoccupying Chattanooga. Fighting would resume less than two months later in the battles for Chattanooga.
D. 1864: Maj Gen William T. Sherman revealed his plans to March to the Sea in a letter to Lt Gen U.S. Grant. If Grant could manage to capture Savannah, Sherman vowed that he “would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores and depending on the country for the balance.” If Savannah was in Federal hands, “I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and would so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me Augusta, with the only powder mills and factories remaining the the South, or let us have the Savannah River.” Either Augusta or Macon would be, in Sherman’s mind, “worth a battle.”
He would “start east and make a circuit south and back [to Atlanta], doing vast damage to the State.” But this would do little good in the long run. He could also threaten to do just that, and thus “hold a rod over the Georgians who are not overloyal to the South.”
Though Sherman proposed speed, he allowed that the campaign could be put off till winter. But whatever was to be done, there had to be some sort of plan. “The more I study the game the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for me to penetrate much farther into Georgia without an objective beyond.”
To that end, Sherman thought it best that Grant’s army and the army based out of New Orleans (now under the helm of Edward Canby) “be reenforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the [Savannah] River; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River and send a force to get Columbus, Ga., either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed, and put my army in find order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commence, and the city of Savannah is in our [meaning Federal] possession.”
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In 1863, the battle at the “River of Death” AKA Chickamauga Creek, GA was fought until nightfall. The total casualties from this two-day battle were second to Gettysburg, PA alone which lasted longer than two days. “The bloodiest two days in American history cost the Federals 1,657 dead, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing for a total of 16,170 casualties out of 58,000 troops. The Confederate losses were 2,312 dead, 14,674 wounded and 1,468 for a total of 18,545 out of 66,000 troops.”
In 1862, near Shepherdstown, VA. “As the sun rose over their camps in Maryland on the 20th, Union soldiers finished their coffee and fell into line to march across Boteler’s Ford again. First, a detachment of infantry took some horses from Battery D, 5th U.S. Artillery, to scoop up the Rebel guns abandoned the day before. It was sweet revenge, as one of the guns had been captured from Battery D at the First Battle of Manassason July 21, 1861. Brigadier General George Sykes’ division of U.S. Regulars followed close behind. The Regular regiments, while tough and reliable, were understrength because many of their companies were still scattered in distant frontier posts. Sykes expected some cavalry to scout the area ahead of him, but orders reached the horsemen so late that they crossed about the same time as the infantry. It was the first in a chain of mistakes that would plague the Federals that day.
The bluecoats headed toward Shepherdstown along a road that ran along a narrow strip of bottomland underneath a tall cliff split by a ravine. The Federals filed past a large abandoned brick building that had once housed a cement mill. A dam across the river had diverted water to power the mill. Also nearby stood three stone limekilns with large arched openings that faced the river. A steep road twisted its way up the ravine to the top of the cliffs.
Major Charles S. Lovell took the 2nd Brigade of Sykes’ division to a belt of woods a mile or so from the river and sent out a skirmish line to within what he thought was ‘30 or 40 paces’ from the edge of the woods. They had expected their cavalry to reconnoiter the area, but to their surprise, Lovell’s skirmishers spotted enemy troops approaching them. Lovell quickly sent word to Sykes. A short distance upriver, a woman forded the Potomac at Shepherdstown to alert the Union army that a large force of Confederates was marching to Boteler’s Ford. A quick look through a spyglass was enough to confirm her warning.
Meanwhile, other units were crossing the Potomac, including Colonel James Barnes’ brigade of Maj. Gen. George W. Morell’s division. Among Barnes’ regiments was the 118th Pennsylvania, a green regiment that had left Philadelphia for the war only three weeks before, after barely a month of training. The Philadelphia Corn Exchange, a financial market that speculated in agricultural futures, paid for their equipment and a $10 bonus for each man, and the regiment was therefore nicknamed the ‘Corn Exchange Regiment.’ During the Battle of Antietam, they had been in the reserve and so had not yet 'seen the elephant.'
The 118th splashed into the Potomac River with orders to march to Shepherdstown. Despite the cold water, they were in high spirits and laughed when any unfortunate comrades slipped and stumbled into the river. Not knowing that Lovell’s pickets had spotted enemy troops, they thought it looked like the Rebs had skedaddled and it would just be an easy day’s march. The Pennsylvanians waded ashore, then halted long enough to replace their socks and shoes before being hustled off to take a position atop the cliffs.
Captain Francis A. Donaldson of Company H of the 118th, however, felt uneasy about the circumstances; the lay of the land was all too familiar. On October 21, 1861, Donaldson had been with the 71st Pennsylvania at the Battle of Ball’s Bluff. Now he found himself once again with his back to a high cliff overlooking the Potomac, with the Army of Northern Virginia somewhere to the west.
Donaldson had good reason to worry. Lovell’s pickets had spotted Hill’s Light Division. The brigades of Brig. Gens. Maxcy Gregg and William D. Pender and Colonel Edward L. Thomas were marching out of a cornfield toward the Union pickets. Right behind them were Brig. Gen. James J. Archer’s and Colonels James H. Lane’s and John M. Brockenbrough’s brigades. A veteran of the 33rd North Carolina recalled that the day ‘was extremely hot, and the sufferings of the men were great.’
Pendleton’s cannons had moved so far to the rear that no Confederate artillery was in position to support Hill’s infantry, and the Yankee guns across the river poured shot and shell into the Confederate ranks with no concern for counterbattery fire. The shell fire was 'so accurate that they’d hit a litter carrying off our wounded, or our canteen men, going across a ridge in our rear for water,' according to a man of the 18th North Carolina. Hill wrote that his men were unflinching in the face of 'the most tremendous fire of artillery I ever saw….It was as if each man felt that the fate of the army was centered in himself.'
Porter, seeing the unexpectedly aggressive Confederates sweeping toward his forces, ordered a withdrawal. The Regulars extricated themselves with so little trouble that one of them felt like going back for more. Private Daniel Webster Burke of the 2nd U.S. Infantry was back on the Maryland side when he realized that one abandoned Rebel cannon had not been spiked. He got permission to go back and take care of the gun. Confederate lead tore through the air around him as he forded the river, spiked the cannon and turned back to rejoin his comrades. In 1892 Burke, who had stayed in the Army and had attained the rank of colonel, was awarded the Medal of Honor for his conspicuous bravery that day in 1862.
Among the other bluecoat regiments getting their baptism by fire that day was the 20th Maine Infantry. Ten months later, they would win immortal fame for their crucial stand on Little Round Top at the Battle of Gettysburg. Their second in command, Lt. Col. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, rode a borrowed horse partway across the ford to direct reinforcements who were being sent to cover the withdrawal. The ford there was passable, but deep enough that the infantrymen were in danger of being swept off their feet and lost in the current. After the infantry had waded past Chamberlain, a bullet struck his mount. The wounded horse dumped Chamberlain into the river, but the officer dragged himself dripping wet but unhurt to the bank. Chamberlain’s regiment performed well during its first time under fire. Despite some initial fear and confusion, only three of his men were wounded; one had accidentally shot himself with his musket.
The 118th Pennsylvania would not get off so easily. They were positioned across a ravine from their compatriots when couriers brought orders for neighboring regiments to retire across the river. The messenger sent to the 118th delivered the orders to a line officer, who relayed them to the colonel. Men from other regiments yelled across a ravine to relay the same orders. When word reached Colonel Charles Mallet Prevost, he spurned the messages, saying: ‘I do not receive orders in that way. If Colonel Barnes has any message to give me, let his aide come to me.’
Prevost’s men quickly regretted his cavalier attitude toward the orders. Not only were the rookies facing Hill’s veterans, but half the Enfield rifles issued to the 118th had defective mainsprings, and the hammers could not strike hard enough to pop the percussion caps. Some men, dazed by the shock of their first combat, were not even aware that their rifles were not firing and rammed cartridge after cartridge into them. As men gave up and tossed away their useless weapons, others grimly held on and pounded on the hammers with rocks to force them to fire. Officers searched desperately for rifles dropped by the dead or wounded, hoping to find some that still worked.
Colonel Prevost grasped the regimental standard, waving the banner to steady his men and urge them forward. A musket ball slammed into his shoulder and ended the brief rally. Command passed to Lt. Col. James Gwyn. An aide brought new orders to retreat; Gwyn made no pompous objections to their form and heeded them. The intensity of Hill’s attack and the inexperience of the regiment began to tell. The 118th fell back to the edge of the cliff and broke up in panic and confusion. Men rushed and tumbled down the steep hillside and streamed into the river as Hill’s men reached the edge of the cliff and unleashed their fire at the fleeing Pennsylvanians. A Tar Heel soldier of Pender’s Brigade watched ‘them take the water like ducks.’ Other Confederates took cover in the cement mill, firing out of the windows. It was the repeat of Ball’s Bluff that Donaldson had feared.
Some of the 118th took shelter in the old limekilns near the cement factory. There, they had to dodge not only Rebel fire but also their own artillery. The gunners across the river were cutting the fuses too short, and shells exploded among the men trying to take shelter along the riverbank. Donaldson believed one Union shell alone killed 12 or 15 of their own soldiers, and he watched several of his men rush with a white flag to the Rebel lines to escape the friendly fire.
Crossing the Potomac under combined enemy and friendly fire seemed less dangerous than staying, and most of the Pennsylvanians decided to risk it. Some waded into the water, while others threaded their way across the mill dam, which in places was knee deep in water. Musket balls tore splinters from the slippery planks of the dam as Colonel Prevost was carried across. Many men were shot down before they could get to safety. Lieutenant J. Rudhall White only had time to give thanks to God for reaching the other side when a musket ball fatally struck him.
The 118th began the fight with 737 men. When the fighting died down around 2 p.m., three officers and 60 men had been killed, 101 were wounded and 105 were missing. Their 269 casualties constituted the bulk of the 361 Union men lost during the battle. Hill was satisfied at driving the Yankees back across the Potomac, and made no attempt to follow. Confederate losses numbered 30 dead and 261 wounded.
The Confederates, jubilant with victory, believed the Union cost was even higher. Hill thought that he had seen ‘the most terrible slaughter that this war has yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating bodies of our foe.’
Some of Prevost’s men blamed his stubbornness for the regiment’s losses. The wound he received while waving the regiment’s flag in the teeth of the enemy attack, however, not only saved Prevost from any official censure but eventually got him a brevet promotion to brigadier general.
The Battle of Shepherdstown was the last bloodshed of the 1862 Maryland campaign. The minor disaster convinced McClellan that caution should be the byword when pursuing Lee’s army. His Union forces reoccupied Harpers Ferry but went no farther, and the Federal general seemed content with reports from his signal posts that the Army of Northern Virginia was remaining static.”
http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/index/shepherdstown-history-articles/battle-of-shepherdstown.html
Pictures: 1863-09-20 Battle of Chickamauga - River Of Death; 1863-09-20 Chickamauga 0900-1100 Early Confederate attacks on the Union left Map 1; 1863-09-20 Chickamauga 1100 to mid-afternoon - Longstreet's Assault Map 2; 1863-09-20 Chickamauga Mid-afternoon till dark Map 3
A. 1861: Battle of Lexington, MO ends in Confederate Victory. After laying siege for nearly a week, Confederate forces of 18,000 men commanded by CSA Maj Gen Sterling Price captured the hills around Lexington, Mo, thus making the city even more open to artillery attacks. An attempt to get supplies to Colonel James Mulligan’s 3,600 Union defenders via the river system failed when the Confederates captured the supply boats along with their supplies. After fighting intensified on September 19, Mulligan surrendered on the 20th.
B. 1862: Confederate victory at Battle of Shepherdstown [Boteler's Ford]. On September 19, a detachment of Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rearguard commanded by Brig. Gen. William Pendleton, and captured four guns. Early on the 20th, Porter pushed elements of two divisions across the Potomac to establish a bridgehead. Hill's division counterattacked while many of the Federals were crossing and nearly annihilated the 118th Pennsylvania (the "Corn Exchange" Regiment), inflicting 269 casualties. This rearguard action discouraged Federal pursuit.
C. 1863: Battle of Chickamauga, GA ends in Confederate Victory. Battle of Chickamauga, GA ends in Confederate Victory. The fighting was essentially toe to toe from one end to the other until, due to a mistaken order, Union troops right in the center under Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood were pulled out of position. In the Confederate center were the forces of Lt Gen James Longstreet, who lost no time capitalizing on this opening. The Union line nearly dissolved, except for Maj Gen George Henry Thomas. Gathering his men on a rise called Snodgrass Hill, they formed a defensive line that held all afternoon; getting for Thomas the nickname “The Rock of Chickamauga.” After dark, under orders, Thomas withdrew to rejoin the rest of the Union army in Chattanooga. CSA Maj Gen Braxton Bragg had won his battle, but it come at a terrible cost. The Battle of Chickamauga was the second costliest battle of the Civil War, ranking only behind Gettysburg, and was by far the deadliest battle fought in the West. These bloody two days in American history cost the Federals 1,657 dead, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing for a total of 16,170 casualties out of 58,000 troops. The Confederate losses were 2,312 dead, 14,674 wounded and 1,468 missing for a total of 18,545 out of 66,000 troops.
Details: Following the successful Tullahoma Campaign, Union Gen. William S. Rosecrans hoped to continue the offensive and force Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga. Rosecrans consolidated Union forces that had been scattered throughout Tennessee and Georgia, and forced Bragg to evacuate the city. Bragg concentrated his forces in LaFayette, Georgia, and determined to reoccupy the valuable Chattanooga. He followed the Union army north, skirmishing with them at Davis’ Cross Roads. The Battle of Chickamauga resumed at 9:30 a.m. the next morning, with coordinated Confederate attacks on the Union left flank. About an hour later, Rosecrans, believing a gap existed in his line, ordered Brig. Gen. Thomas Wood’s division to fill the gap. Wood, however, knew that the order was a mistake; no such gap existed in the Federal line, and moving his division would, in turn, open a large swath in the Union position. However, Wood had already been berated twice in the campaign for not promptly following orders. To avoid further reprimand, he immediately moved, creating a division wide hole in the Union line. This was the chance that the Confederates needed. Longstreet massed a striking force, led by Gen. Hood, of eight brigades divided into three lines. Longstreet’s men hammered through the gap that Wood had created, and Union resistance at the southern end of the battlefield evaporated as Federal troops, including Rosecrans himself, were pushed off the field.
George H. Thomas, in a move that would earn him the name “The Rock of Chickamauga,” took command and began consolidating the scattered Union forces on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. Thomas and his men formed a defensive position, and although Confederates continued to assault and pressed to within feet of the Union line, the Yankees held firm. Thomas withdrew as darkness fell. Although Thomas urged Rosecrans to lead the army in an attack the next day, Rosecrans rejected the idea and remained in Chattanooga. Bragg’s victorious army occupied the heights surrounding Chattanooga, blocking Federal supply lines, but did not pursue Rosecrans.
While Chickamauga was a decided Confederate victory, the results of the battle were staggering. With over 16,000 Union and 18,000 Confederate casualties, Chickamauga reached the highest losses of any battle in the Western theater. Although the Confederates had driven Rosecrans from the field, they had not succeeded in Bragg’s goals of destroying Rosecrans’s army or reoccupying Chattanooga. Fighting would resume less than two months later in the battles for Chattanooga.
D. 1864: Maj Gen William T. Sherman revealed his plans to March to the Sea in a letter to Lt Gen U.S. Grant. If Grant could manage to capture Savannah, Sherman vowed that he “would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores and depending on the country for the balance.” If Savannah was in Federal hands, “I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and would so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me Augusta, with the only powder mills and factories remaining the the South, or let us have the Savannah River.” Either Augusta or Macon would be, in Sherman’s mind, “worth a battle.”
He would “start east and make a circuit south and back [to Atlanta], doing vast damage to the State.” But this would do little good in the long run. He could also threaten to do just that, and thus “hold a rod over the Georgians who are not overloyal to the South.”
Though Sherman proposed speed, he allowed that the campaign could be put off till winter. But whatever was to be done, there had to be some sort of plan. “The more I study the game the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for me to penetrate much farther into Georgia without an objective beyond.”
To that end, Sherman thought it best that Grant’s army and the army based out of New Orleans (now under the helm of Edward Canby) “be reenforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the [Savannah] River; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River and send a force to get Columbus, Ga., either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed, and put my army in find order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commence, and the city of Savannah is in our [meaning Federal] possession.”
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In 1863 at the second and final day of the Battle of Chickamauga. “William Rosecrans, commander of the Union Army of the Cumberland, knew he could not attack. The previous day’s fighting along the Chickamauga had left his army wounded, and now only five brigades remained fresh. For him, reinforcements could not possibly come quickly enough, and they most certainly would not come on this day. He believed himself to be facing perhaps as many as 120,000 Rebels. The true number was about half that. Retreat, as well, seemed impossible. He knew the fate that had befallen other officers before him who had beat hastily towards the north. No, his army would stay and they would receive the enemy’s attacks, and if fortune was with them, the Federals would withstand the strike.
Through the cold night, Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee heard the axes of the enemy felling trees, while the spades dug rifle pits. The only thing that was certain across those dark spaces was that the Federals were not retreating. Everything else was in flux and confusion. Late the previous evening, Bragg had completely reorganized his army, placing half under the newly-arrived James Longstreet, and half under Leonidas Polk. This effectively demoted several high ranking generals, of whom D.H. Hill was the highest.
General Hill commanded a corps, answering to no one but Bragg. Now, he was under Polk, yet was not informed of the change. Bragg had passed it off upon Polk, who, in turn, passed it off upon a courier, who, after searching for some amount of time, could not find Hill and returned to his own camp.
This courier carried with him not only news of Hill’s new and lesser rank, but written orders of the roll he was to play in the morning’s battle. Hill’s Corps, with General John Breckenridge’s Division in the lead, was to begin the attack against the Federal left flank. Though the courier bears some of the blame, most was held by General Bragg himself as Breckenridge had spent a good deal of time in his company the night before.
And so when dawn finally broke, General Hill was still missing. It was only then that Polk took command, sending orders to Hill’s divisional commanders to attack at once. When this message was delivered, however, the courier found Hill in a meeting with his commanders. Hill refused to go into action right away. It was the first he had heard of the plan, he claimed, and wouldn’t be able to move “for an hour or more.”
By this time, Bragg was personally on the scene and berated both Polk and Hill. The main complaint lodged by Hill was that the lines had not been reconnoitered, and for that, he could not be blamed. His corps had been on the Confederate left the previous evening as per orders issued before the reorganization and had just arrived on the right. There was no cavalry on his flanks and nobody seemed to know anything.
General Rosecrans’ line was in two main segments. George Thomas commanded the left, while Alexander McCook held the right. Believing that Bragg’s main goal was to retake Chattanooga, he was determined to hold Thomas’ line, which blocked the roads leading into the city. Knowing this, Thomas called upon Rosecrans for reinforcements.
Rosecrans was not deaf to Thomas’ call, and pulled brigades from his right to strengthen his left. This became a farcical debacle. General James Negley commanded one of Thomas’ Divisions. He had been too far to the right to take much part in the initial struggle. Seeing this, Rosecrans ordered Thomas Wood’s Division from Thomas Crittenden’s Corps to fill the gap left by Negley. Wood apparently misunderstood the orders and moved his division to support Negley, not replace him. This put him a third of a mile behind the actual line.
When Rosecrans noticed, he let loose his rage upon General Wood, who finally moved into his proper position, replacing Negley’s Division. What nobody seemed to notice until now was that Negley’s Division was made up of three brigades, while Wood’s had only two. If Wood were left on his own, he would open up a brigade-size gap in the Federal line. Without orders, Negley left one of his brigades behind.
Finally, at 9:30am, the Confederate attack began. Breckenridge’s Division stepped off, followed en echelon by Patrick Cleburne on his left. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s troopers also joined in, greatly impressing General Hill. They came screaming with violence, hurling themselves against breastworks constructed by four different divisions. But it was futile. Even without the reserves called for by General Thomas, the Federals beat back the storming Rebels, whose wave crested and receded through the mid morning, leaving thousands of wounded and dead behind.
Through the morning attacks, the Union center, held by Joseph Reynolds’ Division, had been lightly hit. When word came for yet more reinforcements to be shifted to the left, Rosecrans turned to General John Brannan, commanding the division on Reynolds’ right. Though Reynolds told Brannan that he could probably hold his own if Thomas really needed him, it was Thomas that canceled the order. Thomas, however, neglected to tell anyone but Brannan about it.
To fill the gap that would have been made if Brannan had left, Rosecrans ordered General Wood, who was on Brannan’s right, to shift to the left. Wood followed the orders to the letter, even though his own skirmishers were engaged and Brannan was still in position. This created a division-size gap in the Federal line, one that General Jefferson C. Davis, whose division was in reserve, was rushing to fill when James Longstreet launched the second Confederate assault.
When John Bell Hood’s Rebels smashed into the Federal line, it was already in confusion and crumbled easily. So quickly it came, and unexpected, that General Rosecrans himself was forced to flee as thousands of Confederates broke through and captured his headquarters.
“All became confusion,” remembered General Gates Thruston, who witnessed the route. “No order could be heard above the tempest of battle. With a wild yell the Confederates swept on the far to their left. They seemed everywhere victorious.” General Rosecrans did not stop until he reached Chattanooga.
And yet, there was still Thomas. The Federal right had collapsed, but the reinforced left had remained. An excited General Longstreet wanted to follow the retreating Yankees, battering them all the way back to Chattanooga. General Bragg, however, was in a foul mood. The battle might have been going in their direction, but it was not moving according to his machinations. He had dreamed of rolling up the Federal left with Polk’s wing, not routing the Federal right with Longstreet’s.
Longstreet was completely taken aback, and immediately assumed that Bragg somehow believed that the battle had been lost. With nothing left to do, Longstreet rode back to his line, which was now facing a new Federal defensive position created by Thomas, whose troops now seemed to be in a U-shape, clinging as they were to the aptly-named Horseshoe Ridge. As Longstreet scouted the line, he could not see that Thomas’ line was disjointed. The two sides of the “U” did not meet, and left a half-mile gap between them.
The Rebels under James Longstreet had attacked, but it was mostly in a piecemeal fashion until his entire line was ablaze. Charge after charge they threw upon the southern-facing line of Horseshoe Ridge, but with each they were hurled back. Longstreet unleashed his artillery upon the eastern-facing portion, hoping to aide General Polk in a full assault that would certainly come quickly. While waiting, he sent troops from Simon Buckner’s Corps into the hastily-filled gap between Thomas’ two lines. They were slow to gain ground, but when they finally broke through, they bagged three entire regiments and ultimately doomed Thomas’ position.
While Polk had ordered D.H. Hill to attack well before Longstreet got into position, Hill was again slow. Around the time that Buckner gained his ground, Hill attacked in earnest. This was all too much, and Thomas was forced into a full retreat with the westering sun. They fled through McFarland’s Gap and did not stop their flight until they landed in Rossville on the outskirts of Chattanooga.
It was a complete Confederate victory, but all sense was lost in the dark. The men were scattered and low on ammunition, and though there was an enemy to pursue, neither Longstreet nor Bragg knew where they had gone. Perhaps by the light of day, all would be revealed.
For now, anyway, the fighting along the Chickamauga was at an end. Both armies paid dearly for their toils, with a combined roll of 30,000. Rosecrans lost 1,657 killed, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 captured or missing. Bragg, the attacker, faired much worse, suffering 2,312 killed, 14,674 wounded, 1,468 missing.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/they-seemed-everywhere-victorious-union-route-at-chickamauga/
Below are several journal entries from 1862, 1863 and 1864 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. In 1864 Maj Gen William T. Sherman revealed his plans to March to the Sea in a letter to Lt Gen U.S. Grant.
Saturday, September 20, 1862: In a letter to his wife, Gen. McClellan writes: “I feel some little pride in having with a beaten and demoralized army defeated Lee so utterly, and saved the North so completely.” He adds, believing that he can now capitalize on his political stock: “I have insisted that Stanton shall be removed and that Halleck shall give way to me as Commander in Chief. I will not serve under him – for he is an incompetent fool – in no way fit for the important place he holds.”
Saturday, September 20, 1862: Gen. Halleck asks what McClellan is doing, having received almost no details since the battle three days earlier. McClellan answers: “I regret that you find it necessary to couch every dispatch I have the honor to receive from you, in a spirit of fault finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this Army, or even to allude to them.”
Sunday, September 20, 1863: Writes Gen. Daniel Harvey Hill of the battle of Chickamauga: “There was no more splendid fighting in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga - that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay in striking was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope.”
Tuesday, September 20, 1864: Sherman wrote a letter to Lt Gen U.S. Grant “He hoped soon to see Grant’s army grown to “a force that is numerically double that of your antagonist, so that with one part you can watch him [the enemy] and with the other you can push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the South Shore [Side] Railroad, compel him to attack you in position, or accept battle on your own terms.”
Reinforcements were good, but Sherman wished for more. “We ought to ask our country for the largest possible armies that can be raised,” he wrote, “as so important a thing as the ‘self-existence of a great nation’ should not be left to the fickle chances of war.”
Of the nearer future, Sherman brought up Wilmington, North Carolina. Grant had suggested sending troops from the Army of the Potomac to occupy the city and cut off its port. But Sherman saw the occupation as pointless. The only thing that really mattered about it was the harbor. “If [Admiral David] Farragut can get across the bar, and the move can be made quick, I suppose it will succeed.”
And if it did succeed, Sherman mused that the fleet might then move to Savannah, Georgia. If Grant could manage to capture Savannah, Sherman vowed that he “would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores and depending on the country for the balance.”
This wouldn’t be as easy as the Federal Navy just capturing Savannah. “Where a million of people live my army won’t starve,” Sherman continued, “but as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force could so delay an army and harass it that it would not be a formidable object.”
That, however, is where Grant and the Navy would come in. If Savannah was in Federal hands, “I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and would so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me Augusta, with the only powder mills and factories remaining the the South, or let us have the Savannah River.” Either Augusta or Macon would be, in Sherman’s mind, “worth a battle.”
He would “start east and make a circuit south and back [to Atlanta], doing vast damage to the State.” But this would do little good in the long run. He could also threaten to do just that, and thus “hold a rod over the Georgians who are not overloyal to the South.”
Though Sherman proposed speed, he allowed that the campaign could be put off till winter. But whatever was to be done, there had to be some sort of plan. “The more I study the game the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for me to penetrate much farther into Georgia without an objective beyond.”
To that end, Sherman thought it best that Grant’s army and the army based out of New Orleans (now under the helm of Edward Canby) “be reenforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the [Savannah] River; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River and send a force to get Columbus, Ga., either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed, and put my army in find order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commence, and the city of Savannah is in our [meaning Federal] possession.”
Sherman promised that if Grant fixed the date for when he would occupy Savannah, “I will insure our possession of Macon and a point on the [Savannah] river below Augusta.” He saw Georgia as most important to the Confederacy than even their capital. “The possession of the Savannah River is more than fatal to the possibility of a Southern independence; they may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia.” This was some pretty bold thinking.
Sherman ended the letter to his old friend as if making plans to meet up over Christmas: “If you can whip Lee and I can march to the Atlantic I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days’ leave of absence to see the young folks.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/sherman-reveals-his-plans-to-march-to-the-sea/
Pictures: 1863-09-20 Eye of the Storm Patrick Cleburne at Chickamauga, Georgia; 1862-09-20 Boteler's Cement Mill - Waud; 1862-09-20 Shepherdstown, VA Map; 1861-09-20 Lexington, Missouri Surrendered to the Rebels
A. Friday, September 20, 1861: Battle of Lexington, MO ends in Confederate Victory. Lexington, Missouri surrendered to the Rebels. The siege of Lexington had lasted well over a week. The past two days, however, saw the most intense fighting. Union Col. Mulligan’s 3,500 men were running short on supplies and ammunition. Still, he held out hope that General Fremont had come through for him and reinforcements were on the way. They were not.
The previous night, General Sterling Price’s men came up with the idea of using bales of hemp as movable breastworks. The hemp was heavy enough to absorb bullets and even cannonballs, but light enough to be moved forward, against the Union troops huddled in their own, stationary works.
By dawn, the bales stretched to the west and north of Lexington, 100 to 400 yards in front of the Federals’ fortifications. The firing resumed in earnest at 8am, and slowly, the Missouri secessionists moved the bales closer to the Union lines.
This was typically accomplished by three unarmed troops pushing the bales while on their hands and knees. Armed troops would load and fire as they were moved forward. Union bullets, shot and shell were useless against such mobile barricades.
The Rebel divisions closed like a boa constrictor around their enemy. It was clear that the situation was becoming dire, even hopeless, for the Union. Several hours of heated battle passed, with the Rebel lines shrinking around them. The Federals’ ammunition was dangerously low and all food and water gone.
It was painfully obvious to an officer under Col. Mulligan, the garrison had to surrender. Without orders, he hoisted a white flag over their fort. Seeing this, both sides ceased firing. General Price, hoping that this was the surrender, sent a messenger to Mulligan asking the reason why the firing had stopped. Mulligan, gallant and stubborn as ever, replied, “General, I hardly know, unless you have surrendered.”
Soon after, the firing commenced and the Rebel hemp bales advanced. The Unionist Home Guards retreated into the inner fortifications, refusing to fight any longer. They raised again a white flag, hoping to stop the senseless battle. Knowing that victory was completely out of his grasp, Mulligan called his subordinates to his side for a brief council of war. They took a vote and a large majority favored surrender over being slaughtered.
Around 2pm, Mulligan dispatched a messenger to Price, asking for the terms of the surrender. Price replied that the surrender would be unconditional, the soldiers would be disarmed and paroled, while the officers would he held as prisoners of war. He gave Mulligan ten minutes to respond.
Having no choice, Mulligan and his troops marched out of their fortifications and laid down their arms. Col. Mulligan and the other officers offered their swords to Price as symbols of their own surrender. “You gentlemen have fought so bravely,” responded Price, “that it would be wrong to deprive you of your swords. Keep them.”
While the troops marched before the Missouri State Guard, a Rebel band played “Dixie.” When the surrender was complete, former (or current, depending upon who was asked) Missouri Governor Claiborne Jackson made a long, harsh speech before the assembled Union troops. He demanded to know what business they had coming into Missouri to make war. Since many of Mulligan’s men were from Illinois, Jackson added, “when Missouri needed troops from Illinois, she would ask for them.” After much expended breath, the displaced Governor told the Federal soldiers that they were allowed to go home.
Col. Mulligan and his wife were the only Unionists to remain with Price. Having refused parole, Mulligan became the guest of the Missouri State Guard and was treated with all kindness and respect due to a gentleman and his lady.
From the victory, Price acquired seven cannons, 3,000 muskets, 750 horses and various other supplies. Price lost 25 killed and 72 wounded, while Mulligan lost 39 killed and 120 wounded.
B. Saturday, September 20, 1862: Confederate victory at Battle of Shepherdstown [Boteler's Ford]. On September 19, a detachment of Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rearguard commanded by Brig. Gen. William Pendleton, and captured four guns. Early on the 20th, Porter pushed elements of two divisions across the Potomac to establish a bridgehead. Hill's division counterattacked while many of the Federals were crossing and nearly annihilated the 118th Pennsylvania (the "Corn Exchange" Regiment), inflicting 269 casualties. This rearguard action discouraged Federal pursuit.
C. Sunday, September 20, 1863: Battle of Chickamauga, GA ends in Confederate Victory. The fighting continues at Chickamauga Creek in Georgia, not far from Chattanooga, Tennessee. The fighting was essentially toe to toe from one end to the other until, due to a mistaken order, Union troops right in the center under Thomas J. Wood (US) were pulled out of position. In the Confederate center were the forces of James Longstreet (CSA), who lost no time capitalizing on this opening. The Union line nearly dissolved, except for General George Henry Thomas (US). Gathering his men on a rise called Snodgrass Hill, they formed a defensive line that held all afternoon; getting for Thomas the nickname “The Rock of Chickamauga.” After dark, under orders, Thomas withdrew to rejoin the rest of the Union army in Chattanooga. General Braxton Bragg (CSA) had won his battle, but it come at a terrible cost. The Battle of Chickamauga was the second costliest battle of the Civil War, ranking only behind Gettysburg, and was by far the deadliest battle fought in the West. These bloody two days in American history cost the Federals 1,657 dead, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing for a total of 16,170 casualties out of 58,000 troops. The Confederate losses were 2,312 dead, 14,674 wounded and 1,468 missing for a total of 18,545 out of 66,000 troops.
Details: Following the successful Tullahoma Campaign, Union Gen. William S. Rosecrans hoped to continue the offensive and force Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga. Rosecrans consolidated Union forces that had been scattered throughout Tennessee and Georgia, and forced Bragg to evacuate the city. Bragg concentrated his forces in LaFayette, Georgia, and determined to reoccupy the valuable Chattanooga. He followed the Union army north, skirmishing with them at Davis’ Cross Roads. The Battle of Chickamauga resumed at 9:30 a.m. the next morning, with coordinated Confederate attacks on the Union left flank. About an hour later, Rosecrans, believing a gap existed in his line, ordered Brig. Gen. Thomas Wood’s division to fill the gap. Wood, however, knew that the order was a mistake; no such gap existed in the Federal line, and moving his division would, in turn, open a large swath in the Union position. However, Wood had already been berated twice in the campaign for not promptly following orders. To avoid further reprimand, he immediately moved, creating a division wide hole in the Union line. This was the chance that the Confederates needed. Longstreet massed a striking force, led by Gen. Hood, of eight brigades divided into three lines. Longstreet’s men hammered through the gap that Wood had created, and Union resistance at the southern end of the battlefield evaporated as Federal troops, including Rosecrans himself, were pushed off the field.
George H. Thomas, in a move that would earn him the name “The Rock of Chickamauga,” took command and began consolidating the scattered Union forces on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. Thomas and his men formed a defensive position, and although Confederates continued to assault and pressed to within feet of the Union line, the Yankees held firm. Thomas withdrew as darkness fell. Although Thomas urged Rosecrans to lead the army in an attack the next day, Rosecrans rejected the idea and remained in Chattanooga. Bragg’s victorious army occupied the heights surrounding Chattanooga, blocking Federal supply lines, but did not pursue Rosecrans.
While Chickamauga was a decided Confederate victory, the results of the battle were staggering. With over 16,000 Union and 18,000 Confederate casualties, Chickamauga reached the highest losses of any battle in the Western theater. Although the Confederates had driven Rosecrans from the field, they had not succeeded in Bragg’s goals of destroying Rosecrans’s army or reoccupying Chattanooga. Fighting would resume less than two months later in the battles for Chattanooga.
D. Tuesday, September 20, 1864: Maj Gen William T. Sherman revealed his plans to March to the Sea in a letter to Lt Gen U.S. Grant. If Grant could manage to capture Savannah, Sherman vowed that he “would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores and depending on the country for the balance.”
This wouldn’t be as easy as the Federal Navy just capturing Savannah. “Where a million of people live my army won’t starve,” Sherman continued, “but as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force could so delay an army and harass it that it would not be a formidable object.”
That, however, is where Grant and the Navy would come in. If Savannah was in Federal hands, “I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and would so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me Augusta, with the only powder mills and factories remaining the the South, or let us have the Savannah River.” Either Augusta or Macon would be, in Sherman’s mind, “worth a battle.”
He would “start east and make a circuit south and back [to Atlanta], doing vast damage to the State.” But this would do little good in the long run. He could also threaten to do just that, and thus “hold a rod over the Georgians who are not overloyal to the South.”
Though Sherman proposed speed, he allowed that the campaign could be put off till winter. But whatever was to be done, there had to be some sort of plan. “The more I study the game the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for me to penetrate much farther into Georgia without an objective beyond.”
To that end, Sherman thought it best that Grant’s army and the army based out of New Orleans (now under the helm of Edward Canby) “be reenforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the [Savannah] River; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River and send a force to get Columbus, Ga., either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed, and put my army in find order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commence, and the city of Savannah is in our [meaning Federal] possession.”
1. Friday, September 20, 1861: If Fremont is Not Removed, Public Service Will Go to the Devil. General Fremont had arrested his former friend and the brother of the United States Postmaster General, Frank Blair. Fremont took offense over Blair’s letter to his brother, detailing why the General should be dismissed. For the past five days, Frank Blair had spent his time languishing in a St. Louis jail. He was, however, not silent about it.
Following the arrest, the Unionist Missouri newspapers fell in line behind Fremont, supporting the arrest of Blair. Though locked up, he accused Fremont of manipulating the press. Only one newspaper in St. Louis supported Blair through his imprisonment. Though they were the smallest paper, they were soon shut down by the Provost Marshall, acting on Fremont’s orders.
The news spread to Washington, where Montgomery Blair, Postmaster General, wired Fremont, offering to send him the controversial letter so that he could see for himself that there was no reason for drama such as this. He also demanded his release. On this date, he sent the letter, much to brother Frank’s chagrin, though he understood that his brother held the best of intentions.
Fremont, however, still refused to release Blair. The very public quarrel, which had taken on a life of its own, was beginning to draw a backlash. Some criticized the Fremont and Blair fight as being detrimental to the public service, as it showed that the Union was not always so united.
“All the talk about this quarrel being detrimental to the public service is bosh,” wrote Frank Blair of the accusations. “If Fremont is not removed, the public service will go to the devil.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lexington-missouri-surrendered-to-the-rebels/
2. Saturday, September 20, 1862: Munfordsville, Kentucky - On September 20, the Union force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Don C. Buell, entered the town of Munfordsville. They skirmished and forced the occupying Confederate forces, commanded by Gen. Braxton Bragg, to withdraw from their positions. Bragg took his force to Bardstown to join up with Maj. Gen. E. Kirby Smith.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html
3. Saturday, September 20, 2012: There are those who might excuse General George McClellan’s restraint in the Battle of Antietam on the grounds that he had to hold back substantial reserves as the last defense of Washington in case of a disaster on the field. He had missed his chance to end the war, others noticed this inaction as well: Antietam will be McClellan’s last battle. Today, an Union expedition leaves out of Bolivar, Tennessee heading to Grand Junction and La Grange, Tennessee. A few skirmishes are fought along the way.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-five
4. Saturday, September 20, 1862: near Shiloh, North Carolina - On September 20, the Union ironclad, USS Lancer, arrived near Shiloh. It sent a landing party ashore and quickly engaged a small Confederate force. The Confederates were soon driven away.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html
5. Saturday, September 20, 1862: In a letter to his wife, Gen. McClellan writes: “I feel some little pride in having with a beaten and demoralized army defeated Lee so utterly, and saved the North so completely.” He adds, believing that he can now capitalize on his political stock: “I have insisted that Stanton shall be removed and that Halleck shall give way to me as Commander in Chief. I will not serve under him – for he is an incompetent fool – in no way fit for the important place he holds.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+20%2C+1862
6. Saturday, September 20, 1862: Gen. Halleck asks what McClellan is doing, having received almost no details since the battle three days earlier. McClellan answers: “I regret that you find it necessary to couch every dispatch I have the honor to receive from you, in a spirit of fault finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this Army, or even to allude to them.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+20%2C+1862
7. Saturday, September 20, 1862: Frances Howell Kennedy Diary. On the corner of Prospect and Washington streets in Hagerstown, Maryland once sat a large house that was called the Rochester House, which was the home of Frances Howell Kennedy, widow of a Hagerstown physician. On September 20, 1862, she saw a young soldier at the train station, who had a bandage around his throat and was walking very languidly. Kennedy asked him to come to her home until he was able to travel, and he accepted the invitation. Fortunately for our country, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. would live to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1902 to 1932.
http://civilwarwomenblog.com/women-of-antietam/
8. Sunday, September 20, 1863: Writes Gen. Daniel Harvey Hill of the battle of Chickamauga: “There was no more splendid fighting in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga - that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay in striking was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+20%2C+1863
9. Sunday, September 20, 1863: Diary of Emily Helm. Battle of Chickamauga: In 1863, General Benjamin Hardin Helm served in the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns under Breckinridge. Early in the morning of September 20, 1863 - the second day of fighting in the Battle of Chickamauga - Breckinridge placed his men to the right of General Patrick R. Cleburne's division and consequently became the extreme right flank of the Confederate line of battle. At 9:30 a.m. with the Kentucky Brigade forming the left, the division moved forward in search of the enemy.
General Breckinridge reported: “At the distance of 700 yards we came upon him [the enemy] in force, and the battle was opened by Helm's brigade with great fury. The Second and Ninth Kentucky, with three companies of the 41st Alabama, encountered the left of a line of breastworks.
The Federal troops held a strong position, which was fortified with three lines of entrenchments composed of fallen timber and rocks concealed in thick undergrowth. This was one of the bloodiest encounters of the day.
But the Federal works extended only half the length of the Brigade. The regiments on the right, the 6th and 4th Kentucky and several companies from the 41st Alabama were successful and passed to the right and clear of the works. Steadily they drove the enemy back. The left-hand regiments reformed and made a second charge that drove the first line of the enemy from their entrenchments.
The advanced position could not be maintained, however, due to heavy fire from their left, and they were forced back. For the third time the Confederates advanced to the charge, under heavy fire. Soon word was received that General Helm was mortally wounded, while attempting to motivate his Kentuckians forward to assault the strong position once again.
Late in the evening, reinforced by several additional brigades, the shattered remnant of the 1st Kentucky Brigade charged once more. This time they drove the enemy from their fortifications toward the Chattanooga road taking a considerable number of prisoners. As darkness fell, a welcome halt was called to this bloody day of fighting.
General Helm had been taken to a house nearby where the yard and hallways were filled with injured soldiers. Helm was placed in a room with several other seriously wounded. Helm asked the doctor if there was any hope and was told there was none. As the sound of battle faded he roused himself to consciousness and asked what the outcome was. On being told that the army had triumphed he uttered, in a painful whisper, "Victory."
Near midnight General Ben Hardin Helm died at the age of 32. The Orphan Brigade had lost another commander.
As the war progressed, Emilie had followed her husband south. In Chattanooga, she organized better care for wounded soldiers. She was in Alabama in September 1863 when she got word that her husband had been killed.
http://civilwarwomenblog.com/emilie-todd-helm/
10. Sunday, September 20, 1863: Battle of Chickamauga. General Braxton Bragg [CS] tries to split General William Rosecrans [US] forces as they try to return to the safety of Chattanooga. A second day breakthrough at the Brotherton Cabin forces the federals into a retreat, halted only by the Rock of Chickamauga, General George Thomas on Snodgrass Hill
The bloodiest two days in American history cost the Federals 1,657 dead, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing for a total of 16,170 casualties out of 58,000 troops. The Confederate losses were 2,312 dead, 14,674 wounded and 1,468 for a total of 18,545 out of 66,000 troops.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186309
11. Sunday, September 20, 1863: Battle of Chickamauga, Georgia. Day 2: Overnight, CSA Gen Braxton Bragg re-organizes his army into two wings---one under Gen. Polk, and another under Lt Gen. James Longstreet, who has just arrived late last night. The orders never find Lt. Gen. D.H. Hill, however, and by morning, he learns from Gen. Polk that Hill’s troops have been made subordinate to Polk’s command, and that Breckenridge’s division in Hill’s Corps is to lead the attack: consequently, there are delays. Bragg has envisioned a series of attacks from right to left, and Breckinridge is to lead off. Hill does not learn of his role in the morning’s attacks until 7:25 AM, when he is lining up his troops and getting them fed, since most of them had not eaten for over 24 hours. Gen. Bragg is furious to find that the attacks have not started yet, and is outraged to find Gen. Polk back of the lines reading a newspaper. Overnight, Gen. Thomas has fortified Kelly’s Field with earthworks and logs, batteries of field guns, and placed eight brigades there, with several more in reserve. Out beyond his flank, he has placed Beatty’s brigade. Although Hill has placed his troops, other sections of the Rebel line are chaotic: Cheatham finds that his division is at right angles with Hill’s, and that it was also partly behind Stewart’s, making at advance moot. Cheatham is pulled out of line, at last, and precious time is lost. Muddled orders, no orders at all, and tangled battle lines plague the Rebel army in the early morning.
Finally, Breckinridge is sent forward by Hill, followed by Walker’s Reserves and what is left of Liddell’s division. The Orphan brigade of Kentuckians, under Gen. Helm, hits the left end of the Union line, and Breckinridge pushes on with the other two of his brigades under Stovall and Adams, who sweep over Beatty’s position, and find themselves astraddle the La Fayette road, and overlapping the Union flank. Breckinridge re-aligns Adams and Stovall at right angles, now facing south, and they advance on Thomas’ flank and rear. Gen. Helm (Pres. Lincoln’s brother-in-law) is mortally wounded. Yankee reserves under Van Derveer and Stanley stop Adams and Stovall cold, driving them back to their original position. Gen. Cleburne’s division goes forward also, but their attack is partly blunted by one flank of Stewart’s Rebel division in their way, and the fact that Cleburne is attacking a line where much of four Federal divisions are dug in. Cleburne’s men suffer heavy losses.
At Bragg’s command (without consulting Longstreet) Stewart’s gray division charges the Federal line at around 11:00 AM, badly mangles Brannan’s flank and also part of Reynolds’ division, and even captures a section of the La Fayette Road, but are finally driven back. Gen. D.H. Hill recommends to Gen. Polk that a second attack be launched, if fresh troops are applied; the brigade of State Rights Gist (yes, that is his real name) and the division of Liddell, already battle-worn, both go forward, but are finally ineffectual.
Nevertheless, Thomas is alarmed at the fury of the Southern attack, and calls for reinforcements. Rosecrans dispatches Van Cleve’s division and part of Negley's to Thomas, and intends to send more. Brannan is asked to reinforce Thomas also, but Brannan hesitates to move until the order is confirmed by Rosecrans. Rosecrans assumes that Brannan is already in motion; he therefore orders Gen. Thomas Wood to shift his division from the Union right to replace Brannan in the center. Wood marches his troops behind Brannan (who is still in line) and Reynolds.
This opens a gap in the Union line at a most opportune moment for the Confederates. Gen Longstreet, in command of the Left Wing of the army, is carefully laying out the lines of his advance. Ordered to attack by Bragg, Longstreet is reluctant to move against dug-in troops, so he lines up eight brigades in three lines in the column, preparing to strike the Union line precisely where Wood’s division has just vacated it: all three of Bushrod Johnson’s brigades (Fulton, Gregg, McNair), all three of Hood’s brigades (Sheffield, Robertson, and Benning), and two of McLaws’ brigades, commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph Kershaw, in the third line. Altogether, Longstreet has nearly 11,000 men in column. Direct command of this column is given to Gen. John Bell Hood. This column would be attacking up the Brotherton Road, erupting into the Brotherton field so that they can deploy to bring all their strength to bear. Lined up on their left is Thomas Hindman’s division (brigades Deas, Manigault, Anderson), and behind Hindman is Preston’s division (brigades Gracie, Kelly, Trigg). Longstreet orders the attack forward at 11:10 AM, possibly intending Stewart’s premature advance to coincide with Hood’s.
Bushrod Johnson’s men emerge from the woods, cross the La Fayette Road, and spread out in line of battle across Brotherton Field, Fulton driving right through, after scattering a skirmish line, and McNair brushing against some of Brannan’s men on his right.
A line of Federal cannon line up at Dyer Field, but Gregg (commanded by Sugg), Sheffield, and Robertson’s Texans push forward and capture most of the guns. A counterattack by Harker’s Brigade from Wood’s division disrupts the advance, but Gen. Hood sends Kershaw in to attack Harker’s Federals. He then rides to rally his Texans. As he does so, he is shot in the thigh, and is rushed to the hospital. As the ball has splintered the bone, the surgeons amputate Hood’s right leg.
As Hindman strikes J.C. Davis’s Federals, he has initial success. Sheridan keeps his two brigades in position until Brig. Gen. Andrew Lytle is killed, and his brigade dissolves in panic toward the rear. One of Hindman’s brigades, under Manigault, is savaged by a flank attack by Wilder’s mounted infantry, armed with the repeating rifles, thus slowing Hindman’s advance. However, soon, most of Crittenden’s corps, and much of McCook’s, is fleeing up the road toward Chattanooga, in a full rout. The Federal right flank and right center, already weakened by Rosecrans’ bolstering of Thomas’s flank, dissolves and ceases to exist. Because of the topography, there is no open way to the army’s left flank, and so the Union soldier’s flee up the road to Chattanooga, carrying Rosecrans with them, who sends his Chief of Staff Gen. James Garfield, back with orders to Thomas to cover the retreat.
Longstreet’s column is basically wheeling to the right, and disrupting the Union line, one piece at a time. Some of the pieces fall back, and as Thomas rides to the right to see about reinforcements, he sees the Confederate breakthrough, and he begins to patch together a line of troops on a spur of Missionary Ridge called Snodgrass Hill and Horseshoe Ridge connected to it.
Longstreet’s advance pauses to re-organize and re-align, parts of it having stopped, and others hopelessly intermingled and confused in the tangled woods and the battle smoke, nearly beyond the effective reach of any commander’s influence. Harker’s Federal brigade, in the meantime, withdraws up Snodgrass Ridge and begins to make a stand as Perry and Robertson’s Texans attack the ridge with their brigades near 1:00 PM, but are driven off.
Thomas sends Brannan, parts of Negley’s division, and what is left of Wood’s to the ridge to dig in, along with Harker’s brigade, and other assorted odds and ends. Thomas’s left—the heavily-fortified crescent that curves around Kelly’s Field, and has resisted attacks all day—he leaves as it is, bolstered with a heavy concentration of infantry and artillery. He then begins to fashion a line with Wood and Hazen’s brigade along Horseshoe Ridge to link the two ends of the blue line.
Gen. Granger, commanding Rosecrans’ Reserves, is only 3 miles away, and hears the noise of battle. Although he is supposed to wait for orders, Granger sends Steedman’s two-brigade division and Col. Daniel McCook’s brigade. Steeman is eventually put on the far Union right on Snodgrass Hill. After several more uncoordinated Confederate assaults, several Rebel divisions are put together (Hindman, Kershaw, and Bushrod Johnson) to attack Snodgrass Hill in unison, and they step off around 3:30 PM. Ground is gained by the Southern attack, as the gray troops fight with bayonet and rifle stocks in a brutal hand-to-hand fight, capturing much of the hill’s slope.
Longstreet, who was behind the lines eating lunch, is approached by Bragg about the progress of the battle, and Longstreet asks for reinforcements to pursue up the Rossville Road after the fleeing Yankees, and thus cut off Thomas’ retreat route. Bragg has his largest division (Cheatham) nearly intact, and part of another, but refuses, denying that there are any troops available. He orders Longstreet to keep attacking. Finally, D.H. Hill, commanding the Rebel right, moves forward: the Confederates on the right finally attack the Kelly Field salient, putting pressure on the whole Federal line, until finally Cleburne’s men take the breastworks and cause a breach in the Union line. At the same time, Longstreet commits his last fresh division, under Gen. Preston, who breaks his division against the impregnable Union positions.
Finally, under cover of falling darkness, Thomas orders Gen. Reynolds to withdraw the troops from the broken salient on the left, followed by Palmer, Baird, and Johnson with the remainders of their divisions; the Rebels capture many from Baird’s division, however, and it is not a clean getaway. Then, unit by unit, the Yankees withdraw up the Rossville Road toward Chattanooga. Steedman, Brannan, and Wood all make a stealthy withdrawal from Snodgrass Hill. Three regiments–the 22nd Michigan, and 21st and 89th Ohio, cover the retreat, but many of them are short on ammunition, and end up as prisoners of the Confederates.
Losses: Killed Wounded Captured/Missing Total
U.S. 1,657 9,756 4,757 16,170
C.S. 2,312 14,674 1,468 18,454
This is the second-bloodiest battle of the war, second only to Gettysburg.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+20%2C+1863
12. Tuesday, September 20, 1864: Still in pursuit by General Sheridan (US) Early’s (CSA) army, bloodied by its defeat at “Third Winchester” the day before, take up a strong defensive position at Fisher’s Hill, south of Strasburg, Virginia. The Union surrender Keytesville, Missouri, as Major General Sterling Price (CSA) presses on into the state to relieve pressure from Union advances in the south.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-180
A Friday, September, 20, 1861: Confederate forces captured the hills around Lexington, Mo, thus making the city even more open to artillery attacks. An attempt to get supplies to the Union defenders via the river system failed when the Confederates captured the supply boats along with their supplies.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-23
A+ Friday, September 20, 1861: Battle of Lexington ends. Sterling Price, with 18,000 men, lays siege to Lexington, Missouri, with a federal force of 3.600 under Colonel James Mulligan. After fighting intensified on September 19, Mulligan surrendered on the 20th.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186109
A++ Friday, September 20, 1861: Lexington, Missouri surrendered to the Rebels. The siege of Lexington had lasted well over a week. The past two days, however, saw the most intense fighting. Union Col. Mulligan’s 3,500 men were running short on supplies and ammunition. Still, he held out hope that General Fremont had come through for him and reinforcements were on the way. They were not.
The previous night, General Sterling Price’s men came up with the idea of using bales of hemp as movable breastworks. The hemp was heavy enough to absorb bullets and even cannonballs, but light enough to be moved forward, against the Union troops huddled in their own, stationary works.
By dawn, the bales stretched to the west and north of Lexington, 100 to 400 yards in front of the Federals’ fortifications. The firing resumed in earnest at 8am, and slowly, the Missouri secessionists moved the bales closer to the Union lines.
This was typically accomplished by three unarmed troops pushing the bales while on their hands and knees. Armed troops would load and fire as they were moved forward. Union bullets, shot and shell were useless against such mobile barricades.
The Rebel divisions closed like a boa constrictor around their enemy. It was clear that the situation was becoming dire, even hopeless, for the Union. Several hours of heated battle passed, with the Rebel lines shrinking around them. The Federals’ ammunition was dangerously low and all food and water gone.
It was painfully obvious to an officer under Col. Mulligan, the garrison had to surrender. Without orders, he hoisted a white flag over their fort. Seeing this, both sides ceased firing. General Price, hoping that this was the surrender, sent a messenger to Mulligan asking the reason why the firing had stopped. Mulligan, gallant and stubborn as ever, replied, “General, I hardly know, unless you have surrendered.”
Soon after, the firing commenced and the Rebel hemp bales advanced. The Unionist Home Guards retreated into the inner fortifications, refusing to fight any longer. They raised again a white flag, hoping to stop the senseless battle. Knowing that victory was completely out of his grasp, Mulligan called his subordinates to his side for a brief council of war. They took a vote and a large majority favored surrender over being slaughtered.
Around 2pm, Mulligan dispatched a messenger to Price, asking for the terms of the surrender. Price replied that the surrender would be unconditional, the soldiers would be disarmed and paroled, while the officers would he held as prisoners of war. He gave Mulligan ten minutes to respond.
Having no choice, Mulligan and his troops marched out of their fortifications and laid down their arms. Col. Mulligan and the other officers offered their swords to Price as symbols of their own surrender. “You gentlemen have fought so bravely,” responded Price, “that it would be wrong to deprive you of your swords. Keep them.”
While the troops marched before the Missouri State Guard, a Rebel band played “Dixie.” When the surrender was complete, former (or current, depending upon who was asked) Missouri Governor Claiborne Jackson made a long, harsh speech before the assembled Union troops. He demanded to know what business they had coming into Missouri to make war. Since many of Mulligan’s men were from Illinois, Jackson added, “when Missouri needed troops from Illinois, she would ask for them.” After much expended breath, the displaced Governor told the Federal soldiers that they were allowed to go home.
Col. Mulligan and his wife were the only Unionists to remain with Price. Having refused parole, Mulligan became the guest of the Missouri State Guard and was treated with all kindness and respect due to a gentleman and his lady.
From the victory, Price acquired seven cannons, 3,000 muskets, 750 horses and various other supplies. Price lost 25 killed and 72 wounded, while Mulligan lost 39 killed and 120 wounded.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lexington-missouri-surrendered-to-the-rebels/
B Saturday, September 20, 1862: Near Shepherdstown, Virginia, Confederate troops under A.P. Hill spar with troops from FitzJohn Porter’s corps for an hour.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+20%2C+1862
B Saturday, September 20, 1862: Battle of Shepherdstown [Boteler's Ford]. On September 19, a detachment of Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rearguard commanded by Brig. Gen. William Pendleton, and captured four guns. Early on the 20th, Porter pushed elements of two divisions across the Potomac to establish a bridgehead. Hill's division counterattacked while many of the Federals were crossing and nearly annihilated the 118th Pennsylvania (the "Corn Exchange" Regiment), inflicting 269 casualties. This rearguard action discouraged Federal pursuit.
B+ Saturday, September 20, 1862: Skirmishes at Shepherdstown, Ashby's Gap, Williamsport, and Hagerstown, as Confederates under A. P. Hill covered the retreat of the Army of Northern Virginia from Sharpsburg. Lee would keep a heavy cavalry presence in the area until October.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186209
C Sunday, September 20, 1863: The fighting continues at Chickamauga Creek in Georgia, not far from Chattanooga, Tennessee. The fighting was essentially toe to toe from one end to the other until, due to a mistaken order, Union troops right in the center under Thomas J. Wood (US) were pulled out of position. In the Confederate center were the forces of James Longstreet (CSA), who lost no time capitalizing on this opening. The Union line nearly dissolved, except for General George Henry Thomas (US). Gathering his men on a rise called Snodgrass Hill, they formed a defensive line that held all afternoon; getting for Thomas the nickname “The Rock of Chickamauga.” After dark, under orders, Thomas withdrew to rejoin the rest of the Union army in Chattanooga. General Braxton Bragg (CSA) had won his battle, but it come at a terrible cost. The Battle of Chickamauga was the second costliest battle of the Civil War, ranking only behind Gettysburg, and was by far the deadliest battle fought in the West. These bloody two days in American history cost the Federals 1,657 dead, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing for a total of 16,170 casualties out of 58,000 troops. The Confederate losses were 2,312 dead, 14,674 wounded and 1,468 missing for a total of 18,545 out of 66,000 troops.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-128
C+ Sunday, September 20, 1863: Following the successful Tullahoma Campaign, Union Gen. William S. Rosecrans hoped to continue the offensive and force Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga. Rosecrans consolidated Union forces that had been scattered throughout Tennessee and Georgia, and forced Bragg to evacuate the city. Bragg concentrated his forces in LaFayette, Georgia, and determined to reoccupy the valuable Chattanooga. He followed the Union army north, skirmishing with them at Davis’ Cross Roads. By September 17, Bragg had been reinforced with Virginia divisions under Gen. John Bell Hood and a Mississippi division under Brig. Gen. Bushrod Johnson—the first attempt to transport Confederate troops from one theater to another to achieve numerical superiority. With renewed confidence that Chattanooga could pass once again into Confederate hands, on the morning of the 18th Bragg marched his army to the west bank of Chickamauga Creek, hoping to wedge his troops between Chattanooga and the Federal army. As Bragg’s infantry crossed the creek on the 18th, they skirmished with Federal infantry and mounted infantry armed with Spencer repeating rifles. Bragg had been hoping that his advance would be a surprise; Rosecrans, however, had observed the Confederates marching in the morning, and anticipated Bragg’s plan. By the time Bragg’s army had crossed the creek, Union reinforcements had arrived.
The Battle of Chickamauga began in earnest shortly after dawn on September 19th. Throughout the day Bragg’s men gained ground but could not break the extended Union line despite a series of aggressive attacks. Confederate luck changed when, at 11 p.m., Gen. Longstreet’s divisions arrived at Chickamauga, giving the Confederate force superior numbers. Bragg divided his forces into two wings. Longstreet commanded the left; Lt. Gen. Leonidas K. Polk took charge of Confederate troops on the right. The battle resumed at 9:30 a.m. the next morning, with coordinated Confederate attacks on the Union left flank. About an hour later, Rosecrans, believing a gap existed in his line, ordered Brig. Gen. Thomas Wood’s division to fill the gap. Wood, however, knew that the order was a mistake; no such gap existed in the Federal line, and moving his division would, in turn, open a large swath in the Union position. However, Wood had already been berated twice in the campaign for not promptly following orders. To avoid further reprimand, he immediately moved, creating a division wide hole in the Union line. This was the chance that the Confederates needed. Longstreet massed a striking force, led by Gen. Hood, of eight brigades divided into three lines. Longstreet’s men hammered through the gap that Wood had created, and Union resistance at the southern end of the battlefield evaporated as Federal troops, including Rosecrans himself, were pushed off the field.
George H. Thomas, in a move that would earn him the name “The Rock of Chickamauga,” took command and began consolidating the scattered Union forces on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. Thomas and his men formed a defensive position, and although Confederates continued to assault and pressed to within feet of the Union line, the Yankees held firm. Thomas withdrew as darkness fell. Although Thomas urged Rosecrans to lead the army in an attack the next day, Rosecrans rejected the idea and remained in Chattanooga. Bragg’s victorious army occupied the heights surrounding Chattanooga, blocking Federal supply lines, but did not pursue Rosecrans.
While Chickamauga was a decided Confederate victory, the results of the battle were staggering. With over 16,000 Union and 18,000 Confederate casualties, Chickamauga reached the highest losses of any battle in the Western theater. Although the Confederates had driven Rosecrans from the field, they had not succeeded in Bragg’s goals of destroying Rosecrans’s army or reoccupying Chattanooga. Fighting would resume less than two months later in the battles for Chattanooga.
http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/chickamauga.html?tab=facts
D Tuesday, September 20, 1864: Maj Gen William T. Sherman revealed his plans to March to the Sea in a letter to Lt Gen U.S. Grant. If Grant could manage to capture Savannah, Sherman vowed that he “would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores and depending on the country for the balance.”
This wouldn’t be as easy as the Federal Navy just capturing Savannah. “Where a million of people live my army won’t starve,” Sherman continued, “but as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force could so delay an army and harass it that it would not be a formidable object.”
That, however, is where Grant and the Navy would come in. If Savannah was in Federal hands, “I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and would so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me Augusta, with the only powder mills and factories remaining the the South, or let us have the Savannah River.” Either Augusta or Macon would be, in Sherman’s mind, “worth a battle.”
He would “start east and make a circuit south and back [to Atlanta], doing vast damage to the State.” But this would do little good in the long run. He could also threaten to do just that, and thus “hold a rod over the Georgians who are not overloyal to the South.”
Though Sherman proposed speed, he allowed that the campaign could be put off till winter. But whatever was to be done, there had to be some sort of plan. “The more I study the game the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for me to penetrate much farther into Georgia without an objective beyond.”
To that end, Sherman thought it best that Grant’s army and the army based out of New Orleans (now under the helm of Edward Canby) “be reenforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the [Savannah] River; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River and send a force to get Columbus, Ga., either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed, and put my army in find order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commence, and the city of Savannah is in our [meaning Federal] possession.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/sherman-reveals-his-plans-to-march-to-the-sea/
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter LTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard WalkoSSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SFC David Reid, M.S, PHR, SHRM-CP, DTMSgt Christopher Collins SPC (Join to see) SPC Gary C. PO3 Lynn Spalding
Through the cold night, Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee heard the axes of the enemy felling trees, while the spades dug rifle pits. The only thing that was certain across those dark spaces was that the Federals were not retreating. Everything else was in flux and confusion. Late the previous evening, Bragg had completely reorganized his army, placing half under the newly-arrived James Longstreet, and half under Leonidas Polk. This effectively demoted several high ranking generals, of whom D.H. Hill was the highest.
General Hill commanded a corps, answering to no one but Bragg. Now, he was under Polk, yet was not informed of the change. Bragg had passed it off upon Polk, who, in turn, passed it off upon a courier, who, after searching for some amount of time, could not find Hill and returned to his own camp.
This courier carried with him not only news of Hill’s new and lesser rank, but written orders of the roll he was to play in the morning’s battle. Hill’s Corps, with General John Breckenridge’s Division in the lead, was to begin the attack against the Federal left flank. Though the courier bears some of the blame, most was held by General Bragg himself as Breckenridge had spent a good deal of time in his company the night before.
And so when dawn finally broke, General Hill was still missing. It was only then that Polk took command, sending orders to Hill’s divisional commanders to attack at once. When this message was delivered, however, the courier found Hill in a meeting with his commanders. Hill refused to go into action right away. It was the first he had heard of the plan, he claimed, and wouldn’t be able to move “for an hour or more.”
By this time, Bragg was personally on the scene and berated both Polk and Hill. The main complaint lodged by Hill was that the lines had not been reconnoitered, and for that, he could not be blamed. His corps had been on the Confederate left the previous evening as per orders issued before the reorganization and had just arrived on the right. There was no cavalry on his flanks and nobody seemed to know anything.
General Rosecrans’ line was in two main segments. George Thomas commanded the left, while Alexander McCook held the right. Believing that Bragg’s main goal was to retake Chattanooga, he was determined to hold Thomas’ line, which blocked the roads leading into the city. Knowing this, Thomas called upon Rosecrans for reinforcements.
Rosecrans was not deaf to Thomas’ call, and pulled brigades from his right to strengthen his left. This became a farcical debacle. General James Negley commanded one of Thomas’ Divisions. He had been too far to the right to take much part in the initial struggle. Seeing this, Rosecrans ordered Thomas Wood’s Division from Thomas Crittenden’s Corps to fill the gap left by Negley. Wood apparently misunderstood the orders and moved his division to support Negley, not replace him. This put him a third of a mile behind the actual line.
When Rosecrans noticed, he let loose his rage upon General Wood, who finally moved into his proper position, replacing Negley’s Division. What nobody seemed to notice until now was that Negley’s Division was made up of three brigades, while Wood’s had only two. If Wood were left on his own, he would open up a brigade-size gap in the Federal line. Without orders, Negley left one of his brigades behind.
Finally, at 9:30am, the Confederate attack began. Breckenridge’s Division stepped off, followed en echelon by Patrick Cleburne on his left. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s troopers also joined in, greatly impressing General Hill. They came screaming with violence, hurling themselves against breastworks constructed by four different divisions. But it was futile. Even without the reserves called for by General Thomas, the Federals beat back the storming Rebels, whose wave crested and receded through the mid morning, leaving thousands of wounded and dead behind.
Through the morning attacks, the Union center, held by Joseph Reynolds’ Division, had been lightly hit. When word came for yet more reinforcements to be shifted to the left, Rosecrans turned to General John Brannan, commanding the division on Reynolds’ right. Though Reynolds told Brannan that he could probably hold his own if Thomas really needed him, it was Thomas that canceled the order. Thomas, however, neglected to tell anyone but Brannan about it.
To fill the gap that would have been made if Brannan had left, Rosecrans ordered General Wood, who was on Brannan’s right, to shift to the left. Wood followed the orders to the letter, even though his own skirmishers were engaged and Brannan was still in position. This created a division-size gap in the Federal line, one that General Jefferson C. Davis, whose division was in reserve, was rushing to fill when James Longstreet launched the second Confederate assault.
When John Bell Hood’s Rebels smashed into the Federal line, it was already in confusion and crumbled easily. So quickly it came, and unexpected, that General Rosecrans himself was forced to flee as thousands of Confederates broke through and captured his headquarters.
“All became confusion,” remembered General Gates Thruston, who witnessed the route. “No order could be heard above the tempest of battle. With a wild yell the Confederates swept on the far to their left. They seemed everywhere victorious.” General Rosecrans did not stop until he reached Chattanooga.
And yet, there was still Thomas. The Federal right had collapsed, but the reinforced left had remained. An excited General Longstreet wanted to follow the retreating Yankees, battering them all the way back to Chattanooga. General Bragg, however, was in a foul mood. The battle might have been going in their direction, but it was not moving according to his machinations. He had dreamed of rolling up the Federal left with Polk’s wing, not routing the Federal right with Longstreet’s.
Longstreet was completely taken aback, and immediately assumed that Bragg somehow believed that the battle had been lost. With nothing left to do, Longstreet rode back to his line, which was now facing a new Federal defensive position created by Thomas, whose troops now seemed to be in a U-shape, clinging as they were to the aptly-named Horseshoe Ridge. As Longstreet scouted the line, he could not see that Thomas’ line was disjointed. The two sides of the “U” did not meet, and left a half-mile gap between them.
The Rebels under James Longstreet had attacked, but it was mostly in a piecemeal fashion until his entire line was ablaze. Charge after charge they threw upon the southern-facing line of Horseshoe Ridge, but with each they were hurled back. Longstreet unleashed his artillery upon the eastern-facing portion, hoping to aide General Polk in a full assault that would certainly come quickly. While waiting, he sent troops from Simon Buckner’s Corps into the hastily-filled gap between Thomas’ two lines. They were slow to gain ground, but when they finally broke through, they bagged three entire regiments and ultimately doomed Thomas’ position.
While Polk had ordered D.H. Hill to attack well before Longstreet got into position, Hill was again slow. Around the time that Buckner gained his ground, Hill attacked in earnest. This was all too much, and Thomas was forced into a full retreat with the westering sun. They fled through McFarland’s Gap and did not stop their flight until they landed in Rossville on the outskirts of Chattanooga.
It was a complete Confederate victory, but all sense was lost in the dark. The men were scattered and low on ammunition, and though there was an enemy to pursue, neither Longstreet nor Bragg knew where they had gone. Perhaps by the light of day, all would be revealed.
For now, anyway, the fighting along the Chickamauga was at an end. Both armies paid dearly for their toils, with a combined roll of 30,000. Rosecrans lost 1,657 killed, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 captured or missing. Bragg, the attacker, faired much worse, suffering 2,312 killed, 14,674 wounded, 1,468 missing.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/they-seemed-everywhere-victorious-union-route-at-chickamauga/
Below are several journal entries from 1862, 1863 and 1864 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. In 1864 Maj Gen William T. Sherman revealed his plans to March to the Sea in a letter to Lt Gen U.S. Grant.
Saturday, September 20, 1862: In a letter to his wife, Gen. McClellan writes: “I feel some little pride in having with a beaten and demoralized army defeated Lee so utterly, and saved the North so completely.” He adds, believing that he can now capitalize on his political stock: “I have insisted that Stanton shall be removed and that Halleck shall give way to me as Commander in Chief. I will not serve under him – for he is an incompetent fool – in no way fit for the important place he holds.”
Saturday, September 20, 1862: Gen. Halleck asks what McClellan is doing, having received almost no details since the battle three days earlier. McClellan answers: “I regret that you find it necessary to couch every dispatch I have the honor to receive from you, in a spirit of fault finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this Army, or even to allude to them.”
Sunday, September 20, 1863: Writes Gen. Daniel Harvey Hill of the battle of Chickamauga: “There was no more splendid fighting in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga - that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay in striking was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope.”
Tuesday, September 20, 1864: Sherman wrote a letter to Lt Gen U.S. Grant “He hoped soon to see Grant’s army grown to “a force that is numerically double that of your antagonist, so that with one part you can watch him [the enemy] and with the other you can push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the South Shore [Side] Railroad, compel him to attack you in position, or accept battle on your own terms.”
Reinforcements were good, but Sherman wished for more. “We ought to ask our country for the largest possible armies that can be raised,” he wrote, “as so important a thing as the ‘self-existence of a great nation’ should not be left to the fickle chances of war.”
Of the nearer future, Sherman brought up Wilmington, North Carolina. Grant had suggested sending troops from the Army of the Potomac to occupy the city and cut off its port. But Sherman saw the occupation as pointless. The only thing that really mattered about it was the harbor. “If [Admiral David] Farragut can get across the bar, and the move can be made quick, I suppose it will succeed.”
And if it did succeed, Sherman mused that the fleet might then move to Savannah, Georgia. If Grant could manage to capture Savannah, Sherman vowed that he “would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores and depending on the country for the balance.”
This wouldn’t be as easy as the Federal Navy just capturing Savannah. “Where a million of people live my army won’t starve,” Sherman continued, “but as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force could so delay an army and harass it that it would not be a formidable object.”
That, however, is where Grant and the Navy would come in. If Savannah was in Federal hands, “I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and would so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me Augusta, with the only powder mills and factories remaining the the South, or let us have the Savannah River.” Either Augusta or Macon would be, in Sherman’s mind, “worth a battle.”
He would “start east and make a circuit south and back [to Atlanta], doing vast damage to the State.” But this would do little good in the long run. He could also threaten to do just that, and thus “hold a rod over the Georgians who are not overloyal to the South.”
Though Sherman proposed speed, he allowed that the campaign could be put off till winter. But whatever was to be done, there had to be some sort of plan. “The more I study the game the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for me to penetrate much farther into Georgia without an objective beyond.”
To that end, Sherman thought it best that Grant’s army and the army based out of New Orleans (now under the helm of Edward Canby) “be reenforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the [Savannah] River; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River and send a force to get Columbus, Ga., either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed, and put my army in find order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commence, and the city of Savannah is in our [meaning Federal] possession.”
Sherman promised that if Grant fixed the date for when he would occupy Savannah, “I will insure our possession of Macon and a point on the [Savannah] river below Augusta.” He saw Georgia as most important to the Confederacy than even their capital. “The possession of the Savannah River is more than fatal to the possibility of a Southern independence; they may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia.” This was some pretty bold thinking.
Sherman ended the letter to his old friend as if making plans to meet up over Christmas: “If you can whip Lee and I can march to the Atlantic I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days’ leave of absence to see the young folks.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/sherman-reveals-his-plans-to-march-to-the-sea/
Pictures: 1863-09-20 Eye of the Storm Patrick Cleburne at Chickamauga, Georgia; 1862-09-20 Boteler's Cement Mill - Waud; 1862-09-20 Shepherdstown, VA Map; 1861-09-20 Lexington, Missouri Surrendered to the Rebels
A. Friday, September 20, 1861: Battle of Lexington, MO ends in Confederate Victory. Lexington, Missouri surrendered to the Rebels. The siege of Lexington had lasted well over a week. The past two days, however, saw the most intense fighting. Union Col. Mulligan’s 3,500 men were running short on supplies and ammunition. Still, he held out hope that General Fremont had come through for him and reinforcements were on the way. They were not.
The previous night, General Sterling Price’s men came up with the idea of using bales of hemp as movable breastworks. The hemp was heavy enough to absorb bullets and even cannonballs, but light enough to be moved forward, against the Union troops huddled in their own, stationary works.
By dawn, the bales stretched to the west and north of Lexington, 100 to 400 yards in front of the Federals’ fortifications. The firing resumed in earnest at 8am, and slowly, the Missouri secessionists moved the bales closer to the Union lines.
This was typically accomplished by three unarmed troops pushing the bales while on their hands and knees. Armed troops would load and fire as they were moved forward. Union bullets, shot and shell were useless against such mobile barricades.
The Rebel divisions closed like a boa constrictor around their enemy. It was clear that the situation was becoming dire, even hopeless, for the Union. Several hours of heated battle passed, with the Rebel lines shrinking around them. The Federals’ ammunition was dangerously low and all food and water gone.
It was painfully obvious to an officer under Col. Mulligan, the garrison had to surrender. Without orders, he hoisted a white flag over their fort. Seeing this, both sides ceased firing. General Price, hoping that this was the surrender, sent a messenger to Mulligan asking the reason why the firing had stopped. Mulligan, gallant and stubborn as ever, replied, “General, I hardly know, unless you have surrendered.”
Soon after, the firing commenced and the Rebel hemp bales advanced. The Unionist Home Guards retreated into the inner fortifications, refusing to fight any longer. They raised again a white flag, hoping to stop the senseless battle. Knowing that victory was completely out of his grasp, Mulligan called his subordinates to his side for a brief council of war. They took a vote and a large majority favored surrender over being slaughtered.
Around 2pm, Mulligan dispatched a messenger to Price, asking for the terms of the surrender. Price replied that the surrender would be unconditional, the soldiers would be disarmed and paroled, while the officers would he held as prisoners of war. He gave Mulligan ten minutes to respond.
Having no choice, Mulligan and his troops marched out of their fortifications and laid down their arms. Col. Mulligan and the other officers offered their swords to Price as symbols of their own surrender. “You gentlemen have fought so bravely,” responded Price, “that it would be wrong to deprive you of your swords. Keep them.”
While the troops marched before the Missouri State Guard, a Rebel band played “Dixie.” When the surrender was complete, former (or current, depending upon who was asked) Missouri Governor Claiborne Jackson made a long, harsh speech before the assembled Union troops. He demanded to know what business they had coming into Missouri to make war. Since many of Mulligan’s men were from Illinois, Jackson added, “when Missouri needed troops from Illinois, she would ask for them.” After much expended breath, the displaced Governor told the Federal soldiers that they were allowed to go home.
Col. Mulligan and his wife were the only Unionists to remain with Price. Having refused parole, Mulligan became the guest of the Missouri State Guard and was treated with all kindness and respect due to a gentleman and his lady.
From the victory, Price acquired seven cannons, 3,000 muskets, 750 horses and various other supplies. Price lost 25 killed and 72 wounded, while Mulligan lost 39 killed and 120 wounded.
B. Saturday, September 20, 1862: Confederate victory at Battle of Shepherdstown [Boteler's Ford]. On September 19, a detachment of Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rearguard commanded by Brig. Gen. William Pendleton, and captured four guns. Early on the 20th, Porter pushed elements of two divisions across the Potomac to establish a bridgehead. Hill's division counterattacked while many of the Federals were crossing and nearly annihilated the 118th Pennsylvania (the "Corn Exchange" Regiment), inflicting 269 casualties. This rearguard action discouraged Federal pursuit.
C. Sunday, September 20, 1863: Battle of Chickamauga, GA ends in Confederate Victory. The fighting continues at Chickamauga Creek in Georgia, not far from Chattanooga, Tennessee. The fighting was essentially toe to toe from one end to the other until, due to a mistaken order, Union troops right in the center under Thomas J. Wood (US) were pulled out of position. In the Confederate center were the forces of James Longstreet (CSA), who lost no time capitalizing on this opening. The Union line nearly dissolved, except for General George Henry Thomas (US). Gathering his men on a rise called Snodgrass Hill, they formed a defensive line that held all afternoon; getting for Thomas the nickname “The Rock of Chickamauga.” After dark, under orders, Thomas withdrew to rejoin the rest of the Union army in Chattanooga. General Braxton Bragg (CSA) had won his battle, but it come at a terrible cost. The Battle of Chickamauga was the second costliest battle of the Civil War, ranking only behind Gettysburg, and was by far the deadliest battle fought in the West. These bloody two days in American history cost the Federals 1,657 dead, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing for a total of 16,170 casualties out of 58,000 troops. The Confederate losses were 2,312 dead, 14,674 wounded and 1,468 missing for a total of 18,545 out of 66,000 troops.
Details: Following the successful Tullahoma Campaign, Union Gen. William S. Rosecrans hoped to continue the offensive and force Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga. Rosecrans consolidated Union forces that had been scattered throughout Tennessee and Georgia, and forced Bragg to evacuate the city. Bragg concentrated his forces in LaFayette, Georgia, and determined to reoccupy the valuable Chattanooga. He followed the Union army north, skirmishing with them at Davis’ Cross Roads. The Battle of Chickamauga resumed at 9:30 a.m. the next morning, with coordinated Confederate attacks on the Union left flank. About an hour later, Rosecrans, believing a gap existed in his line, ordered Brig. Gen. Thomas Wood’s division to fill the gap. Wood, however, knew that the order was a mistake; no such gap existed in the Federal line, and moving his division would, in turn, open a large swath in the Union position. However, Wood had already been berated twice in the campaign for not promptly following orders. To avoid further reprimand, he immediately moved, creating a division wide hole in the Union line. This was the chance that the Confederates needed. Longstreet massed a striking force, led by Gen. Hood, of eight brigades divided into three lines. Longstreet’s men hammered through the gap that Wood had created, and Union resistance at the southern end of the battlefield evaporated as Federal troops, including Rosecrans himself, were pushed off the field.
George H. Thomas, in a move that would earn him the name “The Rock of Chickamauga,” took command and began consolidating the scattered Union forces on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. Thomas and his men formed a defensive position, and although Confederates continued to assault and pressed to within feet of the Union line, the Yankees held firm. Thomas withdrew as darkness fell. Although Thomas urged Rosecrans to lead the army in an attack the next day, Rosecrans rejected the idea and remained in Chattanooga. Bragg’s victorious army occupied the heights surrounding Chattanooga, blocking Federal supply lines, but did not pursue Rosecrans.
While Chickamauga was a decided Confederate victory, the results of the battle were staggering. With over 16,000 Union and 18,000 Confederate casualties, Chickamauga reached the highest losses of any battle in the Western theater. Although the Confederates had driven Rosecrans from the field, they had not succeeded in Bragg’s goals of destroying Rosecrans’s army or reoccupying Chattanooga. Fighting would resume less than two months later in the battles for Chattanooga.
D. Tuesday, September 20, 1864: Maj Gen William T. Sherman revealed his plans to March to the Sea in a letter to Lt Gen U.S. Grant. If Grant could manage to capture Savannah, Sherman vowed that he “would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores and depending on the country for the balance.”
This wouldn’t be as easy as the Federal Navy just capturing Savannah. “Where a million of people live my army won’t starve,” Sherman continued, “but as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force could so delay an army and harass it that it would not be a formidable object.”
That, however, is where Grant and the Navy would come in. If Savannah was in Federal hands, “I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and would so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me Augusta, with the only powder mills and factories remaining the the South, or let us have the Savannah River.” Either Augusta or Macon would be, in Sherman’s mind, “worth a battle.”
He would “start east and make a circuit south and back [to Atlanta], doing vast damage to the State.” But this would do little good in the long run. He could also threaten to do just that, and thus “hold a rod over the Georgians who are not overloyal to the South.”
Though Sherman proposed speed, he allowed that the campaign could be put off till winter. But whatever was to be done, there had to be some sort of plan. “The more I study the game the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for me to penetrate much farther into Georgia without an objective beyond.”
To that end, Sherman thought it best that Grant’s army and the army based out of New Orleans (now under the helm of Edward Canby) “be reenforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the [Savannah] River; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River and send a force to get Columbus, Ga., either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed, and put my army in find order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commence, and the city of Savannah is in our [meaning Federal] possession.”
1. Friday, September 20, 1861: If Fremont is Not Removed, Public Service Will Go to the Devil. General Fremont had arrested his former friend and the brother of the United States Postmaster General, Frank Blair. Fremont took offense over Blair’s letter to his brother, detailing why the General should be dismissed. For the past five days, Frank Blair had spent his time languishing in a St. Louis jail. He was, however, not silent about it.
Following the arrest, the Unionist Missouri newspapers fell in line behind Fremont, supporting the arrest of Blair. Though locked up, he accused Fremont of manipulating the press. Only one newspaper in St. Louis supported Blair through his imprisonment. Though they were the smallest paper, they were soon shut down by the Provost Marshall, acting on Fremont’s orders.
The news spread to Washington, where Montgomery Blair, Postmaster General, wired Fremont, offering to send him the controversial letter so that he could see for himself that there was no reason for drama such as this. He also demanded his release. On this date, he sent the letter, much to brother Frank’s chagrin, though he understood that his brother held the best of intentions.
Fremont, however, still refused to release Blair. The very public quarrel, which had taken on a life of its own, was beginning to draw a backlash. Some criticized the Fremont and Blair fight as being detrimental to the public service, as it showed that the Union was not always so united.
“All the talk about this quarrel being detrimental to the public service is bosh,” wrote Frank Blair of the accusations. “If Fremont is not removed, the public service will go to the devil.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lexington-missouri-surrendered-to-the-rebels/
2. Saturday, September 20, 1862: Munfordsville, Kentucky - On September 20, the Union force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Don C. Buell, entered the town of Munfordsville. They skirmished and forced the occupying Confederate forces, commanded by Gen. Braxton Bragg, to withdraw from their positions. Bragg took his force to Bardstown to join up with Maj. Gen. E. Kirby Smith.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html
3. Saturday, September 20, 2012: There are those who might excuse General George McClellan’s restraint in the Battle of Antietam on the grounds that he had to hold back substantial reserves as the last defense of Washington in case of a disaster on the field. He had missed his chance to end the war, others noticed this inaction as well: Antietam will be McClellan’s last battle. Today, an Union expedition leaves out of Bolivar, Tennessee heading to Grand Junction and La Grange, Tennessee. A few skirmishes are fought along the way.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-five
4. Saturday, September 20, 1862: near Shiloh, North Carolina - On September 20, the Union ironclad, USS Lancer, arrived near Shiloh. It sent a landing party ashore and quickly engaged a small Confederate force. The Confederates were soon driven away.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html
5. Saturday, September 20, 1862: In a letter to his wife, Gen. McClellan writes: “I feel some little pride in having with a beaten and demoralized army defeated Lee so utterly, and saved the North so completely.” He adds, believing that he can now capitalize on his political stock: “I have insisted that Stanton shall be removed and that Halleck shall give way to me as Commander in Chief. I will not serve under him – for he is an incompetent fool – in no way fit for the important place he holds.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+20%2C+1862
6. Saturday, September 20, 1862: Gen. Halleck asks what McClellan is doing, having received almost no details since the battle three days earlier. McClellan answers: “I regret that you find it necessary to couch every dispatch I have the honor to receive from you, in a spirit of fault finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this Army, or even to allude to them.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+20%2C+1862
7. Saturday, September 20, 1862: Frances Howell Kennedy Diary. On the corner of Prospect and Washington streets in Hagerstown, Maryland once sat a large house that was called the Rochester House, which was the home of Frances Howell Kennedy, widow of a Hagerstown physician. On September 20, 1862, she saw a young soldier at the train station, who had a bandage around his throat and was walking very languidly. Kennedy asked him to come to her home until he was able to travel, and he accepted the invitation. Fortunately for our country, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. would live to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1902 to 1932.
http://civilwarwomenblog.com/women-of-antietam/
8. Sunday, September 20, 1863: Writes Gen. Daniel Harvey Hill of the battle of Chickamauga: “There was no more splendid fighting in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga - that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay in striking was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+20%2C+1863
9. Sunday, September 20, 1863: Diary of Emily Helm. Battle of Chickamauga: In 1863, General Benjamin Hardin Helm served in the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns under Breckinridge. Early in the morning of September 20, 1863 - the second day of fighting in the Battle of Chickamauga - Breckinridge placed his men to the right of General Patrick R. Cleburne's division and consequently became the extreme right flank of the Confederate line of battle. At 9:30 a.m. with the Kentucky Brigade forming the left, the division moved forward in search of the enemy.
General Breckinridge reported: “At the distance of 700 yards we came upon him [the enemy] in force, and the battle was opened by Helm's brigade with great fury. The Second and Ninth Kentucky, with three companies of the 41st Alabama, encountered the left of a line of breastworks.
The Federal troops held a strong position, which was fortified with three lines of entrenchments composed of fallen timber and rocks concealed in thick undergrowth. This was one of the bloodiest encounters of the day.
But the Federal works extended only half the length of the Brigade. The regiments on the right, the 6th and 4th Kentucky and several companies from the 41st Alabama were successful and passed to the right and clear of the works. Steadily they drove the enemy back. The left-hand regiments reformed and made a second charge that drove the first line of the enemy from their entrenchments.
The advanced position could not be maintained, however, due to heavy fire from their left, and they were forced back. For the third time the Confederates advanced to the charge, under heavy fire. Soon word was received that General Helm was mortally wounded, while attempting to motivate his Kentuckians forward to assault the strong position once again.
Late in the evening, reinforced by several additional brigades, the shattered remnant of the 1st Kentucky Brigade charged once more. This time they drove the enemy from their fortifications toward the Chattanooga road taking a considerable number of prisoners. As darkness fell, a welcome halt was called to this bloody day of fighting.
General Helm had been taken to a house nearby where the yard and hallways were filled with injured soldiers. Helm was placed in a room with several other seriously wounded. Helm asked the doctor if there was any hope and was told there was none. As the sound of battle faded he roused himself to consciousness and asked what the outcome was. On being told that the army had triumphed he uttered, in a painful whisper, "Victory."
Near midnight General Ben Hardin Helm died at the age of 32. The Orphan Brigade had lost another commander.
As the war progressed, Emilie had followed her husband south. In Chattanooga, she organized better care for wounded soldiers. She was in Alabama in September 1863 when she got word that her husband had been killed.
http://civilwarwomenblog.com/emilie-todd-helm/
10. Sunday, September 20, 1863: Battle of Chickamauga. General Braxton Bragg [CS] tries to split General William Rosecrans [US] forces as they try to return to the safety of Chattanooga. A second day breakthrough at the Brotherton Cabin forces the federals into a retreat, halted only by the Rock of Chickamauga, General George Thomas on Snodgrass Hill
The bloodiest two days in American history cost the Federals 1,657 dead, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing for a total of 16,170 casualties out of 58,000 troops. The Confederate losses were 2,312 dead, 14,674 wounded and 1,468 for a total of 18,545 out of 66,000 troops.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186309
11. Sunday, September 20, 1863: Battle of Chickamauga, Georgia. Day 2: Overnight, CSA Gen Braxton Bragg re-organizes his army into two wings---one under Gen. Polk, and another under Lt Gen. James Longstreet, who has just arrived late last night. The orders never find Lt. Gen. D.H. Hill, however, and by morning, he learns from Gen. Polk that Hill’s troops have been made subordinate to Polk’s command, and that Breckenridge’s division in Hill’s Corps is to lead the attack: consequently, there are delays. Bragg has envisioned a series of attacks from right to left, and Breckinridge is to lead off. Hill does not learn of his role in the morning’s attacks until 7:25 AM, when he is lining up his troops and getting them fed, since most of them had not eaten for over 24 hours. Gen. Bragg is furious to find that the attacks have not started yet, and is outraged to find Gen. Polk back of the lines reading a newspaper. Overnight, Gen. Thomas has fortified Kelly’s Field with earthworks and logs, batteries of field guns, and placed eight brigades there, with several more in reserve. Out beyond his flank, he has placed Beatty’s brigade. Although Hill has placed his troops, other sections of the Rebel line are chaotic: Cheatham finds that his division is at right angles with Hill’s, and that it was also partly behind Stewart’s, making at advance moot. Cheatham is pulled out of line, at last, and precious time is lost. Muddled orders, no orders at all, and tangled battle lines plague the Rebel army in the early morning.
Finally, Breckinridge is sent forward by Hill, followed by Walker’s Reserves and what is left of Liddell’s division. The Orphan brigade of Kentuckians, under Gen. Helm, hits the left end of the Union line, and Breckinridge pushes on with the other two of his brigades under Stovall and Adams, who sweep over Beatty’s position, and find themselves astraddle the La Fayette road, and overlapping the Union flank. Breckinridge re-aligns Adams and Stovall at right angles, now facing south, and they advance on Thomas’ flank and rear. Gen. Helm (Pres. Lincoln’s brother-in-law) is mortally wounded. Yankee reserves under Van Derveer and Stanley stop Adams and Stovall cold, driving them back to their original position. Gen. Cleburne’s division goes forward also, but their attack is partly blunted by one flank of Stewart’s Rebel division in their way, and the fact that Cleburne is attacking a line where much of four Federal divisions are dug in. Cleburne’s men suffer heavy losses.
At Bragg’s command (without consulting Longstreet) Stewart’s gray division charges the Federal line at around 11:00 AM, badly mangles Brannan’s flank and also part of Reynolds’ division, and even captures a section of the La Fayette Road, but are finally driven back. Gen. D.H. Hill recommends to Gen. Polk that a second attack be launched, if fresh troops are applied; the brigade of State Rights Gist (yes, that is his real name) and the division of Liddell, already battle-worn, both go forward, but are finally ineffectual.
Nevertheless, Thomas is alarmed at the fury of the Southern attack, and calls for reinforcements. Rosecrans dispatches Van Cleve’s division and part of Negley's to Thomas, and intends to send more. Brannan is asked to reinforce Thomas also, but Brannan hesitates to move until the order is confirmed by Rosecrans. Rosecrans assumes that Brannan is already in motion; he therefore orders Gen. Thomas Wood to shift his division from the Union right to replace Brannan in the center. Wood marches his troops behind Brannan (who is still in line) and Reynolds.
This opens a gap in the Union line at a most opportune moment for the Confederates. Gen Longstreet, in command of the Left Wing of the army, is carefully laying out the lines of his advance. Ordered to attack by Bragg, Longstreet is reluctant to move against dug-in troops, so he lines up eight brigades in three lines in the column, preparing to strike the Union line precisely where Wood’s division has just vacated it: all three of Bushrod Johnson’s brigades (Fulton, Gregg, McNair), all three of Hood’s brigades (Sheffield, Robertson, and Benning), and two of McLaws’ brigades, commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph Kershaw, in the third line. Altogether, Longstreet has nearly 11,000 men in column. Direct command of this column is given to Gen. John Bell Hood. This column would be attacking up the Brotherton Road, erupting into the Brotherton field so that they can deploy to bring all their strength to bear. Lined up on their left is Thomas Hindman’s division (brigades Deas, Manigault, Anderson), and behind Hindman is Preston’s division (brigades Gracie, Kelly, Trigg). Longstreet orders the attack forward at 11:10 AM, possibly intending Stewart’s premature advance to coincide with Hood’s.
Bushrod Johnson’s men emerge from the woods, cross the La Fayette Road, and spread out in line of battle across Brotherton Field, Fulton driving right through, after scattering a skirmish line, and McNair brushing against some of Brannan’s men on his right.
A line of Federal cannon line up at Dyer Field, but Gregg (commanded by Sugg), Sheffield, and Robertson’s Texans push forward and capture most of the guns. A counterattack by Harker’s Brigade from Wood’s division disrupts the advance, but Gen. Hood sends Kershaw in to attack Harker’s Federals. He then rides to rally his Texans. As he does so, he is shot in the thigh, and is rushed to the hospital. As the ball has splintered the bone, the surgeons amputate Hood’s right leg.
As Hindman strikes J.C. Davis’s Federals, he has initial success. Sheridan keeps his two brigades in position until Brig. Gen. Andrew Lytle is killed, and his brigade dissolves in panic toward the rear. One of Hindman’s brigades, under Manigault, is savaged by a flank attack by Wilder’s mounted infantry, armed with the repeating rifles, thus slowing Hindman’s advance. However, soon, most of Crittenden’s corps, and much of McCook’s, is fleeing up the road toward Chattanooga, in a full rout. The Federal right flank and right center, already weakened by Rosecrans’ bolstering of Thomas’s flank, dissolves and ceases to exist. Because of the topography, there is no open way to the army’s left flank, and so the Union soldier’s flee up the road to Chattanooga, carrying Rosecrans with them, who sends his Chief of Staff Gen. James Garfield, back with orders to Thomas to cover the retreat.
Longstreet’s column is basically wheeling to the right, and disrupting the Union line, one piece at a time. Some of the pieces fall back, and as Thomas rides to the right to see about reinforcements, he sees the Confederate breakthrough, and he begins to patch together a line of troops on a spur of Missionary Ridge called Snodgrass Hill and Horseshoe Ridge connected to it.
Longstreet’s advance pauses to re-organize and re-align, parts of it having stopped, and others hopelessly intermingled and confused in the tangled woods and the battle smoke, nearly beyond the effective reach of any commander’s influence. Harker’s Federal brigade, in the meantime, withdraws up Snodgrass Ridge and begins to make a stand as Perry and Robertson’s Texans attack the ridge with their brigades near 1:00 PM, but are driven off.
Thomas sends Brannan, parts of Negley’s division, and what is left of Wood’s to the ridge to dig in, along with Harker’s brigade, and other assorted odds and ends. Thomas’s left—the heavily-fortified crescent that curves around Kelly’s Field, and has resisted attacks all day—he leaves as it is, bolstered with a heavy concentration of infantry and artillery. He then begins to fashion a line with Wood and Hazen’s brigade along Horseshoe Ridge to link the two ends of the blue line.
Gen. Granger, commanding Rosecrans’ Reserves, is only 3 miles away, and hears the noise of battle. Although he is supposed to wait for orders, Granger sends Steedman’s two-brigade division and Col. Daniel McCook’s brigade. Steeman is eventually put on the far Union right on Snodgrass Hill. After several more uncoordinated Confederate assaults, several Rebel divisions are put together (Hindman, Kershaw, and Bushrod Johnson) to attack Snodgrass Hill in unison, and they step off around 3:30 PM. Ground is gained by the Southern attack, as the gray troops fight with bayonet and rifle stocks in a brutal hand-to-hand fight, capturing much of the hill’s slope.
Longstreet, who was behind the lines eating lunch, is approached by Bragg about the progress of the battle, and Longstreet asks for reinforcements to pursue up the Rossville Road after the fleeing Yankees, and thus cut off Thomas’ retreat route. Bragg has his largest division (Cheatham) nearly intact, and part of another, but refuses, denying that there are any troops available. He orders Longstreet to keep attacking. Finally, D.H. Hill, commanding the Rebel right, moves forward: the Confederates on the right finally attack the Kelly Field salient, putting pressure on the whole Federal line, until finally Cleburne’s men take the breastworks and cause a breach in the Union line. At the same time, Longstreet commits his last fresh division, under Gen. Preston, who breaks his division against the impregnable Union positions.
Finally, under cover of falling darkness, Thomas orders Gen. Reynolds to withdraw the troops from the broken salient on the left, followed by Palmer, Baird, and Johnson with the remainders of their divisions; the Rebels capture many from Baird’s division, however, and it is not a clean getaway. Then, unit by unit, the Yankees withdraw up the Rossville Road toward Chattanooga. Steedman, Brannan, and Wood all make a stealthy withdrawal from Snodgrass Hill. Three regiments–the 22nd Michigan, and 21st and 89th Ohio, cover the retreat, but many of them are short on ammunition, and end up as prisoners of the Confederates.
Losses: Killed Wounded Captured/Missing Total
U.S. 1,657 9,756 4,757 16,170
C.S. 2,312 14,674 1,468 18,454
This is the second-bloodiest battle of the war, second only to Gettysburg.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+20%2C+1863
12. Tuesday, September 20, 1864: Still in pursuit by General Sheridan (US) Early’s (CSA) army, bloodied by its defeat at “Third Winchester” the day before, take up a strong defensive position at Fisher’s Hill, south of Strasburg, Virginia. The Union surrender Keytesville, Missouri, as Major General Sterling Price (CSA) presses on into the state to relieve pressure from Union advances in the south.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-180
A Friday, September, 20, 1861: Confederate forces captured the hills around Lexington, Mo, thus making the city even more open to artillery attacks. An attempt to get supplies to the Union defenders via the river system failed when the Confederates captured the supply boats along with their supplies.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-23
A+ Friday, September 20, 1861: Battle of Lexington ends. Sterling Price, with 18,000 men, lays siege to Lexington, Missouri, with a federal force of 3.600 under Colonel James Mulligan. After fighting intensified on September 19, Mulligan surrendered on the 20th.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186109
A++ Friday, September 20, 1861: Lexington, Missouri surrendered to the Rebels. The siege of Lexington had lasted well over a week. The past two days, however, saw the most intense fighting. Union Col. Mulligan’s 3,500 men were running short on supplies and ammunition. Still, he held out hope that General Fremont had come through for him and reinforcements were on the way. They were not.
The previous night, General Sterling Price’s men came up with the idea of using bales of hemp as movable breastworks. The hemp was heavy enough to absorb bullets and even cannonballs, but light enough to be moved forward, against the Union troops huddled in their own, stationary works.
By dawn, the bales stretched to the west and north of Lexington, 100 to 400 yards in front of the Federals’ fortifications. The firing resumed in earnest at 8am, and slowly, the Missouri secessionists moved the bales closer to the Union lines.
This was typically accomplished by three unarmed troops pushing the bales while on their hands and knees. Armed troops would load and fire as they were moved forward. Union bullets, shot and shell were useless against such mobile barricades.
The Rebel divisions closed like a boa constrictor around their enemy. It was clear that the situation was becoming dire, even hopeless, for the Union. Several hours of heated battle passed, with the Rebel lines shrinking around them. The Federals’ ammunition was dangerously low and all food and water gone.
It was painfully obvious to an officer under Col. Mulligan, the garrison had to surrender. Without orders, he hoisted a white flag over their fort. Seeing this, both sides ceased firing. General Price, hoping that this was the surrender, sent a messenger to Mulligan asking the reason why the firing had stopped. Mulligan, gallant and stubborn as ever, replied, “General, I hardly know, unless you have surrendered.”
Soon after, the firing commenced and the Rebel hemp bales advanced. The Unionist Home Guards retreated into the inner fortifications, refusing to fight any longer. They raised again a white flag, hoping to stop the senseless battle. Knowing that victory was completely out of his grasp, Mulligan called his subordinates to his side for a brief council of war. They took a vote and a large majority favored surrender over being slaughtered.
Around 2pm, Mulligan dispatched a messenger to Price, asking for the terms of the surrender. Price replied that the surrender would be unconditional, the soldiers would be disarmed and paroled, while the officers would he held as prisoners of war. He gave Mulligan ten minutes to respond.
Having no choice, Mulligan and his troops marched out of their fortifications and laid down their arms. Col. Mulligan and the other officers offered their swords to Price as symbols of their own surrender. “You gentlemen have fought so bravely,” responded Price, “that it would be wrong to deprive you of your swords. Keep them.”
While the troops marched before the Missouri State Guard, a Rebel band played “Dixie.” When the surrender was complete, former (or current, depending upon who was asked) Missouri Governor Claiborne Jackson made a long, harsh speech before the assembled Union troops. He demanded to know what business they had coming into Missouri to make war. Since many of Mulligan’s men were from Illinois, Jackson added, “when Missouri needed troops from Illinois, she would ask for them.” After much expended breath, the displaced Governor told the Federal soldiers that they were allowed to go home.
Col. Mulligan and his wife were the only Unionists to remain with Price. Having refused parole, Mulligan became the guest of the Missouri State Guard and was treated with all kindness and respect due to a gentleman and his lady.
From the victory, Price acquired seven cannons, 3,000 muskets, 750 horses and various other supplies. Price lost 25 killed and 72 wounded, while Mulligan lost 39 killed and 120 wounded.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/lexington-missouri-surrendered-to-the-rebels/
B Saturday, September 20, 1862: Near Shepherdstown, Virginia, Confederate troops under A.P. Hill spar with troops from FitzJohn Porter’s corps for an hour.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=September+20%2C+1862
B Saturday, September 20, 1862: Battle of Shepherdstown [Boteler's Ford]. On September 19, a detachment of Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rearguard commanded by Brig. Gen. William Pendleton, and captured four guns. Early on the 20th, Porter pushed elements of two divisions across the Potomac to establish a bridgehead. Hill's division counterattacked while many of the Federals were crossing and nearly annihilated the 118th Pennsylvania (the "Corn Exchange" Regiment), inflicting 269 casualties. This rearguard action discouraged Federal pursuit.
B+ Saturday, September 20, 1862: Skirmishes at Shepherdstown, Ashby's Gap, Williamsport, and Hagerstown, as Confederates under A. P. Hill covered the retreat of the Army of Northern Virginia from Sharpsburg. Lee would keep a heavy cavalry presence in the area until October.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186209
C Sunday, September 20, 1863: The fighting continues at Chickamauga Creek in Georgia, not far from Chattanooga, Tennessee. The fighting was essentially toe to toe from one end to the other until, due to a mistaken order, Union troops right in the center under Thomas J. Wood (US) were pulled out of position. In the Confederate center were the forces of James Longstreet (CSA), who lost no time capitalizing on this opening. The Union line nearly dissolved, except for General George Henry Thomas (US). Gathering his men on a rise called Snodgrass Hill, they formed a defensive line that held all afternoon; getting for Thomas the nickname “The Rock of Chickamauga.” After dark, under orders, Thomas withdrew to rejoin the rest of the Union army in Chattanooga. General Braxton Bragg (CSA) had won his battle, but it come at a terrible cost. The Battle of Chickamauga was the second costliest battle of the Civil War, ranking only behind Gettysburg, and was by far the deadliest battle fought in the West. These bloody two days in American history cost the Federals 1,657 dead, 9,756 wounded, and 4,757 missing for a total of 16,170 casualties out of 58,000 troops. The Confederate losses were 2,312 dead, 14,674 wounded and 1,468 missing for a total of 18,545 out of 66,000 troops.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-128
C+ Sunday, September 20, 1863: Following the successful Tullahoma Campaign, Union Gen. William S. Rosecrans hoped to continue the offensive and force Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga. Rosecrans consolidated Union forces that had been scattered throughout Tennessee and Georgia, and forced Bragg to evacuate the city. Bragg concentrated his forces in LaFayette, Georgia, and determined to reoccupy the valuable Chattanooga. He followed the Union army north, skirmishing with them at Davis’ Cross Roads. By September 17, Bragg had been reinforced with Virginia divisions under Gen. John Bell Hood and a Mississippi division under Brig. Gen. Bushrod Johnson—the first attempt to transport Confederate troops from one theater to another to achieve numerical superiority. With renewed confidence that Chattanooga could pass once again into Confederate hands, on the morning of the 18th Bragg marched his army to the west bank of Chickamauga Creek, hoping to wedge his troops between Chattanooga and the Federal army. As Bragg’s infantry crossed the creek on the 18th, they skirmished with Federal infantry and mounted infantry armed with Spencer repeating rifles. Bragg had been hoping that his advance would be a surprise; Rosecrans, however, had observed the Confederates marching in the morning, and anticipated Bragg’s plan. By the time Bragg’s army had crossed the creek, Union reinforcements had arrived.
The Battle of Chickamauga began in earnest shortly after dawn on September 19th. Throughout the day Bragg’s men gained ground but could not break the extended Union line despite a series of aggressive attacks. Confederate luck changed when, at 11 p.m., Gen. Longstreet’s divisions arrived at Chickamauga, giving the Confederate force superior numbers. Bragg divided his forces into two wings. Longstreet commanded the left; Lt. Gen. Leonidas K. Polk took charge of Confederate troops on the right. The battle resumed at 9:30 a.m. the next morning, with coordinated Confederate attacks on the Union left flank. About an hour later, Rosecrans, believing a gap existed in his line, ordered Brig. Gen. Thomas Wood’s division to fill the gap. Wood, however, knew that the order was a mistake; no such gap existed in the Federal line, and moving his division would, in turn, open a large swath in the Union position. However, Wood had already been berated twice in the campaign for not promptly following orders. To avoid further reprimand, he immediately moved, creating a division wide hole in the Union line. This was the chance that the Confederates needed. Longstreet massed a striking force, led by Gen. Hood, of eight brigades divided into three lines. Longstreet’s men hammered through the gap that Wood had created, and Union resistance at the southern end of the battlefield evaporated as Federal troops, including Rosecrans himself, were pushed off the field.
George H. Thomas, in a move that would earn him the name “The Rock of Chickamauga,” took command and began consolidating the scattered Union forces on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. Thomas and his men formed a defensive position, and although Confederates continued to assault and pressed to within feet of the Union line, the Yankees held firm. Thomas withdrew as darkness fell. Although Thomas urged Rosecrans to lead the army in an attack the next day, Rosecrans rejected the idea and remained in Chattanooga. Bragg’s victorious army occupied the heights surrounding Chattanooga, blocking Federal supply lines, but did not pursue Rosecrans.
While Chickamauga was a decided Confederate victory, the results of the battle were staggering. With over 16,000 Union and 18,000 Confederate casualties, Chickamauga reached the highest losses of any battle in the Western theater. Although the Confederates had driven Rosecrans from the field, they had not succeeded in Bragg’s goals of destroying Rosecrans’s army or reoccupying Chattanooga. Fighting would resume less than two months later in the battles for Chattanooga.
http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/chickamauga.html?tab=facts
D Tuesday, September 20, 1864: Maj Gen William T. Sherman revealed his plans to March to the Sea in a letter to Lt Gen U.S. Grant. If Grant could manage to capture Savannah, Sherman vowed that he “would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores and depending on the country for the balance.”
This wouldn’t be as easy as the Federal Navy just capturing Savannah. “Where a million of people live my army won’t starve,” Sherman continued, “but as you know, in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force could so delay an army and harass it that it would not be a formidable object.”
That, however, is where Grant and the Navy would come in. If Savannah was in Federal hands, “I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and would so threaten Macon and Augusta that he would give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give me Augusta, with the only powder mills and factories remaining the the South, or let us have the Savannah River.” Either Augusta or Macon would be, in Sherman’s mind, “worth a battle.”
He would “start east and make a circuit south and back [to Atlanta], doing vast damage to the State.” But this would do little good in the long run. He could also threaten to do just that, and thus “hold a rod over the Georgians who are not overloyal to the South.”
Though Sherman proposed speed, he allowed that the campaign could be put off till winter. But whatever was to be done, there had to be some sort of plan. “The more I study the game the more am I convinced that it would be wrong for me to penetrate much farther into Georgia without an objective beyond.”
To that end, Sherman thought it best that Grant’s army and the army based out of New Orleans (now under the helm of Edward Canby) “be reenforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the [Savannah] River; that General Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River and send a force to get Columbus, Ga., either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed, and put my army in find order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commence, and the city of Savannah is in our [meaning Federal] possession.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/sherman-reveals-his-plans-to-march-to-the-sea/
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter LTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard WalkoSSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SFC David Reid, M.S, PHR, SHRM-CP, DTMSgt Christopher Collins SPC (Join to see) SPC Gary C. PO3 Lynn Spalding
“They Seemed Everywhere Victorious” – Union Route at Chickamauga
September 20, 1863 (Sunday) William Rosecrans, commander of the Union Army of the Cumberland, knew he could not attack. The previous day’s fighting along the Chickamauga had left his army wou…
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CSM Charles Hayden
Ford LTC Stephen F. Ft Rosecrans National Cemetery at Point Loma,CA was declared "full" in 2014. Spouses of interred veterans and a few others may still be 'buried' there.
Overlooking San Diego Harbor, Point Loma and Ft Rosecrans are amongst attractions for visitors to San Diego.
North Island NAS is clearly visible across the entry to the Harbor, while MCRD to the left is inconspicuous.
SEAL training and their Headquarters further down the peninsula are hidden by the Del Coronado Hotel, whose breakwater is often visited by BUD's trainees after EENT.
Overlooking San Diego Harbor, Point Loma and Ft Rosecrans are amongst attractions for visitors to San Diego.
North Island NAS is clearly visible across the entry to the Harbor, while MCRD to the left is inconspicuous.
SEAL training and their Headquarters further down the peninsula are hidden by the Del Coronado Hotel, whose breakwater is often visited by BUD's trainees after EENT.
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LTC Stephen F.
CSM Charles Hayden - Thanks for letting me know. I am glad that "Spouses of interred veterans and a few others may still be 'buried' at Ft Rosecrans National Cemetery even though it was declared full in 2014.
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LTC Trent Klug
CSM Charles Hayden Having been stationed both at MCRD San Diego and NAS North Island, we were always looking up a Ft. Rosecrans. It's a beautiful place and has the view people would pay millions for.
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LTC Stephen F. great post, extraordinary penmanship my friend. I chose:
1862: Confederate victory at Battle of Shepherdstown [Boteler's Ford]. On September 19, a detachment of Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rearguard commanded by Brig. Gen. William Pendleton, and captured
(because of the surprise of the victory of the Confederate against a superior force). I am out of votes will strike again tomorrow if its the Lords will with more votes.
1862: Confederate victory at Battle of Shepherdstown [Boteler's Ford]. On September 19, a detachment of Porter's V Corps pushed across the river at Boteler's Ford, attacked the Confederate rearguard commanded by Brig. Gen. William Pendleton, and captured
(because of the surprise of the victory of the Confederate against a superior force). I am out of votes will strike again tomorrow if its the Lords will with more votes.
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