Posted on Sep 30, 2016
LTC Stephen F.
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From on high protected battles like the sieges of Petersburg, VA and Atlanta, GA and the battle at Smithfield Crossing, WV can seem like chess matches as forces are moved in from afar and flanking movements, feints, direct assaults and periodic truces to collect and bury the dead take place. However, for those on the ground, the bitter fighting against men whom a decade before could be neighbors was mind-numbing. The smell of gunpowder, rotting flesh, excrement from man and animal was nauseating. Periodically there was deadly quiet before an assault which seems similar to the stillness before a storm. Then all hell broke loose as the assault commenced. Minnie balls whirring and shattering bones, cannon fire which tore men’s heads off and put gaping holes in chests, and the bayonets dripping with blood and gore.
In 1861, Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont preemptively issued an emancipation proclamation in Missouri by declaring all slaves in his district to be free.
In 1863 there were at least ten separate skirmishes from Arkansas in the west to Virginia in the east: “Bayou Meto, Arkansas; Mount Pleasant near Vicksburg, Mississippi; Carter County and Clark’s Neck, Kentucky; Elk River, Glenville and Ball’s Mill, West Virginia; Edwards Ferry [also known as Ball’s Bluff…Barb], Maryland; along with Little Washington and Weaverville, Virginia.”
In 1863, Ford's Theater in Washington, D.C. reopened as Ford's New Theater. John T. Ford leased the First Baptist Church on 10th St. in Washington and turned it into a theater. Built in 1833, the church had been vacant since 1859, when the church merged with the nearby Fourth Baptist Church. The theater had opened in March 1862 but a fire in December of that year forced more than $10,000 in new renovations.
“Yankee Ineptitude Saves the Rebel Army from Destruction.” In 1862 “Stonewall Jackson was in trouble. He had swung around General John Pope’s right flank and hit both Bristoe Station and Manassas Junction, capturing troops, slaves, supplies, and artillery. With a force of 25,000, plus cavalry under Jeb Stuart, this was no mere raiding party – it was half of General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. He couldn’t (and wouldn’t) simply retreat back into Thoroughfare Gap. Quite the opposite was planned. Lee was about to unite his army behind Pope’s force, positioning it between the Federals and Washington.
The hitch was that part of the much larger Army of the Potomac was arriving at Alexandria to join with Pope. Stonewall was caught in the middle. The Federals had been dealt a very fortunate hand. Pope with 60,000 or so troops in his command was marching from Warrenton. General William Franklin was moving west from Alexandria with 10,000. Both forces were heading straight for Gainesville, a small crossroads between Thoroughfare Gap and Manassas Junction. If they made it to Gainesville, it would cut Jackson off from the rest of Lee’s army, under General James Longstreet.
The previous night, Stonewall’s men had disrupted communications between Pope’s force at Warrenton and General-in-Chief Henry Halleck in Washington. That Union troops were about to sandwich Jackson happened completely by coincidence. Neither Pope nor Halleck knew what the other was doing.
In Warrenton, General Pope was mistaken about Jackson’s location (as he had been for some time). When he received word that Manassas Junction was captured, he believed only the advance guard of Jackson’s force was there. The rest, he believed, was probably around Thoroughfare Gap. Hitting Gainesville, he believed, would cut off Stonewall’s advance east.((Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 12, Part 3, p684.))
Meanwhile in Alexandria, General George McClellan had arrived and took command of the troops in the capital. Just as Pope turned to Halleck for advice (and received little), McClellan turned to Halleck to keep his troops out of harm’s way. In a wild spree of telegrams to Halleck in Washington, McClellan argued that Franklin’s Corps, as well as any other Army of the Potomac troops, should be kept near the city. His reasoning was simple. If he reinforced Pope and Pope was defeated, Washington would be left without troops. As time went on, he even petitioned for General Ambrose Burnside to evacuate Fredericksburg to cover Pope’s retreat (even though Pope wasn’t retreating).
When Halleck finally replied, he seemed just as lost at McClellan and Pope. He displayed no signs of leadership and nothing of the organizational cunning for which he had been known. In a final dispatch, Halleck seemed to throw up his hands in disgust and excuse himself of the whole ordeal. “As you must be aware, more than three-quarters of my time is taken up with the raising of new troops and matters in the West,” wrote the exasperated Halleck. “I have no time for details.” He then gave McClellan permission, as ranking officer in the field, to direct affairs “as you deem best.” Halleck wanted only to see the orders McClellan would issue before sending them along to Pope’s army.
Despite all of this, the Federals managed quite well. While most of Jackson’s force plundered the stores and cars at Manassas, a small guard was forming along Bull Run. General George Taylor, commanding a brigade in the Army of the Potomac, had moved out from Alexandria and positioned his force to take back Manassas Junction, believing the only Rebels there were some cavalry.
Seeing the enemy, Jackson ordered his men into the old fortifications. With artillery booming, he dared Taylor to make a move. Taylor’s men formed line of battle and advanced under a galling deluge of iron. Skirmishers were thrown forward, but soon it was obvious that nothing could be done. As they began to back away, Stuart’s cavalry swooped in on their flanks, threatening to cut them off. While it never became a route, Taylor quickly stepped in the direction of Fairfax, where General Isaac Cox’s 5,000 troops were stationed.
Seven miles south, at Bristoe Station, General Ewell, commanding the division Jackson left behind to guard the station, encountered the lead elements of Pope’s push forward. While the bulk of Pope’s army, under Generals Sigel and McDowell, marched on Gainesville, General Reno and men from Heintzelman’s Corps (under General Kearny) moved on Greenwich. General Joe Hooker, commanding a division under Heintzelman, marched up the railroad towards Bristoe.
Hooker deployed his division, pushing back Ewell’s skirmishers as he went. The main Confederate body at Bristoe took cover behind the railroad grade and wherever else they could find it. Artillery was deployed and riddled the coming Yankees with shot and shell. Hooker advanced, but didn’t have much of a chance to fully develop his attack. Ewell was under orders to fall back to Manassas Junction if hard pressed, and so he did, but not before inflicting more than 300 casualties upon the Yankees.
Pope had made a bold advance, but it wasn’t enough. The closest troops he had to the Rebels were those under Hooker. But Hooker, as he reported to Pope, was in no shape to continue. Pope’s other forces were scattered to the west and probably couldn’t be united until the afternoon of the following day.
Believing that he would probably be attacked by Jackson before that could happen, Pope sent for General Fitz John Porter, commanding about 11,000 in the V Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Porter had been guarding Kelly’s Ford along the Rappahannock and had been more or less left out of the plans until now. With an entire corps as reinforcement, thought Pope, Hooker should be able to hold his own against Jackson.
But Jackson had no intension of attacking Pope. The only recourse he could see was to try and convince Pope to attack him before McClellan’s Army of the Potomac could be fully assembled. He decided to make for the old battlefield at Bull Run, and to position his force on the north side of the turnpike. This would give him a fine defensive position, but would also allow him to connect to Longstreet’s wing, which should be coming along shortly. Jackson ordered the Union supply depot to be torched and began to move out well after dark.
Though he, no doubt, could see the fires, Pope believed that Jackson would still be at Manassas Junction the following day. With this in mind, he ordered his entire army to envelope Manassas Junction and bag Jackson’s men. Though he knew that the rest of Lee’s army was somewhere out there, he gave no orders to anyone to cover them. Focusing only upon Jackson at Manassas Junction, he laid his trap.
While Pope focused upon Jackson, General McDowell, commanding Pope’s left flank, worried about Longstreet. He planned to send Sigel’s Corps to slow down the Rebel advance through Thoroughfare Gap, but just as he was about to issue the order, Pope’s orders came through. McDowell and Sigel were to march in the opposite direction, toward Manassas Junction. The only thing standing between Longstreet and what was quickly becoming the rear of Pope’s army was a brigade of cavalry under General John Buford. For now, that would have to do.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/yankee-ineptitude-saves-the-rebel-army-from-destruction/


Pictures: 1862-08 5th Texas - 2nd Manassas; rebel yell; 1862-08-27 2nd Bull Run Map; 1862-08-27 The Army of the Potomac - Scene at the crossing of Kettle Run

A. 1861: Without approval from the White House, Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont, commander of the Army's Dept. of Missouri, declared martial law throughout all of Missouri. He also ordered the confiscation of property of all pro-Southerners who were in arms against the government and declared all slaves in his district to be free.
B. 1862: Second Bull Run Campaign. Maj Gen John Pope was forced to withdraw from the Rappahannock, River because Stonewall Jackson was on his flank. Pope did not realize that roughly half the Confederate army was between his position and Washington, D. C. Lee’s wanted to meet up with Stonewall Jackson, while Pope wanted to recapture Manassas Junction. Believing Jackson was actually much farther west than Manassas, Pope pushed on to Manassas Junction, hoping to catch Jackson coming through Thoroughfare Gap (which Jackson had passed two days before). Ewell bloodies Joseph Hooker badly, inflicting over 300 Union casualties at the Battle of Bristoe Station. Jackson then decides to torch the base at Manassas, and move to the northern edge of the old Bull Run battlefield, where he places his divisions along an unfinished railroad cut that was concealed and yet which overlooked the two main roads nearby. Pope, convinced that Jackson is now at Manassas Junction (which he was but no longer is), and so changes his direction from west-to-east, just as the Rebels go north and west. Another miss.
C. 1863: Bayou Meto, Arkansas. Gen. Davidson’s Federal cavalry attacked Generals Marsh Walker and John Marmaduke main defensive lines on the south side of Bayou Meto, east of Little Rock. The Yankees were rebuffed and the Confederates fell back on Little Rock. Gen. Frederick Steele and the rest of the Federal force approach Little Rock to follow up Davidson’s advance, in spite of nearly 1,000 of his men down sick from the summer heat and fevers.
Details: The Confederate resistance was stiff, and the ground was poor for an attack. Davidson could field only one brigade, with the others falling in behind as reserves. The Federal cavalry advanced both mounted and dismounted, firing as they could. Marmaduke’s troops were ousted from their most forward position and then from the next. Before the bridge, they had scraped out some impromptu works, and put up a solid fight.
When the Rebel infantry and artillery caught sight of the Union troops, they let loose a fire that threw the attackers back, and allowed the outnumbered advance troops to scurry quick over the bridge, which was ignited after their passing. With the bridge “handsomely burning,” as Marmaduke put it, the Federals formed their lines.
“A dash of the First Iowa Cavalry,” wrote General Davidson after the fray, “under fire of the enemy’s battery and sharpshooters lining the opposite bank, failed to save the bridge, which had been set on fire by the enemy, everything having been prepared beforehand for that purpose. Our batteries engaged those of the enemy, and the skirmishers on both sides were busy for about an hour and a half.”
With the setting of the sun, the skirmish was ended. The Federals, as Marmaduke recorded, “failing to occupy the river, returned after a heavy loss, leaving a number of their dead on the ground.”
If true, that number was seven killed. Thirty-eight others were wounded in the affair, including twenty-five from the 1st Iowa Cavalry – who also lost two killed in the dash. The Confederates failed to record their losses, but it’s probable that the Federal attackers suffered greater.
That night, Marmaduke and Walker were ordered to retire to the outskirts of Little Rock, where Sterling Price’s infantry were waiting for the inevitable.
D. 1864: Siege of Atlanta. Forward elements of Sherman's army move south to cut Hood's last supply line to Atlanta, the Macon and Western Railroad. The final assault is nearing today, as General Sherman (US) launches the assault on the Macon & Western Railroad lines. For more than a month Sherman has backed the Rebels into Atlanta with one victory after another. Now with one more victory, General Hood (CSA) would have to either, to surrender, die--or evacuate.
Come the dawn of this day, Hood seemed almost hopeful. “Last night the enemy continued to change their position by their left and center. They have drawn back so that their left is now on the Chattahoochee at the railroad bridge; their right is unchanged, and they appear to be moving troops in that direction. They have no troops nearer than four miles of Atlanta.”
By the late morning, Hood was “of the opinion that the enemy has taken up a new line.” He ordered S.D. Lee, commanding another corps, to dispatch an engineer to “make a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy’s lines.” Come the meridian, the scouts understood that the Union right now rested on Camp Creek southwest of the city. “They are constructing works rapidly,” came one message. And toward evening, Sherman’s advance – his right – began to shell the Rebel skirmishers in their front.
It was becoming clear to Hood that Sherman’s target might be East Point, the rail junction south of the city. If this fell, then both southward-running lines would be cut. His supplies would but severed.
William Hardee’s Corps was dispatched to reinforce the scant array of troops already guarding the point, even reinforcing him with another brigade as need dictated. But though Hood could perceive Sherman’s current movements, he could not foretell his next.
Was East Point truly his target? If it was successfully defended, would Sherman beg off or would he instead move south to the town of Rough and Ready, severing each line in turn? Or might it be Jonesboro, even farther south? If Hood essentially evacuated Atlanta in order to defend Sherman’s southerly reach, might not the Federal corps remaining to the north descend upon the city, catching it nearly defenseless?
Soon all of Hood’s indecision would necessarily dissipate.

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LTC Stephen F.
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Personality conflicts between commanders affected both the north and the south throughout the Civil War. While many leaders put aside their differences others did not. In 1861 there was an ongoing feud between CSA Brigadier General John B. Floyd [31st Governor of Virginia] and CSA Brigadier General Henry Alexander Wise [33rd Governor of Virginia]. Floyd blamed Wise for the Confederate loss at the Battle of Carnifex Ferry, stating that Wise refused to come to his aid even though he was only 17 miles away. In 1863 in east Tennessee relations between the General George Thomas and General Don Carlos Buell were strained, as were those between Buell and Tennessee’s military governor Andrew Johnson.
In the Confederate Heartland Offensive in 1862, General Don Carlos Buell was trying to keep track of the two Confederate armies that are in motion, as well as the cavalries of generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan. He dispatched General Lovell Harrison Rousseau to assume command at Nashville and moved Colonel Miller and a light brigade south to Murfreesboro to guard the southern approaches to Tennessee’s capital and guard against Forrest and Morgan. Under his orders, the rest of the Army of the Ohio converged on Nashville, despite ongoing resistance from US General George Thomas, who thought McMinnville was a better concentration point. Indeed, CS General Forrest’s cavalry had been active around McMinnville, capturing pickets and destroying bridges and otherwise destroying the railroads up to within 10 miles of town. However, Forrest heard of the strong Federal presence now in McMinnville and decided to head up into the mountains to await General Bragg as previously arranged at Altamont near a pass in the Cumberlands.
In East Tennessee in 1863, US General Rosecrans began to cross the Tennessee River at Caperton’s Ferry. His army was large enough that it took until September 4th to get the bulk of it on the southern bank.

In 1864, Federal Lt Gen U.S. Grant and Maj Gen Phil Sheridan underestimated Jubal Early. “General Grant was optimistic. General Lee was still not opposed to taking risks, and suggested that Early divide his force to send a division under Richard Anderson to destroy the railroad near Charlestown. Though the battles around the Weldon Railroad might not have caused Lee to recall some of Early’s troops as Grant nearly promised, it did cause him not to send any additional troops to Early.
Lee would not order Anderson’s division back to Richmond, but added in closing that he was “in great need of his troops, and if they can be spared from the Valley, or cannot operate to advantage there,” he would order them back.
The next day, August 27th, Early backed off. He had held close to Sheridan’s lines, but after a few friction points too many, he decided some distance might be necessary. And so he returned to Bunker Hill, north of Winchester, while Anderson marched his command to Brucetown, just northeast of the same.
Sheridan took Grant’s message to heart and when he witnessed the Confederate pull back, he thought it a retreat. “The indications are that they will fall back perhaps out of the Valley,” wrote Sheridan to one of his cavalry commanders on the night of the 27th. He surmized “that their projected campaign is a failure.” Less than a half hour later, he was convinced that the Rebels were indeed leaving the Valley.
Background: Though the action around the Weldon Railroad south of Petersburg had been little more than a complete debacle, there might, he thought, be some good to come out of it. Late on August 26th, he wrote to Philip Sheridan to relay the good news.
“Telegraphed you that I had good reason for believing that Fitz Lee had been ordered back here. I now think it likely that all troops will be ordered back from the valley except what they believe to be the minimum number to detain you. My reason for supposing this is based upon the fact that yielding up the Weldon road seems to be a blow to the enemy he cannot stand.”
To his commander in the Shenandoah Valley, he figured that the Rebels had suffered as many as 10,000 casualties over the past two weeks. It was true, the Confederates had lost a number of troops, but General Lee wasn’t so ready to give up the Valley.
He was more than happy to hear about how Jubal Early forced the Yankees back toward Harpers Ferry, but kept a realistic outlook. “It will,” wrote Lee, “have little or no effect upon Grant’s operations, or prevent re-enforcements being sent to him.”
Early was proud of his accomplishments, but the sheer size of Sheridan’s force, now sprawling to the number of 30,000, dwarfed his own, dwindled to perhaps 10,000. The original plan had been for Early to once more cross the Potomac. However, Lee reasoned that “if Sheridan’s force is as large as you suppose, I do not know that you could operate to advantage north of the Potomac.”
http://civilwardailygazette.com/their-projected-campaign-is-a-failure-grant-and-sheridan-underestimate-early/

Below are a number of journal entries from 1862, 1863 and 1864 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. In 1864, Maj Gen William T. Sherman shares his thoughts about the siege of Atlanta.
Wednesday, August 27, 1862: Charles Francis Adams, Jr., an officer in the 1st Mass. Cavalry regiment, arrives at Aquia Creek, his regiment having been taken from their state of idle uselessness in South Carolina to the Virginia theater, where more cavalry was needed. He writes to his father in London (who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain) and tells what he is hearing and thinking about the state of affairs in the war: “Here I have access to certain means of information and I think I can give you a little more light than you now have. Do you know that just before leaving the Peninsula McClellan offered to march into Richmond on his own responsibility? Do you know that in the opinion of our leading military men Washington is in more danger than it ever yet has been? Do you know that but for McDowell’s jealousy we should have triumphantly marched into Richmond? Do you know that Pope is a humbug and known to be so by those who put him in his present place? Do you know that today he is so completely outgeneraled as to be cut off from Washington? Yet these are not rumors, but facts, doled out to me by members of McClellan’s and Halleck’s staffs.
Our rulers seem to me to be crazy. The air of this city seems thick with treachery; our army seems in danger of utter demoralization and I have not since the war begun felt such a tug on my nerves as today in Washington. Everything is ripe for a terrible panic, the end of which I cannot see or even imagine. I always mean to be one of the hopeful, but just now I cast about in vain for something on which to hang my hopes. I still believe in McClellan, but I know that the nearest advisers of the President — among them Mr. Holt — distrust his earnestness in this war. Stanton is jealous of him and he and Pope are in bitter enmity. All pin their hope on Halleck and we must do as the rest do; but it is hinted to me that Stanton is likely to be a block in Halleck’s way, and the jealousies of our generals are more than a new man can manage. We need a head and we must have it; a man who can keep these jealousies under subordination; and we must have him or go to the wall. . . . I do consider the outside condition of affairs very critical, but it is my glimpse behind the scenes, the conviction that small men with selfish motives control the war without any central power to keep them in bounds, which terrifies and discourages me.”
Wednesday, August 27, 1862: Stephen Minot Weld, of the 18th Massachusetts Infantry, writes to his father, as his regiment approaches the front: “Warrenton Junction, Aug. 27. Dear Father, — We arrived here this morning and find that the enemy are at Manassas Gap, between us and Washington. General Pope, in my opinion, is a complete failure. He can handle 10,000 men, but no more. We still have communication with Washington via Aquia Creek. I hope we shall see a successful issue to this trouble.”
Wednesday, August 27, 1862: George Templeton Strong writes in his journal about the anxious times, and the scuttlebutt going around New York City concerning the campaign in Virginia: “We seem to be falling back successfully and maintaining our defensive line on the north fork of the Rappahannock. There has been sharp fighting at several points. an enterprising rebel foray seems to have beat up General Pope’s headquarters, destroyed supply trains, and carried off important papers and letters. Scandalous and disgraceful, if we have the whole truth. . . .”
Thursday, August 27, 1863: Sergeant Alexander P. Downing, of the 11th Iowa Infantry Regiment, writes in his journal of his division’s sortie into northern Louisiana, and the miseries of campaigning in the American South in the summer: “Thursday, 27th—Leaving our Oak Ridge bivouac early this morning we journeyed fifteen miles more and stopped for the night on the banks of Bayou Said, only seven miles from Monroe, our destination. During the day we crossed another ridge known as Pine Ridge, which is eight miles across and about twenty feet above the surrounding land. It is beautifully covered with yellow pine, growing so straight and tall, seventy-five to one hundred feet. We noticed a few small clearings with log huts. This is the worst bivouac we have yet occupied. It is full of poisonous reptiles and insects, centipedes, jiggers, woodticks, lizards, scorpions and snakes of all kinds—I have never seen the like. Some of the boys killed two big, spotted, yellow snakes and put them across the road—they measured about fifteen feet each. The ground is covered with leaves ten inches deep, and the water of the bayou has a layer of leaves and moss fully two inches thick.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+27%2C+1863
Saturday, August 27, 1864: Siege of Atlanta: A day of celebration around Atlanta and the South, according to Sherman: “…[S]ome of his infantry came out of Atlanta and found our camps abandoned. It was afterward related that there was great rejoicing in Atlanta “that the Yankees were gone;” the fact was telegraphed all over the South, and several trains of cars (with ladies) came up from Macon to assist in the celebration of their grand victory.”

Pictures: 1862-08 Mark Marahito's painting of Colonel George W. Pratt at Second Manassas; 1862-08-27 Railroad depot at Warrenton Junction; 1864 Potter house Atlanta; 1862-08-27 Union Camp at Manassas Junction

A. Tuesday, August 27, 1861: Without approval from the White House, Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont, commander of the Army's Dept. of Missouri, declared martial law throughout all of Missouri. He also ordered the confiscation of property of all pro-Southerners who were in arms against the government and declared all slaves in his district to be free.
B. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: Second Bull Run Campaign. Stonewall Jackson destroyed the Army of Virginia supply base at Manassas Junction. With Stonewall Jackson on his flank, John Pope was forced to withdraw from the Rappahannock, River. Pope did not realize that roughly half the Confederate army was between his position and Washington, D. C. Both armies were on the move. Lee’s southern army wanted to meet up with Stonewall Jackson, while Pope’s army (US) wanted to recapture Manassas Junction. Believing that Jackson was actually much farther west than Manassas, Pope pushed on to Warrenton and then to Manassas Junction, in hopes of stopping Jackson’s push east (as Pope thought) and hoping to catch him coming through Thoroughfare Gap (which Jackson had passed two days before). Elements of the two armies brush each other going by. George Taylor’s Union brigade, venturing out from Washington, attacks Stonewall’s men along Bull Run Creek, but the Yankees are driven back. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding a division in Heintzelman’s corps, also deploys near Bristoe Station, and attacks Ewell’s division there. Ewell bloodies Hooker badly, inflicting over 300 Union casualties at the Battle of Bristoe Station. Jackson then decides to torch the base at Manassas, and move to the northern edge of the old Bull Run battlefield, where he places his divisions along an unfinished railroad cut that was concealed and yet which overlooked the two main roads nearby. Pope, convinced that Jackson is now at Manassas Junction (which he was but no longer is), and so changes his direction from west-to-east, just as the Rebels go north and west. Another miss.
Details: Eastern Theater, Second Bull Run Campaign - Up to this point, the Northern Virginia campaign has resembled two boxers sparring, circling warily, and landing a tentative jab now and then—except that one boxer, Pope, is blindfolded. He is conducting a campaign without the benefit of knowing where the enemy is.
Gen. Pope finally realizes that Lee is moving to his rear, and he gives orders for his army to move back and north of their Rappahannock line. By this time, Pope now has Reno’s division of the IX Corps, Porter’s V Corps, and Heintzelman’s III Corps from the Army of the Potomac, nearly doubling his numbers to about 90,000. Meanwhile, Stonewall Jackson finishes looting the Union supply base at Manassas Junction, and pulls back to the crossroads of Groveton, near the 1861 battlefield. Hill’s division had gone as far east as Centreville. Believing that Jackson was actually much farther west than Manassas, Pope pushes on to Warrenton and then to Manassas Junction, in hopes of stopping Jackson’s push east (as Pope thought) and hoping to catch him coming through Thoroughfare Gap (which Jackson had passed two days before). Elements of the two armies brush each other going by. George Taylor’s Union brigade, venturing out from Washington, attacks Stonewall’s men along Bull Run Creek, but the Yankees are driven back. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding a division in Heintzelman’s corps, also deploys near Bristoe Station, and attacks Ewell’s division there. Ewell bloodies Hooker badly, inflicting over 300 Union casualties at the Battle of Bristoe Station. Jackson then decides to torch the base at Manassas, and move to the northern edge of the old Bull Run battlefield, where he places his divisions along an unfinished railroad cut that was concealed and yet which overlooked the two main roads nearby. Pope, convinced that Jackson is now at Manassas Junction (which he was but no longer is), and so changes his direction from west-to-east, just as the Rebels go north and west. Another miss.
C. Thursday, August 27, 1863: Bayou Meto, Arkansas. Gen. Davidson’s Federal cavalry attacked Generals Marsh Walker and John Marmaduke main defensive lines on the south side of Bayou Meto, east of Little Rock. The Yankees were rebuffed and the Confederates fell back on Little Rock. Gen. Frederick Steele and the rest of the Federal force approach Little Rock to follow up Davidson’s advance, in spite of nearly 1,000 of his men down sick from the summer heat and fevers.
Details: The Confederate resistance was stiff, and the ground was poor for an attack. Davidson could field only one brigade, with the others falling in behind as reserves. The Federal cavalry advanced both mounted and dismounted, firing as they could. Marmaduke’s troops were ousted from their most forward position and then from the next. Before the bridge, they had scraped out some impromptu works, and put up a solid fight.
When the Rebel infantry and artillery caught sight of the Union troops, they let loose a fire that threw the attackers back, and allowed the outnumbered advance troops to scurry quick over the bridge, which was ignited after their passing. With the bridge “handsomely burning,” as Marmaduke put it, the Federals formed their lines.
“A dash of the First Iowa Cavalry,” wrote General Davidson after the fray, “under fire of the enemy’s battery and sharpshooters lining the opposite bank, failed to save the bridge, which had been set on fire by the enemy, everything having been prepared beforehand for that purpose. Our batteries engaged those of the enemy, and the skirmishers on both sides were busy for about an hour and a half.”
With the setting of the sun, the skirmish was ended. The Federals, as Marmaduke recorded, “failing to occupy the river, returned after a heavy loss, leaving a number of their dead on the ground.”
If true, that number was seven killed. Thirty-eight others were wounded in the affair, including twenty-five from the 1st Iowa Cavalry – who also lost two killed in the dash. The Confederates failed to record their losses, but it’s probable that the Federal attackers suffered greater.
That night, Marmaduke and Walker were ordered to retire to the outskirts of Little Rock, where Sterling Price’s infantry were waiting for the inevitable.
Background: When last we left off, the Federal campaign to capture Little Rock, Arkansas was coming along well, aside from the fact that General Frederick Steele believed he and his Army of Arkansas, was greatly outnumbered. In truth, he outweighed the 8,000 Rebels under Sterling Price to the tune of over 3,000 bodies.
By August 18th, General Steele had advanced west from Helena, and had just begun to cross the White River at Clarendon with just over half his force. The other column, commanded by the cavalry’s John Davidson, moved north from the crossing and occupied Devall’s Bluff.
General Steele had selected Devall’s Bluff as the spot for his hospital. The march through the sweltering heat with sparse water had taken a ghastly toll upon his troops, sundering nearly 1,000 unfit for duty. Four days later, Steele, his troops having hardly recovered, ordered Davidson’s cavalry to advance upon Brownsville, where the Confederate cavalry was in force. All along the way, however, General John Marmaduke and his Rebels harassed and nipped Davidson’s ranks.
Sterling Price’s Confederates had already been pulled back. Most were either in Little Rock itself, or manning the makeshift defenses at Brownsville, twenty-five miles closer to the approaching Federals. As soon as Price received word that Davidson’s Federals were coming, he sent word to Marmaduke to forget any plans of his own and report to General Marsh Walker at Brownsville. For Marmaduke, this was a bitter cut.
General Walker was seen by many to be unfit for his position. Yet John Marmaduke, who had commanded more or less successful independent raids on his own was ranked below him. Walker, who had shown up on the scene this past spring, was highly unwelcome. Half of Marmaduke’s original force was given to him, leaving him but two brigades. More recently, one of those brigades was ordered to Walker at Brownsville. This left Marmaduke with a single brigade. The only upshot was that he was still mostly independent. With Price’s orders of the 23rd, however, that cherished independence was dashed away.
The next day, he was with Walker at Brownsville, commanding again his two brigades, but still rankled. Walker moved off with his troops, taking a position roughly ten miles south. On the 25th, Davidson and Marmaduke finally clashed.
It was anything but a fair fight. The Federals, with 5,000 troopers, attacked Marmaduke’s 1,100. Before the full weight of Davidson’s assault came upon them, Marmaduke abandoned the Brownsville defenses. It wasn’t a route or even a retreat, but a well-managed withdrawal, keeping the Union troops at bay and making them think twice about pursuit.
This bought time enough for Marsh Walker to meet up with Marmaduke and create a new line of battle four miles closer to Little Rock. The new defense was upon a crucial intersection. From the south, Walker’s troops and supplies would be arriving. It was necessary for Marmaduke to hold the road until they were safe.
“The enemy came upon me,” reported Marmaduke, “and were handsomely repulsed.” The reprieve was short, but still long enough to save Walker’s trains. When Davidson’s Federals hit them again, overlapping both their right and left flanks, Maramaduke could do nothing more than retreat. A brigade took up the chase, but with the fall of night, the Federals returned to Brownsville, while Walker and Marmaduke established yet another new line at Bayou Meto, twelve miles east of Little Rock.
D. Saturday, August 27, 1864: Forward elements of Sherman's army move south to cut Hood's last supply line to Atlanta, the Macon and Western Railroad. The final assault is nearing today, as General Sherman (US) launches the assault on the Macon & Western Railroad lines. For more than a month Sherman has backed the Rebels into Atlanta with one victory after another. Now with one more victory, General Hood (CSA) would have to either, to surrender, die--or evacuate.
Details: Just as General Sherman had unleashed his cavalry against to railroads south of Atlanta, John Bell Hood, commanding the Rebels nearly besieged in the city, did the same. When the Federal cavalry returned, they did so with tales of their destruction and promises that nothing would move along the line for ten days. Likewise, when Joe Wheeler’s Confederate riders returned to Hood, they arrived with tidings of wreckage and bridges burned. But it was not so. Neither side’s cavalry could do much damage against their enemies’ lines of supply.
In Sherman’s case, he witnessed the inaccuracy the day after, and seeing the steam of the locomotives plumed to the south, he knew that he had to move with infantry. But Hood had no such evidence, and took Wheeler at his word, and possibly even believed the Yankees to be in retreat. But it was not so.
For the better part of two days, Sherman’s Federals had been snaking to the west and then south of the city. It would take time for him to understand this, but time was something in short supply.
On the morning of the 26th, Hood noted that Sherman’s troops had abandoned the railroad running east out of town, and that they were moving or had moved to the railroad running southwest. They had moved, but as was reported to A.P. Stewart, commanding a corps in Hood’s Army of Tennessee, “thus far their whereabouts [have] not been ascertained.”
The day was spent by the Confederate cavalry probing east and north toward Peach Tree Creek to see what might be found. “General Hood desires you to direct Armstrong to press forward his cavalry in on the enemy’s right,” came one of the early orders, “to ascertain what is going on. Enemy has given up his works on our right.”
Come the dawn of this day, Hood seemed almost hopeful.
“Last night the enemy continued to change their position by their left and center. They have drawn back so that their left is now on the Chattahoochee at the railroad bridge; their right is unchanged, and they appear to be moving troops in that direction. They have no troops nearer than four miles of Atlanta.”
By the late morning, Hood was “of the opinion that the enemy has taken up a new line.” He ordered S.D. Lee, commanding another corps, to dispatch an engineer to “make a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy’s lines.”
Come the meridian, the scouts understood that the Union right now rested on Camp Creek southwest of the city. “They are constructing works rapidly,” came one message. And toward evening, Sherman’s advance – his right – began to shell the Rebel skirmishers in their front.
It was becoming clear to Hood that Sherman’s target might be East Point, the rail junction south of the city. If this fell, then both southward-running lines would be cut. His supplies would but severed.
William Hardee’s Corps was dispatched to reinforce the scant array of troops already guarding the point, even reinforcing him with another brigade as need dictated. But though Hood could perceive Sherman’s current movements, he could not foretell his next.
Was East Point truly his target? If it was successfully defended, would Sherman beg off or would he instead move south to the town of Rough and Ready, severing each line in turn? Or might it be Jonesboro, even farther south? If Hood essentially evacuated Atlanta in order to defend Sherman’s southerly reach, might not the Federal corps remaining to the north descend upon the city, catching it nearly defenseless?
Soon all of Hood’s indecision would necessarily dissipate.

1. Tuesday, August 27, 1861: The Aftermath of Carnifex Ferry. In Western Virginia, the routed Union troops from the sharp skirmish at Carnifex Ferry were still wandering back to their main camp at Gauley Bridge. The victorious Confederates under General Floyd did not follow them or attempt to move in Charleston, but instead fortified their camp and hoped to cut off communication between the Union troops at Gauley and their commander, General Rosecrans, to the north.
Though the ongoing feud between Generals Floyd and Wise was set aside for a few days, General Lee, overseeing operations in Western Virginia, warned Wise that the “Army of Kanawha is too small for active and successful operation to be divided at present. I beg, therefore, for the sake of the cause you have so much at heart, you will permit no division of sentiment or action to disturb its harmony or arrest its efficiency.” This was too little, too late.
Lee was also worried about General Floyd’s position at Carnifex Ferry and wished for Wise to send reinforcements, as he was only seventeen miles away.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-1
2. Tuesday, August 27, 1861: Richmond Whig reports, Jefferson Davis announces the release of Tennessee Congressman Thomas A.R. Nelson in return for “satisfactory pledges to the authorities respecting his future conduct.” Meanwhile New York Times states, General Zollicoffer issues orders to his troops to respect the personal and property rights of all citizens of East Tennessee, regardless of their political opinions.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-1
3. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: near Bolivar, Tennessee - On August 27, Col. Frank C. Armstrong was leading a Confederate force of 3,000 cavalry [troops] towards Bolivar. He was conducting a raid into west Tennessee. When they were 5 miles from Bolivar, the Confederates came into contact with a Union force of 900 cavalry [troops], commanded by Col. Mortimer Leggett, on the Van Buren Road. During the fight, Leggett spotted a Confederate force coming to the area. Even though he knew that he was outnumbered, Leggett decided to stay and fight. Both sides had reinforcements come and bolster their numbers.
The battle would last for 7 hours. Leggett had thought that he was the victor of the battle since he held the ground at the end of the fight. Armstrong thought that he had won the battle. The federals suffered 5 killed, 18 wounded and 64 missing. The confederates suffered 71 casualties.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html
4. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: near Woodbury, Tennessee - On August 27, a Confederate cavalry force, commanded by Brig. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest, learned of a nearby Union force at Round Mountain. The mountain was about 2.5 miles from Woodbury. The Confederate attack was repulsed by the Federal camp.
http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html
5. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: Western theater: Skirmish near Kossuth, Mississippi.
https://bjdeming.com/2012/10/12/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-27-to-september-2-1862/
6. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: McClellan, now arrived at Aquia Creek, argues with Halleck that Burnsides’ Corps and Franklin’s Corps should be held back to protect the capital.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+27%2C+1862
7. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: Battle of Kettle Run, Virginia. Northern Virginia Campaign, Second Manassas - Second Bull Run, Joseph Hooker
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186208
8. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: Stonewall Jackson [CS] destroys Army of Virginia supply base at Manassas Junction, Virginia. Northern Virginia Campaign, Second Manassas
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186208
9. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: Confederate Heartland Offensive: General Buell is trying to keep track of the two Confederate armies that are in motion, as well as the cavalries of generals Forrest and Morgan. He dispatches General Lovell Harrison Rousseau to assume command at Nashville and moves Colonel Miller and a light brigade south to Murfreesboro to guard the southern approaches to Tennessee’s capital and guard against Forrest and Morgan. Under his orders, the rest of the Army of the Ohio is converging on Nashville, despite ongoing resistance from US General George Thomas, who thinks McMinnville will be a better concentration point. Relations between the two generals are strained, as are those between Buell and Tennessee’s military governor Andrew Johnson. Indeed, CS General Forrest’s cavalry has been active around McMinnville, capturing pickets and destroying bridges and otherwise destroying the railroads up to within 10 miles of town. However, Forrest hears of the strong Federal presence now in McMinnville and decides to head up into the mountains to await General Bragg as previously arranged at Altamont near a pass in the Cumberlands.
https://bjdeming.com/2012/10/12/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-27-to-september-2-1862/
10. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: Charles Francis Adams, Jr., an officer in the 1st Mass. Cavalry regiment, arrives at Aquia Creek, his regiment having been taken from their state of idle uselessness in South Carolina to the Virginia theater, where more cavalry was needed. He writes to his father in London (who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain) and tells what he is hearing and thinking about the state of affairs in the war: “Here I have access to certain means of information and I think I can give you a little more light than you now have. Do you know that just before leaving the Peninsula McClellan offered to march into Richmond on his own responsibility? Do you know that in the opinion of our leading military men Washington is in more danger than it ever yet has been? Do you know that but for McDowell’s jealousy we should have triumphantly marched into Richmond? Do you know that Pope is a humbug and known to be so by those who put him in his present place? Do you know that today he is so completely outgeneraled as to be cut off from Washington? Yet these are not rumors, but facts, doled out to me by members of McClellan’s and Halleck’s staffs.
Our rulers seem to me to be crazy. The air of this city seems thick with treachery; our army seems in danger of utter demoralization and I have not since the war begun felt such a tug on my nerves as today in Washington. Everything is ripe for a terrible panic, the end of which I cannot see or even imagine. I always mean to be one of the hopeful, but just now I cast about in vain for something on which to hang my hopes. I still believe in McClellan, but I know that the nearest advisers of the President — among them Mr. Holt — distrust his earnestness in this war. Stanton is jealous of him and he and Pope are in bitter enmity. All pin their hope on Halleck and we must do as the rest do; but it is hinted to me that Stanton is likely to be a block in Halleck’s way, and the jealousies of our generals are more than a new man can manage. We need a head and we must have it; a man who can keep these jealousies under subordination; and we must have him or go to the wall. . . . I do consider the outside condition of affairs very critical, but it is my glimpse behind the scenes, the conviction that small men with selfish motives control the war without any central power to keep them in bounds, which terrifies and discourages me.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+27%2C+1862 
11. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: Stephen Minot Weld, of the 18th Massachusetts Infantry, writes to his father, as his regiment approaches the front: “Warrenton Junction, Aug. 27. Dear Father, — We arrived here this morning and find that the enemy are at Manassas Gap, between us and Washington. General Pope, in my opinion, is a complete failure. He can handle 10,000 men, but no more. We still have communication with Washington via Aquia Creek. I hope we shall see a successful issue to this trouble.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+27%2C+1862
12. Wednesday, August 27, 1862: George Templeton Strong writes in his journal about the anxious times, and the scuttlebutt going around New York City concerning the campaign in Virginia: “We seem to be falling back successfully and maintaining our defensive line on the north fork of the Rappahannock. There has been sharp fighting at several points. an enterprising rebel foray seems to have beat up General Pope’s headquarters, destroyed supply trains, and carried off important papers and letters. Scandalous and disgraceful, if we have the whole truth. . . .”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+27%2C+1862
13. Thursday, August 27, 1863: Sergeant Alexander P. Downing, of the 11th Iowa Infantry Regiment, writes in his journal of his division’s sortie into northern Louisiana, and the miseries of campaigning in the American South in the summer: “Thursday, 27th—Leaving our Oak Ridge bivouac early this morning we journeyed fifteen miles more and stopped for the night on the banks of Bayou Said, only seven miles from Monroe, our destination. During the day we crossed another ridge known as Pine Ridge, which is eight miles across and about twenty feet above the surrounding land. It is beautifully covered with yellow pine, growing so straight and tall, seventy-five to one hundred feet. We noticed a few small clearings with log huts. This is the worst bivouac we have yet occupied. It is full of poisonous reptiles and insects, centipedes, jiggers, woodticks, lizards, scorpions and snakes of all kinds—I have never seen the like. Some of the boys killed two big, spotted, yellow snakes and put them across the road—they measured about fifteen feet each. The ground is covered with leaves ten inches deep, and the water of the bayou has a layer of leaves and moss fully two inches thick.”
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+27%2C+1863
14. Thursday, August 27, 1863: “At least ten separate skirmishes marked the day: Bayou Meto, Arkansas; Mount Pleasant near Vicksburg, Mississippi; Carter County and Clark’s Neck, Kentucky; Elk River, Glenville and Ball’s Mill, West Virginia; Edwards Ferry [also known as Ball’s Bluff…Barb], Maryland; along with Little Washington and Weaverville, Virginia.”
https://bjdeming.com/2013/08/26/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-26-september-2-1863/
15. Thursday, August 27, 1863: East Tennessee operations: US General Rosecrans begins to cross the Tennessee River at Caperton’s Ferry. His army is of such a size that it will take until September 4th to get the bulk of it on the southern bank.
https://bjdeming.com/2013/08/26/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-26-september-2-1863/
16. Thursday, August 27, 1863: At Fort Bowie, the Arizona Territory, as Indians on horseback on the road from Tucson, surround and run off with the entire stock of Union horses.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-124
17. Thursday, August 27, 1863: Ford's Theater reopens as Ford's New Theater.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186308
18. Thursday, August 27, 1863: John T. Ford leases the First Baptist Church on 10th St. in Washington and turns it into a theater. Built in 1833, the church had been vacant since 1859, when the church merged with the nearby Fourth Baptist Church. The theater had opened in March 1862 but a fire in December of that year forced more than $10,000 in new renovations. Today, it finally reopens as Ford's New Theater.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-124
19. August 25-29, 1864 at Smithfield Crossing in Jefferson and Berkeley Counties, West Virginia - On August 29, 2 Confederate infantry divisions crossed Opequon Creek at Smithfield and forced back Merritt's Union cavalry division back along the road to Charles Town. Ricketts's infantry division was brought up to stop the Confederate advance. The federals suffered 20 killed, 61 wounded and 100 captured. The confederates suffered 300 killed and wounded. This was part of Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley Campaign http://www.mycivilwar.com/battles/1864s.html
20. Saturday, August 27, 1864: Georgia operations, Siege of Atlanta: A day of celebration around Atlanta and the South, according to Sherman: “…[S]ome of his infantry came out of Atlanta and found our camps abandoned. It was afterward related that there was great rejoicing in Atlanta “that the Yankees were gone;” the fact was telegraphed all over the South, and several trains of cars (with ladies) came up from Macon to assist in the celebration of their grand victory.”
https://bjdeming.com/2014/08/25/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-25-31-1864/
21. Saturday, August 27, 1864: Shenandoah Valley operations: Battle of Smithfield Crossing continues.
https://bjdeming.com/2014/08/25/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-25-31-1864/

A Tuesday, August 27, 1861: Without approval from the White House, Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont, commander of the Army's Dept. of Missouri, declares martial law throughout all of Missouri. He also orders the confiscation of property of all pro-Southerners who are in arms against the government. He also declares all slaves in his district to be free.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+27%2C+1861
B Wednesday, August 27, 1862: Eastern Theater, Second Bull Run Campaign - Up to this point, the Northern Virginia campaign has resembled two boxers sparring, circling warily, and landing a tentative jab now and then—except that one boxer, Pope, is blindfolded. He is conducting a campaign without the benefit of knowing where the enemy is.
Gen. Pope finally realizes that Lee is moving to his rear, and he gives orders for his army to move back and north of their Rappahannock line. By this time, Pope now has Reno’s division of the IX Corps, Porter’s V Corps, and Heintzelman’s III Corps from the Army of the Potomac, nearly doubling his numbers to about 90,000. Meanwhile, Stonewall Jackson finishes looting the Union supply base at Manassas Junction, and pulls back to the crossroads of Groveton, near the 1861 battlefield. Hill’s division had gone as far east as Centreville. Believing that Jackson was actually much farther west than Manassas, Pope pushes on to Warrenton and then to Manassas Junction, in hopes of stopping Jackson’s push east (as Pope thought) and hoping to catch him coming through Thoroughfare Gap (which Jackson had passed two days before). Elements of the two armies brush each other going by. George Taylor’s Union brigade, venturing out from Washington, attacks Stonewall’s men along Bull Run Creek, but the Yankees are driven back. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding a division in Heintzelman’s corps, also deploys near Bristoe Station, and attacks Ewell’s division there. Ewell bloodies Hooker badly, inflicting over 300 Union casualties at the Battle of Bristoe Station. Jackson then decides to torch the base at Manassas, and move to the northern edge of the old Bull Run battlefield, where he places his divisions along an unfinished railroad cut that was concealed and yet which overlooked the two main roads nearby. Pope, convinced that Jackson is now at Manassas Junction (which he was but no longer is), and so changes his direction from west to east, just as the Rebels go north and west. Another miss.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+27%2C+1862
B+ Wednesday, August 27, 1862: In Virginia, both armies were on the move. Lee’s southern army wanted to meet up with Stonewall Jackson, while Pope’s army (US) wanted to recapture Manassas Junction.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/part-seventy-two
B++ Wednesday, August 27, 1862: With Stonewall Jackson on his flank, John Pope is forced to withdraw from the Rappahanock. Pope does not realize that roughly half the Confederate army is between his position and Washington, D. C.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186208
C Thursday, August 27, 1863: Bayou Meto, east of Little Rock, Marmaduke and Gen. Walker receive a series of attacks from Gen. Davidson’s Federal cavalry. The Yankees are rebuffed, and the Confederates fall back on Little Rock. Gen. Steele and the rest of the Federal force approach Little Rock to follow up Davidson’s advance, in spite of nearly 1,000 of his men down sick from the summer heat and fevers.
http://civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+27%2C+1863
C+ Thursday, August 27, 1863: A Dash Before Little Rock, Arkansas. When last we left off, the Federal campaign to capture Little Rock, Arkansas was coming along well, aside from the fact that General Frederick Steele believed he and his Army of Arkansas, was greatly outnumbered. In truth, he outweighed the 8,000 Rebels under Sterling Price to the tune of over 3,000 bodies.
By August 18th, General Steele had advanced west from Helena, and had just begun to cross the White River at Clarendon with just over half his force. The other column, commanded by the cavalry’s John Davidson, moved north from the crossing and occupied Devall’s Bluff.
General Steele had selected Devall’s Bluff as the spot for his hospital. The march through the sweltering heat with sparse water had taken a ghastly toll upon his troops, sundering nearly 1,000 unfit for duty. Four days later, Steele, his troops having hardly recovered, ordered Davidson’s cavalry to advance upon Brownsville, where the Confederate cavalry was in force. All along the way, however, General John Marmaduke and his Rebels harassed and nipped Davidson’s ranks.
Sterling Price’s Confederates had already been pulled back. Most were either in Little Rock itself, or manning the makeshift defenses at Brownsville, twenty-five miles closer to the approaching Federals. As soon as Price received word that Davidson’s Federals were coming, he sent word to Marmaduke to forget any plans of his own and report to General Marsh Walker at Brownsville. For Marmaduke, this was a bitter cut.
General Walker was seen by many to be unfit for his position. Yet John Marmaduke, who had commanded more or less successful independent raids on his own was ranked below him. Walker, who had shown up on the scene this past spring, was highly unwelcome. Half of Marmaduke’s original force was given to him, leaving him but two brigades. More recently, one of those brigades was ordered to Walker at Brownsville. This left Marmaduke with a single brigade. The only upshot was that he was still mostly independent. With Price’s orders of the 23rd, however, that cherished independence was dashed away.
The next day, he was with Walker at Brownsville, commanding again his two brigades, but still rankled. Walker moved off with his troops, taking a position roughly ten miles south. On the 25th, Davidson and Marmaduke finally clashed.
It was anything but a fair fight. The Federals, with 5,000 troopers, attacked Marmaduke’s 1,100. Before the full weight of Davidson’s assault came upon them, Marmaduke abandoned the Brownsville defenses. It wasn’t a route or even a retreat, but a well-managed withdrawal, keeping the Union troops at bay and making them think twice about pursuit.
This bought time enough for Marsh Walker to meet up with Marmaduke and create a new line of battle four miles closer to Little Rock. The new defense was upon a crucial intersection. From the south, Walker’s troops and supplies would be arriving. It was necessary for Marmaduke to hold the road until they were safe.
“The enemy came upon me,” reported Marmaduke, “and were handsomely repulsed.” The reprieve was short, but still long enough to save Walker’s trains. When Davidson’s Federals hit them again, overlapping both their right and left flanks, Maramaduke could do nothing more than retreat. A brigade took up the chase, but with the fall of night, the Federals returned to Brownsville, while Walker and Marmaduke established yet another new line at Bayou Meto, twelve miles east of Little Rock.
On the morning of this date, following a day of preparation and rest, Generals Walker and Marmaduke had established their main lines on the south side of Bayou Meto. With the sun, they threw a couple of regiments across Reed’s Bridge to meet the coming Federals.
The Confederate resistance was stiff, and the ground was poor for an attack. Davidson could field only one brigade, with the others falling in behind as reserves. The Federal cavalry advanced both mounted and dismounted, firing as they could. Marmaduke’s troops were ousted from their most forward position and then from the next. Before the bridge, they had scraped out some impromptu works, and put up a solid fight.
When the Rebel infantry and artillery caught sight of the Union troops, they let loose a fire that threw the attackers back, and allowed the outnumbered advance troops to scurry quick over the bridge, which was ignited after their passing. With the bridge “handsomely burning,” as Marmaduke put it, the Federals formed their lines.
“A dash of the First Iowa Cavalry,” wrote General Davidson after the fray, “under fire of the enemy’s battery and sharpshooters lining the opposite bank, failed to save the bridge, which had been set on fire by the enemy, everything having been prepared beforehand for that purpose. Our batteries engaged those of the enemy, and the skirmishers on both sides were busy for about an hour and a half.”
With the setting of the sun, the skirmish was ended. The Federals, as Marmaduke recorded, “failing to occupy the river, returned after a heavy loss, leaving a number of their dead on the ground.”
If true, that number was seven killed. Thirty-eight others were wounded in the affair, including twenty-five from the 1st Iowa Cavalry – who also lost two killed in the dash. The Confederates failed to record their losses, but it’s probable that the Federal attackers suffered greater.
That night, Marmaduke and Walker were ordered to retire to the outskirts of Little Rock, where Sterling Price’s infantry were waiting for the inevitable.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/a-dash-before-little-rock-arkansas/
D Saturday, August 27, 1864: Forward elements of Sherman's army move south to cut Hood's last supply line to Atlanta, the Macon and Western Railroad.
http://blueandgraytrail.com/year/186408
D+ Saturday, August 27, 1864: The final assault is nearing today, as General Sherman (US) launches the assault on the Macon & Western Railroad lines. For more than a month Sherman has backed the Rebels into Atlanta with one victory after another. Now with one more victory, General Hood (CSA) would have to either, to surrender, die--or evacuate.
https://sites.google.com/site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-176
D++ Saturday, August 27, 1864: Just as General Sherman had unleashed his cavalry against to railroads south of Atlanta, John Bell Hood, commanding the Rebels nearly besieged in the city, did the same. When the Federal cavalry returned, they did so with tales of their destruction and promises that nothing would move along the line for ten days. Likewise, when Joe Wheeler’s Confederate riders returned to Hood, they arrived with tidings of wreckage and bridges burned. But it was not so. Neither side’s cavalry could do much damage against their enemies’ lines of supply.
In Sherman’s case, he witnessed the inaccuracy the day after, and seeing the steam of the locomotives plumed to the south, he knew that he had to move with infantry. But Hood had no such evidence, and took Wheeler at his word, and possibly even believed the Yankees to be in retreat. But it was not so.
For the better part of two days, Sherman’s Federals had been snaking to the west and then south of the city. It would take time for him to understand this, but time was something in short supply.
On the morning of the 26th, Hood noted that Sherman’s troops had abandoned the railroad running east out of town, and that they were moving or had moved to the railroad running southwest. They had moved, but as was reported to A.P. Stewart, commanding a corps in Hood’s Army of Tennessee, “thus far their whereabouts [have] not been ascertained.”
The day was spent by the Confederate cavalry probing east and north toward Peach Tree Creek to see what might be found. “General Hood desires you to direct Armstrong to press forward his cavalry in on the enemy’s right,” came one of the early orders, “to ascertain what is going on. Enemy has given up his works on our right.”
Come the dawn of this day, Hood seemed almost hopeful.
“Last night the enemy continued to change their position by their left and center. They have drawn back so that their left is now on the Chattahoochee at the railroad bridge; their right is unchanged, and they appear to be moving troops in that direction. They have no troops nearer than four miles of Atlanta.”
By the late morning, Hood was “of the opinion that the enemy has taken up a new line.” He ordered S.D. Lee, commanding another corps, to dispatch an engineer to “make a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy’s lines.”
Come the meridian, the scouts understood that the Union right now rested on Camp Creek southwest of the city. “They are constructing works rapidly,” came one message. And toward evening, Sherman’s advance – his right – began to shell the Rebel skirmishers in their front.
It was becoming clear to Hood that Sherman’s target might be East Point, the rail junction south of the city. If this fell, then both southward-running lines would be cut. His supplies would but severed.
William Hardee’s Corps was dispatched to reinforce the scant array of troops already guarding the point, even reinforcing him with another brigade as need dictated. But though Hood could perceive Sherman’s current movements, he could not foretell his next.
Was East Point truly his target? If it was successfully defended, would Sherman beg off or would he instead move south to the town of Rough and Ready, severing each line in turn? Or might it be Jonesboro, even farther south? If Hood essentially evacuated Atlanta in order to defend Sherman’s southerly reach, might not the Federal corps remaining to the north descend upon the city, catching it nearly defenseless?
Soon all of Hood’s indecision would necessarily dissipate.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/the-enemy-has-taken-up-a-new-line-hood-notices-shermans-absence/
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace CWO4 Terrence Clark SMSgt Lawrence McCarter A1C Pamela G RussellLTC Trent Klug SFC Bernard Walko SFC Stephen King SSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr CPL Ronald Keyes Jr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryDeborah GregsonPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy MSgt (Join to see) SSG Diane R.
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I had another three colonels and one recieved the MOH. I do think personal animus got people killed for ego. LTC Stephen F.
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1stSgt Eugene Harless
1stSgt Eugene Harless
8 y
The biggest example of personal conflict resulted in BGen Jefferson C Davis Killing his Superior William "Bull" Nelson after a physical confrontation during which Nelson, A much bigger man, slapped Davis. Davis went and found a pistol, went to Nelson Office and mortally wounded him. He was placed under house arrest but eventually released without trail, a free man, who continued to lead troops throughout the was and after,
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LTC Stephen F.
LTC Stephen F.
>1 y
Thank you my friend 1stSgt Eugene Harless for reminding us that USA BG Jefferson C Davis mortally wounded MG William "Bull" Nelson after a physical confrontation during which Nelson, who was a much bigger man, slapped Davis.
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SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL
7
7
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LTC Stephen F. I am going with
1862: Second Bull Run Campaign. Maj Gen John Pope was forced to withdraw from the Rappahannock, River because Stonewall Jackson was on his flank. Pope did not realize that roughly half the Confederate army was between his position and Washington, D. C. L
The importance was huge!
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LTC Stephen F.
LTC Stephen F.
>1 y
Thank you my friend and brother-in-Christ SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL for letting us know that you consider August 27, 1862: "Second Bull Run Campaign. Maj Gen John Pope was forced to withdraw from the Rappahannock, River because Stonewall Jackson was on his flank. Pope did not realize that roughly half the Confederate army was between his position and Washington, D. C. Lee’s wanted to meet up with Stonewall Jackson, while Pope wanted to recapture Manassas Junction. Believing Jackson was actually much farther west than Manassas, Pope pushed on to Manassas Junction, hoping to catch Jackson coming through Thoroughfare Gap (which Jackson had passed two days before)." the most significant event on August 27 during the US Civil War.
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SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth
3
3
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Muchos gracious for the great history.
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LTC Stephen F.
LTC Stephen F.
>1 y
You are very welcome my friend and brother-in-Christ SGT David A. 'Cowboy' Groth
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