What was the most significant event on August 31 during the U.S. Civil War?

The railroad became significant for both north and south early on the during the civil war. Cavalry raids tended to be used by the south earlier to destroy railroads. The North also used cavalry to ravage southern railways; but, Maj Gen William T. Sherman set the standard for deliberate rail destruction as he cut a swath across Georgia.
Monday, August 31, 1863: Bragg Learns His Folly – Doesn’t Do Much About It. Braxton Bragg, Confederate commander at Chattanooga, had been beside himself. He had lost track of most of the Federal Army of the Cumberland, which had been poised to cross the Tennessee River above the city, and perhaps even below it. Because he was unsure of his enemy’s location or where the Federals were headed, he issued a surprising number of contradictory orders.
Bragg’s initial plan, if it could in truth be called a “plan,” was to allow the Federals to cross the river, and then jump on them. Soon after such boasting, he lamented that Chattanooga would surely fall. All the while, he was sending brigades here, and divisions there. Bragg even ordered Simon Buckner’s troops, retreating from Knoxville, to attack the enemy, before countermanding the idea, leaving them dangling somewhere off on his far right.
Even D.H. Hill, who commanded an entire corps, had been jostled around by Bragg’s slow confusion. First, he was to widely disperse his men, obviously to search out the Yankee crossings of the Tennessee. Then, he was to make sure he could concentrate at a moment’s notice. On this date, Bragg issued yet another set of orders for Hill.
Like before, he was to do with his men as he saw fit, “keeping in view a concentration at the earliest moment at such point the enemy may cross.” Bragg suggested keeping them near the railroad. The towns of Harrison and Charleston, both upriver from Chattanooga, were to be defended. Not only was Bragg concerned with his right, he was hoping that Hill might have a connection in the East. “If you have any influence in Richmond,” he wrote in closing, “beg for arms.”
While arms were certainly needed, additional troops were needed as well. Fortunately for him, these were already arriving. William Walker’s Division had arrived from Mississippi, but were in poor shape. Walker, too, received bizarre orders. First, Bragg wanted him to join up with Buckner’s retreating troops well up the river. Then, he wanted to move him left. Finally, he broke up the division, sending one brigade into Georgia and putting the rest in reserve.
The reason for such strange orders wasn’t because Bragg didn’t know where the Federal Army of the Cumberland was located, it was because he thought they would cross upriver from Chattanooga, even though various scouts had reported otherwise. This was all part of William Rosecrans’ deception. The Union commander divided his forces, sending a third of his troops slightly upriver from Chattanooga. Bragg took the bait and ignored any information to the contrary, believing that Rosecrans would try to link up with Ambrose Burnside, who had just forced Buckner out of Knoxville.
In truth, Rosecrans had begun crossing the river well downstream of the city on the 29th. By this date, though some units were still crossing, the advance was headed into the mountain passes. On the same day as the crossing, Bragg learned that at least an entire Federal Corps was at Bridgeport. Mostly, he ignored it, nestled in the belief that Rosecrans would never even dare such a move.
On the 30th (or perhaps upon this date), a civilian came into Bragg’s camp and told him that two corps of Yankees had crossed at Caperton’s Ferry, far downriver from Chattanooga. Unsure if he could take the word of a single civilian, Bragg was hesitant. Until on this date, further word came in from Joe Wheeler’s Cavalry, who were patrolling the area around Sand Mountain, near the Federal crossings. While it was true that Wheeler’s report only mentioned cavalry, it certainly added weight to what the civilian said.
His pickets along the river had been scattered, and “the enemy moved into the valley this evening with a very heavy force of cavalry.” By evening, they were thick upon Sand Mountain itself.
Even by this late date, it was not too late. Only two of the three crossings downriver of Chattanooga had been completed, and no single Federal corps was yet on the other side. It would take Rosecrans’ Federals several more days to get everyone on Bragg’s side of the river. In that time, Bragg would have to act.
Meanwhile, in Virginia, another Confederate General was moving to the same end. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had been secure behind the Rapidan River for weeks now. The Federal Army of the Potomac held tight to the Rappahannock. Neither side made any major moves against the other. It was in light of this that James Longstreet, one of Lee’s corps commanders, thought it might be a good time to detach a chunk of his men to aid Bragg in Chattanooga.
It wasn’t the first time he had brought up such an idea. In the spring, before the Gettysburg Campaign, he had suggested it and Lee had quickly shot it down. Now he was doing the same again.
“I called General Lee’s attention to the condition of our affairs in the West,” remembered Longstreet after the war. “I suggested that he should adhere to his defensive tactics upon the Rapidan, and reinforce from his army the army lying in front of Rosecrans – so that it could crush that army, and then push on to the West.”
As before, Lee opposed such a risky move, and went to Richmond to plan for the fall campaign. By this date, he had in mind a new strike and was hammering out the details with President Davis. In writing to Longstreet, he didn’t say a thing about the West, but his proposal was fairly surprising: “I can see nothing better to be done than to endeavor to bring General Meade out and use our efforts to crush his army while in the present condition.”
Longstreet, of course, disagreed, but this time something might eventually come of it.”
[civilwardailygazette.com/bragg-learns-his-folly-doesnt-do-much-about-it/]
‘The Enemy Fled in Confusion’ – The Two Tales of Jonesborough, Georgia in 1864: The night had been one of marching. They arrived in Jonesboro at sunrise, or a little after, and rested while their comrades straggled behind. The Federals north of Atlanta had slipped west and then south over the past week, devouring the countryside and railroad running southwest. The day previous, the northern host drew to within sight of the rails winding southeast to Macon.
But General John Bell Hood had anticipated their latest move and with little warning casually began to slide two corps along the same line to Jonesboro. Arriving first was Patrick Cleburne’s Division, now commanded by Mark Lowrey, as its namesake now helmed William Hardee’s Corps, as Hardee was the wing commander over his own and Stephen D. Lee’s Corps. But there was delay. Both Lee and Cleburne were late, and it wasn’t until 11am that they were arrayed for battle.
Awaiting their attack, entrenched on both sides of the Flint River, was the Sixteenth Corps, now led by Thomas Ransom, taking over for Grenville Dodge, who had been wounded. Ransom’s Corps held the Federal right, with Judson Kilpatrick’s Cavalry extended even farther on the flank. The Confederates saw the infantry, but seemed not to notice the cavalry.
“Each man was provided with sixty rounds of ammunition,” recalled General Lowrey, commanding the attacking Rebel division, “and all were informed that General Hood expected them to go at the enemy with fixed bayonets, and drive them across the river.” Lowrey had given his brigade commanders orders to keep their lines regulated, telling them to halt and dress if necessary. They were to move as one.
“About 3:30pm the division moved forward in good order,” Lowrey continued, “and soon encountered the enemy in an open field, strongly posted behind breast-works, with four pieces of artillery. From prisoners taken the force was ascertained to have been cavalry dismounted, under command of the Federal General Kirkpatrick. Both artillery and small-arms opened vigorously on my lines, but after a short contest the enemy fled in confusion, and were pursued by my command with great impetuosity.”
But General Kilpatrick told a different tale: “At 3:30pm of the same day (August 31) the enemy made a determined attack upon the infantry on my left. It seemed to be the intention of the enemy to break or turn our right flank. At first he entirely ignored my command. This I determined he should not do. Five regiments of cavalry, dismounted, were in position behind barricades directly in the flanks of the charging column. My artillery was in a most favorable position. I directed the artillery to commence firing on the advancing column of the enemy, and the cavalry upon the opposite side of the river to meet and attack him. This attack was determined and gallantly made. The enemy was forced to turn and meet it. He moved down in heavy columns, twice charged and was twice repulsed, but finally forced my people to retire from their rail barricades and across the river.”
Lowrey’s Rebel lines could not remain dressed as he pulled regiment after regiment from the main assault to deal with Kilpatrick’s cavalry. Ultimately, his planned attack was abandoned, and he pursued Kilpatrick and his troopers to the river.
In the meanwhile, S.D. Lee, commanding the other Southern corps, understood the intense firing to mean that Lowrey’s attack was coming off as originally planned. Thinking he would have support on his flank, he ordered his own attack and was viciously mauled by the entrenched Federals.
As the afternoon turned late, General Hardee finally called for a coordinated attack. Both Lowrey and Lee were to form and assault the Union lines as one. This was, of course, the original plan before Kilpatrick had his way with it. But Lee was unsure. While Cleburn’s Corps had been met with success (albeit, not the success they intended), his own had been repulsed. They were too demoralized, he insisted.
“It now became necessary for me to act on the defensive,” admitted Hardee in his report, “and I ordered Cleburne to make no further attempt upon the enemy’s works. It is proper to state that the enemy were strongly intrenched and had one flank resting on the Flint River and both well protected.”
Back in Atlanta, General Hood learned of the repulse, and now believed that Sherman would attempt a full assault upon the city itself. To his he ordered all of Lee’s corps back into the defenses of Atlanta.
“Lee’s corps proceeded to Atlanta,” continued Hardee, “and I remained at Jonesborough with my own corps and a body of cavalry under Brigadier-General Jackson.” Despite all the scouts and all accounts and reports to the contrary, Hardee believed General Hood to be woefully over-cautious.
But this contest was not at an end. There would come a dawn, and with it blood.
[civilwardailygazette.com/the-enemy-fled-in-confusion-the-two-tales-of-jonesborough/]

Below are a number of journal entries from 1862 and 1864 which shed light on what life was like for soldiers and civilians – the good, the bad and the ugly. Maj Gen William T. Sherman provides a daily update on the siege of Atlanta in 1864.
Sunday, August 31, 1862: Gen. Halleck Gen. Pope holds his army in position although large numbers of them are on the road of retreat to Alexandria and Washington. Pope telegraphs to Halleck his report, clearly anxious for reinforcements, and also wondering whether he should retreat to Washington or not: “Numbers 87. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, Centreville, August 31, 1862-10.45 a. m. To Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief rom Maj. Gen. John Pope, USA. “Our troops are all here in position, though much used-up and worn-out. I think it would perhaps have been greatly better if Summer and Franklin had been here three or four days ago; but you may rely on our giving them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to.
　　　 I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital.
　　　 The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnaissance in our front at Cub Run-whether in advance of an attack to-day I do not yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose.　　　JNO. POPE, Major-General, Commanding.”
Sunday, August 31, 1862: Gideon Wells, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, writes of such activities in his journal, when other members of the Cabinet come to him about McClellan’s dismissal: “August 31, Sunday. For the last two or three days there has been fighting at the front and army movements of interest. McClellan with most of his army arrived at Alexandria a week or more ago, but inertness, inactivity, and sluggishness seem to prevail. The army officers do not engage in this move of the War Department with zeal. Some of the troops have gone forward to join Pope, who has been beyond Manassas, where he has encountered Stonewall Jackson and the Rebel forces for the last three days in a severe struggle. The energy and rapid movements of the Rebels are in such striking contrast to those of our own officers that I shall not be seriously surprised at any sudden dash from them. The War Department — Stanton and Halleck—are alarmed. . . .
Yesterday, Saturday, P.M., when about leaving the Department, Chase called on me with a protest addressed to the President, signed by himself and Stanton, against continuing McClellan in command and demanding his immediate dismissal. Certain grave offenses were enumerated. Chase said that Smith had seen and would sign it in turn, but as my name preceded his in order, he desired mine to appear in its place. I told him I was not prepared to sign the document; that I preferred a different method of meeting the question; . . . that I did not choose to denounce McC. for incapacity, or to pronounce him a traitor, as declared in this paper, but I would say, and perhaps it was my duty to say, that I believed his removal from command was demanded by public sentiment and the best interest of the country.
Chase said that was not sufficient, that the time had arrived when the Cabinet must act with energy and promptitude, for either the Government or McClellan must go down. He then proceeded to expose certain acts, some of which were partially known to me, and others, more startling, which were new to me. . . . I proposed as a preferable course that there should be a general consultation with the President. He objected to this until the document was signed, which, he said, should be done at once.
This method of getting signatures without an interchange of views with those who are associated in council was repugnant to my ideas of duty and right. . . .
We hear, this Sunday morning, that our army has fallen back to Centreville. Pope writes in pretty good spirits that we have lost no guns, etc. The Rebels were largely reinforced, while our troops, detained at Annandale by McClellan’s orders, did not arrive to support our wearied and exhausted men. McClellan telegraphs that he hears "Pope is badly cut up." . . . But my faith in present security and of ultimate success is unshaken. We need better generals but can have no better army. There is much latent disloyal feeling in Washington which should be expelled. And oh, there is great want of capacity and will among our military leaders.”
Sunday, August 31, 1862: Stephen Minot Weld, a young officer in the 18th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment, writes to his father, the day after the battle: “Centreville, Aug. 31, 1862. Dear Father, — We had a severe battle at Bull Run yesterday, and were obliged to retire to this place. The retreat was conducted in good order, and without the loss of wagons, etc. General Porter’s corps did most of the fighting. Pope made a complete muddle of the whole affair and ordered us into a place where we were hit hard. I can only thank God that I got out safe. We were under a very severe fire of musketry, round shot, shell and case-shot. My horse was slightly wounded in the leg by a musket shot. If we ever reach Washington in safety, it will be more than I expect.
Pope has blundered terribly. He let Jackson get between him and Washington, destroy any number of cars and the railroad track at Manassas Junction and the telegraph. Jackson then went to Centreville, then to Bull Run. . . . Pope knows he is dead if he retreats to Washington and so he keeps us here, where the enemy may cut off our supplies. The place itself is very strong and we occupy the enemy’s old works. . . .”

Wednesday, August 31, 1864: Siege of Atlanta: The Battle of Jonesboro begins. General Sherman: “[A]ll moved straight for the railroad. Schofield reached it near Rough and Ready, and Thomas at two points between there and Jonesboro. Howard found an intrenched foe (Hardee’s corps) covering Jonesboro, and his men began at once to dig their accustomed rifle-pits. Orders were sent to Generals Thomas and Schofield to turn straight for Jonesboro, tearing up the railroad-track as they advanced. About 3.00 p.m. the enemy sallied from Jonesboro against the Fifteenth corps, but was easily repulsed, and driven back within his lines. All hands were kept busy tearing up the railroad, and it was not until toward evening of the 1st day of September that the Fourteenth Corps (Davis) closed down on the north front of Jonesboro, connecting on his right with Howard, and his left reaching the railroad, along which General Stanley was moving, followed by Schofield. General Davis formed his divisions in line about 4 p.m., swept forward over some old cotton-fields in full view, and went over the rebel parapet handsomely, capturing the whole of Govan’s brigade, with two field-batteries of ten guns. Being on the spot, I checked Davis’s movement, and ordered General Howard to send the two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps (Blair) round by his right rear, to get below Jonesboro, and to reach the railroad, so as to cut off retreat in that direction. I also dispatched orders after orders to hurry forward Stanley, so as to lap around Jonesboro on the east, hoping thus to capture the whole of Hardee’s corps. I sent first Captain Audenried (aide-de-camp), then Colonel Poe, of the Engineers, and lastly General Thomas himself (and that is the only time during the campaign I can recall seeing General Thomas urge his horse into a gallop). Night was approaching, and the country on the farther side of the railroad was densely wooded. General Stanley had come up on the left of Davis, and was deploying, though there could not have been on his front more than a skirmish-line. Had he moved straight on by the flank, or by a slight circuit to his left, he would have inclosed the whole ground occupied by Hardee’s corps, and that corps could not have escaped us; but night came on, and Hardee did escape.
Meantime General Slocum had reached his corps (the Twentieth), stationed at the Chattahoochee bridge, had relieved General A. S. Williams in command, and orders had been sent back to him to feel forward occasionally toward Atlanta, to observe the effect when we had reached the railroad. That night I was so restless and impatient that I could not sleep, and about midnight there arose toward Atlanta sounds of shells exploding, and other sound like that of musketry. I walked to the house of a farmer close by my bivouac, called him out to listen to the reverberations which came from the direction of Atlanta (twenty miles to the north of us), and inquired of him if he had resided there long. He said he had, and that these sounds were just like those of a battle. An interval of quiet then ensued, when again, about 4 a.m., arose other similar explosions, but I still remained in doubt whether the enemy was engaged in blowing up his own magazines, or whether General Slocum had not felt forward, and become engaged in a real battle.”


Pictures: 1863 Chickamauga Campaign Aug-Sep; 1864-08-31 Jonesborough; 1864-Aug 26 to Sep 3 The Road to Atlanta Map; 1864-08-31 Sherman attacks Atlanta. As a major transportation and logistics center

A. Saturday, August 31, 1861: Richmond announced today that no less than five men were being named as full Confederate generals, the promotions were announced as becoming effective on different dates so that these five would know who was superior to each other. In order they were: Samuel Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, and P.G.T. Beauregard. The only full General the North would name wouldn’t get the job for almost another three years: U.S. Grant.
B. Sunday, August 31, 1862: Medon Station, Tennessee. CSA Col. Frank C. Armstrong led 3,300 cavalry troops towards Medon Station. The Union force at the railroad station dug into a defensive position with a barricade of cotton bales. The Confederates attacked at 3 P.M then Union reinforcements arrived by train. Believing he couldn't defeat the Union garrison without a major battle, Armstrong drew off to the west of Medon Station and camped that night on the Casey Savage farm. In a dispatch to his boss, General Price Armstrong (CSA) seems to suggest that his mission has been accomplished. . . . “I have crossed the Hatchie [river]; passed between Jackson and Bolivar; destroyed the bridges and one mile of trestle work between the two places, holding for more than thirty hours the road.” The Federals held their position and Armstrong had to finally withdraw.
Background: Colonel Frank C. Armstrong and his 3,300 cavalry troops were on a mission along the Mississippi and Tennessee Central Railroad to harass the enemy, stir-up the Federal detachments, interdict and disrupt the enemy's supply line. After a 7 hour battle near Bolivar, he leads his men northward to Medon.
C. Monday, August 31, 1863: Chickamauga Campaign: Maj Gen General William Starke Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland had cleared most of middle Tennessee of Confederates, now he was currently in the area of Shellmouth, in eastern Alabama. Facing him was CSA General Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee which had withdrawn from Chattanooga. He is concentrating his troops in Dalton and Lafayette in Georgia. Rosecrans sent the first Federal soldiers on an expedition in their direction today.. CSA General Nathan Bedford Forrest followed orders to evacuate East Tennessee with all his forces except Scott’s Brigade, which is to guard the bridge at Loudon and burn it upon the approach of the enemy (done September 2, below). Upon arriving in Chattanooga, Forrest and his men are deployed “wheresoever the Commanding General determined that cavalry were wanted to cover the movements of the Confederates in the coming evacuation of that position; and to observe the movements likewise of Rosecrans, who now revealed a manifest purpose to cross the Tennessee river westward of Chattanooga, with the object of striking a blow, by way of Will’s Valley, at Bragg’s communications.” Union commanders all the way up to General-in-Chief Halleck, are anxiously try to monitor the location of Forrest’s forces and wondering about his plans.
D. Wednesday, August 31, 1864: Siege of Atlanta. The Battle of Jonesboro begins. It would not be until 1:30 pm on the afternoon of August 31 that CSA Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee and Lee were in place and ready to attack. As Patrick Cleburne advanced and engaged the enemy from the north, S. D. Lee ordered his corps to advance from the west. Disheartened from bloody attempts to take Union entrenchments at Utoy Creek, East Atlanta and Peach Tree Creek, these veterans stopped when they came under heavy fire. Even S. D. Lee wrote "The attack was not made by the troops with that spirit and inflexible determination that would ensure success...The attack was a feeble one and a failure."
Pat Cleburne's attack was more successful than Lee's. In command of Hardee's Corps, the Arkansas Irishman advanced, broke through the outer Union lines and crossed the Flint River, capturing two pieces of artillery. Lee's unsuccessful assault spelled the end to Cleburne's advance, as he had to withdraw to support his brethren in gray.
After the attack of Lee's and Hardee's Corps on the Union entrenchments west of Jonesboro during the afternoon of the 31st, General Hood made a series of errors. Hood sent orders for Hardee to "...return Lee's Corps to this place (Atanta)." Hood knew that the Union trenches were only lightly defended by Slocum's XX Corp's. Additionally, both the commander of the remaining Confederate cavalry and General Hardee himself had informed Hood that significant amounts of Union forces were threatening his rear. With General Joseph Wheeler and his cavalry off disrupting the rear echelons, Hood refused to believe the only reliable reports of troop strength and location that he had and arrogantly reinforced himself.
Hardee faced a logistical nightmare. Sixty thousand Union soldiers were concentrating south of Atlanta, with some of the best forces marching on his position. Ordinance and subsistence trains, hastily sent south for protection from the Atlanta attack envisioned by Hood, only "encumbered" Hardee with additional problems, since they could not travel unescorted because of Union cavalry. The attack was commanded by General Sherman personally. Jonesboro offered no natural defense perimeter and Hardee did not have the time to construct additional defenses. Finally, with the rail lines cut the Confederate Army was preparing to move to Lovejoy [Station] on the Macon and Western Railroad south of Jonesboro, so "Old Reliable" was, in essence, fighting a rear guard action on September 1st.

Hood ordered Hardee and Lee on August 31 to take their corps to Jonesboro and attack the enemy, assumed to be three corps, and drive them away. Yet already Hood was preparing for the worst: he ordered the army's ordnance reserve packed on trains and taken out of the city.
Hardee's plan called for the assault to begin against the Federal right, with Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne's division on the extreme left, wheeling northward to turn the enemy flank. Then, from south to north, the rest of the line would pick up the attack; Lee's divisions would advance after Cleburne "had hotly engaged the enemy at close quarters." Around 3 p.m. Cleburne began his attack, heading for John Corse's division, entrenched on a ridge. An attack by Hugh J. Kilpatrick's cavalry forced the Southerners to fight off to their left. Then Brown's division went in, but under heavy artillery and rifle fire fell back. On Lee's front, six brigades of Patton Anderson's and Carter Stevenson's division met the same bloody repulse. General Anderson himself was severely wounded, shot in the jaw. By 4:30, all along the line, the Southerners were withdrawing to their original positions.
Casualties for the day reflected the usual disproportion between defender and attacker. While Federal losses totaled a mere 179 killed and wounded, S.D. Lee estimated 1,300 casualties in his corps alone, and Hardee would have lost another 400. Having been beaten in assault, Hardee rightly concluded that "it now became necessary for me to act on the defensive."

1. Saturday, August 31, 1861: Hold onto your cap: Butler’s wild ride to Washington. Since the fall of Fort Hatteras, Union General Butler had noticed the importance of holding this section of North Carolina coast. After he gave his report to General Wool, his commander at Fortress Monroe, Wool sent him to Washington on “Official Business.” This was, apparently, to convince the War Department to not abandon North Carolina. In particular, Wool wished to take a place called “Edisto… the resort of South Carolina during the Summer.” Butler was all for it.
Towards evening, he took a steamer to Annapolis and then went by rail via the Annapolis & Elk Ridge Railroad, a line that Butler was very familiar with. Upon reaching the station at Elkton, where it junctioned with the Baltimore & Ohio, nineteen miles north of Washington, Butler was told that he could go no farther that night.
As Butler told it after the war, a discussion ensued with the engineer of his train who said it was too dangerous. Butler, however, had “not come here for safety. Why is it too dangerous?”
A north-bound freight was due to leave Washington at midnight. It was 11:15pm.2 Butler then suggested that if they detached all of the cars and he rode in the cab with the engineer, the train would be pulling less weight.
“Shall we go slow,” asked the timid engineer, “so that we shall find out when a train is coming before we reach it, in time to back out?”
The incredibly daring and brave General Butler insisted that they could “hack out very quickly… let her go as fast as she can go!”
“Hold onto your cap, General,” exclaimed the now emboldened pilot as he threw open the throttle and steamed south to Washington at full speed.
The nineteen miles was covered in forty minutes.
Before he hopped out of the cab, Butler slapped a twenty dollar gold coin in the engineer’s hand and was off to Postmaster Blair’s house. Still awake, Blair and Gustavus Fox, now the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, were in the study. When he saw Butler, Fox cried out, “Where from?”
“Direct from Hatteras!” the victorious Butler barked before telling both of his great victory on the North Carolina coast. Both Fox and Blair insisted that they go across the street to the White House to wake up President Lincoln. After fifteen minutes, the President, still in his incredibly long night shirt, joined them in the Cabinet room.
There, Fox related the story of the capture of Hatteras, which made the six foot, four inch tall Lincoln so jubilant that he hugged the five foot tall Assistant Secretary in a very awkward embrace and proceeded to dance around the room, twisting and twirling in unbridled joy over the great victory of General Butler.
After fixing his nightshirt, which had been jostled about during the dancing, Lincoln took Butler by the hand (apparently only wishing to dance with Fox), thanked him and asked the General to return the next day at 10am for the morning Cabinet meeting.
[civilwardailygazette.com/hold-onto-your-cap-butlers-wild-ride-to-washington/]
2. Sunday, August 31, 1862: Meanwhile in Virginia, Lee (CSA) was pushing General Pope’s (US) army back toward Washington. They were now within 25 miles of the Capital.
[site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-three]
3. Sunday, August 31, 1862: Drenching rains begin the night before, and continue throughout the day in northern Virginia. The Confederates, especially Stonewall Jackson, are impatient to launch a pursuit of Pope and to threaten Washington.
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+31%2C+1862]
4. Sunday, August 31, 1862: Manassas/Second Manassas followup: Although General Lee has been victorious, he orders General Jackson to march behind the Federal right flank while Longstreet pins Pope in Centreville, even though Pope has been reinforced by all four corps of McClellan’s Army of the Potomac. President Lincoln, upon hearing the news, tells his secretary, “Well John we are whipped again, I am afraid. The enemy reinforced on [General John] Pope and drove back his left wing and he has retired to Centerville [Virginia] where he says he will be able to hold his men. I don’t like that expression. I don’t like to hear him admit that his men need holding.”
[bjdeming.com/2012/10/12/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-27-to-september-2-1862/
5. Sunday, August 31, 1862: Confederate Heartland Offensive: General Kirby Smith allows his men to rest for a day and then heads for Lexington.
[bjdeming.com/2012/10/12/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-27-to-september-2-1862/
6. Sunday, August 31, 1862: Western Theater: Confederate guerrillas capture the steamboat W. B. Terry on the Tennessee River after it runs aground. Drought has lowered all river levels.
[bjdeming.com/2012/10/12/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-27-to-september-2-1862/
7. Sunday, August 31, 1862: Rogers' Gap, Tennessee - On August 31, Union force, commanded by Brig. Gen. George W. Morgan, attacked the Confederate camp at Rogers' Gap. The Confederates were quickly dispersed by the Federals.
[mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html
8. Sunday, August 31, 1862: Gen. Halleck Gen. Pope holds his army in position although large numbers of them are on the road of retreat to Alexandria and Washington. Pope telegraphs to Halleck his report, clearly anxious for reinforcements, and also wondering whether he should retreat to Washington or not: “Numbers 87. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, Centreville, August 31, 1862-10.45 a. m. To Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief rom Maj. Gen. John Pope, USA. “Our troops are all here in position, though much used-up and worn-out. I think it would perhaps have been greatly better if Summer and Franklin had been here three or four days ago; but you may rely on our giving them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to.
　　　 I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital.
　　　 The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnaissance in our front at Cub Run-whether in advance of an attack to-day I do not yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose.　　　JNO. POPE, Major-General, Commanding.”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+31%2C+1862
9. Sunday, August 31, 1862: During this campaign, McClellan has been holding back many of his troops: Sumner’s corps, the rest of Burnside, and Franklin. Now, wires Gen. Halleck, offering assistance to Gen. Pope, but not-so-subtlely hinting that he would like to be given overall command: "I am ready to afford you any assistance in my power; but you will readily perceive how difficult an undefined position, such as I now hold, must be. At what hour in the morning can I see you alone, either at your own house or the office?" Indeed, the lack of clarity about command structure has plagued the campaign from the beginning. There are already calls for McClellan’s dismissal.
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10. Sunday, August 31, 1862: Gideon Wells, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, writes of such activities in his journal, when other members of the Cabinet come to him about McClellan’s dismissal: “August 31, Sunday. For the last two or three days there has been fighting at the front and army movements of interest. McClellan with most of his army arrived at Alexandria a week or more ago, but inertness, inactivity, and sluggishness seem to prevail. The army officers do not engage in this move of the War Department with zeal. Some of the troops have gone forward to join Pope, who has been beyond Manassas, where he has encountered Stonewall Jackson and the Rebel forces for the last three days in a severe struggle. The energy and rapid movements of the Rebels are in such striking contrast to those of our own officers that I shall not be seriously surprised at any sudden dash from them. The War Department — Stanton and Halleck—are alarmed. . . .
Yesterday, Saturday, P.M., when about leaving the Department, Chase called on me with a protest addressed to the President, signed by himself and Stanton, against continuing McClellan in command and demanding his immediate dismissal. Certain grave offenses were enumerated. Chase said that Smith had seen and would sign it in turn, but as my name preceded his in order, he desired mine to appear in its place. I told him I was not prepared to sign the document; that I preferred a different method of meeting the question; . . . that I did not choose to denounce McC. for incapacity, or to pronounce him a traitor, as declared in this paper, but I would say, and perhaps it was my duty to say, that I believed his removal from command was demanded by public sentiment and the best interest of the country.
Chase said that was not sufficient, that the time had arrived when the Cabinet must act with energy and promptitude, for either the Government or McClellan must go down. He then proceeded to expose certain acts, some of which were partially known to me, and others, more startling, which were new to me. . . . I proposed as a preferable course that there should be a general consultation with the President. He objected to this until the document was signed, which, he said, should be done at once.
This method of getting signatures without an interchange of views with those who are associated in council was repugnant to my ideas of duty and right. . . .
We hear, this Sunday morning, that our army has fallen back to Centreville. Pope writes in pretty good spirits that we have lost no guns, etc. The Rebels were largely reinforced, while our troops, detained at Annandale by McClellan’s orders, did not arrive to support our wearied and exhausted men. McClellan telegraphs that he hears "Pope is badly cut up." . . . But my faith in present security and of ultimate success is unshaken. We need better generals but can have no better army. There is much latent disloyal feeling in Washington which should be expelled. And oh, there is great want of capacity and will among our military leaders.”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+31%2C+1862]
11. Sunday, August 31, 1862: Stephen Minot Weld, a young officer in the 18th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment, writes to his father, the day after the battle: “Centreville, Aug. 31, 1862. Dear Father, — We had a severe battle at Bull Run yesterday, and were obliged to retire to this place. The retreat was conducted in good order, and without the loss of wagons, etc. General Porter’s corps did most of the fighting. Pope made a complete muddle of the whole affair and ordered us into a place where we were hit hard. I can only thank God that I got out safe. We were under a very severe fire of musketry, round shot, shell and case-shot. My horse was slightly wounded in the leg by a musket shot. If we ever reach Washington in safety, it will be more than I expect.
Pope has blundered terribly. He let Jackson get between him and Washington, destroy any number of cars and the railroad track at Manassas Junction and the telegraph. Jackson then went to Centreville, then to Bull Run. . . . Pope knows he is dead if he retreats to Washington and so he keeps us here, where the enemy may cut off our supplies. The place itself is very strong and we occupy the enemy’s old works. . . .”
[civilwarsesquicentdaily-wolfshield.blogspot.com/search?q=August+31%2C+1862]
12. Monday, August 31, 1863: The month of August 1863, would later prove to have the least amount of battle casualties until the war would end. Quantrill's Raiders on Lawrence, Kansas took 182 lives but another 4,104 men would die from their wounds, disease, accidents, exposure and / or starvation.
[site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-c/week-125]
13. Monday, August 31, 1863: “Minor fighting marked the end of August with action on the Marais des Cygnes, Kansas [where a massacre in 1858 had horrified the nation]; at Winter’s Gap, Tennessee; and Will’s Valley, Alabama [part of the Chickamauga Campaign].”
[bjdeming.com/2013/08/26/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-26-september-2-1863/
14. Wednesday, August 31, 1864: Georgia operations, Siege of Atlanta: The Battle of Jonesboro begins. General Sherman: “[A]ll moved straight for the railroad. Schofield reached it near Rough and Ready, and Thomas at two points between there and Jonesboro. Howard found an intrenched foe (Hardee’s corps) covering Jonesboro, and his men began at once to dig their accustomed rifle-pits. Orders were sent to Generals Thomas and Schofield to turn straight for Jonesboro, tearing up the railroad-track as they advanced. About 3.00 p.m. the enemy sallied from Jonesboro against the Fifteenth corps, but was easily repulsed, and driven back within his lines. All hands were kept busy tearing up the railroad, and it was not until toward evening of the 1st day of September that the Fourteenth Corps (Davis) closed down on the north front of Jonesboro, connecting on his right with Howard, and his left reaching the railroad, along which General Stanley was moving, followed by Schofield. General Davis formed his divisions in line about 4 p.m., swept forward over some old cotton-fields in full view, and went over the rebel parapet handsomely, capturing the whole of Govan’s brigade, with two field-batteries of ten guns. Being on the spot, I checked Davis’s movement, and ordered General Howard to send the two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps (Blair) round by his right rear, to get below Jonesboro, and to reach the railroad, so as to cut off retreat in that direction. I also dispatched orders after orders to hurry forward Stanley, so as to lap around Jonesboro on the east, hoping thus to capture the whole of Hardee’s corps. I sent first Captain Audenried (aide-de-camp), then Colonel Poe, of the Engineers, and lastly General Thomas himself (and that is the only time during the campaign I can recall seeing General Thomas urge his horse into a gallop). Night was approaching, and the country on the farther side of the railroad was densely wooded. General Stanley had come up on the left of Davis, and was deploying, though there could not have been on his front more than a skirmish-line. Had he moved straight on by the flank, or by a slight circuit to his left, he would have inclosed the whole ground occupied by Hardee’s corps, and that corps could not have escaped us; but night came on, and Hardee did escape.
Meantime General Slocum had reached his corps (the Twentieth), stationed at the Chattahoochee bridge, had relieved General A. S. Williams in command, and orders had been sent back to him to feel forward occasionally toward Atlanta, to observe the effect when we had reached the railroad. That night I was so restless and impatient that I could not sleep, and about midnight there arose toward Atlanta sounds of shells exploding, and other sound like that of musketry. I walked to the house of a farmer close by my bivouac, called him out to listen to the reverberations which came from the direction of Atlanta (twenty miles to the north of us), and inquired of him if he had resided there long. He said he had, and that these sounds were just like those of a battle. An interval of quiet then ensued, when again, about 4 a.m., arose other similar explosions, but I still remained in doubt whether the enemy was engaged in blowing up his own magazines, or whether General Slocum had not felt forward, and become engaged in a real battle.”
[bjdeming.com/2014/08/25/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-25-31-1864/
15. Wednesday, August 31, 1864: At Steelville, Missouri a gang of bushwackers capture and plunder the town, killing militia men and citizens who tried to obstruct them. In Memphis, Col. Fielding Hurst’s (US) command, the 6th Tennessee Cavalry is told to dismount and are to report as “unassigned.”
[site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-177
16. Wednesday, August 31, 1864: In Chicago, George McClellan, formerly Major General in the Federal Army is elected as the next nominee for President of the United States as the Democratic National Convention comes to an end.
[site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-177

A Saturday, August 31, 1861: Richmond announced today that no less than five men were being named as full generals, the promotions being effective on different dates so that these five would know who was superior to each other. In order they were: Samuel Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, and P.G.T. Beauregard. The only full General the North would name wouldn’t get the job for almost another three years: U.S. Grant.
[site/civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-a/part-twenty-1
B Sunday, August 31, 1862: Medon Station, Tennessee - On August 31, Col. Frank C. Armstrong was leading his Confederate cavalry towards Medon Station. The Union force at the railroad station dug into a defensive position with a barricade of cotton bales.
At 3:00 P.M., the Confederates attacked. The Federals held their position and Armstrong had to finally withdraw.
[mycivilwar.com/battles/1862s.html]
B+ Sunday, August 31, 1862: Colonel Frank C. Armstrong (CSA) and his 3,300 cavalry troops were on a mission along the Mississippi and Tennessee Central Railroad to harass the enemy, stir-up the Federal detachments, interdict and disrupt the enemy's supply line. After a 7 hour battle near Bolivar, he leads his men northward to Medon. Just as he was preparing for a fight at the depot there, Union reinforcements arrived by train. Believing he couldn't defeat the Union garrison without a major battle, Armstrong drew off to the west of Medon Station and camped that night on the Casey Savage farm. In a dispatch to his boss, General Price Armstrong (CSA) seems to suggest that his mission has been accomplished. . . . “I have crossed the Hatchie [river]; passed between Jackson and Bolivar; destroyed the bridges and one mile of trestle work between the two places, holding for more than thirty hours the road.”
[civilwarhardemancotn/departments/department-b/part-seventy-three
C Monday, August 31, 1863: The Federal Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General William Starke Rosecrans actions for the last several months had been overshadowed by more dramatic actions at Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg further west. He had cleared most of middle Tennessee of Confederates, now he was currently in the area of Shellmouth, in eastern Alabama. Facing him was the Army of Tennessee, with General Braxton Bragg (CSA) commanding. Bragg’s force in east Tennessee was roughly centered around a small river town (pop. 2546, including 451 Negroes) formerly known as Ross’s Landing. The townspeople had changed the name and incorporated as the city of Chattanooga. Rosecrans sent the first soldiers on an expedition in their direction today.
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C+ Monday, August 31, 1863: Chickamauga Campaign: CS General Bragg has withdrawn from Chattanooga and is concentrating his troops in Dalton and Lafayette in Georgia. CS General Nathan Bedford Forrest follows orders to evacuate East Tennessee with all his forces except Scott’s Brigade, which is to guard the bridge at Loudon and burn it upon the approach of the enemy (done September 2, below). Upon arriving in Chattanooga, Forrest and his men are deployed “wheresoever the Commanding General determined that cavalry were wanted to cover the movements of the Confederates in the coming evacuation of that position; and to observe the movements likewise of Rosecrans, who now revealed a manifest purpose to cross the Tennessee river westward of Chattanooga, with the object of striking a blow, by way of Will’s Valley, at Bragg’s communications.” Union commanders all the way up to General-in-Chief Halleck, are anxiously try to monitor the location of Forrest’s forces and wondering about his plans.
[bjdeming.com/2013/08/26/the-american-civil-war-150th-anniversary-august-26-september-2-1863/]
Wednesday, August 31, 1864: Today, if you drive south on the Old Dixie Road, Highway 41, just south of Atlanta near Sosebee’s Wrecker Service, this was the site of Rough and Ready Station (it was even mentioned in “Gone with the Wind”). This is the last supply line stop the Macon Railroad had leading into Atlanta. Confederate Generals William Hardee and Stephen D. Lee with two corps moves to block Sherman (US) at Jonesboro, Georgia, and attacked the Union troops, but the Rebels are thrown back with staggering losses. The Federals capture the railroad. Fearing an attack on Atlanta, General Hood (CSA) withdraws one corp from Hardee’s force that night to go back and defend the city.
[civilwarhardemancotn/departments/1864/week-177]
D August 31–September 1, 1864: The Battle of Jonesborough [Jonesboro]. Sherman had successfully cut Hood’s supply lines in the past by sending out detachments, but the Confederates quickly repaired the damage. In late August, Sherman determined that if he could cut Hood’s supply lines—the Macon & Western and the Atlanta & West Point Railroads—the Rebels would have to evacuate Atlanta. Sherman, therefore, decided to move six of his seven infantry corps against the supply lines. The army began pulling out of its positions on August 25 to hit the Macon & Western Railroad between Rough and Ready and Jonesborough. To counter the move, Hood sent Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee with two corps to halt and possibly rout the Union troops, not realizing Sherman’s army was there in force. On August 31, Hardee attacked two Union corps west of Jonesborough but was easily repulsed. Fearing an attack on Atlanta, Hood withdrew one corps from Hardee’s force that night. The next day, a Union corps broke through Hardee’ s troops which retreated to Lovejoy’s Station, and on the night of September 1, Hood evacuated Atlanta. Sherman did cut Hood’s supply line but failed to destroy Hardee’s command.
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D August 31 - September 1, 1864 Jonesborough (Jonesboro), Georgia
Estimated casualties: 3,149 (1,149 Union, 2,200 Confederate)
For a month General William Tecumseh Sherman(gallery) had tried to capture Atlanta using cavalry and artillery to no avail. John Bell Hood's Army of Tennessee clung to its lifeline, the Macon and Western Railroad, using it to resupply the Confederate troops in the Gateway City. Two things weighed heavily on Sherman's mind. Lincoln needed a victory prior to the 1864 Presidential election and Sherman needed Atlanta. It would be impossible to achieve his goal of "saltwater" without this Georgia rail hub.
The XX Corps remained near the Western and Atlantic Railroad Trestle over the Chattahoochee River. The Union trenches were manned by dismounted cavalry
From his position east of the city, Sherman ordered a "grand movement" of troops to the west, then south. Six divisions totaling 60,000+ men were making a semi-circle around the city to small town of Jonesborough, Georgia. By cutting the railroad that Hood depended upon for supplies Sherman hoped to force the well-entrenched Confederates to retreat. With minimal food, clothes and munitions the march began on August 25 and took four days. Only Henry Slocum's XX Corps remained in the vicinity of Atlanta.
Just west of downtown Jonesboro the Flint River afforded the Macon and Western Railroad some semblance of protection. Oliver Howard advanced to the Flint to get water for his thirsty men, crossed the river after a brief struggle with Confederate cavalry and gained the high ground east of the river. Having gained more ground than thought possible, Howard wisely ordered his men to entrench and regroup. The commander of the Confederate cavalry informed Hood that a significant amount of the Union Army was within a couple of miles of the Macon and Western Railroad.
By nightfall on August 30 Confederate troops began to take positions west of Jonesboro, preparing to attack, however, a large force was delayed by advancing Union soldiers north of the city.
August 31, 1864 It would not be until 1:30 pm on the afternoon of August 31 that Hardee and Lee were in place and ready to attack. As Patrick Cleburne advanced and engaged the enemy from the north, S. D. Lee ordered his corps to advance from the west. Disheartened from bloody attempts to take Union entrenchments at Utoy Creek, East Atlanta and Peach Tree Creek, these veterans stopped when they came under heavy fire. Even S. D. Lee wrote "The attack was not made by the troops with that spirit and inflexible determination that would ensure success...The attack was a feeble one and a failure."
Pat Cleburne's attack was more successful than Lee's. In command of Hardee's Corps, the Arkansas Irishman advanced, broke through the outer Union lines and crossed the Flint River, capturing two pieces of artillery. Lee's unsuccessful assault spelled the end to Cleburne's advance, as he had to withdraw to support his brethren in gray.
After the attack of Lee's and Hardee's Corps on the Union entrenchments west of Jonesboro during the afternoon of the 31st, General Hood made a series of errors. Hood sent orders for Hardee to "...return Lee's Corps to this place (Atanta)." Hood knew that the Union trenches were only lightly defended by Slocum's XX Corp's. Additionally, both the commander of the remaining Confederate cavalry and General Hardee himself had informed Hood that significant amounts of Union forces were threatening his rear. With General Joseph Wheeler and his cavalry off disrupting the rear echelons, Hood refused to believe the only reliable reports of troop strength and location that he had and arrogantly reinforced himself.
Hardee faced a logistical nightmare. Sixty thousand Union soldiers were concentrating south of Atlanta, with some of the best forces marching on his position. Ordinance and subsistence trains, hastily sent south for protection from the Atlanta attack envisioned by Hood, only "encumbered" Hardee with additional problems, since they could not travel unescorted because of Union cavalry. The attack was commanded by General Sherman personally. Jonesboro offered no natural defense perimeter and Hardee did not have the time to construct additional defenses. Finally, with the rail lines cut the Confederate Army was preparing to move to Lovejoy [Station] on the Macon and Western Railroad south of Jonesboro, so "Old Reliable" was, in essence, fighting a rear guard action on September 1st.
Formed in a horseshoe around the tiny hamlet, Hardee's troops now were now fighting for time...the time needed to march two corps of men from Atlanta to Lovejoy Station. Slowly the Union forces advanced towards Hardee's line, and none seemed in a hurry for the encounter. At 4:00pm the first attack came against the entrenched Rebels, barely more than one deep. The onslaught continued, increasing in ferocity as the sunset drew near.
Then, much more quickly than it had started it was over. The Rebel line was overrun, pierced multiple times. Confederate artillery that moments earlier had been firing canister and other forms of death on advancing Bluecoats were given up to the invaders who had not been deterred by the guns of destruction.
Sherman hoped to strike a devastating blow against Hardee by cutting off his line of retreat, but the swarthy Cajun easily outfoxed the red-haired Ohioan and withdrew to a strong position some seven miles south of the city. The battle of Jonesboro was over.
[aboutnorthgeorgia.com/ang/Battle_of_Jonesboro]
D August 31–September 1, 1864: Battle of Jonesboro, STEPHEN DAVIS
After three Union cavalry raids failed to cut the Macon & Western railroad, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman judged, "I expect I will have to swing across to that road in force to make the matter certain." Sherman left the Twentieth Corps at the Chattahoochee and with his six other corps marched southwest of Atlanta, then swung east, aiming to cut the railroad between East Point and Jonesboro. Sherman was not just making an infantry raid on the Macon & Western; he was throwing virtually his entire army upon it. This "grand swing by the right" began on August 25.
Hardee's and Lee's corps attacked on the afternoon of August 31, 1864, and were repulsed with heavy Confederate casualties. (Douglas Ullman, Jr. )
Gen. John Bell Hood soon learned from his cavalry at noon on the 27th that enemy infantry were marching south toward Fairburn, strength as yet unknown. On the 28th, Hood ordered two brigades to move south by rail to Jonesboro. He suspected some sort of raid on the railway, but was unsure of the Yankees's objective. By the 29th, Hood concluded that maybe two of three Union corps were involved. By the next day, Confederates knew that five, maybe even six corps were involved, but they didn't know exactly where they were heading. Hood ordered S.D. Lee to move his headquarters to East Point; he sent General William J. Hardee four miles further down the road to Rough and Ready to sift through cavalry reports. Lastly, Hood had sent two brigades of infantry to Jonesboro. In the meantime, Hood held Stewart's corps and the military within the works of Atlanta to guard the city. On the morning of August 30, cavalryman Frank Armstrong, eight miles west of Jonesboro, reported a strong infantry force moving against him.
On the 30th, having wrecked miles of the West Point Railroad, the Fourth and Twenty-third Coprs marched eastward to strike the Macon road south of Rough and Ready. Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard's Army of the Tennessee headed straight for Jonesboro, with the Fourteenth Corps taking different roads to its left; Armstrong's Southern cavalry, battling Kilpatrick, contested Howard's advance throughout the day. Despite this resistance, and despite Sherman's advice that Howard could stop his march that day short of Jonesboro if he wanted to, Howard decided to press on, largely because his thirsty men needed watering at the Flint River. Around 5 p.m. Howard's advance reached the Flint and battled retreating Rebel cavalry across the river bridge. Howard's army dug in, expecting to be attacked in what General Blair called its "saucy position." John A. Logan's Fifteenth Corps entrenched on the high ground east of the river. A division of the Sixteenth Corps formed on its right; the Seventeenth started crossing the river to form on the left.
Armstrong wired Hood that the Yankees, now just a mile west of Jonesboro, could attack the railroad that very night. Quickly Hood ordered Hardee to march his corps to Jonesboro, and told Lee to follow. Meanwhile he told the small force at Jonesboro to "hold your position at all hazards. Help is ordered to you."
August 31, 1864 Hood ordered Hardee and Lee on August 31 to take their corps to Jonesboro and attack the enemy, assumed to be three corps, and drive them away. Yet already Hood was preparing for the worst: he ordered the army's ordnance reserve packed on trains and taken out of the city.
Hardee's plan called for the assault to begin against the Federal right, with Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne's division on the extreme left, wheeling northward to turn the enemy flank. Then, from south to north, the rest of the line would pick up the attack; Lee's divisions would advance after Cleburne "had hotly engaged the enemy at close quarters." Around 3 p.m. Cleburne began his attack, heading for John Corse's division, entrenched on a ridge. An attack by Hugh J. Kilpatrick's cavalry forced the Southerners to fight off to their left. Then Brown's division went in, but under heavy artillery and rifle fire fell back. On Lee's front, six brigades of Patton Anderson's and Carter Stevenson's division met the same bloody repulse. General Anderson himself was severely wounded, shot in the jaw. By 4:30, all along the line, the Southerners were withdrawing to their original positions.
Casualties for the day reflected the usual disproportion between defender and attacker. While Federal losses totaled a mere 179 killed and wounded, S.D. Lee estimated 1,300 casualties in his corps alone, and Hardee would have lost another 400. Having been beaten in assault, Hardee rightly concluded that "it now became necessary for me to act on the defensive."
[battlefields/atlanta/atlanta-history-articles/battle-of-jonesboro.html]
FYI GySgt Jack Wallace SSG Franklin Briant SSG Byron Howard Sr SFC William Farrell CMDCM John F. "Doc" Bradshaw SPC Lyle MontgomeryPO2 Marco MonsalveSPC Woody Bullard SSG Michael Noll SSG Bill McCoy SPC Mike Bennett Sgt Sheri Lynn SPC Gary C.SrA Ronald MooreMSgt James Parker CPT Chris LoomisCPT Kevin McComasSFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL SSG Pete Fleming
The Atlanta Campaign 1864
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ZEs107oFnM

How come we cant grow beards and mustaches like that today LTC Stephen F.?Great pictures, love those old steam trains.

A great read in Civil War history LTC Stephen F.; I am going to go with 1864 this morning.