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Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Reluctant Seaman
He was perhaps the most celebrated naval historian of his era, an influential promoter of United States naval and commercial expansion during America’s rise to world power in the late nineteenth century. As the author of numerous articles and books, including the landmark The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Alfred Thayer Mahan was widely regarded as a brilliant naval theorist. From his writings, readers would never have guessed, however, that the renowned champion of the United States Navy hated the sea, and while an active-duty naval officer, lived in constant fear of ocean storms and colliding ships.
Mahan’s fear of accidents at sea was not unfounded. During a forty-year naval career that began as a midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy in 1856, he was involved in numerous maritime mishaps. As a young first lieutenant in 1861, Mahan was named the executive officer of Captain Percival Drayton’s 11-gun USS Pocahontas, and immediately set a dubious standard for his budding career. Captain Drayton was familiar with his new junior officer and noted in his diary that Mahan was ‘young enough not to have too fixed ways and is quite clever.’ Drayton, however, had never seen Mahan handle a ship.
On November 7, 1861, a small Union fleet assaulted Fort Walker at Port Royal, South Carolina, a Confederate stronghold on the edge of Drayton’s hometown that was commanded, as chance would have it, by his brother Thomas. Delayed by a storm and mechanical problems, the Pocahontas arrived on the scene after the other ships had pounded the fort into submission. As his vessel moved through the water to join the rest of the flotilla in Port Royal Sound, Lieutenant Mahan became engrossed in observing his superior officer, who was deep in thought over the fate of his defeated brother inside the pulverized fort. Mahan enjoyed studying human emotions and expressions, but as the Pocahontas‘s deck officer that day, he should have been watching the direction in which his ship was drifting. Suddenly, the Pocahontas slammed into the anchored Union sloop Seminole. The vain executive officer deflected any blame for his slip-up by suggesting that the fault lay with his superior, Captain Drayton, who, he sarcastically noted, ‘had done a good deal of staff duty; had less than the usual deck habit of his period.’
http://www.historynet.com/alfred-thayer-mahan-the-reluctant-seaman.htm
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1998/spring/naval-activities-in-spanish-american-war.html
https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-geopolitical-vision-of-alfred-thayer-mahan/
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/mahan
@ col mikel COL Mikel J. Burroughs @ ltc stephen LTC Stephen F. @ ltc wayne LTC Wayne Brandon @ ltc jeff LTC Jeff Shearer @ maj william Maj William W. 'Bill' Price @ capt marty Maj Marty Hogan @ smsgt doc SMSgt Minister Gerald A. "Doc" Thomas @ tsgt joe TSgt Joe C. @ ssgt robert SSgt Robert Marx @ sra christopher SrA Christopher W. @ msg andrew MSG Andrew White @ sfc joe SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL @ ssg robert SSG Robert Webster @ sgt jim SGT Jim Arnold @ sgt david SGT (Join to see) @ sp5 mark SP5 Mark Kuzinski @ po1 chip PO1 William "Chip" Nagel @ po1 tony PO1 Tony Holland Alan K. @ po3 tom PO3 Tom Howard
He was perhaps the most celebrated naval historian of his era, an influential promoter of United States naval and commercial expansion during America’s rise to world power in the late nineteenth century. As the author of numerous articles and books, including the landmark The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Alfred Thayer Mahan was widely regarded as a brilliant naval theorist. From his writings, readers would never have guessed, however, that the renowned champion of the United States Navy hated the sea, and while an active-duty naval officer, lived in constant fear of ocean storms and colliding ships.
Mahan’s fear of accidents at sea was not unfounded. During a forty-year naval career that began as a midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy in 1856, he was involved in numerous maritime mishaps. As a young first lieutenant in 1861, Mahan was named the executive officer of Captain Percival Drayton’s 11-gun USS Pocahontas, and immediately set a dubious standard for his budding career. Captain Drayton was familiar with his new junior officer and noted in his diary that Mahan was ‘young enough not to have too fixed ways and is quite clever.’ Drayton, however, had never seen Mahan handle a ship.
On November 7, 1861, a small Union fleet assaulted Fort Walker at Port Royal, South Carolina, a Confederate stronghold on the edge of Drayton’s hometown that was commanded, as chance would have it, by his brother Thomas. Delayed by a storm and mechanical problems, the Pocahontas arrived on the scene after the other ships had pounded the fort into submission. As his vessel moved through the water to join the rest of the flotilla in Port Royal Sound, Lieutenant Mahan became engrossed in observing his superior officer, who was deep in thought over the fate of his defeated brother inside the pulverized fort. Mahan enjoyed studying human emotions and expressions, but as the Pocahontas‘s deck officer that day, he should have been watching the direction in which his ship was drifting. Suddenly, the Pocahontas slammed into the anchored Union sloop Seminole. The vain executive officer deflected any blame for his slip-up by suggesting that the fault lay with his superior, Captain Drayton, who, he sarcastically noted, ‘had done a good deal of staff duty; had less than the usual deck habit of his period.’
http://www.historynet.com/alfred-thayer-mahan-the-reluctant-seaman.htm
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1998/spring/naval-activities-in-spanish-american-war.html
https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-geopolitical-vision-of-alfred-thayer-mahan/
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/mahan
@ col mikel COL Mikel J. Burroughs @ ltc stephen LTC Stephen F. @ ltc wayne LTC Wayne Brandon @ ltc jeff LTC Jeff Shearer @ maj william Maj William W. 'Bill' Price @ capt marty Maj Marty Hogan @ smsgt doc SMSgt Minister Gerald A. "Doc" Thomas @ tsgt joe TSgt Joe C. @ ssgt robert SSgt Robert Marx @ sra christopher SrA Christopher W. @ msg andrew MSG Andrew White @ sfc joe SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL @ ssg robert SSG Robert Webster @ sgt jim SGT Jim Arnold @ sgt david SGT (Join to see) @ sp5 mark SP5 Mark Kuzinski @ po1 chip PO1 William "Chip" Nagel @ po1 tony PO1 Tony Holland Alan K. @ po3 tom PO3 Tom Howard
Posted in these groups: 
Military History
Spanish American War
Naval/Maritime History
Strategy
American History
Military History Spanish American War Naval/Maritime History Strategy American History
Posted 7 y ago
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Thanks my friend SGT John " Mac " McConnell for reminding us about Alfred Thayer Mahan and sharing the video.
As a graduate of USMA, West Point I am very familiar with the names Thayer and Mahan which are names of the mathematical and engineering department buildings at West Point.
I walked in the fall, winter and summer son many times to Thayer and Mahan Halls as a cadet. We marched to Thayer Hall six days a week for calculus as a plebe.
His middle name Thayer, honors "the father of West Point", Sylvanus Thayer.
Images: Thayer Hall West Point; 2013-04-12 Mahan Hall; West Point panorama from the Hudson River. Mahan hall if to the left and Thayer Hall is left center
Thayer Hall and Thayer Hotel are named after superintendent Sylvanus Thayer while Mahan Hall is named after Alfred's dad Prof. Dennis Hart Mahan, AM, LLD,
Mahan Hall: Completed in 1974, it is named after USMA alumnus Dennis Hart Mahan. Mahan Hall is home to the academy's Department of Civil & Mechanical Engineering and Department of Systems Engineering.
Thayer Hall: Built in 1911 as a riding hall where the cadets were taught horsemanship, in 1958 it was converted into an academic hall containing over 100 classrooms. The cadet bookstore is housed on the fourth floor and there is a large lecture hall, Robinson Auditorium in the south end of the building. The first two floors of Thayer Hall are home to the Departments of History, Mathematics, Behavioral Sciences and Leadership (BS&L), and Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS).
"Mahan was born at West Point, New York, where his father was a professor of military engineering at the United States Military Academy. Mahan chose the navy for his profession and, graduating from the United States Naval Academy in 1859, saw active service in the American Civil War. At its conclusion, he continued his navy career and traveled widely. There was little indication during these years of the intellectual importance he was to attain.
Mahan was selected in 1885 to lecture on naval strategy, tactics, and history at the newly established Naval War College. He probably received the assignment because he wrote “The Gulf and Inland Waters,” a competent volume appearing in 1883 as a part of a larger history of the American Civil War. His duties at the war college forced him to crystallize his thoughts on sea power and history. It was not his intention to do original research but rather to use the best historical works available to investigate his chosen field. From his lectures came the basis for his most important work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783, which appeared in 1890. There followed in 1892 The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire: 1793–1812 and in 1905 Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. He also wrote biographies and biographical sketches, as well as several interpretative articles upon events of his time.
A large number of his professional colleagues in the United States Navy did not recognize the importance of the task Mahan had set for himself. By his own choice, he retired from the navy in 1896 to pursue his literary career. He was a member of the naval war board that provided advice on strategy during the Spanish-American War. As a representative at the First International Conference at The Hague, he spoke against prohibiting poison gas, because he thought it inconsistent with permitting the use of the submarine torpedo. He was also instrumental in persuading American delegates not to sign the convention establishing the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration until a reservation was added safeguarding the traditional position of the United States against European involvement in the Americas and American involvement in Europe.
Concepts of naval strategy . Mahan defined sea power as the ability of a nation to control movement across the sea. He claimed that this control is the most potent factor in national prosperity and in the course of history. The components of a nation’s sea power are geographical factors and national resources, the character of its people and its government, and its diplomatic and naval policies.
From his studies Mahan derived several strategic principles, having to do with the concentration of force, the choice of the correct objective, and the importance of lines of communications. Reduced to more concrete terms these principles mean that a nation should construct a battle fleet that has as its main objective the ability to destroy an enemy battle fleet. French naval history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the American experience during the War of 1812 led him to believe that cruiser warfare and raids against merchant shipping were of secondary importance. Until Mahan, however, such warfare had been the basic naval strategy of the United States.
Mahan’s works appeared at a time when national rivalries were producing the international crises that culminated in World War I and when technological developments made possible the Dreadnought-type battleship which had only big guns. His works were avidly read by the British, the Japanese, and the Germans. In his own nation, he exerted influence in part by his writings and in part by his close friendship with such leaders as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge.
Mahan’s theories of sea power remained cogent in naval strategy until the middle of the twentieth century. After World War II his concepts of sea power required modification. He had studied naval rivalries and fleet actions; consequently, his theories were applicable primarily when two or more powers were contesting the control of the sea. His principles did not easily fit the post-World War II situation in which the United States, controlling the sea, confronted the Soviet Union, controlling a large land mass. Nonetheless, his principles are still valuable in military analyses.
Military power and theory of history . It was perhaps inevitable that Mahan, with his background and professional concerns, should see military force as playing a dominant role in history. To him history was the revelation of the plan of Providence. An integral part of this plan was the use of military force to preserve civilization and to right moral wrongs. It followed, therefore, that a nation could not blindly accept arbitration on all questions, for such arbitration might involve compromises on moral issues. Although Mahan saw history as a plan, he did not deny the individual a role: a military leader or a statesman can, by correct decision and action, shape events, but his power is limited by the materials with which he must work. Mahan, in his presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1902, issued a warning against too much research on detail, urging instead a careful grouping of facts and parts that would yield the truth of the whole.
Mahan was widely read in his own day. His emphasis on the role of the military and his call for expansion found resonance in the nationalism and imperialism of his time. While the basis of his philosophy was an orthodox, and even fundamentalist, Protestantism, the results of his thoughts were acceptable to the evolutionists of “the survival of the fittest” school. Historians feel that Mahan overstressed sea power and neglected the importance of other factors, but Mahan’s contributions have not been erased. The strategic value of his principles has declined with the advent of the missile age and the nuclear weapon. Yet as both a historian and a strategist, Mahan influenced his own age and left a legacy of value to the future."
http://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/historians-us-biographies/alfred-thayer-mahan
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. LTC Wayne Brandon LTC Bill Koski Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown Maj Marty Hogan SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SPC Margaret Higgins MSgt Jason McClish AN Christopher Crayne SPC Tom DeSmet SGT Charles H. Hawes SGT (Join to see) SGT Michael Thorin SP5 Robert Ruck MSG Andrew White
As a graduate of USMA, West Point I am very familiar with the names Thayer and Mahan which are names of the mathematical and engineering department buildings at West Point.
I walked in the fall, winter and summer son many times to Thayer and Mahan Halls as a cadet. We marched to Thayer Hall six days a week for calculus as a plebe.
His middle name Thayer, honors "the father of West Point", Sylvanus Thayer.
Images: Thayer Hall West Point; 2013-04-12 Mahan Hall; West Point panorama from the Hudson River. Mahan hall if to the left and Thayer Hall is left center
Thayer Hall and Thayer Hotel are named after superintendent Sylvanus Thayer while Mahan Hall is named after Alfred's dad Prof. Dennis Hart Mahan, AM, LLD,
Mahan Hall: Completed in 1974, it is named after USMA alumnus Dennis Hart Mahan. Mahan Hall is home to the academy's Department of Civil & Mechanical Engineering and Department of Systems Engineering.
Thayer Hall: Built in 1911 as a riding hall where the cadets were taught horsemanship, in 1958 it was converted into an academic hall containing over 100 classrooms. The cadet bookstore is housed on the fourth floor and there is a large lecture hall, Robinson Auditorium in the south end of the building. The first two floors of Thayer Hall are home to the Departments of History, Mathematics, Behavioral Sciences and Leadership (BS&L), and Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS).
"Mahan was born at West Point, New York, where his father was a professor of military engineering at the United States Military Academy. Mahan chose the navy for his profession and, graduating from the United States Naval Academy in 1859, saw active service in the American Civil War. At its conclusion, he continued his navy career and traveled widely. There was little indication during these years of the intellectual importance he was to attain.
Mahan was selected in 1885 to lecture on naval strategy, tactics, and history at the newly established Naval War College. He probably received the assignment because he wrote “The Gulf and Inland Waters,” a competent volume appearing in 1883 as a part of a larger history of the American Civil War. His duties at the war college forced him to crystallize his thoughts on sea power and history. It was not his intention to do original research but rather to use the best historical works available to investigate his chosen field. From his lectures came the basis for his most important work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783, which appeared in 1890. There followed in 1892 The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire: 1793–1812 and in 1905 Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. He also wrote biographies and biographical sketches, as well as several interpretative articles upon events of his time.
A large number of his professional colleagues in the United States Navy did not recognize the importance of the task Mahan had set for himself. By his own choice, he retired from the navy in 1896 to pursue his literary career. He was a member of the naval war board that provided advice on strategy during the Spanish-American War. As a representative at the First International Conference at The Hague, he spoke against prohibiting poison gas, because he thought it inconsistent with permitting the use of the submarine torpedo. He was also instrumental in persuading American delegates not to sign the convention establishing the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration until a reservation was added safeguarding the traditional position of the United States against European involvement in the Americas and American involvement in Europe.
Concepts of naval strategy . Mahan defined sea power as the ability of a nation to control movement across the sea. He claimed that this control is the most potent factor in national prosperity and in the course of history. The components of a nation’s sea power are geographical factors and national resources, the character of its people and its government, and its diplomatic and naval policies.
From his studies Mahan derived several strategic principles, having to do with the concentration of force, the choice of the correct objective, and the importance of lines of communications. Reduced to more concrete terms these principles mean that a nation should construct a battle fleet that has as its main objective the ability to destroy an enemy battle fleet. French naval history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the American experience during the War of 1812 led him to believe that cruiser warfare and raids against merchant shipping were of secondary importance. Until Mahan, however, such warfare had been the basic naval strategy of the United States.
Mahan’s works appeared at a time when national rivalries were producing the international crises that culminated in World War I and when technological developments made possible the Dreadnought-type battleship which had only big guns. His works were avidly read by the British, the Japanese, and the Germans. In his own nation, he exerted influence in part by his writings and in part by his close friendship with such leaders as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge.
Mahan’s theories of sea power remained cogent in naval strategy until the middle of the twentieth century. After World War II his concepts of sea power required modification. He had studied naval rivalries and fleet actions; consequently, his theories were applicable primarily when two or more powers were contesting the control of the sea. His principles did not easily fit the post-World War II situation in which the United States, controlling the sea, confronted the Soviet Union, controlling a large land mass. Nonetheless, his principles are still valuable in military analyses.
Military power and theory of history . It was perhaps inevitable that Mahan, with his background and professional concerns, should see military force as playing a dominant role in history. To him history was the revelation of the plan of Providence. An integral part of this plan was the use of military force to preserve civilization and to right moral wrongs. It followed, therefore, that a nation could not blindly accept arbitration on all questions, for such arbitration might involve compromises on moral issues. Although Mahan saw history as a plan, he did not deny the individual a role: a military leader or a statesman can, by correct decision and action, shape events, but his power is limited by the materials with which he must work. Mahan, in his presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1902, issued a warning against too much research on detail, urging instead a careful grouping of facts and parts that would yield the truth of the whole.
Mahan was widely read in his own day. His emphasis on the role of the military and his call for expansion found resonance in the nationalism and imperialism of his time. While the basis of his philosophy was an orthodox, and even fundamentalist, Protestantism, the results of his thoughts were acceptable to the evolutionists of “the survival of the fittest” school. Historians feel that Mahan overstressed sea power and neglected the importance of other factors, but Mahan’s contributions have not been erased. The strategic value of his principles has declined with the advent of the missile age and the nuclear weapon. Yet as both a historian and a strategist, Mahan influenced his own age and left a legacy of value to the future."
http://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/historians-us-biographies/alfred-thayer-mahan
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs LTC Stephen C. LTC Wayne Brandon LTC Bill Koski Capt Seid Waddell Capt Tom Brown Maj Marty Hogan SFC William Farrell SSgt Robert Marx PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SPC Margaret Higgins MSgt Jason McClish AN Christopher Crayne SPC Tom DeSmet SGT Charles H. Hawes SGT (Join to see) SGT Michael Thorin SP5 Robert Ruck MSG Andrew White
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SFC William Farrell
Thanks LTC Stephen F., while I am not a graduate if the USMA, West Point I have been in and out of Thayer Hall several times over the years. Isnt it a beautiful campus?
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SGT John " Mac " McConnell
Always a pleasure to share history here on RP LTC Stephen F. . Good morning my friend.
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Great naval history and did not know anything about this man previously. Morning SGT John " Mac " McConnell
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SMSgt Lawrence McCarter SrA Christopher Wright [ ~795644:MSgt John McGowan] SGT Gregory Lawritson Lt Col Scott Shuttleworth LTC (Join to see) MSG Frederick Otero Sgt Steven Thomas SGT Mark Halmrast LCDR (Join to see) SFC Dave Beran SCPO Morris Ramsey SPC Margaret Higgins SGT Jim Arnold SFC William H. PO1 William "Chip" Nagel SSG James BehnkePFC (Join to see) CPL Dave Hoover
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