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Spiro Agnew: Media Monopoly and Beginning of Fake News - November 13, 1969
Spiro Agnew gives a speech on the abuse and bias of the Liberal Media in the year 1969. One of the first in America to publicly call out the news media for i...
Thank you, my friend Maj Marty Hogan for making us aware that November 9 is the anniversary of the birth of wordsmith extraordinaire Spiro Theodore "Ted" Agnew.who after serving as Governor of Maryland became the 39th vice president of the United States from 1969 until his resignation in 1973.
He was a staunch conservative who had a talent for using arcane words to insult, complement or entertain.
Nattering nabobs of negativism ..
Rest in peace Spiro Theodore Agnew.
Spiro Agnew: Media Monopoly and Beginning of Fake News - November 13, 1969
"Spiro Agnew gives a speech on the abuse and bias of the Liberal Media in the year 1969. One of the first in America to publicly call out the news media for it's liberal bias, Vice President Agnew's speech has taken on prophetic properties in recent years and is hailed as a landmark speech on the subject of Liberal News bias."
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y97l3n8pVP8
Images
1. Vice President Spiro Agnew with President Richard Nixon.
2. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew speaks in Tennessee during the 1972 congressional campaign - by Wally McNamee.
3. Spiro T. Agnew bust.
Biographies:
1. senate.gov/about/officers-staff/vice-president/VP_Spiro_Agnew
2. thoughtco.com/spiro-agnew-biography-4171644
1. U.S. Senate background from senate.gov/about/officers-staff/vice-president/VP_Spiro_Agnew.htm
"Vice Presidents of the United States
Spiro Theodore Agnew (1969-1973)
Citation: Mark O. Hatfield, with the Senate Historical Office. Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 481-488.
Introduction by Mark O. Hatfield.
U.S. Senate Collection
A little over a week ago, I took a rather unusual step for a Vice President . . . I said something.
—Spiro Agnew
On November 13, 1969, Vice President Spiro Agnew became a household word when he
vehemently denounced television news broadcasters as a biased "unelected elite" who subjected
President Richard M. Nixon's speeches to instant analysis. The president had a right to
communicate directly with the people, Agnew asserted, without having his words "characterized
through the prejudices of hostile critics." Agnew raised the possibility of greater government
regulation of this "virtual monopoly," a suggestion that the veteran television newscaster Walter
Cronkite took as "an implied threat to freedom of speech in this country." But Agnew's words
rang true to those whom Nixon called the Silent Majority. From then until he resigned in 1973,
Agnew remained an outspoken and controversial figure, who played traveling salesman for the
administration. In this role, Spiro Agnew was both the creation of Richard Nixon and a reflection
of his administration's siege mentality.1
Early Years
The son of a Greek immigrant whose name originally was Anagnostopoulos, Spiro Theodore
Agnew was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on November 9, 1918. He attended public schools and
went to Johns Hopkins University in 1937 to study chemistry, before transferring to the
University of Baltimore Law School, where he studied law at night while working at a grocery
and an insurance company during the day. In 1942 he married a fellow insurance company
employee, Elinor Isabel Judefind, known to all as Judy. Drafted into the army during World War
II, he won a Bronze Star for his service in France and Germany. He returned to school on the GI
Bill of Rights, received his law degree in 1947, practiced law in a Baltimore firm, and eventually
set up his own law practice in the Baltimore suburb of Towson.
Remaking His Image
Moving from city to suburb, Agnew remade his own image. When he recalled the ethnic slurs he
suffered about "Spiro" while a school boy, he now called himself "Ted" and vowed that none of
his children would have Greek names. Agnew similarly changed party affiliations. Although his
father was a Baltimore Democratic ward leader and Agnew had first registered as a Democrat,
his law partners were Republicans and he joined their party. In 1957 the Democratic county
executive of Baltimore County appointed him to the board of zoning appeals. In 1960 Agnew
made his first race for elective office, running for associate circuit judge, and coming in fifth in a
five-person contest. In 1961, when a new county executive dropped him from the zoning board,
Agnew protested vigorously and in so doing built his name recognition in the county. The
following year he ran for county executive. A bitter split in the Democratic party helped make
him the first Republican elected Baltimore County executive in the twentieth century. In office he
established a relatively progressive record, and in 1966, when nominated as the Republican
candidate for governor of Maryland, Agnew positioned himself to the left of his Democratic
challenger, George Mahoney. An arch segregationist, Mahoney adopted the campaign slogan,
"Your Home Is Your Castle—Protect It," which only drove liberal Democrats into Agnew's
camp. Charging Mahoney with racial bigotry, Agnew captured the liberal suburbs around
Washington and was elected governor.2
It came as a shock to Agnew's liberal supporters when as governor he took a more hard-line
conservative stance on racial matters than he had during the campaign. Early in 1968, students at
the predominantly African American Bowie State College occupied the administration building
to protest the run-down condition of their campus—at a time when Maryland essentially ran
separate college systems for black and white students. Instead of negotiating, Agnew sent the
state police to take back the administration building. When the students went to Annapolis to
protest, Agnew ordered their arrest and had the college temporarily closed down. Then in April,
when riots broke out in Baltimore following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Governor Agnew summoned black leaders to his office. Rather than appeal for their help, he
castigated them for capitulating to radical agitators. "You were intimidated by veiled threats,"
Agnew charged, "you were stung by . . . epithets like `Uncle Tom.'" Half of the black leaders
walked out before he finished speaking. "He talked to us like we were children," one state senator complained. The incident dramatically reversed Agnew's public image, alienating his liberal
supporters and raising his standing among conservatives.3
Spiro Who?
On the national scene, Agnew formed a committee to draft New York Governor Nelson
Rockefeller for president in 1968. In March, during his weekly press conference, Agnew watched
on television what he expected would be Rockefeller's declaration of candidacy. Without
warning, Rockefeller withdrew from the contest, humiliating Agnew in front of the press corps.
Rockefeller later jumped back into the race, but by then Agnew had moved toward the
frontrunner, Richard Nixon. When polls showed none of the better-known Republicans adding
much as Nixon's running mate, Nixon surprised everyone—as he liked to do—by selecting the
relatively unknown Agnew. "Spiro who?" asked the pundits, who considered Agnew unqualified
for national office. Despite such doubts, Nixon saw much promise in his choice. "There can be a
mystique about the man," Nixon assured reporters. "You can look him in the eyes and know he's
got it."4
Nixon expected Agnew to appeal to white southerners and others troubled by the civil rights
movement and recent rioting in the cities. Attention shifted from this issue during the campaign,
however, when Agnew made a number of gaffes, including some ethnic slurs and an accusation
that Vice President Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, was soft on communism.
Agnew also encountered allegations of having profited financially from his public office, charges
that he flatly denied. Agnew's biggest problem was that he seemed so ordinary and unremarkable.
A tall, stiff, bullet-headed man and the sort of fastidious dresser who never removed his tie in
public, he tended to speak in a deadening monotone. Whether he helped or hurt the campaign is
not clear, but in November the Nixon-Agnew ticket won a razor-thin victory over the Democratic
candidate Hubert Humphrey and the independent candidacy of Alabama Governor George
Wallace.5
Learning the Constraints of the Office
Although Nixon had chosen a running mate who would not outshine him, he had pledged to give
his vice president a significant policy-making role and—for the first time—an office in the West
Wing of the White House. Nixon also encouraged Agnew to use his position as presiding officer
of the Senate to get to know the members of Congress in order to serve as their liaison with the
White House, and Agnew enthusiastically charged up Capitol Hill. Having had no previous
legislative experience, he wanted to master the techniques of presiding over the Senate. For the
first months of his vice-presidency, he met each morning with the Senate parliamentarian, Floyd
Riddick, to discuss parliamentary procedures and precedents. "He took pride in administering the
oath to the new senators by never having to refer to a note," Riddick observed. "He would study
and memorize these things so that he could perform without reading." According to Riddick, at
first Agnew presided more frequently than had any vice president since Alben Barkley.6
"I was prepared to go in there and do a job as the President's representative in the Senate," said
Agnew, who busily learned to identify the senators by name and face. Yet he quickly discovered
the severe constraints on his role as presiding officer. Agnew had prepared a four-minute speech
to give in response to a formal welcome from Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. When Mansfield
moved that the vice president be given only two minutes to reply, Agnew felt "it was like a slap
in the face." The vice president also unwittingly broke precedent by trying to lobby on the Senate
floor. During the debate over the ABM (Anti-Ballistic-Missile) Treaty, Agnew approached Idaho
Republican Senator Len Jordan and asked how he was going to vote. "You can't tell me how to
vote!" said the shocked senator. "You can't twist my arm!" At the next luncheon of Republican
senators, Jordan accused Agnew of breaking the separation of powers by lobbying on the Senate
floor, and announced the "Jordan Rule," whereby if the vice president tried to lobby him on
anything, he would automatically vote the other way. "And so," Agnew concluded from the
experience, "after trying for a while to get along with the Senate, I decided I would go down to
the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue and try playing the Executive game."7
The vice president fit in no better at the White House than at the Capitol. Nixon's highly
protective staff concluded that Agnew had no concept of his role, especially in relation to the
president. Nixon found their few private meetings dismaying because of Agnew's "constant self-aggrandizement." Nixon told his staff that as vice president he rarely had made any requests of
President Dwight Eisenhower. "But Agnew's visits always included demands for more staff,
better facilities, more prerogatives and perquisites." The anticipated use of Agnew as a conduit to
the nation's mayors and governors floundered when it became apparent that Agnew did nothing
more than pass their gripes along to the president. When Agnew protested that Nixon did not see
enough of his cabinet, Nixon grumbled that his vice president had become an advocate for all the
"crybabies" in the cabinet who wanted to plead their special causes. Nixon's chief of staff H.R.
Haldeman took Agnew aside and advised him that "the President does not like you to take an
opposite view at a cabinet meeting, or say anything that can be construed to be mildly not in
accord with his thinking."8
Nixon appointed Agnew head of the National Aeronautics and Space Council but again found the
vice president more irritant than asset. In April 1969, while at Camp David, Nixon summoned
Haldeman to complain that the vice president had telephoned him simply to lobby for a candidate
for director of the Space Council. "He just has no sensitivity, or judgment about his relationship"
with the president, Haldeman noted. After Agnew publicly advocated a space shot to Mars,
Nixon's chief domestic advisor, John Ehrlichman, tried to explain to him the facts of fiscal life:
Look, Mr. Vice President, we have to be practical. There is no money for a Mars trip. The President has already decided that. So the President does not want such a trip in the [Space Council's] recommendations. It's your job . . .to make absolutely certain that the Mars trip is not in there.
From such experiences, the White House staff concluded that Agnew was not a "Nixon team
player."9
Unleashing Agnew
Throughout his first term, President Nixon was preoccupied with the war in Vietnam. By the fall
of 1969, Nixon came to the unhappy conclusion that there would be no quick solution in
Vietnam and that it would steadily become his war rather than Lyndon Johnson's. On November
3, Nixon delivered a television address to the nation in which he called for public support for the
war until the Communists negotiated an honorable peace. Public reaction to the speech was
generally positive, but the Nixon family was "livid with anger" over the critical commentary by
various network broadcasters. Nixon feared that the "constant pounding from the media and our
critics in Congress" would eventually undermine his public support. As president he wanted to
follow the Eisenhower model of remaining above the fray and to use Agnew for the kind of
hatchet work that he himself had done for Ike. When his speech writer Pat Buchanan proposed
that the vice president give a speech attacking network commentators, Nixon liked the idea. H.R.
Haldeman went to discuss the proposed speech with the vice president, who was interested "but
felt it was a bit abrasive." Nevertheless, the White House staff believed the message needed to be
delivered, "and he's the one to do it."10
Agnew already had some hard-hitting speeches under his belt. On October 20, 1969, at a dinner
in Jackson, Mississippi, he had attacked "liberal intellectuals" for their "masochistic compulsion
to destroy their country's strength." On October 30 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, he called student
radicals and other critics of the war "impudent snobs." On November 11 in Philadelphia he
decried the "intolerant clamor and cacophony" that raged in society. Then, on November 13 in
Des Moines, Iowa, he gave Buchanan's blast at the network news media. Haldeman recorded in
his diary that, as the debate on Agnew mounted, the president was "fully convinced he's right and
that the majority will agree." The White House sent word for the vice president "to keep up the
offensive, and to keep speaking," noting that he was now a "major figure in his own right." The
vice president had become "Nixon's Nixon."11
Agnew relished the attention showered upon him. He had been frustrated with his assignment as
liaison with the governors and mayors, and dealing with taxation, health, and other substantive
issues had required tedious study. By contrast, he found speechmaking much more gratifying. As
John Ehrlichman sourly noted, Agnew "could take the texts prepared in the President's
speechwriting shop, change a phrase here and there, and hit the road to attack the effete corps of
impudent snobs." His colorful phrases, like "nattering nabobs of negativism," and "radiclibs" (for
radical liberals) were compiled and published as "commonsense quotations." "I have refused to
`cool it'—to use the vernacular," Agnew declared, "until the self-righteous lower their voice a
few decibels. . . . I intend to be heard over the din even if it means raising my voice."12
The Agnew Upsurge
The "Agnew upsurge" fascinated President Nixon, who took it as evidence that a new
conservative coalition could be built between blue-collar ethnic voters and white-collar
suburbanites. Nixon believed that Agnew was receiving increasing press coverage because his
attacks on the media "forced them to pay attention." When some of his advisers wanted to put Agnew out in front in opposition to expanded school desegregation, Nixon hesitated because he
did not want to "dilute or waste the great asset he has become." By March 1970, the relationship
between the president and vice president reached its apex when the two appeared for an amusing
piano duet at the Gridiron Club. No matter what tunes Nixon tried to play, Agnew would drown
him out with "Dixie," until they both joined in "God Bless America" as a finale.13
As the strains of their duet faded, Nixon began having second thoughts and concluded that he
needed to "change the Agnew approach." He informed Haldeman that the vice president had
become a better salesman for himself than for the administration, emerging as "too much of an
issue and a personality himself." That month, when the Apollo XIII astronauts had to abort their
mission and return to earth, Haldeman worked frantically to keep Agnew from flying to Houston
and upstaging the president. Agnew sat in his plane on the runway for over an hour until Nixon
finally canceled the trip. "VP mad as hell," Haldeman noted, "but agreed to follow orders." In
May 1970, after National Guardsmen shot and killed four students at Kent State University,
Nixon cautioned Agnew not to say anything provocative about students. Word leaked out that the
president was trying to muzzle his vice president. The next time Buchanan prepared "a hot new
Agnew speech," Nixon felt more leery than before.14
By the summer of 1970, Nixon pondered how best to use Agnew in that fall's congressional
elections. The president himself wanted to remain remote from partisanship and limit his
speaking to foreign policy issues while Agnew stumped for candidates. Nixon worried that, if
Agnew continued to appear an unreasonable figure, using highly charged rhetoric, he might hurt
rather than help the candidates for whom he campaigned. "Do you think Agnew's too rough?"
Nixon asked John Ehrlichman one day. "His style isn't the problem, it's the content of what he
says. He's got to be more positive. He must avoid all personal attacks on people; he can take on
Congress as a unit, not as individuals." Some Republican candidates even asked Agnew to stay
out of their states. As the campaign progressed, Agnew's droning on about law and order
diminished his impact. Nixon felt compelled to abandon his presidential aloofness and enter the
campaign himself, barnstorming around the country, as Attorney General John Mitchell
complained, like a man "running for sheriff." The disappointing results of the midterm
elections—Republicans gained two seats in the Senate but lost a dozen in the House—further
shook Nixon's confidence in Agnew.15
The Number One Hawk
In 1971 the president devoted most of his attention to foreign policy, planning his historic visit to
China, a summit in Moscow, and continued peace talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris. The
vice president went abroad for a series of good-will tours and ached for more involvement in
foreign policy—an area that Nixon reserved exclusively for himself and National Security
Adviser Henry Kissinger. Nixon preferred that Agnew limit himself to attacking the media to
"soften the press" for his foreign policy initiatives. He decided to keep the vice president out of
all substantive policy decisions, since Agnew seemed incapable of grasping the big picture. For
his part, Agnew complained that he was "never allowed to come close enough" to Nixon to
participate in any policy discussions. "Every time I went to see him and raised a subject for discussion," the vice president later wrote, "he would begin a rambling, time-consuming
monologue."16
Agnew, who described himself as the "number-one hawk," went so far as to criticize Nixon's
"Ping-Pong Diplomacy" with the People's Republic of China. The dismayed president considered
Agnew "a bull in the . . . diplomatic China shop." Nixon had H.R. Haldeman lecture the vice
president on the importance of using the China thaw to "get the Russians shook." "It is beyond
my understanding," Nixon told Ehrlichman. "Twice Agnew has proposed that he go to China!
Now he tells the world it's a bad idea for me to go! What am I going to do about him?"17
The Connally Alternative
By mid-1971, Nixon concluded that Spiro Agnew was not "broad-gauged" enough for the vice presidency. He constructed a scenario by which Agnew would resign, enabling Nixon to appoint
Treasury Secretary John Connally as vice president under the provisions of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment. By appealing to southern Democrats, Connally would help Nixon create a political
realignment, perhaps even replacing the Republican party with a new party that could unite all
conservatives. Nixon rejoiced at news that the vice president, feeling sorry for himself, had
talked about resigning to accept a lucrative offer in the private sector. Yet while Nixon excelled
in daring, unexpected moves, he encountered some major obstacles to implementing this scheme.
John Connally was a Democrat, and his selection might offend both parties in Congress, which
under the Twenty-fifth Amendment had to ratify the appointment of a new vice president. Even
more problematic, John Connally did not want to be vice president. He considered it a "useless"
job and felt he could be more effective as a cabinet member. Nixon responded that the
relationship between the president and vice president depended entirely on the personalities of
whoever held those positions, and he promised Connally they would make it a more meaningful
job than ever in its history, even to the point of being "an alternate President." But Connally
declined, never dreaming that the post would have made him president when Nixon was later
forced to resign during the Watergate scandal.18
Nixon concluded that he would not only have to keep Agnew on the ticket but must publicly
demonstrate his confidence in the vice president. He recalled that Eisenhower had tried to drop
him in 1956 and believed the move had only made Ike look bad. Nixon viewed Agnew as a
general liability, but backing him could mute criticism from "the extreme right." Attorney
General John Mitchell, who was to head the reelection campaign, argued that Agnew had become
"almost a folk hero" in the South and warned that party workers might see his removal as a
breach of loyalty. As it turned out, Nixon won reelection in 1972 by a margin wide enough to
make his vice-presidential candidate irrelevant.19
Immediately after his reelection, however, Nixon made it clear that Agnew should not become
his eventual successor. The president had no desire to slip into lame-duck status by allowing
Agnew to seize attention as the frontrunner in the next election. "By any criteria he falls short,"
the president told Ehrlichman:
"Energy? He doesn't work hard; he likes to play golf. Leadership?" Nixon laughed. "Consistency? He's all over the place. He's not really a conservative, you know."
Nixon considered placing the vice president in charge of the American Revolution Bicentennial
as a way of sidetracking him. But Agnew declined the post, arguing that the Bicentennial was "a
loser." Because everyone would have a different idea about how to celebrate the Bicentennial, its
director would have to disappoint too many people. "A potential presidential candidate," Agnew
insisted, "doesn't want to make any enemies."20
Impeachment Insurance
Unbeknownst to both Nixon and Agnew, time was running out for both men's political careers.
Since the previous June, the White House had been preoccupied with containing the political
repercussions of the Watergate burglary, in which individuals connected with the president's
reelection committee had been arrested while breaking into the Democratic National Committee
headquarters. Although Watergate did not influence the election, persistent stories in the media
and the launching of a Senate investigation spelled trouble for the president. Innocent of any
connection to Watergate, Agnew spoke out in Nixon's defense.
Then, on April 10, 1973, the vice president called Haldeman to his office to report a problem of
his own. The U.S. attorney in Maryland, investigating illegal campaign contributions and
kickbacks, had questioned Jerome Wolff, Agnew's former aide. Wolff had kept verbatim
accounts of meetings during which Agnew discussed raising funds from those who had received
state contracts. Agnew swore that "it wasn't shakedown stuff, it was merely going back to get
support from those who had benefitted from the Administration." Since prosecutor George Beall
was the brother of Maryland Republican Senator J. Glenn Beall, Agnew wanted Haldeman to
have Senator Beall intercede with his brother—a request that Haldeman wisely declined.21
President Nixon was not at all shocked to learn that his vice president had become enmeshed in a
bribery scandal in Maryland. At first, Nixon took the matter lightly, remarking that taking
campaign contributions from contractors was "a common practice" in Maryland and other states.
"Thank God I was never elected governor of California," Nixon joked with Haldeman. But
events began to move quickly, and on April 30, 1973, Nixon asked Haldeman and Ehrlichman to
resign because of their role in the Watergate coverup. Then, that summer, the Justice Department
reported that the allegations against Agnew had grown more serious. Even as vice president,
Agnew had continued to take money for past favors, and he had received some of the payments
in his White House office.22
Nixon had quipped that Agnew was his insurance against impeachment, arguing that no one
wanted to remove him if it meant elevating Agnew to the presidency. The joke took on reality
when Agnew asked House Speaker Carl Albert to request that the House conduct a full inquiry
into the charges against him. Agnew reasoned that a vice president could be impeached but not
indicted. That line of reasoning, however, also jeopardized the president. For over a century since
the failed impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, it had been commonly accepted reasoning that impeachment was an impractical and inappropriate congressional tool against the presidency.
Agnew's impeachment would set a precedent that could be turned against Nixon. A brief from
the solicitor general argued that, while the president was immune from indictment, the vice
president was not, since his conviction would not disrupt the workings of the executive branch.
Agnew, a proud man filled with moral indignation, reacted to these arguments by digging in his
heels and taking a stance that journalists described as "aggressively defensive." He refused the
initial suggestions from the White House that he resign voluntarily, after which Agnew believed
that high-level officials "launched a campaign to drive me out by leaking anti-Agnew stories to
the media."23
"I Will Not Resign If Indicted!"
By September, it was a more desperate, less confident-looking man who informed Nixon that he
would consider resignation if granted immunity from prosecution. Nixon noted that "in a sad and
gentle voice he asked for my assurance that I would not turn my back on him if he were out of
office." Believing that for Agnew to resign would be the most honorable course of action, Nixon
felt confident that, when the vice president left for California shortly after their meeting, he was
going away to think matters over and to prepare his family for his resignation. But in Los
Angeles, fired up by an enthusiastic gathering of the National Federation of Republican Women,
Agnew defiantly shouted, "I will not resign if indicted!" As Agnew later explained, he had spent
the previous evening at the home of the singer Frank Sinatra, who had urged him to fight back.24
Nixon's new chief of staff and "crisis manager," General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., was haunted by
the specter of a double impeachment of the president and vice president, which could turn the
presidency over to congressional Democrats. General Haig therefore took the initiative in forcing
Agnew out of office. He instructed Agnew's staff that the president wanted no more speeches like
the one in Los Angeles. He further advised that the Justice Department would prosecute Agnew
on the charge of failing to record on his income tax returns the cash contributions he had
received. Haig assured Agnew's staff that, if the vice president resigned and pleaded guilty on the
tax charge, the government would settle the other charges against him and he would serve no jail
sentence. But if Agnew continued to fight, "it can and will get nasty and dirty." From this report,
Agnew concluded that the president had abandoned him. The vice president even feared for his
life, reading into Haig's message: "go quietly—or else." General Haig similarly found Agnew
menacing enough to alert Mrs. Haig that should he disappear she "might want to look inside any
recently poured concrete bridge pilings in Maryland."25
A Plea of Nolo Contendere
Meanwhile, Agnew's attorneys had entered into plea bargaining with the federal prosecutors. In
return for pleading nolo contendere, or no contest, to the tax charge and paying $160,000 in back
taxes (with the help of a loan from Frank Sinatra), he would receive a suspended sentence and a
$10,000 fine. On October 10, 1973, while Spiro T. Agnew appeared in federal court in
Baltimore, his letter of resignation was delivered to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Agnew
was only the second vice president to resign the office (John C. Calhoun had been the first). Prior
to resigning, Agnew paid a last visit to President Nixon, who assured him that what he was doing was best for his family and his country. When he later recalled the president's gaunt appearance,
Agnew wrote: "It was hard to believe he was not genuinely sorry about the course of events.
Within two days, this consummate actor would be celebrating his appointment of a new Vice President with never a thought of me."26
Nixon still wanted to name John Connally as vice president, but Senate Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield intimated that Congress would never confirm him. On October 12—even as pictures
of Agnew were being removed from federal offices around the country—Nixon appointed House
Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford as the first vice president to be selected under the Twentyfifth Amendment. Agnew was stunned by the laughter and gaiety of the televised event that
seemed "like the celebration of a great election victory—not the aftermath of a stunning
tragedy."27
The coda to the Agnew saga occurred the following year, as Nixon's presidency came to an end.
In June 1974, the besieged president dictated an entry in his diary in which he confronted the real
possibility of impeachment. Nixon reviewed a series of decisions that now seemed to him
mistakes, such as asking Haldeman and Ehrlichman to resign, appointing Elliot Richardson
attorney general, and not destroying the secret tape recordings of his White House conversations.
"The Agnew resignation was necessary although a very serious blow," Nixon added,
because while some thought that his stepping aside would take some of the pressure off the effort to get the President, all it did was to open the way to put pressure on the President to resign as well. This is something we have to realize: that any accommodation with opponents in this kind of a fight does not satisfy—it only brings on demands for more.
On August 9, 1974, Richard Nixon joined Spiro Agnew in making theirs the first presidential and
vice-presidential team in history to resign from office.28
Following his resignation, the vice president who had made himself a household word faded
quickly into obscurity. Agnew moved to Rancho Mirage, California, where he became an
international business consultant, tapping many of the contacts he had made with foreign
governments on travels abroad as vice president. He published his memoir, ominously entitled
Go Quietly . . . or else, and a novel, The Canfield Decision, whose protagonist was a wheeling
and dealing American vice president "destroyed by his own ambition." For the rest of his life,
Agnew remained largely aloof from the news media and cut off from Washington political
circles. Feeling "totally abandoned," he refused to accept any telephone calls from former
President Nixon. When Nixon died in 1994, however, Agnew chose to attend his funeral. "I
decided after twenty years of resentment to put it aside," he explained. The next year, Spiro
Agnew's bust was at last installed with those of other vice presidents in the halls of the U.S.
Capitol. "I'm not blind or deaf to the fact that there are those who feel this is a ceremony that
should not take place," he acknowledged. He died of leukemia on September 17, 1996, in his
home state of Maryland.29
Notes:
1. John R. Coyne, Jr., The Impudent Snobs: Agnew vs. the Intellectual Establishment (New Rochelle, NY, 1972), pp.
7-18, 265-70.
2. Jim G. Lucas, Agnew: Profile in Conflict (New York, 1970), pp. 9-37.
3. Ibid., pp. 37-62.
4. Jules Witcover, White Knight: The Rise of Spiro Agnew (New York, 1972), pp. 4-10, 180-99; Robert W. Peterson,
ed., Agnew: The Coining of a Household Word (New York, 1972), pp. 1-25; Dan Rather and Gary Paul Gates, The
Palace Guard (New York, 1974), p. 295.
5. Witcover, pp. 234-82; Lucas, pp. 19, 63-100; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York,
1978), 311-13.
6. Tom Wicker, One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream (New York, 1991), p. 344; Peterson, ed., p. 9;
Nixon, p. 340; Allen Drury, Courage and Hesitation (Garden City, NY, 1971), p. 98; Floyd M. Riddick: Senate
Parliamentarian Oral History Interviews, 1978-1979 (U.S. Senate Historical Office, Washington, DC), p. 68.
7. Drury, pp. 98-100; Witcover, p. 293.
8. H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries; Inside the Nixon White House (New York, 1994), p. 27; John
Ehrlichman, Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (New York, 1982), pp. 106, 111, 145-46; Spiro T. Agnew, Go
Quietly...else (New York, 1980), pp. 31-32.
9. Haldeman, p. 53; Ehrlichman, pp. 144-45, 152.
10. Nixon, pp. 409-12; Haldeman, pp. 99, 106; Witcover, pp. 296-97, 449.
11. Coyne, pp. 253-70; Haldeman, p. 109; Rather and Gates, p. 296.
12. Ehrlichman, p. 146; James Calhoun, The Real Spiro Agnew: Commonsense Quotations of a Household World
(Greta, LA, 1970), p. 45.
13. Haldeman, pp. 118, 127-28.
14. Ibid., pp. 147, 150, 161-62, 169.
15. Ibid., pp. 179-80; Ehrlichman, p. 103; Rather and Gates, pp. 300-302.
16. Haldeman, pp. 240-41; Agnew, p. 34.
17. Nixon, p. 549; Haldeman, p. 247; Ehrlichman, pp. 154-55; Agnew, p. 23.
18. Haldeman, pp. 275, 296, 306-7, 317, 327; Witcover, pp. 432-33; Agnew, pp. 38-40.
19. Nixon, pp. 674-75; Haldeman, pp. 356-57.
20. Ehrlichman, p. 142; Haldeman, p. 534; Agnew, pp. 37-38.
21. Haldeman, p. 629; Agnew, pp. 50-51, 57-58; Richard M. Cohen and Jules Witcover, A Heartbeat Away: The
Investigation and Resignation of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew (New York, 1974), pp. 3-16.
22. Jonathan Aitken, Nixon: A Life (Washington, 1993), pp. 356-57, 503-4; Nixon, p. 823; Ehrlichman, pp. 142-43;
Agnew, pp. 98-99.
23. Agnew, pp. 100-103, 130-32; Cohen and Witcover, pp. 149, 190-216.
24. Nixon, pp. 912-18; Agnew, p. 178.
25. Agnew, pp. 182-83, 186-90; Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Inner Circles: How America Changed the World: A
Memoir (New York, 1992), pp. 350-67.
26. Agnew, pp. 192-99.
27. Ibid., pp. 201-2, 220-21; Haig, pp. 367-70.
28. Nixon, pp. 1002-5.
29. Washington Post, September 19, 1996."
2. Background from thoughtco.com/spiro-agnew-biography-4171644
"Biography of Spiro Agnew: The Vice President Who Resigned
The rise and fall of the ex-vice president
by Tom Murse
Tom Murse is a former political reporter and current Managing Editor of daily paper "LNP," and weekly political paper "The Caucus," both published by LNP Media in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
Updated July 16, 2018
Spiro T. Agnew was a little known Republican politician from Maryland whose unlikely ascent to the vice presidency prompted many Americans in the late 1960s to wonder "Spiro who?" Agnew was an unremarkable figure known to speak in a "deadening monotone" who was nonetheless notorious for his combative relationship with the press and unwavering loyalty to his boss, President Richard M. Nixon. He once referred to journalists as a "tiny, enclosed fraternity of privileged men elected by no one” and to Nixon's critics as “nattering nabobs of negativism.”
Agnew is perhaps most well-known for the end of his career. He was forced to resign from office after being charged with extortion, bribery and conspiracy and pleading no contest to income-tax evasion in 1973.
Early Years
Spiro Theodore Agnew (also known as Ted) was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on Nov. 9, 1918. His father, Theophrastos Anagnostopoulos, had immigrated to the U.S. from Greece in 1897 and changed his surname. The elder Agnew sold produce before entering the restaurant business. His mother was American, a native of Virginia.
Spiro Agnew attended the public schools in Baltimore and entered Johns Hopkins University to study chemistry in 1937. He transferred out of the prestigious school after struggling academically and enrolled at the University of Baltimore Law School. He earned his law degree, but only after being drafted into the Army during World War II. He returned to law school after being discharged and received his law degree in 1947, then went on to practice law in Baltimore.
Early Career in Politics
Agnew was little known outside of his home state of Maryland before Nixon chose him as a running mate. His first foray into politics came in 1957 when he was appointed to the Baltimore County zoning appeals board, on which he served three years. He ran and lost for a judgeship in 1960, then won the Baltimore County executive position two years later. (The position is similar to that of mayor of a city.) During Agnew's tenure, the county enacted a law requiring restaurants and other establishments to be to be open to customers of all races, built new schools and increased teacher salaries. He was, in other words, a progressive Republican.
After creating a name for himself in the populous Maryland County, Agnew sought and won the Republican gubernatorial nomination in 1966. He beat a Democratic candidate, George Mahoney, who supported segregation and campaigned on the slogan "Your Home Is Your Castle—Protect It." "Charging Mahoney with racial bigotry, Agnew captured the liberal suburbs around Washington and was elected governor," Agnew's Senate biography reads. But he would serve as governor for fewer than two years before he caught to eye of his party's presidential hopeful, Nixon.
Rise to the Vice Presidency
Nixon chose Agnew as a running mate in the campaign of 1968, a decision that was controversial and unpopular with the Republican Party. The GOP viewed the progressive urban politician with suspicion. Nixon responded by describing Agnew as "one of the most underrated political men in America," an "old fashioned patriot” who, having been raised and elected in Baltimore, was a master strategist on urban issues. “There can be a mystique about a man. You can look him in the eye and know he's got it. This guy has got it," Nixon said in defense of his choice for running mate.
Agnew was elected vice president in 1968; he and Nixon were re-elected to second term in 1972. In 1973, as the Watergate investigation was churning toward a denouement that would force the resignation of Nixon, Agnew ran into legal trouble.
Criminal Charge and Resignation
Agnew was facing possible impeachment or criminal charges in 1973 for allegedly accepting payoffs from contractors when he served as Baltimore County executive and vice president. But he remained defiant in the face of a grand jury's investigation. "I will not resign if indicted! I will not resign if indicted!" he proclaimed. But evidence that he evaded paying his income taxes—he was accused of failing to report $29,500 in income—soon led to his downfall.
He resigned from office on Oct. 10, 1973, under a plea deal that allowed him to avoid prison time. In a formal statement to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Agnew stated: "I hereby resign the office of Vice President of the United States, effective immediately." A judge sentenced Agnew to three years of probation and fined him $10,000.
Nixon became the first president in U.S. history to use the 25th Amendment to appoint a successor to the position of vice president, House Minority Leader Gerald Ford. The amendment establishes the orderly transfer of power for replacing the president and vice president in the event they die in office, quit or are impeached.
The prosecution of the case removed Agnew from the presidential line of succession, which turned out to be a fateful decision. Nixon was forced to resign less than a year later, in August 1994, amid the Watergate scandal, and Ford took over the presidency. Agnew's resignation was only the second by a vice president. (The first took place in 1832, when Vice President John C. Calhoun resigned the office to take a U.S. Senate seat.)
Marriage and Personal Life
Angew married Elinor Isabel Judefind in 1942, whom he met while employed at an insurance company during his law-school years. The couple went to a movie and for chocolate milkshakes on their first date and discovered they had grown up four blocks apart. The Agnews had four children: Pamela, Susan, Kimberly, and James.
Agnew died of leukemia in Berlin, Maryland, at the age of 77.
Legacy
Agnew will forever be known for his rapid ascent from obscurity to national prominence and his scathing attacks on the news media and polemics on society and culture. He was critical of efforts to lift America's economically disadvantaged out of systemic poverty and of civil-rights protestors in the tumultuous late 1960s. He frequently used derogatory slurs, such as, “If you've seen one city slum, you've seen them all.”
Agnew reserved much of his ire for members of the news media. He was among the first politicians to accuse journalists of bias.
Spiro Agnew Fast Facts
• Full Name: Spiro Theodore Agnew
• Also Known As: Ted
• Known For: Serving as vice president under Richard M. Nixon and resigning for tax evasion
• Born: Nov. 9, 1918 in Baltimore, Maryland, USA
• Parents' Names: Theophrastos Anagnostopoulos, who changed his surname to Agnew, and Margaret Marian Pollard Agnew
• Died: Sept. 17, 1996 in Berlin, Maryland, USA
• Education: Law degree from the University of Baltimore Law School, 1947
• Key Accomplishments: Enacted a law in Baltimore County requiring restaurants and other establishments to be to be open to customers of all races, built new schools and increased teacher salaries
• Spouse Name: Elinor Isabel Judefind
• Children's Names: Pamela, Susan, Kimberly and James
• Famous Quote: "In the United States today, we have more than our share of the nattering nabobs of negativism. They have formed their own 4-H club — the hopeless, hysterical hypochondriacs of history."
Sources
• Hatfield, Mark O. Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997.
• Naughton, James M. "Agnew Quits Vice Presidency And Admits Tax Evasion In '67; Nixon Consults On Successor." The New York Times. 11 October 1973. .nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1010.html
• "Spiro T. Agnew, Ex-Vice President, Dies at 77." The New York Times. 18 September, 1996. nytimes.com/1996/09/18/us/spiro-t-agnew-ex-vice-president-dies-at-77.html"
FYI COL Mikel J. Burroughs Lt Col John (Jack) Christensen Lt Col Charlie Brown LTC Greg Henning LTC Jeff Shearer Maj Bill Smith, Ph.D. Maj William W. "Bill" Price CPT Scott Sharon CWO3 Dennis M. SFC Joe S. Davis Jr., MSM, DSL SSG William Jones SGT (Join to see) SGT John " Mac " McConnell SP5 Mark Kuzinski PO1 H Gene Lawrence PO2 Kevin Parker PO3 Bob McCord SSG Donald H "Don" Bates
He was a staunch conservative who had a talent for using arcane words to insult, complement or entertain.
Nattering nabobs of negativism ..
Rest in peace Spiro Theodore Agnew.
Spiro Agnew: Media Monopoly and Beginning of Fake News - November 13, 1969
"Spiro Agnew gives a speech on the abuse and bias of the Liberal Media in the year 1969. One of the first in America to publicly call out the news media for it's liberal bias, Vice President Agnew's speech has taken on prophetic properties in recent years and is hailed as a landmark speech on the subject of Liberal News bias."
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y97l3n8pVP8
Images
1. Vice President Spiro Agnew with President Richard Nixon.
2. Vice President Spiro T. Agnew speaks in Tennessee during the 1972 congressional campaign - by Wally McNamee.
3. Spiro T. Agnew bust.
Biographies:
1. senate.gov/about/officers-staff/vice-president/VP_Spiro_Agnew
2. thoughtco.com/spiro-agnew-biography-4171644
1. U.S. Senate background from senate.gov/about/officers-staff/vice-president/VP_Spiro_Agnew.htm
"Vice Presidents of the United States
Spiro Theodore Agnew (1969-1973)
Citation: Mark O. Hatfield, with the Senate Historical Office. Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 481-488.
Introduction by Mark O. Hatfield.
U.S. Senate Collection
A little over a week ago, I took a rather unusual step for a Vice President . . . I said something.
—Spiro Agnew
On November 13, 1969, Vice President Spiro Agnew became a household word when he
vehemently denounced television news broadcasters as a biased "unelected elite" who subjected
President Richard M. Nixon's speeches to instant analysis. The president had a right to
communicate directly with the people, Agnew asserted, without having his words "characterized
through the prejudices of hostile critics." Agnew raised the possibility of greater government
regulation of this "virtual monopoly," a suggestion that the veteran television newscaster Walter
Cronkite took as "an implied threat to freedom of speech in this country." But Agnew's words
rang true to those whom Nixon called the Silent Majority. From then until he resigned in 1973,
Agnew remained an outspoken and controversial figure, who played traveling salesman for the
administration. In this role, Spiro Agnew was both the creation of Richard Nixon and a reflection
of his administration's siege mentality.1
Early Years
The son of a Greek immigrant whose name originally was Anagnostopoulos, Spiro Theodore
Agnew was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on November 9, 1918. He attended public schools and
went to Johns Hopkins University in 1937 to study chemistry, before transferring to the
University of Baltimore Law School, where he studied law at night while working at a grocery
and an insurance company during the day. In 1942 he married a fellow insurance company
employee, Elinor Isabel Judefind, known to all as Judy. Drafted into the army during World War
II, he won a Bronze Star for his service in France and Germany. He returned to school on the GI
Bill of Rights, received his law degree in 1947, practiced law in a Baltimore firm, and eventually
set up his own law practice in the Baltimore suburb of Towson.
Remaking His Image
Moving from city to suburb, Agnew remade his own image. When he recalled the ethnic slurs he
suffered about "Spiro" while a school boy, he now called himself "Ted" and vowed that none of
his children would have Greek names. Agnew similarly changed party affiliations. Although his
father was a Baltimore Democratic ward leader and Agnew had first registered as a Democrat,
his law partners were Republicans and he joined their party. In 1957 the Democratic county
executive of Baltimore County appointed him to the board of zoning appeals. In 1960 Agnew
made his first race for elective office, running for associate circuit judge, and coming in fifth in a
five-person contest. In 1961, when a new county executive dropped him from the zoning board,
Agnew protested vigorously and in so doing built his name recognition in the county. The
following year he ran for county executive. A bitter split in the Democratic party helped make
him the first Republican elected Baltimore County executive in the twentieth century. In office he
established a relatively progressive record, and in 1966, when nominated as the Republican
candidate for governor of Maryland, Agnew positioned himself to the left of his Democratic
challenger, George Mahoney. An arch segregationist, Mahoney adopted the campaign slogan,
"Your Home Is Your Castle—Protect It," which only drove liberal Democrats into Agnew's
camp. Charging Mahoney with racial bigotry, Agnew captured the liberal suburbs around
Washington and was elected governor.2
It came as a shock to Agnew's liberal supporters when as governor he took a more hard-line
conservative stance on racial matters than he had during the campaign. Early in 1968, students at
the predominantly African American Bowie State College occupied the administration building
to protest the run-down condition of their campus—at a time when Maryland essentially ran
separate college systems for black and white students. Instead of negotiating, Agnew sent the
state police to take back the administration building. When the students went to Annapolis to
protest, Agnew ordered their arrest and had the college temporarily closed down. Then in April,
when riots broke out in Baltimore following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Governor Agnew summoned black leaders to his office. Rather than appeal for their help, he
castigated them for capitulating to radical agitators. "You were intimidated by veiled threats,"
Agnew charged, "you were stung by . . . epithets like `Uncle Tom.'" Half of the black leaders
walked out before he finished speaking. "He talked to us like we were children," one state senator complained. The incident dramatically reversed Agnew's public image, alienating his liberal
supporters and raising his standing among conservatives.3
Spiro Who?
On the national scene, Agnew formed a committee to draft New York Governor Nelson
Rockefeller for president in 1968. In March, during his weekly press conference, Agnew watched
on television what he expected would be Rockefeller's declaration of candidacy. Without
warning, Rockefeller withdrew from the contest, humiliating Agnew in front of the press corps.
Rockefeller later jumped back into the race, but by then Agnew had moved toward the
frontrunner, Richard Nixon. When polls showed none of the better-known Republicans adding
much as Nixon's running mate, Nixon surprised everyone—as he liked to do—by selecting the
relatively unknown Agnew. "Spiro who?" asked the pundits, who considered Agnew unqualified
for national office. Despite such doubts, Nixon saw much promise in his choice. "There can be a
mystique about the man," Nixon assured reporters. "You can look him in the eyes and know he's
got it."4
Nixon expected Agnew to appeal to white southerners and others troubled by the civil rights
movement and recent rioting in the cities. Attention shifted from this issue during the campaign,
however, when Agnew made a number of gaffes, including some ethnic slurs and an accusation
that Vice President Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, was soft on communism.
Agnew also encountered allegations of having profited financially from his public office, charges
that he flatly denied. Agnew's biggest problem was that he seemed so ordinary and unremarkable.
A tall, stiff, bullet-headed man and the sort of fastidious dresser who never removed his tie in
public, he tended to speak in a deadening monotone. Whether he helped or hurt the campaign is
not clear, but in November the Nixon-Agnew ticket won a razor-thin victory over the Democratic
candidate Hubert Humphrey and the independent candidacy of Alabama Governor George
Wallace.5
Learning the Constraints of the Office
Although Nixon had chosen a running mate who would not outshine him, he had pledged to give
his vice president a significant policy-making role and—for the first time—an office in the West
Wing of the White House. Nixon also encouraged Agnew to use his position as presiding officer
of the Senate to get to know the members of Congress in order to serve as their liaison with the
White House, and Agnew enthusiastically charged up Capitol Hill. Having had no previous
legislative experience, he wanted to master the techniques of presiding over the Senate. For the
first months of his vice-presidency, he met each morning with the Senate parliamentarian, Floyd
Riddick, to discuss parliamentary procedures and precedents. "He took pride in administering the
oath to the new senators by never having to refer to a note," Riddick observed. "He would study
and memorize these things so that he could perform without reading." According to Riddick, at
first Agnew presided more frequently than had any vice president since Alben Barkley.6
"I was prepared to go in there and do a job as the President's representative in the Senate," said
Agnew, who busily learned to identify the senators by name and face. Yet he quickly discovered
the severe constraints on his role as presiding officer. Agnew had prepared a four-minute speech
to give in response to a formal welcome from Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. When Mansfield
moved that the vice president be given only two minutes to reply, Agnew felt "it was like a slap
in the face." The vice president also unwittingly broke precedent by trying to lobby on the Senate
floor. During the debate over the ABM (Anti-Ballistic-Missile) Treaty, Agnew approached Idaho
Republican Senator Len Jordan and asked how he was going to vote. "You can't tell me how to
vote!" said the shocked senator. "You can't twist my arm!" At the next luncheon of Republican
senators, Jordan accused Agnew of breaking the separation of powers by lobbying on the Senate
floor, and announced the "Jordan Rule," whereby if the vice president tried to lobby him on
anything, he would automatically vote the other way. "And so," Agnew concluded from the
experience, "after trying for a while to get along with the Senate, I decided I would go down to
the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue and try playing the Executive game."7
The vice president fit in no better at the White House than at the Capitol. Nixon's highly
protective staff concluded that Agnew had no concept of his role, especially in relation to the
president. Nixon found their few private meetings dismaying because of Agnew's "constant self-aggrandizement." Nixon told his staff that as vice president he rarely had made any requests of
President Dwight Eisenhower. "But Agnew's visits always included demands for more staff,
better facilities, more prerogatives and perquisites." The anticipated use of Agnew as a conduit to
the nation's mayors and governors floundered when it became apparent that Agnew did nothing
more than pass their gripes along to the president. When Agnew protested that Nixon did not see
enough of his cabinet, Nixon grumbled that his vice president had become an advocate for all the
"crybabies" in the cabinet who wanted to plead their special causes. Nixon's chief of staff H.R.
Haldeman took Agnew aside and advised him that "the President does not like you to take an
opposite view at a cabinet meeting, or say anything that can be construed to be mildly not in
accord with his thinking."8
Nixon appointed Agnew head of the National Aeronautics and Space Council but again found the
vice president more irritant than asset. In April 1969, while at Camp David, Nixon summoned
Haldeman to complain that the vice president had telephoned him simply to lobby for a candidate
for director of the Space Council. "He just has no sensitivity, or judgment about his relationship"
with the president, Haldeman noted. After Agnew publicly advocated a space shot to Mars,
Nixon's chief domestic advisor, John Ehrlichman, tried to explain to him the facts of fiscal life:
Look, Mr. Vice President, we have to be practical. There is no money for a Mars trip. The President has already decided that. So the President does not want such a trip in the [Space Council's] recommendations. It's your job . . .to make absolutely certain that the Mars trip is not in there.
From such experiences, the White House staff concluded that Agnew was not a "Nixon team
player."9
Unleashing Agnew
Throughout his first term, President Nixon was preoccupied with the war in Vietnam. By the fall
of 1969, Nixon came to the unhappy conclusion that there would be no quick solution in
Vietnam and that it would steadily become his war rather than Lyndon Johnson's. On November
3, Nixon delivered a television address to the nation in which he called for public support for the
war until the Communists negotiated an honorable peace. Public reaction to the speech was
generally positive, but the Nixon family was "livid with anger" over the critical commentary by
various network broadcasters. Nixon feared that the "constant pounding from the media and our
critics in Congress" would eventually undermine his public support. As president he wanted to
follow the Eisenhower model of remaining above the fray and to use Agnew for the kind of
hatchet work that he himself had done for Ike. When his speech writer Pat Buchanan proposed
that the vice president give a speech attacking network commentators, Nixon liked the idea. H.R.
Haldeman went to discuss the proposed speech with the vice president, who was interested "but
felt it was a bit abrasive." Nevertheless, the White House staff believed the message needed to be
delivered, "and he's the one to do it."10
Agnew already had some hard-hitting speeches under his belt. On October 20, 1969, at a dinner
in Jackson, Mississippi, he had attacked "liberal intellectuals" for their "masochistic compulsion
to destroy their country's strength." On October 30 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, he called student
radicals and other critics of the war "impudent snobs." On November 11 in Philadelphia he
decried the "intolerant clamor and cacophony" that raged in society. Then, on November 13 in
Des Moines, Iowa, he gave Buchanan's blast at the network news media. Haldeman recorded in
his diary that, as the debate on Agnew mounted, the president was "fully convinced he's right and
that the majority will agree." The White House sent word for the vice president "to keep up the
offensive, and to keep speaking," noting that he was now a "major figure in his own right." The
vice president had become "Nixon's Nixon."11
Agnew relished the attention showered upon him. He had been frustrated with his assignment as
liaison with the governors and mayors, and dealing with taxation, health, and other substantive
issues had required tedious study. By contrast, he found speechmaking much more gratifying. As
John Ehrlichman sourly noted, Agnew "could take the texts prepared in the President's
speechwriting shop, change a phrase here and there, and hit the road to attack the effete corps of
impudent snobs." His colorful phrases, like "nattering nabobs of negativism," and "radiclibs" (for
radical liberals) were compiled and published as "commonsense quotations." "I have refused to
`cool it'—to use the vernacular," Agnew declared, "until the self-righteous lower their voice a
few decibels. . . . I intend to be heard over the din even if it means raising my voice."12
The Agnew Upsurge
The "Agnew upsurge" fascinated President Nixon, who took it as evidence that a new
conservative coalition could be built between blue-collar ethnic voters and white-collar
suburbanites. Nixon believed that Agnew was receiving increasing press coverage because his
attacks on the media "forced them to pay attention." When some of his advisers wanted to put Agnew out in front in opposition to expanded school desegregation, Nixon hesitated because he
did not want to "dilute or waste the great asset he has become." By March 1970, the relationship
between the president and vice president reached its apex when the two appeared for an amusing
piano duet at the Gridiron Club. No matter what tunes Nixon tried to play, Agnew would drown
him out with "Dixie," until they both joined in "God Bless America" as a finale.13
As the strains of their duet faded, Nixon began having second thoughts and concluded that he
needed to "change the Agnew approach." He informed Haldeman that the vice president had
become a better salesman for himself than for the administration, emerging as "too much of an
issue and a personality himself." That month, when the Apollo XIII astronauts had to abort their
mission and return to earth, Haldeman worked frantically to keep Agnew from flying to Houston
and upstaging the president. Agnew sat in his plane on the runway for over an hour until Nixon
finally canceled the trip. "VP mad as hell," Haldeman noted, "but agreed to follow orders." In
May 1970, after National Guardsmen shot and killed four students at Kent State University,
Nixon cautioned Agnew not to say anything provocative about students. Word leaked out that the
president was trying to muzzle his vice president. The next time Buchanan prepared "a hot new
Agnew speech," Nixon felt more leery than before.14
By the summer of 1970, Nixon pondered how best to use Agnew in that fall's congressional
elections. The president himself wanted to remain remote from partisanship and limit his
speaking to foreign policy issues while Agnew stumped for candidates. Nixon worried that, if
Agnew continued to appear an unreasonable figure, using highly charged rhetoric, he might hurt
rather than help the candidates for whom he campaigned. "Do you think Agnew's too rough?"
Nixon asked John Ehrlichman one day. "His style isn't the problem, it's the content of what he
says. He's got to be more positive. He must avoid all personal attacks on people; he can take on
Congress as a unit, not as individuals." Some Republican candidates even asked Agnew to stay
out of their states. As the campaign progressed, Agnew's droning on about law and order
diminished his impact. Nixon felt compelled to abandon his presidential aloofness and enter the
campaign himself, barnstorming around the country, as Attorney General John Mitchell
complained, like a man "running for sheriff." The disappointing results of the midterm
elections—Republicans gained two seats in the Senate but lost a dozen in the House—further
shook Nixon's confidence in Agnew.15
The Number One Hawk
In 1971 the president devoted most of his attention to foreign policy, planning his historic visit to
China, a summit in Moscow, and continued peace talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris. The
vice president went abroad for a series of good-will tours and ached for more involvement in
foreign policy—an area that Nixon reserved exclusively for himself and National Security
Adviser Henry Kissinger. Nixon preferred that Agnew limit himself to attacking the media to
"soften the press" for his foreign policy initiatives. He decided to keep the vice president out of
all substantive policy decisions, since Agnew seemed incapable of grasping the big picture. For
his part, Agnew complained that he was "never allowed to come close enough" to Nixon to
participate in any policy discussions. "Every time I went to see him and raised a subject for discussion," the vice president later wrote, "he would begin a rambling, time-consuming
monologue."16
Agnew, who described himself as the "number-one hawk," went so far as to criticize Nixon's
"Ping-Pong Diplomacy" with the People's Republic of China. The dismayed president considered
Agnew "a bull in the . . . diplomatic China shop." Nixon had H.R. Haldeman lecture the vice
president on the importance of using the China thaw to "get the Russians shook." "It is beyond
my understanding," Nixon told Ehrlichman. "Twice Agnew has proposed that he go to China!
Now he tells the world it's a bad idea for me to go! What am I going to do about him?"17
The Connally Alternative
By mid-1971, Nixon concluded that Spiro Agnew was not "broad-gauged" enough for the vice presidency. He constructed a scenario by which Agnew would resign, enabling Nixon to appoint
Treasury Secretary John Connally as vice president under the provisions of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment. By appealing to southern Democrats, Connally would help Nixon create a political
realignment, perhaps even replacing the Republican party with a new party that could unite all
conservatives. Nixon rejoiced at news that the vice president, feeling sorry for himself, had
talked about resigning to accept a lucrative offer in the private sector. Yet while Nixon excelled
in daring, unexpected moves, he encountered some major obstacles to implementing this scheme.
John Connally was a Democrat, and his selection might offend both parties in Congress, which
under the Twenty-fifth Amendment had to ratify the appointment of a new vice president. Even
more problematic, John Connally did not want to be vice president. He considered it a "useless"
job and felt he could be more effective as a cabinet member. Nixon responded that the
relationship between the president and vice president depended entirely on the personalities of
whoever held those positions, and he promised Connally they would make it a more meaningful
job than ever in its history, even to the point of being "an alternate President." But Connally
declined, never dreaming that the post would have made him president when Nixon was later
forced to resign during the Watergate scandal.18
Nixon concluded that he would not only have to keep Agnew on the ticket but must publicly
demonstrate his confidence in the vice president. He recalled that Eisenhower had tried to drop
him in 1956 and believed the move had only made Ike look bad. Nixon viewed Agnew as a
general liability, but backing him could mute criticism from "the extreme right." Attorney
General John Mitchell, who was to head the reelection campaign, argued that Agnew had become
"almost a folk hero" in the South and warned that party workers might see his removal as a
breach of loyalty. As it turned out, Nixon won reelection in 1972 by a margin wide enough to
make his vice-presidential candidate irrelevant.19
Immediately after his reelection, however, Nixon made it clear that Agnew should not become
his eventual successor. The president had no desire to slip into lame-duck status by allowing
Agnew to seize attention as the frontrunner in the next election. "By any criteria he falls short,"
the president told Ehrlichman:
"Energy? He doesn't work hard; he likes to play golf. Leadership?" Nixon laughed. "Consistency? He's all over the place. He's not really a conservative, you know."
Nixon considered placing the vice president in charge of the American Revolution Bicentennial
as a way of sidetracking him. But Agnew declined the post, arguing that the Bicentennial was "a
loser." Because everyone would have a different idea about how to celebrate the Bicentennial, its
director would have to disappoint too many people. "A potential presidential candidate," Agnew
insisted, "doesn't want to make any enemies."20
Impeachment Insurance
Unbeknownst to both Nixon and Agnew, time was running out for both men's political careers.
Since the previous June, the White House had been preoccupied with containing the political
repercussions of the Watergate burglary, in which individuals connected with the president's
reelection committee had been arrested while breaking into the Democratic National Committee
headquarters. Although Watergate did not influence the election, persistent stories in the media
and the launching of a Senate investigation spelled trouble for the president. Innocent of any
connection to Watergate, Agnew spoke out in Nixon's defense.
Then, on April 10, 1973, the vice president called Haldeman to his office to report a problem of
his own. The U.S. attorney in Maryland, investigating illegal campaign contributions and
kickbacks, had questioned Jerome Wolff, Agnew's former aide. Wolff had kept verbatim
accounts of meetings during which Agnew discussed raising funds from those who had received
state contracts. Agnew swore that "it wasn't shakedown stuff, it was merely going back to get
support from those who had benefitted from the Administration." Since prosecutor George Beall
was the brother of Maryland Republican Senator J. Glenn Beall, Agnew wanted Haldeman to
have Senator Beall intercede with his brother—a request that Haldeman wisely declined.21
President Nixon was not at all shocked to learn that his vice president had become enmeshed in a
bribery scandal in Maryland. At first, Nixon took the matter lightly, remarking that taking
campaign contributions from contractors was "a common practice" in Maryland and other states.
"Thank God I was never elected governor of California," Nixon joked with Haldeman. But
events began to move quickly, and on April 30, 1973, Nixon asked Haldeman and Ehrlichman to
resign because of their role in the Watergate coverup. Then, that summer, the Justice Department
reported that the allegations against Agnew had grown more serious. Even as vice president,
Agnew had continued to take money for past favors, and he had received some of the payments
in his White House office.22
Nixon had quipped that Agnew was his insurance against impeachment, arguing that no one
wanted to remove him if it meant elevating Agnew to the presidency. The joke took on reality
when Agnew asked House Speaker Carl Albert to request that the House conduct a full inquiry
into the charges against him. Agnew reasoned that a vice president could be impeached but not
indicted. That line of reasoning, however, also jeopardized the president. For over a century since
the failed impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, it had been commonly accepted reasoning that impeachment was an impractical and inappropriate congressional tool against the presidency.
Agnew's impeachment would set a precedent that could be turned against Nixon. A brief from
the solicitor general argued that, while the president was immune from indictment, the vice
president was not, since his conviction would not disrupt the workings of the executive branch.
Agnew, a proud man filled with moral indignation, reacted to these arguments by digging in his
heels and taking a stance that journalists described as "aggressively defensive." He refused the
initial suggestions from the White House that he resign voluntarily, after which Agnew believed
that high-level officials "launched a campaign to drive me out by leaking anti-Agnew stories to
the media."23
"I Will Not Resign If Indicted!"
By September, it was a more desperate, less confident-looking man who informed Nixon that he
would consider resignation if granted immunity from prosecution. Nixon noted that "in a sad and
gentle voice he asked for my assurance that I would not turn my back on him if he were out of
office." Believing that for Agnew to resign would be the most honorable course of action, Nixon
felt confident that, when the vice president left for California shortly after their meeting, he was
going away to think matters over and to prepare his family for his resignation. But in Los
Angeles, fired up by an enthusiastic gathering of the National Federation of Republican Women,
Agnew defiantly shouted, "I will not resign if indicted!" As Agnew later explained, he had spent
the previous evening at the home of the singer Frank Sinatra, who had urged him to fight back.24
Nixon's new chief of staff and "crisis manager," General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., was haunted by
the specter of a double impeachment of the president and vice president, which could turn the
presidency over to congressional Democrats. General Haig therefore took the initiative in forcing
Agnew out of office. He instructed Agnew's staff that the president wanted no more speeches like
the one in Los Angeles. He further advised that the Justice Department would prosecute Agnew
on the charge of failing to record on his income tax returns the cash contributions he had
received. Haig assured Agnew's staff that, if the vice president resigned and pleaded guilty on the
tax charge, the government would settle the other charges against him and he would serve no jail
sentence. But if Agnew continued to fight, "it can and will get nasty and dirty." From this report,
Agnew concluded that the president had abandoned him. The vice president even feared for his
life, reading into Haig's message: "go quietly—or else." General Haig similarly found Agnew
menacing enough to alert Mrs. Haig that should he disappear she "might want to look inside any
recently poured concrete bridge pilings in Maryland."25
A Plea of Nolo Contendere
Meanwhile, Agnew's attorneys had entered into plea bargaining with the federal prosecutors. In
return for pleading nolo contendere, or no contest, to the tax charge and paying $160,000 in back
taxes (with the help of a loan from Frank Sinatra), he would receive a suspended sentence and a
$10,000 fine. On October 10, 1973, while Spiro T. Agnew appeared in federal court in
Baltimore, his letter of resignation was delivered to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Agnew
was only the second vice president to resign the office (John C. Calhoun had been the first). Prior
to resigning, Agnew paid a last visit to President Nixon, who assured him that what he was doing was best for his family and his country. When he later recalled the president's gaunt appearance,
Agnew wrote: "It was hard to believe he was not genuinely sorry about the course of events.
Within two days, this consummate actor would be celebrating his appointment of a new Vice President with never a thought of me."26
Nixon still wanted to name John Connally as vice president, but Senate Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield intimated that Congress would never confirm him. On October 12—even as pictures
of Agnew were being removed from federal offices around the country—Nixon appointed House
Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford as the first vice president to be selected under the Twentyfifth Amendment. Agnew was stunned by the laughter and gaiety of the televised event that
seemed "like the celebration of a great election victory—not the aftermath of a stunning
tragedy."27
The coda to the Agnew saga occurred the following year, as Nixon's presidency came to an end.
In June 1974, the besieged president dictated an entry in his diary in which he confronted the real
possibility of impeachment. Nixon reviewed a series of decisions that now seemed to him
mistakes, such as asking Haldeman and Ehrlichman to resign, appointing Elliot Richardson
attorney general, and not destroying the secret tape recordings of his White House conversations.
"The Agnew resignation was necessary although a very serious blow," Nixon added,
because while some thought that his stepping aside would take some of the pressure off the effort to get the President, all it did was to open the way to put pressure on the President to resign as well. This is something we have to realize: that any accommodation with opponents in this kind of a fight does not satisfy—it only brings on demands for more.
On August 9, 1974, Richard Nixon joined Spiro Agnew in making theirs the first presidential and
vice-presidential team in history to resign from office.28
Following his resignation, the vice president who had made himself a household word faded
quickly into obscurity. Agnew moved to Rancho Mirage, California, where he became an
international business consultant, tapping many of the contacts he had made with foreign
governments on travels abroad as vice president. He published his memoir, ominously entitled
Go Quietly . . . or else, and a novel, The Canfield Decision, whose protagonist was a wheeling
and dealing American vice president "destroyed by his own ambition." For the rest of his life,
Agnew remained largely aloof from the news media and cut off from Washington political
circles. Feeling "totally abandoned," he refused to accept any telephone calls from former
President Nixon. When Nixon died in 1994, however, Agnew chose to attend his funeral. "I
decided after twenty years of resentment to put it aside," he explained. The next year, Spiro
Agnew's bust was at last installed with those of other vice presidents in the halls of the U.S.
Capitol. "I'm not blind or deaf to the fact that there are those who feel this is a ceremony that
should not take place," he acknowledged. He died of leukemia on September 17, 1996, in his
home state of Maryland.29
Notes:
1. John R. Coyne, Jr., The Impudent Snobs: Agnew vs. the Intellectual Establishment (New Rochelle, NY, 1972), pp.
7-18, 265-70.
2. Jim G. Lucas, Agnew: Profile in Conflict (New York, 1970), pp. 9-37.
3. Ibid., pp. 37-62.
4. Jules Witcover, White Knight: The Rise of Spiro Agnew (New York, 1972), pp. 4-10, 180-99; Robert W. Peterson,
ed., Agnew: The Coining of a Household Word (New York, 1972), pp. 1-25; Dan Rather and Gary Paul Gates, The
Palace Guard (New York, 1974), p. 295.
5. Witcover, pp. 234-82; Lucas, pp. 19, 63-100; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York,
1978), 311-13.
6. Tom Wicker, One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream (New York, 1991), p. 344; Peterson, ed., p. 9;
Nixon, p. 340; Allen Drury, Courage and Hesitation (Garden City, NY, 1971), p. 98; Floyd M. Riddick: Senate
Parliamentarian Oral History Interviews, 1978-1979 (U.S. Senate Historical Office, Washington, DC), p. 68.
7. Drury, pp. 98-100; Witcover, p. 293.
8. H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries; Inside the Nixon White House (New York, 1994), p. 27; John
Ehrlichman, Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (New York, 1982), pp. 106, 111, 145-46; Spiro T. Agnew, Go
Quietly...else (New York, 1980), pp. 31-32.
9. Haldeman, p. 53; Ehrlichman, pp. 144-45, 152.
10. Nixon, pp. 409-12; Haldeman, pp. 99, 106; Witcover, pp. 296-97, 449.
11. Coyne, pp. 253-70; Haldeman, p. 109; Rather and Gates, p. 296.
12. Ehrlichman, p. 146; James Calhoun, The Real Spiro Agnew: Commonsense Quotations of a Household World
(Greta, LA, 1970), p. 45.
13. Haldeman, pp. 118, 127-28.
14. Ibid., pp. 147, 150, 161-62, 169.
15. Ibid., pp. 179-80; Ehrlichman, p. 103; Rather and Gates, pp. 300-302.
16. Haldeman, pp. 240-41; Agnew, p. 34.
17. Nixon, p. 549; Haldeman, p. 247; Ehrlichman, pp. 154-55; Agnew, p. 23.
18. Haldeman, pp. 275, 296, 306-7, 317, 327; Witcover, pp. 432-33; Agnew, pp. 38-40.
19. Nixon, pp. 674-75; Haldeman, pp. 356-57.
20. Ehrlichman, p. 142; Haldeman, p. 534; Agnew, pp. 37-38.
21. Haldeman, p. 629; Agnew, pp. 50-51, 57-58; Richard M. Cohen and Jules Witcover, A Heartbeat Away: The
Investigation and Resignation of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew (New York, 1974), pp. 3-16.
22. Jonathan Aitken, Nixon: A Life (Washington, 1993), pp. 356-57, 503-4; Nixon, p. 823; Ehrlichman, pp. 142-43;
Agnew, pp. 98-99.
23. Agnew, pp. 100-103, 130-32; Cohen and Witcover, pp. 149, 190-216.
24. Nixon, pp. 912-18; Agnew, p. 178.
25. Agnew, pp. 182-83, 186-90; Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Inner Circles: How America Changed the World: A
Memoir (New York, 1992), pp. 350-67.
26. Agnew, pp. 192-99.
27. Ibid., pp. 201-2, 220-21; Haig, pp. 367-70.
28. Nixon, pp. 1002-5.
29. Washington Post, September 19, 1996."
2. Background from thoughtco.com/spiro-agnew-biography-4171644
"Biography of Spiro Agnew: The Vice President Who Resigned
The rise and fall of the ex-vice president
by Tom Murse
Tom Murse is a former political reporter and current Managing Editor of daily paper "LNP," and weekly political paper "The Caucus," both published by LNP Media in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
Updated July 16, 2018
Spiro T. Agnew was a little known Republican politician from Maryland whose unlikely ascent to the vice presidency prompted many Americans in the late 1960s to wonder "Spiro who?" Agnew was an unremarkable figure known to speak in a "deadening monotone" who was nonetheless notorious for his combative relationship with the press and unwavering loyalty to his boss, President Richard M. Nixon. He once referred to journalists as a "tiny, enclosed fraternity of privileged men elected by no one” and to Nixon's critics as “nattering nabobs of negativism.”
Agnew is perhaps most well-known for the end of his career. He was forced to resign from office after being charged with extortion, bribery and conspiracy and pleading no contest to income-tax evasion in 1973.
Early Years
Spiro Theodore Agnew (also known as Ted) was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on Nov. 9, 1918. His father, Theophrastos Anagnostopoulos, had immigrated to the U.S. from Greece in 1897 and changed his surname. The elder Agnew sold produce before entering the restaurant business. His mother was American, a native of Virginia.
Spiro Agnew attended the public schools in Baltimore and entered Johns Hopkins University to study chemistry in 1937. He transferred out of the prestigious school after struggling academically and enrolled at the University of Baltimore Law School. He earned his law degree, but only after being drafted into the Army during World War II. He returned to law school after being discharged and received his law degree in 1947, then went on to practice law in Baltimore.
Early Career in Politics
Agnew was little known outside of his home state of Maryland before Nixon chose him as a running mate. His first foray into politics came in 1957 when he was appointed to the Baltimore County zoning appeals board, on which he served three years. He ran and lost for a judgeship in 1960, then won the Baltimore County executive position two years later. (The position is similar to that of mayor of a city.) During Agnew's tenure, the county enacted a law requiring restaurants and other establishments to be to be open to customers of all races, built new schools and increased teacher salaries. He was, in other words, a progressive Republican.
After creating a name for himself in the populous Maryland County, Agnew sought and won the Republican gubernatorial nomination in 1966. He beat a Democratic candidate, George Mahoney, who supported segregation and campaigned on the slogan "Your Home Is Your Castle—Protect It." "Charging Mahoney with racial bigotry, Agnew captured the liberal suburbs around Washington and was elected governor," Agnew's Senate biography reads. But he would serve as governor for fewer than two years before he caught to eye of his party's presidential hopeful, Nixon.
Rise to the Vice Presidency
Nixon chose Agnew as a running mate in the campaign of 1968, a decision that was controversial and unpopular with the Republican Party. The GOP viewed the progressive urban politician with suspicion. Nixon responded by describing Agnew as "one of the most underrated political men in America," an "old fashioned patriot” who, having been raised and elected in Baltimore, was a master strategist on urban issues. “There can be a mystique about a man. You can look him in the eye and know he's got it. This guy has got it," Nixon said in defense of his choice for running mate.
Agnew was elected vice president in 1968; he and Nixon were re-elected to second term in 1972. In 1973, as the Watergate investigation was churning toward a denouement that would force the resignation of Nixon, Agnew ran into legal trouble.
Criminal Charge and Resignation
Agnew was facing possible impeachment or criminal charges in 1973 for allegedly accepting payoffs from contractors when he served as Baltimore County executive and vice president. But he remained defiant in the face of a grand jury's investigation. "I will not resign if indicted! I will not resign if indicted!" he proclaimed. But evidence that he evaded paying his income taxes—he was accused of failing to report $29,500 in income—soon led to his downfall.
He resigned from office on Oct. 10, 1973, under a plea deal that allowed him to avoid prison time. In a formal statement to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Agnew stated: "I hereby resign the office of Vice President of the United States, effective immediately." A judge sentenced Agnew to three years of probation and fined him $10,000.
Nixon became the first president in U.S. history to use the 25th Amendment to appoint a successor to the position of vice president, House Minority Leader Gerald Ford. The amendment establishes the orderly transfer of power for replacing the president and vice president in the event they die in office, quit or are impeached.
The prosecution of the case removed Agnew from the presidential line of succession, which turned out to be a fateful decision. Nixon was forced to resign less than a year later, in August 1994, amid the Watergate scandal, and Ford took over the presidency. Agnew's resignation was only the second by a vice president. (The first took place in 1832, when Vice President John C. Calhoun resigned the office to take a U.S. Senate seat.)
Marriage and Personal Life
Angew married Elinor Isabel Judefind in 1942, whom he met while employed at an insurance company during his law-school years. The couple went to a movie and for chocolate milkshakes on their first date and discovered they had grown up four blocks apart. The Agnews had four children: Pamela, Susan, Kimberly, and James.
Agnew died of leukemia in Berlin, Maryland, at the age of 77.
Legacy
Agnew will forever be known for his rapid ascent from obscurity to national prominence and his scathing attacks on the news media and polemics on society and culture. He was critical of efforts to lift America's economically disadvantaged out of systemic poverty and of civil-rights protestors in the tumultuous late 1960s. He frequently used derogatory slurs, such as, “If you've seen one city slum, you've seen them all.”
Agnew reserved much of his ire for members of the news media. He was among the first politicians to accuse journalists of bias.
Spiro Agnew Fast Facts
• Full Name: Spiro Theodore Agnew
• Also Known As: Ted
• Known For: Serving as vice president under Richard M. Nixon and resigning for tax evasion
• Born: Nov. 9, 1918 in Baltimore, Maryland, USA
• Parents' Names: Theophrastos Anagnostopoulos, who changed his surname to Agnew, and Margaret Marian Pollard Agnew
• Died: Sept. 17, 1996 in Berlin, Maryland, USA
• Education: Law degree from the University of Baltimore Law School, 1947
• Key Accomplishments: Enacted a law in Baltimore County requiring restaurants and other establishments to be to be open to customers of all races, built new schools and increased teacher salaries
• Spouse Name: Elinor Isabel Judefind
• Children's Names: Pamela, Susan, Kimberly and James
• Famous Quote: "In the United States today, we have more than our share of the nattering nabobs of negativism. They have formed their own 4-H club — the hopeless, hysterical hypochondriacs of history."
Sources
• Hatfield, Mark O. Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997.
• Naughton, James M. "Agnew Quits Vice Presidency And Admits Tax Evasion In '67; Nixon Consults On Successor." The New York Times. 11 October 1973. .nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1010.html
• "Spiro T. Agnew, Ex-Vice President, Dies at 77." The New York Times. 18 September, 1996. nytimes.com/1996/09/18/us/spiro-t-agnew-ex-vice-president-dies-at-77.html"
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Great history share, I remember those days so well. Nixon, then Agnew soured me on politicians.
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